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Introduction
The Violent Re-emergence of Ukuthwala
The official end of apartheid South Africa in 1994 heralded a new unifying political and legislative 
system, as well as the introduction of liberal economic policies and a modest welfare scheme. The 
changes concerned have drastically altered the daily lives of many South Africans over the last two 
decades. Some black individuals and communities on the local level, who are supposedly the bene-
ficiaries of such changes, have, however, not necessarily experienced it as positive and liberating. De-
spite governmental and non-governmental organisation (NGO) drives for equality and the creation 
of a welfare system, gender discrimination and sexual violence remain prevailing issues. Persistent 
forms of structural violence are still evident in income disparities, with various groups increasingly 
lobbying for political agency and cultural autonomy. It is within the relatively broad context of social, 
cultural, economic and political transformation in South Africa that certain resilient customs – that 
uphold forms of gender inequality, financial exploitation and abuse – are still practised, contrary 
to their unconstitutional, illegal, or litigious nature. Arranged marriages, male circumcision, female 
genital cutting and virginity testing are good examples of such practices. In general, the legal-cultural 
controversy surrounding the practices entails the contentious relationship between the right to prac-
tise cultural customs,1 as opposed to the individual’s human rights.2
 The ukuthwala marriage custom that some of the Cape Nguni groups in South Africa practise 
is a case in point.3 Ukuthwala entails the abduction of a young woman or girl as a precursor to mar-
riage.4 Even though customary law protects ukuthwala as being one form of indigenous marriage, it 
often involves various forms of gender discrimination and sexual abuse that the constitutional law 
condemns. Reporting on ukuthwala for the newspaper Sowetan Live, Mapumulo (2009), for example, 
quotes what Nomvula – an abducted bride – told her: 
1  As sanctioned by customary law.
2  As protected by the new Constitution, which was approved in 1996.
3  Cape Nguni refers to various cultural groups within South Africa, including the Zulu, the Xhosa, the Thembu, 
the Mfengu, and the Swazi. Though people tend to associate ukuthwala with Nguni people in general, other 
cultural groups in Southern Africa also practise variants of abduction marriage. My use of the term ‘Cape 
Nguni’ is based on the fact that I conducted my research among the Mpondo, who are one of the Cape Ngu-
ni groups that practise ukuthwala. Chapter Three provides a detailed discussion of the groups concerned.
4  Ukuthwala is the nominal term for this practice. Literally translated, it means ‘to carry’. I shall also use the 
noun form thwala marriage and the verb form ‘thwala’ (‘abducting’ or ‘abduction’), as well as the anglicised 
verb forms ‘thwala’ed’, ‘thwala’s’ and ‘thwala’ing’, as popularised in the media. 
2I curse the day my aunt asked me to go with her to fetch water. I lost my dignity, 
virginity and respect for any man, because of what my so-called husband put 
me through […] I was 14. I had never had sex before, but he forced himself on 
me. When I refused [his advances], he beat me up.
Rather than being an isolated case, Nomvula’s experience was part of a wave of reported cases of 
violent abduction marriage that took place among the Mpondo people in the Eastern Cape province 
during the early months of 2009.5 Consequently, the incidents of violence were splashed over the co-
ver pages of South Africa’s national newspapers, with them making news headlines on the bulletins 
of the South African Broadcasting Corporation for the first time in the history of the South African 
media (see, for example, Fuzile 2009; Hans 2009; Ndabeni 2009; Ngcukana 2009; Sizani 2009). The 
reason for the media outrage was not so much the custom an sich, but, rather, it was the abnormal 
intensity of the various forms of violence perpetrated, as well as the surrounding communities’ social 
condonation of them, that gave rise to the headlining concerned. Superintendent Susan Pienaar 
(PMG 2009), head of the Crime Prevention Unit of the South African Police Service (SAPS) at the time, 
agreed with media reports, saying that “the practice of ukuthwala had resulted in 353 cases in 2006, 
and 338 in 2007”. Almost without exception, the incidents involved force, violence and/or rape, and 
the lack of consent on the part of the girls involved. In interviews with the press, Captain Adonis of the 
SAPS (OR Tambo District Municipality) called the intensity of the violence perpetrated a “new phe-
nomenon”, while emeritus professor of isiXhosa Literature and Theology, Peter Mtuze, lamented the 
“unorthodox revival of ukuthwala” (Khumalo 2009). Professor Lucy Jamison of the Children’s Institute 
at the University of Cape Town had already expressed her concern about the apparently violent turn 
in ukuthwala more than a year before the start of the media sensationalism. In reviewing the situ-
ation, she noted that “[w]e know it [ukuthwala] happens, but we don’t know on what scale or how 
frequently. No academic research has been done on forced marriages [in the South African context]” 
(van Schalkwyk and Mhlan 2008). Using the media as its springboard, the discussion on ukuthwala 
quickly spread to various other segments of society as well – radiating out from journalism, through 
law enforcement, academia and politics, to the social services.
 Of specific interest is the fact that the marriage custom concerned was supposed to have 
fallen into disuse, only to find it re-emerge, in a transformed way, in the past decade, according to 
the media reports. The resurgence of such an act, furthermore, was also occurring at a time when the 
institution of formal marriage in South(ern) Africa was in sharp decline (see White 2015). While fewer 
people appear to be willing to contract into formal marriages, ukuthwala seemed to be re-emerging 
in a form that was perceived as being more commonplace and violent than before. The new and 
more violent turn that the practice has taken frequently has assumed the form of criminal offences, 
putting its practitioners at odds with the law. The practice also exemplified how marriage customs 
were currently adapting and responding to the social, cultural, political and economic challenges 
5  I shall also use the terms ‘amaMpondo’, which means ‘Mpondo people’, and ‘EmaMpondweni’, which deno-
tes the geographical area of the (historical) Mpondo homeland within the Eastern Cape province.
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of post-apartheid South Africa. Both the jurisprudent and the public discourse have addressed the 
social concerns of endemic sexual violence, as well as the scholarly concerns with regard to how 
the custom is caught up in the often-ambiguous relationship between constitutional human rights 
and customary law, albeit it on an abstract legal level. What still remains a matter of speculation in 
the news media (and what, at least until the time of the current study, the scientific community has 
largely chosen to ignore) is whether ukuthwala has indeed re-emerged as a customary practice, and 
the reason for its apparent increasing violence. The media speculation has, however, opened the 
door for an anthropological investigation of the local points of view on, and the experiences of, the 
contested custom, within the context of an ethos of post-apartheid legal pluralism. 
 The media headlines and public discussion of ukuthwala that captured my attention kept 
me mentally preoccupied during the early months of 2010. My fascination with this custom and the 
way in which it was demonised in public discourse, along with its apparent legal ambiguities – which 
often fluctuated between scientific interest, anthropological curiosity and humanitarian urgency – 
prompted me to seek the answers for which I was searching in the form of a Master’s of Science 
degree that I completed in 2012. Since published scholarly research on the topic was meagre at the 
time, I confined my research to the legal aspects of ukuthwala, on which there was some published 
material. However, my fieldwork in the Lusikisiki region of the Eastern Cape province (see maps i, ii 
and iii) increasingly made me aware of four aspects of the controversy that demanded further inves-
tigation.
i) South Africa, with the Eastern Cape province highlighted in red. Source: http://www.googlemaps.com.
4ii) The Eastern Cape province. Source: http://www.googlemaps.com.
iii) Lusikisiki in the Eastern Cape province. Source: http://www.googlemaps.com.
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The first aspect that cried out for attention was the far-reaching influence of sexual and gender vio-
lence, in terms of the economy and the continuing influence of historical processes and events on 
marriage practices in general, and on ukuthwala in particular. Secondly, the discrepancy between 
the local and national discourses on the practice that has led to ongoing conflict between the various 
actors engaged with ukuthwala was an issue of concern. While some authors argue that ukuthwala 
has never been violent, others argue the opposite. On the local level, Nomvula’s case illustrates the 
observed discrepancy, with her complete opposition to the practice, whether violent or not, running 
counter to her aunt’s active support of its violent form. Thirdly, as indicated by Prof. Mtuze’s unease 
with what he calls the “unorthodox revival of ukuthwala” (Khumalo 2009), the intensity of the violen-
ce that often accompanied ukuthwala proceedings made me question whether the custom was not 
rather branching off into some new form of aberrative practice that might have entailed abduction 
sans the intention to marry the young victims involved. Finally, the ways in which the still relative-
ly unknown and little practised custom was changing had the potential to reveal how such broad 
societal problems and structures as poverty, violence, modern legislation, and economic policies 
impact on the lifeworlds of members of local communities. The four aspects combined made me 
realise that a more holistic understanding of the practice than I held at this point was necessary, 
making it feasible to investigate the issue at various levels of society, and at the intersections where 
national events, processes and policies interact with various local marriage practices. 
 The four above-mentioned aspects, furthermore, all relate to two crucial issues that are at 
stake in the controversy – cultural change and violence. My planned holistic research on ukuthwala, I 
believed, should therefore engage with the two aspects present on both the local and the theoretical 
level. Studying ukuthwala at the local level might give insight into how violence at different levels 
of South African society interacts with, and tends to reinforce, that at the other levels, resulting in 
(new) violent and/or changing practices that inevitably affect the life of those living in marginalised 
populations. A theoretical engagement, in contrast, could serve to explain how various historical 
and current national events and processes have led to the context within which ukuthwala was, at 
the stage at which I undertook the study, becoming more violent. The use of theories of modernity 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 1993; Eisenstadt 2000; Macamo 2006; Piot 1999) could prove profitable in 
analysing, and in gaining an understanding of, cultural change in contemporary South Africa on a 
diachronic basis. Additionally, analytical models of structural and systemic violence (Farmer 1996, 
2004), concepts, such as cultural violence (Galtung 1990) and symbolic violence (Bourdieu and Wac-
quant 2004), as well as studies on the linkages between historical sociopolitical upheaval and sexual 
violence (Mager 1998; Morrell 2001; Wood 2005) would be likely to facilitate grappling with the issue 
of the perpetration of violence during ukuthwala. 
 Taking up this challenge, I officially commenced with a doctoral investigation in February 
2013. Broadening my earlier Master’s of Science focus on the legal aspects of ukuthwala, so that I 
could also account for the concerns that came to light through my Master’s fieldwork, media  reports 
and some scholarly publications, my doctoral research led me to ask the following interlinked 
 research questions: 
6  Is ukuthwala re-emerging in a more violent way under the conditions of  modernity,  
and can these new violent forms still be considered marriage practices?
 Since answering the questions was no small task, the purpose of this introduction is to ex-
plain the approach that I then followed, and the stages through which my research went during my 
investigation of ukuthwala’s violent re-emergence. A working definition of ukuthwala, as presented 
in the literature, precedes a discussion of the current scholarly debate on the practice of ukuthwala; 
this discussion will further explain the social and theoretical relevance of the research, as well as the 
areas where additional research is still necessary. I shall then present my own research objectives, 
which will reveal the innovative aspects of the investigation, as well as how I situate myself within 
the broader field of cultural anthropology. I then introduce the research sub-questions guiding my 
investigation. Finally, I shall provide the rationale underlying the sequence of the individual chapters 
in the dissertation. The chapter concludes with a short summary of each chapter.
Initial Definitions of Ukuthwala
I started with my preliminary investigation of ukuthwala in 2010, a few months after reading about 
it in the news media in 2009. During this initial phase of my research, I attempted to construct a 
working definition of ukuthwala from a social science and anthropological perspective. However, I 
soon realised that doing so was no easy undertaking, since the existing research and the published 
material within the field of social sciences was minimal at the time. 
 The extremely propagandistic and sensationalist nature of the news media publications was 
evident in some of the titles that appeared during 2009. Reporting for the BBC, Fihlani (2009) wrote 
“The Stolen Youth of SA’s Child Brides”; The Telegraph reported on “Poverty In South Africa: Three 
Cows and a Forced Marriage” (Khumalo 2009), while The Herald headlined: “Culture No Justification 
for Young Girls’ Forced Marriage” (Petrus 2009). Though these short reports failed to produce critical 
readings of the details of current abduction marriages, the following aspects ofukuthwala did beco-
me clear: that it was a traditional engagement practice that was becoming increasingly violent, often 
implying the rape of minors. It was, furthermore, stated that abductions happened in poverty-stric-
ken (mostly rural) areas as part of the traditional marriage process, with the practice holding serious 
health risks for the victims concerned, due to the prevalent HIV/AIDS (human immunodeficiency vi-
rus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome) pandemic. Finally, the media reports indicated that the 
habit of ukuthwala had fallen into disuse, and that it seemed to have ceased completely, when it 
suddenly re-emerged during the last decade in a transformed way. 
 More interesting, however, was the work that investigative journalists undertook for the te-
levision programmes Third Degree (2010) and Special Assignment (2011), both of which aired broad-
casts concerning ukuthwala. While the documentaries concerned provided an account of the parties 
involved, and of the amount of force and coercion that abductions often entail, as well as of the 
possible concomitant financial benefits that are connected to the wealth transfers to a bride’s family, 
they failed to situate the practice within the contemporary or historical sociopolitical contexts within 
which they tend to occur.
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 The theoretical and the sociocultural knowledge of ukuthwala, at this point, was so meagre, 
that my research into the topic in the existing literature found only four publications in the field of so-
cial sciences, written, respectively, by Britten (1930), Soga (1931), Hunter (1969), and De Jager (1971). 
Though the above-mentioned authors provide descriptions of the possible reasons for ukuthwala 
taking place, De Jager (1971) only mentions the phenomenon in passing as an irregular and uncom-
mon marital custom, without further inquiry into its source and context.6 The number of legal publi-
cations found pertained, as was to have been expected, only to the formal legal aspects of ukuthwa-
la, and not to the sociocultural. The most prominent of the publications concerned were those of 
Bekker (1994), Koyana and Bekker (2007), and Maundeni (2010). Whereas the first two publications 
present ukuthwala as a benign and amicable proceeding between two families, Maundeni focuses 
on the friction between the practice of ukuthwala and the Constitution’s statutes of human rights. A 
report on ukuthwala, compiled by Ntlokwana (2011), was then published and presented to the South 
African Law Commission in 2011. Its purpose was to outline the parameters within which the custom 
may be practised, and which of its violent elements are recognisable as a criminal offence. During 
the same year, Maphanga (2011) completed a Master’s degree in practical theology. Pointing out the 
sexual violence occurring during recent cases, in her thesis she provides a framework for how clerics 
and councillors can support girls who suffer from post-traumatic stress syndrome as a result of the 
abuses that they suffered during their abduction. 
 Drawing from the available published sources mentioned above, I constructed a provisional 
definition of ukuthwala in terms of its historical and ideal conception: The ukuthwala practice forms 
part of the repertoire of betrothal proceedings of the Cape Nguni people in Southern Africa. Ideally, 
in short, and customarily, the husband-to-be abducts a girl and places her in the care of womenfolk 
at the homestead of the possible groom. The relatives of the prospective husband then inform the 
girl’s parents that she is safe, and the marriage negotiations commence. If a man does not arrange 
the girl’s abduction with her parents, and if he does not receive their consent, the parents may ask 
that he return her to their care. If this is the case, the prospective husband should return her imme-
diately, safe and secure. Note, however, that this provisional definition was based on a small sample 
of studies which continually grew, along with my developing awareness of new studies on ukuthwala 
that various sources published during the course of my doctoral research. As will become clear, the 
definition, though reflecting the ideal form of ukuthwala, did not accurately enough reflect what was 
happening in the field at the time.
 Noteworthily, ukuthwala can take various forms. Soga (1931, 271) writes that “uku-twala [sic] 
is applied to two forms of abduction, to genuine cases of abduction by force, and also to fake cases 
of abduction”. In a genuine case, the girl is unaware of her pending abduction, whereas in a fake case 
she is in cahoots with the abductor, but she resists him in public through role-play, in line with the 
apparent cultural expectations of female propriety. The “methods of compulsion exercised vary con-
siderably in individual cases” (Britten 1930, 269), no matter whether force or role-play are involved. 
In addition to finding such variation, Britten, furthermore, states that a girl sometimes orchestrates 
6  I shall shortly discuss the reasons that Britten and Soga give for the occurrence of a thwala marriage.
8her own abduction if her lover is not her parents’ choice for a husband, and that a father might con-
trive an abduction in order to bypass social conventions, if he is too poor to host a wedding feast 
(269−270). In addition, Ntlokwana (2011, 4) mentions that ukuthwala might be performed to hasten 
the marriage proceedings before an unwanted pregnancy. It can also be employed to show the se-
riousness of the young man’s intentions, or in cases where a girl is subject to thwala, so as to escape 
having to pay some of the  lobola fee.7 The examples given illustrate different strategic uses of ukuth-
wala for the various actors involved. 
 Though the “methods of compulsion […] vary considerably in individual cases”, as Britten 
(1930, 269) indicates, no critical engagement occurs regarding this aspect of ukuthwala, and neither 
does the author concerned heed what “compulsion” implies. Yet, it is specifically these two aspects 
of ukuthwala that endow the practice with its fluid boundaries and that cause constant conflict re-
garding the custom, even among those who practise it. The three features of ukuthwala noted – 
compulsion, internal diversity and fluid boundaries – therefore lay at the heart of my research, as 
I investigated why ukuthwala was re-emerging in more violent forms than before, and whether the 
violence that the men perpetrated in connection with the act was still recognisable as being intrin-
sically related to the institution of marriage. The necessity for the anthropological inquiry into the 
above-mentioned aspects of ukuthwala will become clear in the following section that provides an 
overview of the ukuthwala debate, following on its extensive coverage in the media.
Debating Ukuthwala After the 2009 Media Sensationalism 
After a wave of scholarly publications started to appear in the years following the media coverage of 
2009, I found that I drastically needed to change my aforementioned provisional definition of ukuth-
wala, as well as the social science approach that my investigation had taken until this point. Save 
for a few texts that I shall fleetingly mention, the majority of the wave of scholarly publications to 
emanate in response to such an issue was still firmly rooted within the field of jurisprudence, eviden-
cing the pervasive lack of research undertaken within the field of social science and anthropology in 
particular. The legal texts in question are focused on how harmful or illegal ukuthwala can be from 
an outsider’s perspective, as opposed to what ukuthwala actually is, and to the nature of its practice, 
in all its different forms, on the local level. Below, I shall give a short overview of the publications 
concerned, of the current debate on ukuthwala with which the literature engages, as well as of how 
my investigation built on, and responded to, the debate. As opposed to the work of the legal scholars 
involved, my ethnographic approach aimed to capture what ukuthwala was from an emic point of 
view, and at attempting to understand its violent forms, as opposed to condemning the practice an 
sich. Starting with a few publications in fields that are unrelated to social science, I shall move on to 
7  ‘ Lobola’ is an isiXhosa term for ‘bridewealth’. It also refers to the negotiation process that determines the 
value and currency of the bridewealth that the groom and his family have to transfer to the family of the 
intended bride. I shall define and focus on  lobola more specifically in Chapter Seven. Even though the isiZu-
lu spelling of ‘lobolo’ also often appears in both the popular and scholarly debates, I shall use the isiXhosa 
spelling of the term, as my informants were all isiXhosa-speaking. 
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the much larger body of legal publications, and then I shall conclude with three inspiring studies that 
set the stage for a discourse on ukuthwala within the scope of the social sciences.
 Currently, the published material on ukuthwala forms part of the body of knowledge of a 
wide variety of disciplines, showing the broad sweep of attention that the practice draws in both 
academic and societal circles. While the first of Nkosi’s two articles on ukuthwala that are written 
from an educational perspective investigates the custom’s detrimental effect on the educational de-
velopment of schoolgoing girls (2009), the second focuses on the challenges and responsibilities of 
school heads when dealing with abducted girls (2014). Kaschula et al. (2013) investigate the cultural 
attitudes towards violent forms of abduction, but do so through the eyes of literature and language 
studies. Kheswa and Hoho’s (2014) investigation of abduction marriages is situated within the field 
of psychology, as they focus on psychological disorders, health risks and the social stigmatisation of 
girls who undergo thwala as part of their marriage. Finally, and more in keeping than the above with 
the jurisprudent debate, Van der Watt and Ovens (2012) investigate ukuthwala from a criminological 
point of view. In doing so, they focus on the “dynamics between ukuthwala and child trafficking [and] 
underscore the psychosocial impact of ukuthwala on child victims” (11). Focusing on the negative 
aspects of ukuthwala, they assert that the practice has “digressed from a traditional practice to a 
merely criminal act” (11). Though I do not engage with the aforementioned texts in the body of my 
dissertation, and though they typify the mainstream concerns with regard to the detrimental effects 
of ukuthwala for society, I do believe that the corpus of work is worth mentioning. This is especially 
so in the light of the scant amount of literature that is available on the topic in general, as well as be-
cause it indicates that there is an emerging scholarly discourse on abduction marriages that focuses 
on avenues other than the jurisprudential. 
 Legal publications on ukuthwala are, however, more numerous than are those with a more 
general focus. Before reviewing the texts concerned, an important note is necessary with regard to 
how legal scholars define the concept of ukuthwala. As mentioned, The Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act, 120 of 1998 classifies and protects the custom that the term ukuthwala denotes as 
a form of customary marriage. Though the Act concerned does not define different forms of custo-
mary marriage, it does specify five minimal prerequisites by which any form of customary marriage 
must abide (see Meyer 2009): 1) prospective spouses must be older than 18 years; 2) both spouses 
to be must consent to a customary union; 3) in the rare case that either of the two is a minor, both 
his/her parents or legal guardians must also give their consent to the union; 4) affinity or relation 
by blood may not serve as a prohibition to a customary marriage, even if customary law prohibits 
such a union; 5) if the husband wants to enter into further (polygynous) marriages, the bride needs 
to agree to him doing so. In addition, a court must approve a written contract between the spouses 
that stipulates the regulation of the marriage and property in terms of polygynous marriage. The 
legal scholars’ definition of ukuthwala, thus, derives from the codified legal stipulations involved. 
If any actions of the marriage do not comply with the above-mentioned stipulations, the marriage 
concerned is, by default, not a legal customary marriage. If an abduction marriage, thus, transgresses 
any of the stipulations mentioned, it is not ukuthwala from a legal point of view. 
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 If there is reason to believe that an abduction marriage has transgressed any of the minimal 
prerequisites set out in customary law, then the existence of a possible transgression can be verified 
by calling on certain sections of the Constitution. For example, Section 28(2) of the Constitution spe-
cifies that children should be protected from “maltreatment, neglect, abuse and degradation” (SAL-
RC 2014, 29), and that any action that is not in the best interest of the child could constitute abuse. 
According to section 7 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, the best interest of the child depends on, 
among other factors, “the child’s age, maturity and stage of development; and the need to protect 
the child from any physical or psychological harm” (SALRC 2014, 29). The aforesaid Children’s Act, 
section 12(1), furthermore, also states that “[e]very child has the right not to be subjected to social, 
cultural and religious practices which are detrimental to his or her wellbeing” (Government of South 
Africa 2005, 36). Even though the culture concerned may condone the marriage of minors and some 
forms of marital abuse as forming part of ukuthwala, it is not in the best interest of the child from a 
constitutional point of view, and can, thus, amount to a criminal offence. The living custom, as the 
Mpondo people practise it on the local level, however, rarely complies with the legal stipulations of 
customary marriage.8 As I shall now point out, it is the limited codified definition within the legal de-
bate that generally restricts its ability to present a more holistic view of ukuthwala as a living custom 
on the local level, thus confining the attendant debate to an abstract level. 
 In the first in-depth legal analysis of ukuthwala to be published following on the media ex-
posure, Bennett (2010) explores the cultural justifications of ukuthwala in terms of its protection un-
der customary law, with his work probably being the first in-depth legal publication on the subject. 
He concludes that
people are [currently] exploiting culture for their own ends. Of particular con-
cern are the resort to violence and sexual intercourse in order to force young 
women into submission. Thwala always had the potential for such behaviour, 
and […] this potential is being realized. (25) 
Though Bennett (2010) alludes to the historical potential for violence as part of abduction marriages, 
he does not critically explore the practice within the contemporary context, basing his definitions 
and descriptions of ukuthwala on (mostly dated legal) resources respectively published in 1931, 
1936, 1948, 1952, 1981, and 1982 (see his list of references in Bennett 2010, 6−7). Though his descrip-
tion of ukuthwala might be dated, he, nevertheless, does make two important points. His first point 
is that the Mpondo people tend to practise ukuthwala in diverse ways, ranging from mutual consent 
to violent coercion, with his second point being that the current violence is not, per se, new.
 Following Bennett (2010), other authors in the legal field have also published articles with 
reference to ukuthwala. Wadesango, Rembe, and Chabaya (2011) investigate harmful practices, of 
which ukuthwala is only one example. They argue that “such practices have devastating physical and 
8  I shall explain the history and rationale for the legal codification of customs, as well as its adverse conse-
quences, in more detail in Chapter Four.
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psychological effects on women. They reinforce the inferior status of women in society and continue 
to violate their rights and this has serious implications on the achievement of gender equality in 
society” (212). Along similar lines, but with a specific focus on ukuthwala, Choma (2011) evaluates 
whether the custom of ukuthwala breeches the Constitution’s human rights prescriptions, while 
Mubangizi (2012) explores the tension between human rights and customary law, using ukuthwala 
as an example of a source of such tension. Though the authors reveal the discriminatory potential 
of ukuthwala and how it can affect women and children negatively, their analyses remain on an ab-
stract jurisprudent level, and they do not, therefore, take actual forms of discrimination and violence 
into account, as they play out at the local level. 
 Mwambene and Sloth-Nielsen (2011), as well as Monyane (2013), take the legal discussion a 
step further, however. As mentioned earlier, in 2008 Professor Jamison of the Children’s Institute at 
the University of Cape Town lamented the fact that no scientific researcher had yet investigated for-
ced marriages in South Africa. Noteworthily, the three above-mentioned authors particularly inves-
tigate ukuthwala as a form of forced marriage. Calling the practice “forced marriage” (5), Mwambene 
and Sloth-Nielsen (2011) argue that 
ukuthwala, like many other customary institutions, has changed radically. The 
practice has now taken on other dimensions, including young girls forcibly 
being married to older men, relatives of the girl kidnapping and taking the girls 
themselves as wives, and abductions not being reported to the Traditional Au-
thorities. (5) 
In accordance with the assumption that marriage customs are currently undergoing radical change, 
Monyane (2013) writes that “ukuthwala […] has evolved considerably [...] In recent times, the prac-
tice has taken on new dimensions: young girls are being married forcibly to older men” (64). Rather 
sweepingly, he concludes that “[u]kuthwala fails the constitutional compatibility test on any number 
of grounds” (79), due to the growing number of abuses that people are tending to perpetrate in its 
name. The three aforementioned authors argue that contemporary violent forms of ukuthwala are 
either distortions of ‘correct’ customary practices, or else they are drastically changed forms thereof 
that are incompatible with the upholding of the principle of human rights. Such claims obviously 
stand in stark contrast to Bekker’s (1994), Koyana and Bekker’s (2007), and Bennett’s (2010) under-
standing of ukuthwala as a possibly amicable procedure. 
 The discrepancy in the literature on ukuthwala (as to whether it is a benign or a malignant 
practice) gives rise to two important questions. With Bennett (2010) already alluding to the histori-
cal potential of the practice for violence (despite his otherwise benign definition of ukuthwala), are 
the current levels of violence really an indication that the re-emerging custom is subject to cultural 
change, and to distortion in the process? Alternatively, do they simply indicate how gender and ma-
rital violence now appear in post-apartheid, constitutionally run South Africa? Secondly, if the levels 
of violence have, indeed, intensified, as both the media and legal scholars allege, can such violent 
aberrations still form part of customary marriage practice? The responses of legal scholars are limi-
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ted to such questions, as their discipline often restricts them to the investigation of codified forms of 
culture, rather than enabling them to investigate the actual lived and practised counterparts. Though 
providing a very necessary perspective on the issue, the restrictions of jurisprudence call for an inves-
tigation of ukuthwala as a lived custom on the local level. Three more recent studies (Karimakwenda 
2013; Nkosi and Wassermann 2014; Rice 2014) do take up this responsibility, thereby setting the stage 
for the commencement of a social science discourse on the subject. Through a brief overview of all 
three studies published along the course of my doctoral trajectory, I shall illustrate how each addres-
ses the discrepancies, assumptions and limitations within the existing literature. This overview will 
lead to a discussion of my own investigation of the custom of ukuthwala.
 Through an historical overview of marital violence, Karimakwenda (2013) addresses the as-
sumption that not violence per se, but, rather, the severity and the prevalence of violence, are the 
new phenomena involved. Though published in a legal journal, Acta Juridica, Karimakwenda’s study 
breaks with legal tradition by also investigating non-codified forms of ukuthwala within the context 
of marital violence. 
 Karimakwenda argues that 
[m]any of the coercive aspects of ukuthwala have been denounced as newly 
deviant and antithetical to the way marriage traditions were practiced in the 
past [...] these depictions of ukuthwala and traditional marriage are inaccura-
te. An examination of historical sources concerning Xhosa-speaking peoples in 
the Eastern Cape reveals the deeply rooted and longstanding linkages between 
marriage and violence. (339)
 
Linking marital violence to the broader sociocultural context, she continues to explain that 
in practice, marriage and violence were intertwined. The force exercised with 
some forms of ukuthwala is a subpart of this much larger pattern. Women were 
recurrently brutally coerced into marriage, with or without ukuthwala, and once 
in those marriages, violence was employed to subdue unwilling wives, and to 
discipline wives for infractions. (342)
In turn, Nkosi and Wassermann (2014) published a study in the history and human sciences journal, 
New Contree. In the article, they address the assumption in terms of the legal debate that there is a 
singular, correct customary form of ukuthwala, and that the current forms thereof are, thus, either 
changed, or distorted. They argue that the 
reality is that ukuthwala up to 1994 were not done in a single one-dimensional 
manner but were, like any other cultural custom, not practiced in one agreed 
upon manner. This forms the root of the post-1995 legal debates related to the 
practice. (313) 
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They illustrate their understanding of the above through describing two local concepts between 
which there is a marked difference, namely that of the historical “ukuthwala intombi” (134), which is 
consensual and without violence and sexual coercion, and that of the “ukuthwala ngenkani” (134), 
which is forcible, abusive, lacking in consent, and violent. Placing the different forms in the contem-
porary context, they illustrate a growing “grey area” (134), in which various forms of ukuthwala over-
lap and conflate. It is this melding of the various forms of the practice that has been spurring on the 
continuous media sensationalism and legal debates since 2009. The researchers involved attempt to 
understand “whether the current practice of ukuthwala have historical claims to validity or if it has, 
as has happened to many other customs, been reimagined over time so as to suit the ever changing 
contemporary needs” (135). Nkosi and Wassermann are the first authors whose work I came across 
who investigate ukuthwala within the context of cultural change, bringing a much-needed perspec-
tive to the debate. However, as will be seen in Chapter Four, the two forms of ukuthwala on which 
they focus seem also to be two fictive types. 
 Most recently, four years after I commenced with my own preliminary research of ukuthwala, 
Rice (2014) published an anthropological study on the practice in the Journal of Southern African 
Studies. She confirms that ukuthwala is “virtually absent from contemporary discussions in the social 
sciences” (382), and that such a social science perspective could serve to 
move beyond both the inflexible position and ‘horror-stricken’ approach taken 
by gender rights activists, and beyond discussions that have taken place in the 
legal sphere [since both] approaches remain quite distant from the lived experi-
ence of people in communities where ukuthwala is practiced. (399) 
Rice, therefore, situates her investigation “more fully within a social field characterised by complex 
systems of obligation and power imbalances dependent on gender and age [thereby illustrating] 
that resistance to it [ukuthwala] both symbolises and realises a shift in the social fabric of society” 
(399) on the local level. Grounded in thick ethnographic research, Rice is, to my knowledge, the first 
to investigate ukuthwala as a living custom that the local cultural dynamics of gender, age and power 
shape, as opposed to studying it primarily from secondary sources. She is, furthermore, also one of 
the first to situate her study within family-making processes and kinship structures (see Rice 2014, 
385−388), which is crucial to understanding any marriage practice that is, by definition, embedded 
in such processes and structures. Her discussion of family making and kinship is, however, limited to 
a few short paragraphs on the power disparities that are based on age and gender,  lobola practices 
and the reasons for the institution of marriage having experienced a general decline in South Africa. 
 As seen from the literature discussed, the debate on ukuthwala swiftly intensified after the 
news media catapulted it into public view. Legal voices and opinions still dominate the scholarly 
debate, however, bringing to light the associated discrepancies and assumptions. The unfolding of 
the associated debate necessitated me altering my initial understanding of ukuthwala, which consi-
sted, up until this time, of a mere enumeration of the reasons for an abduction taking place, which 
had mainly been in line with Britten’s (1930) thinking on the matter. I had to give an account of what 
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more recent legal publications had made clear, namely that the practice of ukuthwala is often con-
trary to how the codified customary law stipulates that it should be, in terms of which conflict has 
occurred between the constitutional human rights concerned and the right to practise (potentially 
harmful) customs that customary law seeks to protect. The authors criticising the existing related 
legal publications then reveal that violence, as part of ukuthwala, is not new, and that there is an 
overlap between the practice of ukuthwala as a marriage custom and the practice of ukuthwala for 
purposes other than marriage. If I, thus, wanted to discover why intense levels of violence had mar-
ked ukuthwala’s re-emergence from a position of relative obscurity, my investigation also needed to 
inquire about the alternative purposes that abduction marriage serves. Though the three publicati-
ons presenting social science perspectives on the practice could be steering the debate in a direction 
in which a more holistic view of contemporary ukuthwala is possible, crucial questions still require 
answering, as Rice (2014) indicates. Accordingly, I wish to return to Rice’s investigation, in order to 
point out what I believe to be the most prominent aspects of the ukuthwala debate that demand 
accounting for within the ambit of the social sciences, and on which I shall, consequently, focus.
 Rice’s (2014) study reveals how current forms of ukuthwala are the result of “power imbalan-
ces dependent on gender and age” (399). However, by its immersion within the local sociocultural 
context, it neglects the broader national context and its influences on the local level. Cognisant of 
such a shortcoming, Rice points out a few aspects of the controversy that still require accounting for 
within the broader context than has prevailed up until this point. Rice writes that “a thorough discus-
sion of the impact of both rights discourses […] on local subjectivities and experiences is beyond the 
scope of this paper, these issues almost certainly affect the ways in which people experience ukuth-
wala today” (384). 
 As seen from the above discussion, legal scholars tend to focus on the tension between con-
flicting legal systems, but not on how such conflict (or how public discourses on human rights) im-
pact on the cultural lifeworlds and subjectivities of those on the local level who are caught up in the 
tension. Furthermore, Rice mentions that “there is more to be said about ukuthwala marriage, sexu-
ality and violent masculinity” (399). Save for Karimakwenda’s (2013) historical overview of ukuthwala 
and marital violence, and for Nkosi and Wassermann’s (2014) exploration of the “gray area” (134) that 
is marked by violence, it is remarkable that no researcher has yet sought to situate and investigate 
the practice of ukuthwala within the broader contemporary sociocultural context of “sexuality and 
violent masculinity” (Rice 2014, 399). This is especially important in the light that such masculinity is 
one of South Africa’s most salient and hotly debated topics in academia, politics and the media.9
 Apart from the aspects that Rice (2014) mentions, three further issues exist within the de-
bate that still require address. The first, bluntly put, is the issue of money. The media have sensa-
9  Note that this dissertation is not a reaction to Rice’s call for further investigation into rights discourses, 
sexuality and violent masculinity. Though my Master’s in Science thesis focused on the legal aspects of 
ukuthwala, it also contained chapters on the contextual influence of violent masculinity, the HIV/AIDS pan-
demic, and the influence of economic policy on ukuthwala, two years before Rice’s article was published. I, 
thus, already started investigating such aspects from the outset of my PhD studies in February 2013. 
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tionalised the payment of bridewealth as part of customary marriage, to the extent that they show 
ukuthwala to be the selling and buying of girls. The influence of bridewealth negotiations on con-
temporary ukuthwala practices has not yet entered the scholarly debate, with it, thus, remaining 
a topic of speculation within the popular media. The second, as yet unaddressed, issue is whether 
ukuthwala is, indeed, subject to distortion to satisfy current needs other than marriage, as both the 
media and legal scholars allege. In other words, when and why do abductions, which still bear the 
label of ukuthwala, occur for purposes other than marriage? The third issue, which encapsulates all 
the other unaddressed issues, pertains to the current and historical social dimensions of ukuthwala. 
A number of authors have recently noted the national decline in the marriage rates, as well as the 
considerable number of changes that have occurred in terms of marriage and kinship practices (see 
Hosegood, McGrath, and Moultrie 2009; Hunter 2010, 2015; Niehaus 2015; Van Dijk 2015; White 2015). 
Yet, the effect of the changes, which are the result of specific historical and contemporary events and 
processes, on ukuthwala still requires consideration.
 An important note on why I chose to build my whole doctoral dissertation on such an un-
common and rare marriage procedure (De Jager 1971; Hunter 1969) is, however, necessary before 
I continue. This is specifically so since an explanation for my choice highlights the necessity for the 
anthropological and social science perspective that I have decided to take in the study. As mentio-
ned earlier, “the practice of ukuthwala had resulted in 353 cases in 2006, and 338 in 2007” (PMG 2009). 
Other than the above-mentioned figures, no published statistics exist on how frequently ukuthwala 
is practised. The reasons for ukuthwala not showing up prominently in the related statistics are, most 
probably, linked to the protected status of the practice under codified customary law. Reports on the 
violent forms of ukuthwala tend to treat such cases as incidents of rape, abduction or sexual assault. 
The reports document and process the details of the crime, but not the intricacies of the custom 
itself. The cultural and societal condonation of violent ukuthwala might also result in the lack of 
reporting on abusive cases. 
 Irrespective of how infrequently people practise the custom, and of the absence of statistics 
to prove that its occurrence is becoming more frequent, its ongoing discussion is still fervent and 
broad on a national scale. I believe that this is so due to ukuthwala concerning much broader current 
affairs in modern South Africa than the mere custom itself, particularly in terms of the interplay and 
conflicts that are occurring between customary practices, human rights and the media. As such, it 
is not ukuthwala an sich that is interesting, but how it is possible to use the practice as a diagnostic 
event (see Falk Moore 1986) through which to consider the broader processes and conflicts playing 
out in contemporary South Africa. In this sense, my study is in line with that of Lund (1994), who, 
based on the work of Falk Moore (1986), defines such diagnostic events as follows: 
Some events do, however, possess diagnostic qualities, i.e. the unfolding of 
these particular events elicit the enacted interests and strategies of particular 
groups and discloses a series of processes which appear less articulated else-
where. A diagnostic event is, of course, not generalizable in itself, but it gives 
hints to certain patterns of processes which could and should be looked for. (13)
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The way in which I investigate and use ukuthwala as a diagnostic event for understanding the broa-
der processes and the strategies of groups of people, which other researchers have yet to articulate 
as clearly elsewhere, therefore connects my work to a long tradition in African Studies that started 
with Gluckman and the Manchester School (see Kapferer 2010). Accordingly, I do not treat ukuthwala 
as an illustration of violence, or of the change that has come about in a specific marriage custom. 
Instead of focusing on its typicality, I consider ukuthwala within the above-mentioned tradition, since 
its atypical events serve to generate responses among certain groups of people and government 
bodies that might otherwise remain under-communicated and ambivalent. 
 Investigating the practice of ukuthwala is, thus, important, since the practice concerns con-
tinuous forms of discrimination and abuse. In addition, ukuthwala serves as a diagnostic case for 
understanding the processes with which it is engaged. As I shall now point out, I adopt an anthropo-
logical approach in the case of the present study, to reveal whether and why ukuthwala is re-emer-
ging more violently on the local level. I also adopt such an approach to allow for an exploration of the 
broader issues on the national level with which the practice is enmeshed, and of how the different 
levels intersect with, and discursively affect, each other.
Engaging with the Debate from an Anthropological Perspective
At this point I wished to enter the current debate. Building on my collected data and on the amount 
of knowledge that I gained during my Master’s of Science research, I aimed to investigate ukuthwala 
from an anthropological perspective. Yet, my research was to differ from that of Rice (2014) in one 
crucial way. Whereas Rice focuses chiefly on the local level, the anthropological approach that I take 
is much more holistic. Since I believed that current forms of ukuthwala best appear as the result of 
the interaction between local and national processes, discourses and events, my investigation was 
to situate ukuthwala at the crossroads of local and national contexts, in an attempt to understand 
the full nature of ukuthwala in all its complexity. I, therefore, chose to investigate different themes10 
within the debate at the macro, meso and micro levels of South African society. My qualitative re-
search is, thus, a combination of fieldwork and extensive literature research. Whereas my fieldwork 
has enabled me to explore the topic from the different perspectives that the various actors11 involved 
on the meso and micro level hold, my extensive literature research illuminates the discourses and 
perspectives on ukuthwala at the macro level.12 My fieldwork has also enabled me to investigate 
how the historical development of marriage practices in general has shaped the present ukuthwala 
phenomenon. 
 Gupta and Ferguson’s (1992; see also Ferguson and Gupta 2002, and Ferguson 2007) critique 
of the representation and conceptualisation of space in the social sciences – specifically in anthro-
pology – is helpful in terms of my multilevelled approach to the spaces (or contexts, as I call them) 
where ukuthwala occurs and changes. Gupta and Ferguson (1992) argue that the representation of 
10  Changes in marriage practices, human rights discourses, gender, economic policy, and violence.
11  Social workers, police officers, traditional authorities, local community members, and thwala’ed women.
12  The government, the judiciary, and the media.
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space has always been “remarkably dependent on images of break, rupture, and disjunction. This 
distinctiveness of societies, nations, and cultures is based […] on the fact that they occupy ‘naturally’ 
discontinuous spaces” (6). Attempting to provide an anthropological approach that is critical of the 
conception of space as being inherently discontinuous, the researchers concerned argue that we 
should rather understand
social change and cultural transformation as situated within interconnected 
spaces […] For if one begins with the premise that spaces have always been 
hierarchically interconnected […] then cultural and social change becomes not 
a matter of cultural contact and articulation but one of rethinking difference 
through connection. (8, emphasis in the original)
Following this line of thought, I do not conceive of current forms of ukuthwala as being the result 
of shaping solely due to contact with a more powerful external force. Rather, the production of cur-
rent forms of ukuthwala occurs within a space that is characteristically reflective of the presence 
of hierarchical power relations that exist between the state and the local communities, as well as 
between the actors on the local level. Put differently, current forms of ukuthwala are the result of the 
interaction that occurs where the state’s broadly distributed and enforced laws and policies (on the 
macro and meso levels of society) interact with the ways in which hierarchical power relations struc-
ture the customs and practices of local communities (on the micro level of society). My investigation 
of ukuthwala was, therefore, to take both the local and the national levels into account. Rice (2014) 
has already alluded to two of the four processes and discourses within the national (macro) context 
that are of current concern: (1) the tension between human rights and customary law; and (2) the 
nationwide escalation of violent masculinity. The third process, which had not yet received attention 
in terms of the academic debate on ukuthwala, despite its sensationalisation in the media, as I have 
pointed out above, consists of the restructuring of, and the changes that have been brought about 
in, the national economic policies. The fourth process, as indicated above, consists of the national 
decline of, and the changes in, marriage and kinship practices. The above-mentioned four aspects 
of the national context – or the “space”, as Gupta and Ferguson (1992, 8) call it – all have bearing on 
the local context (or space), in relation to which it influences communities socioculturally, as well 
as politically and economically. It is, accordingly, necessary to understand the specific hierarchical 
structuring of customary marriage and kinship practices on the local level, and how they respond to 
such influences. The various ways in which individuals and communities grapple with the influences 
on customary marriage and kinship practices inadvertently, or wilfully, affects ukuthwala. Understan-
ding the interaction among the four aspects of the national context in terms of marriage and kinship 
practices on the local level could, therefore, hold the keys to answering my main research questions, 
namely: is ukuthwala re-emerging in a more violent way under the conditions of modernity, and 
could I still regard the new violent forms as marriage practices?
 The main research questions, however, have given rise to four sub-questions pertaining to 
the four aspects mentioned above. In order to answer the main research questions successfully, I 
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accordingly operationalised the sub-questions by means of applying an anthropological research 
design. The four research sub-questions were:
1) How do the historical events and processes that changed marriage and kinship practices contex-
tually influence the current re-emergence of violent ukuthwala? (The sub-question is addressed 
in Chapter Three.)
2) How are conflicting discourses on human rights and custom shaping ukuthwala’s violent re-emer-
gence? (The sub-question is addressed in Chapter Four.)
3) How does the restructuring of the economy and economic policy influence current ukuthwala 
practices? (The sub-question is addressed in Chapter Five.)
4) How do various forms of violence converge in ukuthwala practices, causing the continuation of 
gender-based violence? (The sub-question is addressed in Chapter Six.)
The anthropological research design through which I operationalised the above questions encom-
passed extensive literature research, and seven months of multisited ethnographic research (consis-
ting of three months’ Master’s of Science fieldwork in 2012, and of four months’ additional fieldwork 
in 2013). Whereas the extensive literature research that I conducted illuminated my understanding of 
the national processes, events and policies at play on both the macro and the meso levels of society, 
my ethnographic fieldwork, in contrast, revealed how individuals and communities on the local level 
responded to the forces concerned. 
 My ethnographic fieldwork entailed the conducting of multisited research in the Eastern 
Cape town of Lusikisiki and its surrounding villages, as well as in the cities of Johannesburg and 
Pretoria in the Gauteng province. The qualitative research methods employed included small talk, 
participant observation, semi-structured and in-depth interviewing, case studies, and life histories. 
The interviewees consisted of both men and women of the older and the younger generation, as well 
as of various officials13 who were directly involved with ukuthwala. Finally, I also interviewed Sou-
th Africa-based scholars who had investigated ukuthwala or ukuthwala-related topics.14 The broad 
scope of informants allowed me to investigate different positions and points of view, as gender, age, 
and diverse emic and etic perspectives determine. 
 My anthropological approach, which I operationalised through my ethnographic fieldwork 
and literature study, did not, however, take the form of a conventional monograph on the marriage 
practices of the Mpondo people as such. Rather, a constellation of interrelated marriage practices, 
combined with issues of marital change, law, gender, violence, and economic policies, has driven the 
thesis of this anthropological investigation. This is in opposition to the traditional notion of a mono-
graph that centres around a specific ethnicity or culture. Ukuthwala, like other forms of (traditional) 
marriage, is neither ethnically nor culturally bound, but, rather, it is comprised of a set of interrela-
13  Police officers, social workers, councillors, and the wards of girls who had escaped abusive thwala 
 marriages.
14  Customary law, sexual violence, the influence of HIV/AIDS on marriage practices, and kinship structures.
19
Introduction The Violent Re-emergence of Ukuthwala
ted customs that various Nguni groups practise throughout Southern Africa, as I mentioned at the 
beginning of this introductory section. The monograph that I present is, thus, focused on how indi-
viduals and communities at the local level experience the ways in which various (historical) events, 
processes and policies on the national level affect their interrelated marriage patterns and practices. 
I, therefore, do not focus on a specific ethnic or cultural group, but on ukuthwala in general, and on 
marriage-related practices that are relevant to it. The discussion on various cultural groups, customs, 
languages, and demographic arrangements that chapters Two and Three contain is, therefore, im-
portant for orientation with regard to the general research location and population (which is situated 
in the Eastern Cape province). 
The Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of an introduction, six chapters and a conclusion. The current Introduction 
serves as the introduction to the entire dissertation; Chapter One provides the theoretical framework, 
while Chapter Two presents the research setting, the methods and the research population. Chapter 
Three analyses the historical and contemporary contexts that are relevant to ukuthwala, while chap-
ters Four, Five and Six, respectively, address one of the above- mentioned research sub-questions. 
The dissertation then comes to a close in the Conclusion that presents the final conclusions of the 
entire investigation.
 Chapters Three to Six are arranged in a specific order. Whereas Chapter Three provides the 
historical developments that indirectly influenced marriage and kinship practices relevant to ukuth-
wala on the macro and meso level in general, chapters Four to Six hone in on the contemporary 
contexts at the micro level, as events at the macro level have shaped them. Chapter Four also serves 
as a bridge that mediates the shift from the national macro level to the local micro level, by way of its 
discussion of the legal discourses on ukuthwala. Whereas Chapter Five investigates how the re-emer-
ging forms of ukuthwala are still mostly ongoing for the purpose of marriage, despite them being 
violent and acquisitive of new functions, Chapter Six shifts the attention to forms of abduction that 
bear the label of ukuthwala, but which, arguably, are no longer linked to marriage. The Conclusion 
brings the dissertation to a close by means of a general analysis of the entire text and of the main 
research questions. 
 Chapter One introduces the overarching framework and anthropological approach that I fol-
low, in exploring two general theoretical issues that are relevant to my analysis of ukuthwala in all 
the successive chapters. The first such issue concerns the influence of modernity in South Africa, with 
specific reference to how it affects national politics, and the jurisprudent and economic ideologies, 
as well as the local cultural practices. The second issue that is at stake in the present context is that of 
violence. I shall present various theorisations of the mechanisms of violence, and how they appear as 
analytical models in the process of investigating the violence that currently characterises ukuthwala. 
 Chapter Two introduces the relevant research setting, the population, and the methodolo-
gical approach. The chapter commences with a description of the research settings in which I con-
ducted my fieldwork, as well as of the important aspects of the local settings that are relevant to the 
practice of ukuthwala. I then discuss the research methods that I used during the fieldwork, before 
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reflecting on my own position within the field. I conclude with an explanation of the underlying rati-
onale for how I present the data. 
 Chapter Three provides a thorough investigation of the research population and of their mar-
riage and kinship practices on both the regional and the national level, from a historical perspective. I 
chronologically investigate the major events and processes that influenced traditional marriage and 
kinship practices. I conclude with an overview of how contemporary marriage and kinship practices 
characteristically serve as the context within which the practice of ukuthwala is currently re-emer-
ging. 
 Chapter Four focuses on how the changing political climate and the adoption of a pluralist 
legal system in South Africa are changing traditional bride abduction practices, resulting in conflic-
ting discourses and confusion as to how the custom of ukuthwala requires definition on both the 
macro and micro level of practice. I explore how the conflict finds expression on the local level, at 
which level patriarchal notions of custom and gender – based on idealised historical ideals – appear 
in terms of both the practice of, and the discourses on, ukuthwala. 
 Chapter Five reveals how the changing economic climate in South Africa is influencing ukuth-
wala and other marriage-related practices. The economic changes involved have caused a steep rise 
in the bridewealth price, straining family-making processes and marriage negotiations. This chapter 
explores how ukuthwala is potentially becoming an economic survival strategy that utilises the ex-
ploitation of young women for purposes of financial gain. Yet, as I discovered, this possibility requires 
consideration in the light that economic exploitation is not a new phenomenon in relation to ukuth-
wala, but that it only appears as such in numerous local and national discourses. 
 Chapter Six explores how current forms of violent ukuthwala can link to the broader social 
context of sexual violence, in general. Through an overview of historical events and process that 
have served to facilitate the emergence of a violent form of masculinity, combined with contempo-
rary discourses on masculinity, this chapter reveals that two general and overlapping discourses of 
violent masculinity are at play during abduction procedures. Whereas one of the discourses might, 
indeed, lead to violent cases of ukuthwala, the other seems, rather, to reflect the local discourses on 
suspicious male others and on forms of violence that are unrelated to ukuthwala.
 By drawing on the evidence found in the field, and by means of synthesising the analyses of 
the preceding chapters, the Conclusion will answer the main research question of the entire inves-
tigation. It will do this by means of explicating how the practice of ukuthwala has continuously led 
to the abuse of girls and young women on the one hand, while, simultaneously, on the other hand 
becoming a discourse on sexual and gender violence in general. In addition, this chapter will also 
highlight the social and scholarly contributions that this dissertation makes to the controversy on 
ukuthwala and marriage practices in South Africa. It also points out how it serves as a diagnostic 
event for understanding the broader processes of political, economic, cultural, and social change 
within the wider society.
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Having provided an overview of the ukuthwala controversy in the previous chapter, I now want to 
explain the theoretical frame that guided my investigation of how historic events; the advent of hu-
man rights; new economic policy; and rising levels of violence have influenced the violent re-emer-
gence of the practice. Even though national processes and events (like the introduction of capitalism 
and foreign legal systems) were part of South Africa’s historical development during the period of 
colonialism and apartheid, major changes have also marked them during the last two decades of 
post-apartheid constitutionalism. My theoretical framework and analytical approach, thus, need to 
account for how the historical and modern forces of foreign governments and governmental sys-
tems (colonial, apartheid and constitutional) have influenced, and are still influencing, the violent 
re-emergence of a traditional custom from past to present. Two crucial concepts are relevant in this 
regard: modernity and violence. Throughout this chapter, I shall elucidate how theories and analyti-
cal models of modernity and violence can render understandable the process of change over time. 
 I shall begin with a short historical overview of modernity, through focusing on its develop-
ment in Africa as a plurality rather than on its historical conceptualisation, in the singular. I shall 
then illustrate how modernity in South Africa has shaped the various local and national social re-
alities within which traditional practices, like ukuthwala, come to change. The issue of violence, as 
a defining aspect of ukuthwala, will then come to the fore. Farmer’s (2004) analytical framework for 
conceptualising violence will form the core of this discussion. Though direct sexual violence may be 
the most salient social issue that is at stake in this context, I argue that the force is, rather, a symptom, 
or the result, of the violent context within which the Mpondo people practise ukuthwala. A review 
of the literature will make clear how various types of violence – structural, cultural, symbolic, and 
direct – operate at various levels within the South African context, furthermore shaping the social 
realities within which ukuthwala is re-emerging. Finally, I shall illustrate how we can understand the 
processes through which these contextually important forms of violence translate into direct forms 
of ukuthwala-related violence.
Modernity 
Modernity is still a hotly debated topic, I believe, because of its often-conflicting attributes, charac-
teristics and interpretations. The polemic surrounding ukuthwala serves as a good example of how 
such a theoretical debate finds expression in real lifeworlds at the local level. Though the news media 
persistently refer to ukuthwala as an outdated practice, the statement belies itself by the mere fact 
that the practice is more in use now than it was a few decades ago. How should we then account 
for the alleged re-emergence of this outdated practice in contemporary South Africa? Exploring this 
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conundrum will help to understand the historical and contemporary reasons for the re-emergence 
of ukuthwala, as well as providing a workable theory of modernity within which to frame this inves-
tigation. I shall, thus, turn to the available literature on modernity in search of such a framing theory 
within the (South) African context. 
 From the conception of modernity in Enlightenment philosophy (Descartes [1641] 2009; He-
gel [1807] 1977), to the early theorists of modernity and modernisation (Durkheim [1893] 1973; Marx 
[1848; 1867] 1983; Weber [1922] 1978), those concerned thought that the movement had a single uni-
versal trajectory. With its genesis in Western Europe, people believed that modern thought, systems 
and establishments of society would expand throughout the world,15 replacing what people saw to 
be more traditional or primitive systems and beliefs.16 This take on modernity was very Eurocentric 
in its assumption, always pitting (western) Europe as the barometer and harbinger of modernity and 
its modernising projects. Modernity became, in the words of the Comaroffs (1993), “a narrative that 
replaces the uneven, protean relations among ‘ourselves’ and ‘others’ in world history with a simple, 
epic story about the passage from savagery to civilization, from the mystical to the mundane” (xii). 
Such conceptualisation led to a form of binary opposition that held sway for some time within the 
debate on modernity. Accordingly, modernity came to denote European progress, civilisation, world 
religion and industrialisation, as opposed to ‘the rest’ that still needed to make the epic journey out 
of savagery, mysticism, traditionalism, and ignorance. 
 With the advent of colonialism, modernity’s civilising projects came to bear on the coloni-
sed subjects. However, history shows colonised subjects to have been eager to become educated 
converts, which suited the purpose of the colonialists, who wished to make them both compliant 
and useful for their own benefit. Macamo (2006) writes that “[c]olonialism was the historical form 
through which modernity became a real social project on the African continent. Colonialism, ho-
wever, was premised on the denial of that same modernity to Africans” (8). Ironically, Dussel (1995) 
writes that “[c]onceptually modern rationality affords an emancipative potential to civilizations with 
less developed instruments, technologies, practical politico-economic structures, and capacities for 
subjective expression” (65). Few initially realised or tolerated this “emancipative potential”. Colonia-
lism, as Gikandi (2003) writes, “depriv[ed] people of the rights that were associated with the project of 
modernity itself”, since it was “difficult to reconcile the notion of free self-conscious individuals with 
colonial domination” (337). 
 Still, irrespective of civilising aspirations and capitalist exploitation, the Eurocentric and uni-
versalist vision of modernity seemed to spawn hybridised offspring. The number of new forms of 
modernity seemed to increase with the passing of colonial occupation, and with the rise of novel 
local forms of capitalism and government in the newly independent nation-states. As the emanci-
pative potential took hold, turning into a form of creative and liberating agency, the local communi-
ties assimilated modern technologies and systems of government into their own indigenous forms. 
Eisenstadt (2000) argues that the cultural and political movements that gave rise to the formation 
15  Capitalism, the nation state, democracy and industrialisation, among others.
16  From a primitivist point of view.
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of the new sociopolitical and cultural realities “have attempted to dissociate Westernization from 
modernity, denying the Western monopoly on modernity, rejecting the Western cultural program as 
the epitome of modernity” (23). In turn, Piot (1999) argues that the hybridised “‘modernities […] owe 
their meaning and shape to that encounter [colonialism] as much as to anything ‘indigenous’” (1). 
He, accordingly, speaks of “an alternative modernity […] within capitalism” (21), since “modernity’s 
roots lie in Africa as much as in Europe” (21). Macamo (2006) writes that the result of these new forms 
of modernity came to be that “Africans produce[d] their own social reality in dialogue with modernity 
as they move[d] from colonialism into a world defined by themselves and by what they [... did ...] in 
their everyday life” (3). 
 These hybridised, alternative or plural modernities, therefore, break with the universalist 
view of modernity that the initial theorists held. As a result, it seems to be comparatively localised, 
resembling an indigenously constructed social reality. As seen in terms of the above-mentioned 
example, many characteristics of universalist modernity are present as part of the discursive system 
through which local forms of modernity have developed and overlapped. Such characteristics inclu-
de globalisation, the nation state, world religion, capitalism, industrialisation, empirical rationality, 
the mass media, and universal humanity and constitutionalism. It is for this reason that Comaroff 
and Comaroff (1993) argue that there are, in fact, “many modernities” (xi), because (globalised) world 
systems are always “in the plural: diverse and dynamic, multiple and multidirectional” (xi). To accept 
that more than one form of modernity might shape different societies and cultures of the world in va-
rious ways seems obvious, but how does the process work? Or, more concretely, how did modernity 
shape the various and diverse local social realities of South Africa that have now come to facilitate 
the violent re-emergence of ukuthwala within various contexts? During the course of my archival and 
literature research, I identified four characteristics of modernity whose influence I came to see during 
my fieldwork in rural South Africa. The four characteristics – liberalism, capitalism, historicism, and 
emancipatory ideology – despite having their origins in European modernity, have become hybridi-
sed and pluralised within the South African context, shaping the various social realities that now form 
the context within which the practice of ukuthwala has come to re-emerge. 
 The first important characteristic of modernity that I identified was liberalism. Classical libe-
ralism, of which John Locke (1632−1704) is often cited as being the founding father, introduced the 
notion that the ‘self’ was a free, autonomous individual. Classical liberalism promotes civil liberties, 
rejects the notion of divine, or hereditary, rule, and proposes limits on governmental authority. One 
governmental restriction that Locke proposed was the government’s regulation of the market econo-
my. The function of the government was to protect property, rather than to impose monopoly. Over 
the course of time, the classical liberal approach changed, giving rise to neo-liberalism. Neo-libera-
lism, however, is more closely associated with the economy than was classical liberalism’s emphasis 
on the rights, equality and liberties of the individual. Neo-liberalism, as a major driving force behind 
South Africa’s political, legal and economic realities, led the nation into “experiment[ing] with con-
stitutional law, populist politics, and, if hesitantly, post-neoliberal forms of redistribution” (Coma-
roff and Comaroff 2012, 123). Economically, neo-liberalism (of which neo-capitalism is an offshoot) 
denotes economic liberalisation through free trade, open markets, deregulation, and privatisation. 
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Jurisprudentially, neoliberal ideologies of universal human rights inspired the formulation of South 
Africa’s 1996 Constitution. 
 Legal pluralism, under the protection of the Constitution, is a good example of how hybridi-
sed modernities have come to produce various social realities in South Africa. Though South Africa’s 
legal system is subject to the statutes of the Constitution (which is an import of Western moderni-
ty), it accommodates both civil (European) and customary (indigenous) law. The citizens concerned, 
therefore, have often to choose whether they want to take a case to a civil court or to a traditional 
tribunal. A civil court might, for example, handle a case of ukuthwala quite differently to how a tradi-
tional tribunal handles it. Coexisting legal systems (with one foreign, and one indigenous) represent 
two local modes of modernity that have come to hybridise by means of legal pluralism, which has 
served to produce various possible social (or legal) realities. The influence of liberalism and the legal 
systems to which it has led in South Africa will be the focus of Chapter Four.
 The second prominent characteristic of modernity is capitalism, which neo-liberalism also 
inspired, as I previously mentioned. Marx’s ([1867] 1996) Das Kapital reveals modernity’s concerns 
with economic systems that are in the service of political, economic and social systems of exploitati-
on and control, whether going by the name of socialism or capitalism. Capitalism, specifically, beca-
me an important modern entrepreneurial force with the expansion of the colonial empires. Comaroff 
and Comaroff (2012) note that
[a]s an ideology, it [modernity] has never been dissociable from capitalism […] 
capitalist-modernity has realized itself, if very unevenly, in the great aspirations 
of liberalism. But it has also excluded many populations from just these things, 
especially those in colonial theaters who have been subjugated to its modes of 
extraction. (116, emphasis in the original.)
The influence of capitalism in South Africa has had far-reaching consequences. The country’s offici-
al addition to the ranks of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries in 2010 signified the 
economic successes that it had managed to achieve by that time, yet the severe disparities between 
the different income groups present in the country still reflect the uneven patterns of distribution 
of wealth and exclusion that characterised the colonial and apartheid epochs (see Leibbrandt et al. 
2010). The disparities concerned have, inevitably, come to impact on the capitalist economy in South 
Africa, with it evolving into a modest welfare state. 
 The burgeoning capitalist economy had dire consequences on the local level. The introduc-
tion of capitalism and the monetary system, for example, led to the replacement of cattle as bride-
wealth currency with cash, which, in turn, served greatly to inflate bridewealth prices during the last 
century. Increasingly, impoverished individuals and families often had to pay large sums of money 
as a form of bridewealth before a customary marriage could commence, even in cases of thwala 
marriages. Unable to pay the high amounts required, individuals and families have felt compelled 
to devise alternate ways of contracting marriages, changing marriage and kinship practices in the 
process. How economic (neo)capitalist policy has influenced and shaped the social realities of local 
marriage economies and customs will be addressed in Chapter Five, specifically. 
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 The third important characteristic of modernity in South Africa is historicism, which I shall 
combine with the fourth characteristic, emancipatory ideology. The Comaroffs (1993) argue that 
modernity is a force that is both “profoundly ideological and profoundly historical” (xi). The historic 
events, whether classical or recent, that shaped modernity have always been imbued with an ideo-
logical construction of reality and the world; in this sense, a certain ideology of modernity is likely 
to lead to a certain action that influences history. For example, the classical universalist ideology 
of modernity as a civilising force often served as a justification for colonialism (see Serequeberhan 
1989), while a more recent neoliberal ideology of modernity led to emancipatory movements in the 
colonies, and to a relatively pluralistic vision of modernity in the present, as Dussel (1995) argues. 
History and ideology, thus, function as mutually constructive characteristics of modernity. 
 Following the Comaroffs (1993), I shall investigate the historical events and ideologies that 
have come to influence marriage practices in general, and which currently impact on the violent 
forms taken by ukuthwala. The historical events and ideologies concerned include colonialism and 
the resultant decimation of the local economies; the ideology of racial segregation, which led to the 
apartheid system; the labour migration system, which the apartheid ideology also inspired, and the 
militarisation of black people during the anti-apartheid struggle, to mention but a few of the forces 
involved. Whereas the influence of historic events and ideologies on marriage practices in general 
will be the focus of Chapter Three, the current effect of history and ideology on violent ukuthwala 
practices will come to the fore in Chapter Six. The latter chapter specifically focuses on how the cur-
rent forms of violence are the result of historical processes, in conjunction with certain ideologies of 
masculinity. 
Violence
While physical sexual and gender-based violence are obvious concerns as far as the actual thwala 
process goes, I discovered hidden, and less conspicuous, forms of violence that have come contextu-
ally to influence ukuthwala, while investigating the history of, and the influence of modernity in, Sou-
th Africa. The economy serves as a good example of the above. Though the adoption of neoliberal 
economic policies has served to deregulate the economy and to open up the existing markets, it has 
also resulted in unemployment and in increasing income disparities. The structure of the economy is, 
therefore, violent, in the sense that it has led to the further impoverishment of the poor, contextually 
influencing marriage practices and ukuthwala. The links between violent contextual structures and 
ukuthwala’s violent character became evident during my fieldwork, when I discovered how the poor 
utilise violent ukuthwala as an economic survival strategy. My theoretical framework and analytical 
approach, thus, had to account for both structural and direct forms of violence on both the national 
and the local levels in South Africa. During my field research, I soon discovered, however, that the 
various levels on which, and the forms through which, people commit violence are neither distinct, 
nor separate from, other forms/levels of violence, and nor is it exclusive. On the contrary, the various 
forms of violence, whether structural or direct, national or local, are interdependent and mutually 
constructive. The systematic way in which I shall discuss various forms of violence allows me to pro-
vide a comprehensive description of the various layers and forms of violence that are relevant to the 
modern South African setting of the current study. 
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 Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004) provide the central premise of my analytical framework 
for understanding violence in general. They argue that “[w]hat constitutes violence is always medi-
ated by an expressed or implicit dichotomy between legitimate/illegitimate, permissible or sancti-
oned act[s]” (2). Just as ukuthwala can be both traditional and modern,17 depending on the scope 
and the ideologies of the beholder, so can violence be either “legitimate/illegitimate”, depending on 
the vantage point of the viewer and his/her (or, indeed, ‘their’) ideologies and cultural models. The 
classic example of this duality is that of the Law (capital ‘L’), which, though being a means of curbing 
(illegitimate) violence, yet, itself, uses (legitimate) violence in this pursuit. Blomley (2003) explains the 
situation when he posits that 
[l]aw, of course, can entail a genuine attempt at crafting nonviolent remedies. 
Even when legal agents use violence, it may well be of a distinct form […] Yet, 
both of these things said, violence – whether threatened or implied – is one 
means through which law acts in the world. Violence is not aberrant, but central 
to law. (129−130)
The dichotomy between legitimate and illegitimate violence is not only present on the macro level, 
but it also permeates down to the very local and personal level. It also muddies any clear definition 
of what violence as part of ukuthwala might be, specifically since the practitioners of violence, as part 
of the thwala process, often culturally justify it. This sometimes takes the form of masculine identity 
and of (legitimised) social control (as Chapter Six illustrates). 
 Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004) further explain this dichotomy by drawing our atten tion to
the extent to which structural inequalities and power relations are naturalized 
by our categories and conceptions of what violence really is. […] Structural vio-
lence is generally invisible because it is part of the routine grounds of everyday 
life and transformed into expressions of moral worth. (4)
The second premise of this study is, thus, that certain structural inequalities18 and power relations19 
in South Africa have tended to become ‘invisible’ as they have become part of the sociocultural fabric 
of everyday life. Put differently, people do not perceive some forms of violence as such, because the 
forms constitute part of their lifeworlds and they do not cause direct physical harm, thus resulting in 
their normalisation. 
17  According to Piot’s (1999) definition of modernity.
18  The income disparities and the economic exclusion the neo-capitalist economy has caused, or the far su-
perior socio-medical support that is available in the metropolis, as opposed to that which is available in the 
rural areas.
19  The gender inequality that patriarchy, as well as the authoritative position of older women, cause, for 
example.
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 Legassick (1974), for example, argues that 
South Africa has been and is dominated by capitalism, that is, a mode of pro-
duction in which the economic surplus is subject to private appropriation and 
in which ownership of the means of production is severed from ownership of 
labour-power. (255)
The above-mentioned form of structural inequality – which is a form of structural violence to which I 
shall shortly turn – is not perceived as being violence per se. This is due to it having been part of the 
South African lifestyle for a very long time. It, consequently, became an integral part of the overall 
fabric of society that fell along racial lines under apartheid in such a way as to exclude the majority of 
the black population from accessing not only the means of production, but also the economic sur-
plus that it produced. In time, the amount of violence that the structure of apartheid policy caused 
was seen in its full reality, and abandoned. However, the exploitative nature of the capitalist system 
that it left behind was not dismantled; rather, the system still functions as the normative, given eco-
nomic system, veiling the inherent structural inequalities of which it has been the cause.
 My analytical approach to violence, in general, is therefore founded on two premises. The 
first is that violence always implies a dichotomy of legitimate/illegitimate, depending on the indivi-
dual’s, or the societal, cultural models of violence. Certain masculine discourses, for example, legiti-
mate sexual violence through confirming the status of culturally institutionalised patriarchy. The very 
same government that uses the judicial system to legitimise the violence of incarceration, if indivi-
duals are guilty of having perpetrated sexual violence, has come to condemn such violent actions as 
being illegitimate. The second premise, which seems to be a corollary of the first, is that some forms 
of violence tend to become invisible because of their ordinariness. In line with the above, if a whole 
community shares, or agrees on, the patriarchal legitimisation of sexual violence during ukuthwala 
proceedings, they will not recognise the proceedings as being violent, thus rendering them both nor-
mal and invisible. Though the two above-mentioned premises are helpful in understanding violence 
in general, my analytical approach also has to account for the various levels and types of violence 
in South Africa specifically. The concepts of structural, cultural, symbolic and sexual violence might 
prove to be helpful in this regard. 
 The macro, or national, level is the first level at which I want to investigate the violent con-
text of ukuthwala. The prominent actors on this level are the government, the Constitution, and the 
capitalist system, with the form of violence that is most relevant to this level being structural vio-
lence. Although neither the government nor the Constitution is responsible for the perpetration of 
direct violence, some do experience the governmental actions and the constitutional considerations 
with regard to ukuthwala as being structurally violent. Criminalising marriages if those concerned 
are younger than 18 years old could force communities to revise their marriage practices in terms 
of the capacity that age allows, with such a consideration having served as a cultural condition for 
centuries, for example. The violence resulting from structural inequality, in turn, plays a part in con-
structing the violent context within which ukuthwala is practised. 
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 Johan Galtung first coined the term ‘structural violence’ in 1969, in his paper, Violence, Peace 
and Peace Research (cf. (with Höivik) 1971, 1990). Gustavo Gutierrez (1988) appropriated Galtung’s 
theories of structural, and other forms of, violence. Gutierrez’s ideas then became a central aspect of 
the liberation theology movement that permeated Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s. Other 
important figures of this movement were Leonardo Boff (see Boff and Boff 1987), Oscar Romero (see 
Eaton 1991), and Jon Sobrino (1994). Galtung (1969), rather than providing an elaborate theory of 
structural violence, mentions that such violence is a form of “social injustice” (italics in the original, 
171) that occurs when, instead of an object or a person perpetrating direct violence, a structure per-
petrates indirect violence. In turn, Köhler and Alcock (1976) posit that “[w]henever persons are har-
med, maimed, or killed by poverty and unjust social, political, and economic institutions, systems, or 
structures, we speak of structural violence” (343). 
 On the basis of the work of these relatively early authors, Farmer (2004) constructs a more 
elaborate theory of structural violence, in terms of the following definition:
Structural violence is violence exerted systematically – that is, indirectly – by 
everyone who belongs to a certain social order: hence the discomfort these ide-
as provoke in a moral economy still geared to pinning praise or blame on indivi-
dual actors. In short, the concept of structural violence is intended to inform the 
study of the social machinery of oppression. (307)
Farmer (2004) suggests that those who belong to a certain exclusive group, like the captains of in-
dustry, the politicians, or those who uphold law and order indirectly and systematically perpetrate 
structural violence.20 To use capitalism as an example of the above, those who hold power over the 
mode of production reap the entire financial reward, systematically excluding and exploiting those 
who are engaged in the production process, namely the labourers. How, then, was I to study and 
analyse the “social machinery of oppression” (Farmer 2004, 307)?
 Farmer (1996) provides an analytical framework for examining the nature of structural violen-
ce, and how it contributes to cumulative human suffering. Such analysis should be “geographically 
broad […] historically deep”, taking the “[s]imultaneous consideration of various social ‘axes’” (italics 
in the original, 274) into account. The axes concerned are those of gender (especially in terms of poor 
women), and race and ethnicity (specifically in terms of poverty-stricken races or ethnic groups). The 
applicability of the analytical framework to the study of ukuthwala immediately becomes apparent: 
the current study investigates ukuthwala as the result of nationwide conflicts21 and forces22 that are, 
inevitably, geographically broad; the practice of ukuthwala, as I shall argue, is the result of the culmi-
20  With it being possible to add the dominant discourses of a patriarchy that subjugates women and children 
to the list.
21  In relation to universal human rights and cultural pluralism in Chapter Four.
22  In relation to capitalism and poverty in Chapter Five.
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nation of a number of historical processes,23 so that it requires investigation as such. The individuals 
who are most vulnerable to the committing of possible crimes in the name of ukuthwala are, finally, 
almost without exception poor black female minors. This makes Farmer’s (1996) emphasis on the 
need to investigate the social axes of gender and race even more relevant to my investigation than it 
might otherwise have been.24
 As will be shown in chapters Three, Five and Six, for example, historically deep analysis re-
veals how apartheid policy necessitated the labour migration of numerous black labourers on which 
the structurally violent effect was twofold. Firstly, implementation of the policy caused the disruption 
of (social) family life and structures, and, secondly, it caused the systematic (material) impoverish-
ment of the black homelands. The impact of such effects, as I shall illustrate, led to an intensification 
of physical gender-based violence along a circuitous route. 
 Though the local level feels the effects of structural violence intensely, the effects are ge-
nerally most observable on the national level, both impersonally and indirectly, as I have shown. 
The culture of the practitioners, on the meso level of society, has also contextually influenced the 
re-emergence of the practice of ukuthwala. The meso level, in terms of the current study, thus de-
notes the Mpondo culture in general, as it manifests in EmaMpondweni, while the forms of violence 
that are most relevant to this level are those of cultural and symbolic violence. Both cultural and 
symbolic forms of violence, in common with structural violence, do not necessarily imply the presen-
ce of direct violence, thus often rendering the former invisible because of their ordinariness and their 
indirect influence. 
 The concept of cultural violence also owes its origins to Galtung (1990), who, himself, con-
nects the concept of structural violence with that of cultural violence (cf. 1969). Cultural violence, 
thus, appears as a sub-type of structural violence. Galtung (1990) mentions that, by “‘cultural violen-
ce’ we mean those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion 
and ideology, language and art […] that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violen-
ce” (291). Alternatively, cultural violence occurs when a cultural group justifies the use of either a form 
of direct or structural violence on the grounds of cultural sanction. The concept of cultural violence is 
23  Colonisation, capitalisation, apartheid, and racial segregation, as I explore in chapters Three and Six.
24  I am aware of the pitfalls of using the category of poor black women, which is a gross stereotype, generalisa-
tion and othering on a number of levels. Yet, I believe I am justified in the use of such terms. Farmer’s social 
axes of gender and race/ethnicity are unspecific, though they favour the poor and the female gender – they 
are, thus, applicable to any context. It is also not a form of othering, with the vulnerability of poor women 
frequently being overstated in the (South) African context. That poor black girl children and young women 
are the object of this study is simply because ukuthwala concerns them with immediate effect. Analysing 
ukuthwala from an historically deep perspective will, furthermore, reveal why such groupings are specifical-
ly vulnerable because of their gender, ethnicity and age, refuting any accusation of uncritical stereotyping. 
Yet, investigating how ukuthwala empowers some individuals to choose a marriage partner for themselves 
(see Chapter Five) will also keep me from uncritically accepting the contentious and disempowering terms 
that I use (i.e. black, poor, female, and child). 
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particularly relevant to the contents of Chapter Six, in which I shall illustrate how the perpetrators of 
violence tend to utilise and culturally justify their employment of such methods, in terms of their use 
in ukuthwala marriages. This is so specifically in the case of those men who seek to subjugate women 
by means of imposing the practice on them. Viewing ukuthwala as a form of cultural violence enables 
me to explain why cultural communities perceive the form of violence that men perpetrate during 
the practising of ukuthwala as being culturally justifiable. Yet, in line with Farmer’s (2004) call to focus 
specifically on gender, my investigation of violence needed to include a more specific analysis of why 
women acquiesce and support the practice, especially in those cases in which they themselves have 
been the victims. 
 A third form of violence might provide an explanation for women’s often uncritical attitude 
towards gender-based violence, namely symbolic violence. The perpetration of such violence is clo-
sely linked to the practising of structural and cultural violence. Coining the term in the 1970s, Bour-
dieu and Passeron (1990) refined the related theory in their later publications, in one of which they 
(Bourdieu and Passeron 2004) define symbolic violence as: 
the violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity […] 
social agents are knowing agents who, even when they are subjected to deter-
minisms, contribute to producing the efficacy of that which determines them 
insofar as they structure what determines them. (272, italics in the original)
The idea that any social agent is complicit in the violence that they suffer obviously drew much cri-
ticism. However, such a response was due to a misunderstanding of Bourdieu and Passeron’s (1990) 
intended meaning. Symbolic violence, according to the two authors (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2004), 
is based on the agent’s misrecognition of his/her complicity in the structure under which he/she suf-
fers. Bourdieu states: “I call misrecognition the fact of recognizing a violence which is wielded precise-
ly inasmuch as one does not perceive it as such” (272, italics in the original). The above echoes Sche-
per-Hughes and Bourgois’ (2004) belief that violence is rendered invisible through its everydayness. 
Put simply, symbolic violence denotes the violence that individuals suffer who do not perceive their 
suffering as being violent, and who, therefore, comply with it. Bourdieu uses gender as an example 
of the above. If a culture that is very patriarchal seeks to subjugate women, such subjugation might 
appear to be a form of symbolic violence if the women who are affected by it do not see their own 
subjugation as being violent, and, therefore, acquiesce to accepting it as normal.
 The idea that both cultural and symbolic violences emphasise gender (poor, black girl child-
ren in this case) recalls Farmer’s (1996) notion that structural violence requires analysis along the 
social axes of gender and race/ethnicity. Cultural and symbolic violence, as I have shown, are sub-ty-
pes of structural violence that are analysable along the same axes. The analysis might reveal how 
the girls concerned first came to be in such a vulnerable position, as well as how their position (of 
subjugation) indirectly protects the ukuthwala custom, if the former becomes normal through the 
acceptance of cultural and symbolic forms of violence. Applying such an analysis, Chapter Eight will 
show how complicit women do not see the violence in their own actions, thereby perpetuating the 
cultural justification of gender-based violence. 
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 The last level on which the violent context of ukuthwala appears is the micro or local level, 
with the forms of violence that are most relevant to this level being those of gender and sexual violen-
ce (of which both are a form of direct violence). Stressing the extent of current sexual and gender-ba-
sed violence, the Medical Research Council of South Africa (see Jewkes et al. 2009) reported that one 
out of every four South African men admitted to raping a woman or girl. That men admit to rape so 
openly is possibly even more disturbing than is the fact that 25 per cent of the men who took part 
in the survey had committed rape. Talking about rape so freely also alludes to the normality of such 
actions as instances of the performance of everyday patriarchy within a general culture of violence. 
Rape, however, is only one violent symptom of the much broader issue of gender and sexual violen-
ce, as manifest in South Africa. During the course of my research, I realised that the broader issue of 
gender and sexual violence could be traced back to South Africa’s political past and to the country’s 
long journey through which it has passed in its transition to democracy. During this time, a culture 
of violence developed that, in turn, gave rise to the current levels of gender and sexual violence that 
are now influencing ukuthwala’s violent re-emergence on the local level. My analysis of direct forms 
of violence on the local level must, therefore, account for the national historical processes that are 
in line with Farmer’s (1996) call for an analysis of violence that should be both geographically broad 
and historically deep. 
 Hamber (2000) writes that, in “South Africa, the legacy of the past and how it destructively 
plays itself out in the present needs to be fully understood if current levels of violence are to be ade-
quately addressed” (13). The influence of apartheid, the struggle for democracy, and the more recent 
socio-economic challenges that the local populace have encountered in the evolution of this nation 
are, thus, the starting reference point in the rendering comprehensible of violence in general, and 
sexual violence, by extension. Hamber describes how violence was “legitimized by all political grou-
pings in the decades prior to the 1990s” (6). The apartheid government legitimised the perpetration 
of violence against its critics, and they, in turn, legitimised violence as part of their struggle against 
the regime. The negotiation process for democratic reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s, thus, 
opened up spaces for an increase in the amount of violence that the local people perpetrated, due to 
the liminal authority and the power vacuums that it caused in the political interim. 
 Ironically, negotiating democracy, thus, ushered in more normalised levels of violence than 
before, with the result being, as Hamber (2000) states, that the “pervasive nature of this violence see-
ped into all parts of public life, undermining the moral interpersonal and social fabric of society” (6). 
The forms of political violence that had become legitimate in South Africa, thus, eventually spilled 
over into other aspects of the public, cultural and personal spheres, congealing, over time, to beco-
me legitimised in the other spheres as well. Hamber (2000) continues to argue that the “nature of vio-
lence in the early 1990s also changed, from vertical […] to horizontal […] By the 1990s intra-commu-
nity and intra-organisational conflict in the townships and rural areas […] accounted for the greatest 
number of fatalities” (7). One result of the formation of legitimised interpersonal and intra-communal 
violence is that “the experience of being violently victimised in South Africa has almost become a 
statistically normal feature of everyday life in the many urban and rural settings” (Hamber 2000, 8). 
The perpetration of general forms of violence as a normal feature of everyday life, thus, created an 
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environment in which sexual violence also became normal. Farmer’s (1996) assertion that structural 
violence specifically victimises women supports the above argument, as does Bourdieu and Pas-
seron’s (1990) conviction that women tend to be relatively vulnerable to forms of symbolic violence. 
 In strengthening the link between general normalised violence and sexual violence in parti-
cular, Wood (2005) argues that
the re-definition of gender and the liberalization of sexuality entailed by the de-
mocratic transition have posed serious challenges to orthodox, mainly autho-
ritarian notions of masculinity, leaving many men with a disempowering sense 
of irrelevance in the domestic sphere. (304)
Wood’s (2005) notion of a “crisis of masculinity” (304) is indicative of the sense of disempowerment 
and of the sense of perceived loss of historical patriarchal authority and control, which is in line with 
the notions of Mager (1998) and Morrell (2001). The latter two authors illustrate how a number of 
sociocultural and eco-political changes led to a crisis of masculinity, which, over time, changed a 
culture that was based on respect into a culture that was characteristically (sexually) violent. Though 
such an increase of sexual violence certainly indicates the social imploding of cultural life in South 
Africa, I could also argue that, if this initial increase of violence is to continue, seeping into other as-
pects of cultural life and practice, the violence concerned might eventually appear to consist of the 
acceptable violation of cultural norms. Wood et al. (2008) investigate how young people in South Afri-
ca construe, differentiate and legitimate such violent practices in terms of their sexual relationships. 
The researchers involved argue that “violence can be conceptualized as a dimension of everyday 
living, a form of communication that configures lives and subjectivities […] especially in relation 
to gender” (45). The key term in the above context is “everyday living”, which stresses how violent 
sexual crime becomes normal, especially along gendered lines within a culture that characteristically 
favours different forms of violence.
 In short, the apartheid state was a form of national structurally violent governance, which 
legitimised the perpetration of violence to keep itself in power. Such violence-prone governance led 
to the anti-apartheid struggle that legitimised its violence, in turn, so as to remove the apartheid 
government, by means of a process that the liberating ideology of African modernity partially infor-
med. The national political legitimisation of violence then exacerbated the existing forms of cultural 
and symbolic violence, like institutionalised forms of traditional patriarchy. This, in turn, led to the 
formation of an everyday culture of violence. The question then arises: How, and in what ways, has 
the culture of violence come to find expression in direct forms of gender and sexual violence on the 
local level, and how does this relate to the re-emergence of violent ukuthwala?
 By means of linking the action of rape with capitalist processes in South Africa, Singleton 
(2012) provides a good example of one way in which the culture of violence developed over time to 
result in the cultural legitimisation and expression of direct sexual violence. The author (Singleton 
2012) writes that the 
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linkage of rape to capitalist processes is useful in analyzing causes of sexual vio-
lence in postapartheid South Africa, where notions of individual property rights 
and exchange confront universal concepts of patriarchy. […] Although some 
practices have a long history, many changed and acquired new meanings, es-
pecially within the context of colonialism and the introduction of capitalism. 
(61)
Singleton (2012) argues that the introduction of capitalist thought (by means of the process of co-
lonialism) merged with the system of indigenous patriarchy and, consequently, led to the negotia-
tion of sexual and gender relationships in terms of currency, property and ownership in the current 
South African setting of everyday violence. Singleton’s example, incidentally, also illustrates the link 
between modernity and violence in South Africa. While colonisation and the capitalist economy (of 
which both are forms of structural violence on the national level) are the heritage of the presence 
of European forms of modernity in Africa, the way in which modernity in Africa hybridised with the 
indigenous economies and patriarchy (being the forms of indigenous cultural violence on the meso 
and local level) partly led to the development of African forms of modernity that display exacerbated 
forms of structural and cultural violence. 
 The imagining of ostensibly loving and romantic relationships in terms of consumerism and 
financial provision is key to understanding the way in which sexual and gender relationships and vio-
lence are negotiated on the local level. If a man financially provides for a female partner, he (and per-
haps the couple’s society) might accept that he ‘bought’ her love, and, thus, has the right to ‘possess’ 
and dominate her. The danger, then, is that a man’s “ownership” of his wife entitles him to treat her as 
he pleases, which is the point at which violence enters the picture. Such beliefs become exacerbated 
in patriarchal societies, in which cultural and symbolic violence is already present, acceptable and 
part of the everyday. Jewkes et al. (1999) refer to this dilemma in their aptly titled article, “He Must 
Give Me Money, He Mustn’t Beat Me”. As part of the researchers’ survey that they conducted in South 
Africa, they questioned women as to the patriarchal nature of their culture. Their responses indicated 
that the prevailing culture did favour the “subservience of women to their husband, punishment of 
her by him in some situations, male ownership of women, notions of male sexual entitlement and an 
interpretation of beating as a sign of love” (8). Jewkes et al. (1999) also write that in “the Eastern Cape, 
one in five women responded that at least sometimes it would be acceptable” for a man to commit 
violence against his partner (8).25 In this example, we see how the cultural violence of patriarchy be-
came imbued with the capitalist notions of ownership, entitlement and the subservience of women, 
which, in turn, translated into direct forms of sexual and gender-based violence. 
25  Incidentally, this conflation of cultural patriarchy with capitalist ideals again recalls modernity’s pluralisti-
cability to simultaneously be both local and global, as well as both universalising and culturally specific. It 
also shows the need for Farmer’s analysis along two axes – that of history, and that of ethnicity and gender, 
with the first being a call for an historically deep analysis that takes the role of capitalism into account, whe-
reas the second emphasises the need for paying particular attention to the way in which structural violence 
affects poor black women. 
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 Rather than arguing that indigenous patriarchy was never expressed in a violent way, I urge 
that the historical processes that I discuss influenced the pervasive patriarchal system in such a way 
that its violent expression became relatively commonplace and direct. Notions of the male owner-
ship of women, based on both patriarchal and capitalist ideologies, are, furthermore, important to 
this study, since all forms of customary marriages revolve around the issue of  lobola or bridewealth. 
During the course of my fieldwork, the topic of bridewealth and sexual violence during ukuthwa-
la procedures surfaced recurrently. Chapter Six specifically discussed these linkages, and how they 
have come to facilitate the violent re-emergence of ukuthwala.
Conclusion
As I have shown, modernity and violence were the two central concepts in my theoretical framing of 
the current investigation, and so they are in the analytical approach that follows. While theories of 
modernity are helpful in explaining how the contexts within which ukuthwala is re-emerging came 
into being, analytical models for understanding the perpetration of violence can explain how the 
contexts influence and facilitate the type of violence now characterising ukuthwala. 
 I commenced by illustrating how European conceptualisation and ideologies of modernity 
led to colonisation that, in turn, led to the formation of plural hybrid forms of African modernity. I 
then illustrated how four aspects of modernity – liberalism (Gikandi 2003); capitalism (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 2012); historicism; and ideology (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993) – shaped the various social 
realities that now form the context within which ukuthwala is re-emerging in a mutually constructive 
way. I then illustrated how certain ideologies led to the occurrence of certain events that shaped the 
country’s history, using the apartheid system, and its ideologies of racial segregation, as an example. 
 The advent of modernity in South Africa and the violence that is omnipresent in the country 
are intricately and inextricably linked. As I have shown, the historical processes and the historic even-
ts that shaped modernity in South Africa,26 all implied some or other form of violence, ranging from 
the national to the very local levels of society. I identified two premises (those of Scheper-Hughes 
and Bourgois 2004) that form the foundation of my analytical framework for the analysis of violence. 
The first premise is that the presence of violence always implies a dichotomy of legitimate/illegiti-
mate, depending on the individual’s or the societal cultural models with regard to the matter. While 
a minority of South African citizens saw apartheid as a legitimate form of governance, the non-white 
majority perceived it to be illegitimate. The same can be said to hold true for the violence that is con-
ducted during ukuthwala practices. The second premise, which seems to be a corollary of the first, is 
that some forms of violence become invisible because of their everydayness. If some or other forms 
of violence are culturally justified, people no longer perceive them as such, and the forms in question, 
thus, become invisible. Such perceptions, furthermore, explain why people came to see certain forms 
of violence as legitimate. Throughout this dissertation, I shall, thus, analyse when, how, why, and in 
what context people view violence as legitimate and invisible, or illegitimate, during the committing 
of ukuthwala procedures. 
26  In terms of colonisation, the capitalisation of the rural economy, apartheid, and the anti-apartheid struggle.
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 I introduced Farmer’s (1996) analytical model for studying structural violence as a model that 
I appropriated to investigate the various forms of violence that I encountered during the course of 
my investigation. The different forms included structural violence (Farmer 2004), cultural violence 
(Galtung 1990), symbolic violence (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2004), and direct forms of violence (sexu-
al and gender; Jewkes et al. 1999; Wood 2005). The analytical strength and value of Farmer’s model 
is multiple. My undertaking of a geographically broad and historically deep analysis allowed me to 
trace the historical events and processes (which the advent of modernity set in motion) that resulted 
in the current violent social realities in South Africa, generally speaking; the focus of the analysis on 
gender and ethnicity, in contrast, is helpful in homing in on how, specifically, poor black women be-
came the victims of the various forms of violence (embodied in the violent forms of ukuthwala) that 
historical national developments caused.

Chapter Two 
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In the previous chapter, I set out the theoretical framework of my investigation on the violent re-emer-
gence of ukuthwala. Yet, it is within the rural local towns and villages of the Eastern Cape province of 
South Africa that ukuthwala finds concrete expression in lived experiences, and it is in the cities whe-
re the judicial conflicts and discourses thereon ensue. A thorough description of the settings, both 
rural and urban, involved is therefore necessary. In the current chapter, I therefore want to discuss 
how the data required were obtained, as well as the details of the people and the research settings 
where I collected the data. Firstly, I shall discuss the research periods concerned, and then I shall turn 
my focus onto the research setting involved. I shall then discuss the methodologies that I used to ob-
tain the data, as well as the reasons for the methods that I chose, how I applied the methods, and the 
possible pitfalls thereof. I shall next present some of the research problems that I encountered, and 
how I dealt with the problems. I shall then introduce the key informants, along with an assessment 
of my working relationship with them. I shall follow this with a critical reflection on my situatedness 
as a researcher within the research setting, as well as on the subject matter of the research. I shall 
conclude with the rationale for the way in which I represented the study data. 
 I investigate ukuthwala as part of a constellation of interrelated marriage customs that a 
number of Cape Nguni groups practise, implying that my phenomena of investigation exceeded the 
bounds of the localities in which I conducted my research. This being the case, I shall focus on the 
specific research sites where I conducted my field research, after I give a brief overview of the region 
concerned. I shall then devote the entire following chapter to an in-depth discussion of the broader 
research population – consisting of both Mpondo and the Cape Nguni groupings – and their marri-
age and kinship practices. Doing so will also allow me to illustrate how the relevant marriage and 
kinship structures have changed over time as the result of the interaction between both the local and 
the national hierarchical structures of power, as Gupta and Ferguson (1992) propose. 
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EmaMpondweni and the Research Periods Concerned
i) The EmaMpondweni highlands. Used with photographer Walter Köppe’s permission.  
Source: http://blogsausbetties.com/tag/transkei/.
 As I mentioned in the introductory chapter, I carried out my field research in the EmaMpond-
weni region of the Eastern Cape province (see photo i). Though EmaMpondweni forms part of the 
Republic of South Africa, it is subject to the cultural and customary jurisdiction of the Mpondo royal fa-
mily, which the reigning queen, Lombekiso Ma Sobhuza Sigcau (see photo ii), currently heads. EmaM-
pondweni previously fell under the apartheid-constructed homeland of the Transkei, which name is 
still in use, albeit not politically. As such, the area is still rather underdeveloped, being home to several 
impoverished communities, who lack efficient electricity and sanitation structures, proper healthcare, 
and educational institutions. Despite such shortcomings, the end of the apartheid era also heralded 
in new economic and political liberties, with people being able to observe the effects of the growing 
democratisation of the region in the growing middle-class presence in the otherwise still largely eco-
nomically limited rural areas. Since the late nineteenth century, the area has seen a steady seasonal 
flow of migrant labour to farms that are situated in the current Western Cape province, and especially 
to the mines around Johannesburg. Nuclear and extended family and kin structures have taken on 
new forms in the absence of the father and older brothers, as well as the mother in many cases. If 
the parents work in other areas, their young children very often live with relatives, specifically with 
their older siblings, or with their grandparents. The women still do most of the domestic chores, with 
the mother appearing as primary caregivers, while the men appear to be the primary breadwinners. 
However, such perceptions are now only cultural ideals. Yet, due to the prevalence of income dispari-
ties and unemployment, any member of a family who can secure a paying job now acts as a primary 
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breadwinner. Single-generation households are, therefore, also coming to be increasingly common.27
ii) Queen Lombekiso MaSobhuza Sigcau. Source: Govender (2014), http://www.timeslive.co.za/ 
politics/2014/07/21/zuma-in-court-bid-to-block-princess-who-would-be-king.
 My research in EmaMpondweni encompassed two separate fieldwork periods, during which I 
conducted multisited ethnographic research. My first field trip allowed me to take the time to identify 
the key issues that were at stake in regards to my research intentions. My second field trip allowed me to 
focus on the identified issues more intensely, as well as to pose the questions that emerged during my 
indexing of the data gathering that I undertook during my first field trip. I shall succinctly introduce the 
different sites and explain the amount of time that I spent at each. I shall then give an overview of the 
general commonalities of the local sites, which precedes a description of each locality in more detail. 
 My initial induction into the research field, which lasted from the beginning of February 2012 
to the end of April 2012 (constituting a three-month period), formed part of a Master’s of Science 
research project. During this initial field trip to the Eastern Cape region of South Africa, I based myself 
in the town of Lusikisiki, and in the villages of Bambisana and Mugwambu. Lusikisiki, which served as 
a type of home base for me, was where I spent just slightly over two months collecting data by means 
of undertaking daily commutes to the villages immediately surrounding the town. I undertook two 
separate one-week visits to Bambisana and its surrounding villages, and I spent the last week of this 
fieldwork period at the roadside village of Mugwambu. 
 My second field research period commenced at the end of January 2013 and concluded at 
the end of May 2013 (being four months in duration). Though Lusikisiki once more served as the 
home base for my research, I undertook two separate trips to other locations. The first trip was again 
spent at Bambisana, where I conducted research into the surrounding villages for two weeks. I spent 
27  I shall discuss the research area and family structures in much greater depth in the following chapter. 
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time here specifically because the area is much more rural than Lusikisiki, and it was here that I found 
most of the thwala’ed women who became my interviewees. Moving between the various rural lo-
cations was also necessary, since ukuthwala is an irregular marriage form that is not concentrated 
in any one community or area. I, thus, accompanied my informants in a joint search for abduction 
cases. I, therefore, did not confine my research in the Eastern Cape to the geographical borders of the 
three urbanised, yet rural, settlements, but it was, rather, spread throughout the areas concerned. 
The areas between the three locations (Lusikisiki, Bambisana and Mugwambu) also contained re-
latively small villages and family compounds, thus blurring any clear division that I might otherwise 
have been able to draw between the urban and the rural environments encountered (see photo iii). 
This fieldwork period also took me much further, to the province of Gauteng, where I conducted in-
terviews in Johannesburg and Pretoria, respectively. The purpose of my research in the Eastern Cape 
was rather different to that of my research in Gauteng. To understand the local dynamics of ukuthwa-
la was the primary concern, and, thus, the reason for me to spend most of the time allotted for my 
fieldwork immersed at the local level in the Eastern Cape. My decision to visit Gauteng was chiefly to 
attempt to come to an understanding of how outsiders, who were in some or other way engaged with 
the ukuthwala controversy, viewed the custom through the lenses of their official professions. 
iii) Villages in EmaMpondweni, as often spread out without any clear geographic boundary. Used with 
photographer Walter Köppe’s permission. Source: http://blogsausbetties.com/tag/transkei/.
The Four Main Research Locations 
Lusikisiki is situated on the escarpment between the EmaMpondweni highlands and the eastern 
coast of South Africa (see map iii on page four and photo iv below). According to the 2011 nationwide 
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census (Government of South Africa 2011), Lusikisiki covers an area of more or less 4.09 km², with it 
having a population of 4028. Of the inhabitants, 93.99 per cent were black African, while 81.00 per 
cent had isiXhosa as their home language. Apart from its one asphalt main street, all of the other 
roads in the town at the time of the study were gravel, resulting in a great deal of dust when the area 
was dry, but turning to mire in the rainy season. Though the town was built up around the gravel 
roads that branch out diagonally from the main street, there is one new, and continually expanding, 
suburb that is called New Town. Taxis, informal vendors and small entrepreneurial businesses that 
create congestion on the sidewalks and in the car parking areas provide an industrial buzz all day 
long, giving rise to traffic jams at any time of the day, with there being no recognisable peak hour. 
Immigrants, who come mainly from China, India, and Pakistan, own most of the big stores and ware-
houses in the town. Though coloured, white and Indian South Africans also own some of the stores 
and businesses concerned, not many of them live in Lusikisiki on a permanent basis. 
iv) Lusikisiki’s main street. Used with photographer Walter Köppe’s permission.  
Source: http://blogsausbetties.com/tag/transkei/.
 Lusikisiki’s classification as a town (as opposed to a village), together with Bisho, Flagstaff 
and Port St Johns (which are also situated in EmaMpondweni), implies that a magistrate’s court and 
Department of Home Affairs offices are based in it. A number of private medical practices exist in the 
town, as well as does a big hospital with a daily mobile clinic that travels around in the surrounding 
areas, going from village to village. Even so, the amount of medical care that the authorities provide 
is still insufficient, as the patients concerned have sometimes to sit in queues for days before seeing 
a medical practitioner. The town, furthermore, sports an array of professional businesses, two private 
primary schools, and one primary government school. I, furthermore, met a number of college and 
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university graduates in the town, to find that, on average (as far as I could tell), those who worked and 
lived in Lusikisiki had a good comprehension of the English language.
 During my stay in Lusikisiki, I resided in the vacant parish rectory of the local Uniting Refor-
ming Church in Southern Africa, which is an indigenous sister church of the Dutch Reformed Church 
of South Africa. I specifically chose Lusikisiki as a home base, since most of the media reports mentio-
ned the area concerned as being one in which the locals practised ukuthwala. The surrounding rural 
villages were relatively inaccessible, as well as was the governmental place of safety for vulnerable 
girls – including thwala’ed ones. Lusikisiki, furthermore, served as my point of entry to the field, with 
it being the first point of contact from which I was able to build up relationships with my informants. 
The townspeople’s good comprehension of English also enabled me to start with my interviews and 
field research prior to me finding reliable interpreters.
 The village of Bambisana is situated in the mountains 42km south-west of Lusikisiki, and I ex-
perienced its environs as being much more rural than were those of Lusikisiki. The village started out 
as a mission station of the Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa, with its main purpose being that 
of providing a mission hospital. In the course of time, the government took over the hospital, which 
also built a primary and secondary school nearby. Other than the hospital, the school, and a Chine-
se-owned family grocery store, there were no other formal industries or form of commerce in the area 
at the time of the study. Bambisana seemed to be a collection of mud huts and small brick houses 
that were loosely clustered around the school and hospital. With only a few hundred people living 
in the village itself, the population density was low. However, numerous villages huddled around 
Bambisana, blurring any geographical border that it might have had. When doing research there, I 
once more lived in an old mission parish rectory. As in the case of the house in which I resided at Lu-
sikisiki, the house in which I stayed in Bambisana now also belongs to the Uniting Reforming Church 
in Southern Africa. Here, however, I shared the accommodation with three young missionaries. The 
village’s rural setting enabled me to engage more directly in participant observation, especially when 
I was able to visit family homesteads together with my informants. I found that people living in this 
mountainous region could provide more helpful information on traditional marriage practices in ge-
neral than could their more urbanised counterparts. 
 Mugwambu, which is a small village that is about 20km north of Lusikisiki, was roughly the 
same size as Bambisana at the time of the study. Here, I visited a family whom I had met shortly after 
I had arrived in Lusikisiki, during my initial research period (see photo v). I was accommodated in a 
homestead that was typical of the Mpondo, consisting of thatched huts, with a cattle enclosure and 
plots of cultivated land close by. The purpose of staying here for a short time was to experience the 
daily local life in a more rural setting than I had previously encountered. During my preliminary archi-
val research, I found that people frequently referred to the link that ukuthwala has with indigenous 
beliefs, traditional forms of patriarchy, and low levels of education. Living in a rural village for some 
time brought me closer to such conditions, and I was able to observe the local lifestyle on a more 
personal basis than I had been able to do up until that stage. Staying under such conditions provided 
additional insight into the prevailing situation. Living here also presented me with numerous oppor-
tunities to interview the local inhabitants. Every day, I followed various family members on their daily 
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rounds. During this time, I witnessed a festival that the locals held for a widow who had just come out 
of mourning, and another for a widow who went into mourning at the time. In addition to helping to 
build a traditional cattle enclosure (a boma, or kraal), I learned a great deal about the manifestation 
of cultural respect in the society, including the locals’ seating arrangements in a hut, their order of 
serving and greeting, and their speaking rules, regarding who may speak when and where.28 The vil-
lages where I did research around Lusikisiki and Bambisana closely resembled Mugwambu in social 
setting and practice.
v) Mrs Nothembile Nohe (above right), with her daughter and some of her grandchildren, in front of the 
hut in which I stayed at Mugwambu. Photo taken by the author, April 2012. 
 My final research setting was Gauteng province – the commercial and industrial centre of the 
country – where I spent about two weeks. I was based in Johannesburg, and undertook one trip to 
Pretoria, where I spent three days. Though Gauteng is one of my multisited research settings where 
I conducted ethnographic fieldwork, it is unlike the local level and the rural settings of the Eastern 
Cape for two main reasons. Firstly, the province is geographically far from the location where the phe-
nomenon under investigation occurs, and secondly, the purpose of my fieldwork there was entirely 
different to that which I had undertaken in the Eastern Cape. My primary focus in Gauteng was to gain 
fuller comprehension of the relationship between indigenous law and the Constitution; of when an 
abduction marriage would be legal, according to indigenous law; of what the procedure would be if 
a civil court were to find that an ukuthwala marriage had entailed illegal elements; and finally, of how 
28  The ‘boma’, or ‘kraal’, is a traditional cattle enclosure with horizontal beams woven between vertical logs, 
with vegetation filling any open gaps. 
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NGOs perceived ukuthwala and how they dealt with girls who fled from such marriages. During my 
research in the province, I gathered valuable information with regard to the legal and governmental 
(outsiders’) perspective on cultural practices at the time. This enabled me to compare the perspec-
tive at stake with the various local perspectives that I had encountered. 
Qualitative Research Design – Ethnography and its Methods  
Having some insight into the local setting prevailing in the area under investigation, I shall now give 
an account of why a qualitative research design was chosen as being the most suitable option for 
this specific study. As was mentioned in the introduction, I believe that current forms of ukuthwala 
are best understood as being the result of the interaction between local and national processes, 
discourses and events, which necessitates the taking of a holistic approach towards them. I, there-
fore, investigate different themes within the debate (primarily focusing on issues of human rights 
discourses, gender, and economic policy) at the macro, meso and micro levels of South African soci-
ety. My qualitative research is, thus, a combination of extensive literature research and ethnographic 
fieldwork. Conducting extensive literature research served to illuminate the discourses and perspec-
tives on ukuthwala at the macro level (including the government, the judiciary, and the media). Such 
research also enabled me to investigate how the historical development of marriage practices in 
general has shaped the present ukuthwala phenomenon. In contrast, the ethnographic fieldwork 
enabled me to explore the topic from the different perspectives that the various actors involved on 
both the meso and the micro level29 held. My ethnographic research was, furthermore, able to pro-
vide me with in-depth descriptions and insight into the lifeworlds, emotions and motivations that 
have served to stimulate the violent re-emergence of ukuthwala. The long-term fieldwork of which 
ethnographic research consists enabled me to build up intimate and confidential relationships with 
my informants, which were crucial, in the light of my investigation into sensitive and controversial 
topics. The conducting of long-term fieldwork also allowed me, as a researcher, to investigate the 
research topic from various perspectives, and, in particular, to formulate the necessary emic and 
subdominant points of view. 
 The versatility of ethnographic research sprouts from the fact that it allows the undertaking 
of different kinds of analysis of diverse data types at various stages of an investigation. Writing within 
the context of social research in general (of which ethnography is one sub-form), Babbie and Mouton 
(2010) differentiate between two types of social analyses, based on the data taken into considerati-
on, namely archival/document research, and field research. Bringing the identified differentiation 
to bear on my own research, I shall illustrate, in this section, how the two units of analysis aided 
me during the two phases of my ethnographic research. I shall, secondly, discuss the ethnographic 
methods that aided me in the collection and analysis of various types of data. I shall, finally, show 
how I initiated employing the methods involved as a means of finding a point of access into the field 
through the relationships that I was able to build up with my main informants. 
29  Including the social workers, the police officers and the traditional authorities, as well as the local commu-
nity members and the thwala’ed women.
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 According to Babbie and Mouton (2010), the first category of social research entails “concep-
tual or non-empirical […] theories and models, analyzing concepts, or reviewing the body of know-
ledge” (84). This category encompasses already published material, which is, thus, available prior to 
the fieldwork period. Though not referring to Babbie and Mouton, Sanjek (1990), along similar lines, 
also alludes to such an available conceptual category – as well as to its purpose – when writing that 
“[s]ignificant theories, those in books and journals, determine the place, problems, and record ob-
jectives brought to the field. […] Critical, political, and theoretical awareness precedes ethnography 
and structures the research proposals that fieldworkers nowadays most often prepare themselves” 
(395−396). The analysis of ‘non-empirical’ or ‘conceptual’ data, therefore, is possible so as to con-
struct an initial conceptual and theoretical framework in preparation for the fieldwork period, as well 
as to help guide the research throughout the course of the investigation. 
 Constructing such a provisional theoretical and conceptual framework prior to doing the 
fieldwork research was, accordingly, the first methodological phase of my ethnographic study. I 
spent a number of months doing archival and document research in the libraries at Radboud Univer-
sity of Nijmegen in the Netherlands, and at Stellenbosch University in South Africa. The conceptual 
or non-empirical data that I analysed during this pre-fieldwork period was composed of published 
scientific and academic research with regard to the jurisprudent debates and to the sociocultural 
conflicts and processes. It also related to the economic policies that had a bearing on the lifeworlds 
of the Mpondo. I also undertook online research that was specifically focused on finding reports on 
ukuthwala that had appeared in the news media, or that the government, or the relevant NGOs, had 
produced. First analysing existing data, and then constructing a research proposal and a theoretical 
framework based on the data (see Sanjek 1990) aided me in planning my fieldwork, as well as pro-
viding me with helpful background information on the area, and on the people living there, before I 
entered the field. However, as I have already analysed the non-empirical data in the literature review 
and in the theoretical framework in the prior chapter, in the current chapter I shall focus on the empi-
rical units of analysis, and on Babbie and Mouton’s (2010) second category of general social research. 
 Babbie and Mouton (2010) define “empirical [units of analysis as] human behaviour, histo-
rical events, or social programs” (84). The empirical units of analysis in the current study, therefore, 
consist of the human behaviours that I observed and studied during the fieldwork period of my re-
search, as well as the current and historical events that are presently reshaping ukuthwala. My data, 
thus, have to do with human action and communication. Collecting and analysing empirical data 
supplements the conceptual data obtained. Sanjek (1990) quotes Middleton, who writes that “[w]hat 
the fieldworker does in essence is to build up hypothetical structures or patterns as he goes along. 
Every new fact that he gathers can either be fitted into that structure, or if not, he is forced to change 
the structure” (Sanjek 1990, 397). Prior to embarking on the fieldwork concerned, I thus constructed a 
provisional hypothesis about the re-emergence of ukuthwala, namely that violence has always been 
a potential element of the practice, but that it is now acquiring new forms for novel purposes. I then 
tested, changed and rethought the hypothesis, on the basis of the insights that I had gained from the 
empirical data that I had collected in the field. Whenever new data contradicted my hypothesis, I had to 
change it, and, when the data gathered served to supplement my hypothesis, I expanded and refined it.
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 The methods that I used to gather the empirical data were those of participant observation; 
small talk; informal conversations; semi-structured and in-depth interviewing; focus group discus-
sions; life histories; case studies; and, finally, the making of field and head notes. Men and women 
from older and younger generations comprised my sources of primary data. My youngest female 
interviewee was 22 years old, with the youngest male interviewee being 21 years old. The oldest lady 
whom I interviewed did not know her exact age, but claimed that she was older than 80 years, while 
the oldest man was 83 years old. With the exception of five Xhosa individuals, and a few individuals 
having both a Pondo and a Zulu parent, the rest were all of Mpondo descent.
 Rather than using the above-mentioned methods as separate, rigid models in terms of the 
organised and formal settings, the given situation determined the method(s) used, and the infor-
mants who participated in the particular method(s). For example, it often happened that what I set 
out to conduct as a relatively formal interview became an informal conversation as the formal cir-
cumstances became more relaxed. For instance, meeting someone for the first time was invariably 
accompanied by the exchange of very formal greetings and shows of deference, yet the moment that 
I asked the informants what they thought of the dispute over who would ascend the Mpondo thro-
ne, they relaxed into laughter, since they did not expect an outsider to be aware of the dispute that 
was ongoing at the time. Chatting lightly about the topic, thus, served to create a relatively relaxed 
atmosphere, in which the interviewees felt that they could start to trust me as the researcher. At 
other times, an informal conversation with one or two informants led into being an insightful focus 
group discussion, as bystanders joined in the discussions. I, thus, found that being able to be flexible 
as regards the methodological approach adopted, so that I was able, during the course of a given 
situation, to change my modus operandi relatively quickly (as, for instance, from an interview to a 
focus group discussion) often proved to be rewarding. Such occurrences, which transpired fairly fast, 
tended to yield more data than I would have obtained if I had rigidly applied a specific research me-
thod. 
 Altogether, besides numerous occasions on which I participated in small talk, I conducted 
64 interviews and ten focus group discussions. Of the 64 interviews, 45 were with women, whereas 
19 were with men; five were with academics and NGO workers in Gauteng; five were with someone 
who either had had a close family member abductee, or who had a close family member who was an 
abductor; nine were in-depth interviews with thwala’ed women;30 and one interview was with a man 
who had abducted his wife. Of the ten focus group discussions, three of the focus groups consisted 
of women only, whereas one consisted of men only, and six consisted of both men and women. The 
smallest focus group numbered only three individuals. The mixed focus groups ranged in size from 
three individuals to more than forty. The topics of the focus group discussion centred on the local 
experience of human rights with regard to marriage, the growing intensity of sexual violence, and the 
ukuthwala awareness campaigns. On a number of occasions, I interviewed elderly individuals, both 
male and female, who were uncertain about their date of birth. The informants, furthermore, often 
used the terms ‘men’, ‘women’, ‘girl’ and ‘boy’ in very different ways when referring to age and gender 
30  I obtained life histories from five of the nine women, in addition to my initial interview with them.
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categories. For the purpose of my research, I, thus, define the elderly as consisting of individuals who 
are older than 60 years, the middle-aged as consisting of those between 40 and 59 years old, and the 
young as consisting of those between 20 and 39 years old. In using the term ‘girl’, I specifically refer 
to underaged girls who are younger than 18 years old. I clearly indicate any deviation from the very 
general categories. I shall, furthermore, provide more personal information on the informants when I 
quote them in the following chapters, as well as when I mention their names in the list of informants 
that I provide at the end of the dissertation.31
 While it happened twice that I had large focus groups, I did not originally set out to have focus 
groups of such a size. Through my main informants, I arranged to meet the village chiefs and elders at 
their weekly imbizo gatherings. The term ‘imbizo’ refers to a type of customary tribunal at which the 
legally empowered chief and elders gather to settle disputes and misdemeanours within their village 
jurisdiction. On two such occasions, the chief invited the whole village to participate in the focus 
groups, including the women of the village, who, traditionally, the men do not allow to join the imbizo 
meetings, unless they are party to a case that they are hearing. Though the size of the two instances 
concerned was unusual, the focus groups concerned proved to be invaluable. At the first such village 
gathering, I met an elderly thwala’ed lady (who herself is the offspring of an abduction marriage), 
and her son. During the discussion that I had with them, an elderly man forcefully interrupted us, de-
fending the practice of ukuthwala as a family-building mechanism, thus bringing the widely diverse 
perceptions of ukuthwala to the fore. The second village gathering also yielded interesting data when 
a young woman became engaged in a heated debate with three young men with regard to ukuthwala 
and human rights. Perhaps predictably, she was against abduction marriage, calling it ‘rape’, whereas 
they saw the practice as an important part of acceptable cultural practice. Allowing situations to de-
velop naturally, and adapting my methods accordingly, was, thus, a worthwhile endeavour, yielding 
data that I might not otherwise have obtained.
 The ethnographic methods that aided me during the conducting of conversations and inter-
views are discussed below. I made extensive use of a Dictaphone that enabled me to transcribe the 
vast majority of my communicative encounters (whether they took the form of formal interviews or 
informal conversations) with care. Doing the transcriptions enabled me to revisit my initial thoughts 
and attitudes, as well as the factual information that I encountered, even if, in the case of the latter, 
it was only audible. Transcribing interviews and carefully analysing them facilitated my laying bare 
both the informants’ way of reasoning about, and the language construction that they used in descri-
bing, the relevant subject matter. Finding such subtleties was important, as the way in which people 
use language reveals much about the inner reasoning of individuals. The constructed vocalisation 
of language reveals the inner reasoning of individuals in relation to their attitudes and beliefs. When 
interviewing an elderly woman, for example, she said that ukuthwala was ‘bad’, since a person could 
end up in jail for practising the custom. In shifting the ‘bad’ of ukuthwala to the negative results that 
the practice might hold for those who are responsible for it, the focus becomes less on the negative 
31  See Appendix A for a schematic overview of all the interviews conducted, and Appendix B for a selection of 
interview transcripts from which I have quoted in this dissertation. 
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results that it might hold for the girl in question. In other words, the woman in question was saying 
that an action resulting in a jail term was ‘bad’, and not that ukuthwala was ‘bad’, per se.
 Making field notes was another ethnographic method that I used. The notes that I primarily 
recorded as a supplement to the recorded interviews and conversations encompassed descriptions 
of non-verbal information or communication, such as facial expressions, who spoke when and to 
what extent, and tone of voice or the maintenance of silence. The notes revealed much about the at-
titudes of those involved and their social position. The notes that I took on the physical surroundings, 
like the number of buildings in a compound, the building material used, the presence or absence 
of a kraal, and its distance from Lusikisiki, for instance, might indicate something of the financial 
situation concerned and even the level of education of the informants. I also often found households 
consisting of young children and elderly grandparents, which, more often than not, indicated either 
that the parents had migrated to work in the cities, or that the middle generation had died out from 
AIDS-related illnesses. This was very helpful in researching the practice of ukuthwala, as will become 
clear in Chapter Three. 
 The method of participant observation enabled me to gain the desired access to an insi-
der’s perspective on the Mpondo and their local lifeworlds. Though I do not imply that I was able 
to become an intrinsic part of their world, I did gain valuable insights into it by means of living in 
close association with both Xhosa and Mpondo people. Such proximity meant attending their local 
restaurants (selling their traditional dishes) in company with them, joining in their local festivals, and 
aiding them in their daily chores (as in helping them to carry water from a small river nearby to the 
huts in which they resided). My participant observation chiefly entailed living in Mugwambu with an 
Mpondo family, but I also used the method when informally socialising with my informants and their 
acquaintances.
 Studying the aforementioned archival and media documents served as a method by means 
of which I was able to acquaint myself with the field and subject matter involved. It also served as 
a method of identifying the important issues that were at stake in the surrounding controversy. My 
interview questions and conversations revolved around the identified issues. The questions that I 
asked tended, at first, to be somewhat set, although they were written in everyday language, as I was 
aware that the prevailing levels of literacy were rather low in the area in which I conducted my rese-
arch. However, I realised, on a number of occasions, that my questions were styled in such a manner 
that the informants could not, under certain circumstances, provide an open-ended answer to them, 
thus hampering their ability to answer the questions freely. I, accordingly, changed such questions, 
and added other questions to guide me in possible further interviews.
 I had two priorities when entering the field and when trying to find the proper help; my first 
priority was to establish amicable working relationships with my six main informants (whom I met 
during my first field trip), who also acted as interpreters.32 Once I felt that the relationships concerned 
had been established by means of the conducting of several informal conversations, I moved on to 
32  I want to confine myself to a discussion of the ethnographic design here, and I shall, therefore, elaborate on 
the details of my key informants later on. 
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holding the semi-structured and in-depth interviews, which sometimes flowed from a casual con-
versation. The communicative situations were mostly recorded digitally, or by hand. The informal 
conversations often revolved around my research and around what exactly I wanted to investigate. 
This gave me the opportunity to explain my interests, which greatly helped in the translation process. 
Most of my informants, for example, were not acquainted with the term ‘customary law’, which is, 
historically, both a Western term and legal jargon. When they had come to understand the subject 
matter of my research questions, the interpreters adopted the expression the cultural way (of our 
ancestors), which was an expression that all those contacted understood clearly. With the exception 
of a few interviews that I conducted in Lusikisiki, my main informants organised all the meetings at 
which I conducted interviews, or at which I held conversations with the local people. The meetings 
usually took place at peoples’ homes, where I always felt warmly received. 
 My second step in engaging, and in establishing good rapport, with my informants was to 
obtain permission for my fieldwork from the highest traditional authority at the Tribal Council of 
Qaukeni. A number of chiefs, as well as the king and/or queen and/or senior members of their imme-
diate family, preside over Qaukeni, being the royal court that is situated at the residence of the Pondo 
royal family. The Tribal Council of Qaukeni, on granting me permission to proceed with my research, 
gave me a letter of introduction to the communities involved. The granting of such permission only, 
however, occurred after one of my key informants – Mrs JikilezaNomthandazo Gongxeka – had taken 
great pains to explain that my research was for the sole purpose of coming to understand the nature 
of ukuthwala. She later informed me that numerous bad experiences with the media had closed 
doors for outsiders who had wanted to ask questions with regard to ukuthwala and male initiation 
ceremonies. Though a number of people were initially sceptical about talking to me, they became 
much more relaxed and willing to talk to me after seeing my letter of introduction. Procuring the let-
ter of introduction also facilitated my main informants’ organisation of my participation in the imbizo 
meetings, as well as my contact with people who, in some or other way, were involved with thwala 
cases. A simple “He is known at Qaukeni Great Place”, as my main informants put it, was sufficient 
reassurance to gain me access to the lifeworlds of the local people, which would, otherwise, not have 
been an easy task. 
Ethnographic Pitfalls 
The main concerns of an ethnographic research design are the biases of the researcher, which are 
intimately wound up with the concern that the ethnographer’s main instrument of research is him/
herself. Difficulty also lies in having to make generalisations that are appropriate to the larger com-
munity from the limited amount of information that a researcher gains from a relatively small num-
ber of informants. However, ways exist of contending with such challenges, to at least some extent.
 The bias of the researcher becomes especially relevant when sensitive topics are under in-
vestigation. An initial glance at the custom of ukuthwala could easily make the researcher a victim of 
unnuanced prejudice that construes all abductors as rapists, and all indigenous marriage practices 
as brutal. Crapanzano (2011, 455) writes that ethnographic distance helped him to mask and rationa-
lise his position as scientific researcher on the one hand, and as human being with emotions on the 
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other, while he was researching emotive issues. He describes the keeping of ethnographic distance 
as involving the maintenance of a balance between empathy and objectivity. My feeling of empathy 
led me, firstly, to commence this investigation, and then it required that I position myself within the 
debate, siding with the vulnerable individuals involved, whoever they were. The adoption of an ob-
jective stance, however, demands the taking of a rational scientific approach that is based on empi-
rically verifiable facts. My objectivity, which afforded me the opportunity to utilise a rational scientific 
approach, enabled me to place the requisite ethnographic distance between my research subject 
matter and myself. Though I might not have remained equally objective throughout the course of my 
entire study, my adherence to the principle of ethnographic distance did help me become aware of 
my own emotionality, and the various ways in which it could possibly affect my otherwise rational 
approach. 
 In addition to the above, my gender and linguistic limitations presented difficulties to me in 
terms of the data collection, since I was my own main instrument of research. My understanding of 
isiXhosa was still rudimentary, consisting of a single year’s study of the language at the University of 
Stellenbosch. Though the majority of my informants had a sound basic grasp of the English langua-
ge, I still needed the assistance of interpreters when working with them. However, my informants 
appreciated my ability to exchange formal greetings with them and to conduct small talk in what 
was, in most cases, their home language before I commenced with the interviews. In this sense, my 
rudimentary isiXhosa language skills led to the informants, by and large, having a positive attitude 
towards me. Nevertheless, my limited knowledge of the language did present a challenge as far as 
the interpreting of local terms and translation went. At one stage, for example, when translating an 
ukuthwala account for me, a key informant alternated between use of the English words ‘rape’ and 
‘sex’. Noticing this, I asked him after the interview whether the interviewee had used the IsiXhosa 
word for ‘rape’ or ‘sex’ when describing her own abduction. Surprisingly, he said both – she thought 
of her own experience as rape, yet used the neutral word ‘sex’ when talking about the custom of 
ukuthwala in general. This situation alerted me to the importance of making sure that my interpreters 
translated the isiXhosa words for ‘rape’, ‘sex’ and ‘forced sex’ as such, rather than translating them as 
just one blanket English word. Simultaneously, the above incident also sensitised me to the fact that 
the informants themselves were often in doubt as to how they should reflect on their own experien-
ces, which was indicative of the conflicting views that the wider community held on ukuthwala as 
well.
 In certain Mpondo communities, the manifestation of different gender roles and hierarchies 
is still very strong, with numerous taboos being in place regarding who might discuss what, and 
when. With ukuthwala being a very sensitive issue, I believed that the two genders felt more comfor-
table when conversing about it in their own language with someone of the same sex. I, thus, strove 
to work with both male and female interpreters, though I did not always manage to have a female 
interpreter present when I was interviewing women, and vice versa. However, this did not seem to 
affect the results of this study in any noticeable way, since both the male and the female participants 
in the study revealed very intimate, sensitive and personal information when talking to an interpreter 
of the opposite sex. Neither did either sex reveal any more information when talking to an interpreter 
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of the same sex than did those who spoke to someone of the opposite sex. I, therefore, concluded 
that my initial assumption about the gender sensitivities of the study participants was dismissible, 
whereas the inability to comprehend their language to the fullest extent was, indeed, a limitation to 
grasping the full meaning of what they had to say. 
 The third challenge that I found in terms of the chosen research model was that of gene-
ralisation, in regard to which there were two main concerns, namely: 1) the potential of flattening 
out (internal) cultural diversity in the making of generalisations, and 2) the limited scope that the 
study of ethnography allows for generalisation in general. Addressing the first concern, Abu-Lughod 
(1993) writes that the researcher must guard against the generalisations that are inherent in ethno-
graphic culture, as their use tends to produce the unwanted homogenisation of cultural variations. 
Such generalisations, the researcher argues, emerge in the language of power that is present in the 
discourses that researchers use. She proposes that her structuring of individual stories in biographi-
cal fashion, centred on her anthropological interests, is a way of circumventing generalisations and 
misplaced notions of the researcher’s authority in regard to the other’s culture. Such circumvention 
is possible, she argues, because the personal stories involved are inevitably connected with the broa-
der society and with the social processes of which individuals are a part.
 Abu-Lughod’s (1993) notion of structuring biographical stories along the lines of our anthro-
pological interests is, indeed, helpful in terms of avoiding the flattening out of the manifest charac-
teristics of internal cultural diversity. The main aim of anthropological research is to gain in-depth 
insight into diverse cultural aspects, and into how humans interact with culture as part of their per-
sonal lifeworlds, of which an intimate understanding is sought, as opposed to a broad general un-
derstanding of culture as a whole. Such an intimate understanding specifically reveals the intricacies 
of internal cultural diversity more effectively than does the latter. As such, the desire to grasp the eth-
nographic meaning of biographical stories is especially helpful in terms of the current study, as one 
of its primary foci is concerned with coming to an understanding of the internal diversity of opinions, 
perspectives and ways of executing ukuthwala. Yet, I also believe that generalisations, when groun-
ded in biographical stories, can also provide insightful ethnographic depth to our understanding of 
existing lifeworlds. 
 The basing of generalisations on such biographical stories alone, nonetheless, is difficult, 
because the adoption of an ethnographic approach entails the undertaking of qualitative research, 
which implies having, per se, to rely on a rather limited amount of data. Accordingly, I supplemented 
the intimate stories of my informants with the data that I collected from already published docu-
ments and theories, case studies of similar practices, and reports presented in the media. I anticipa-
ted that combining data in this way would render the making of generalisations feasible, at least on 
a limited scale, provided that the findings of the published materials showed multiple similarities to 
the data that I collected from the individuals concerned. The use of such a method not only illumina-
ted my understanding of the link existing between the individual and their immediate society, but it 
also presented me with the opportunity to engage in limited generalisations with regard to the social 
processes in which the societies found themselves embroiled. It also enabled me to offer possible 
theoretical explanations for the existence of such social processes. 
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Hurdles Along the Ethnographic Path
The main problem that I faced while doing my fieldwork was having to come to terms with the ethical 
implications of my research problem. The two ideal target groups for the research were the men who 
actually thwala’ed girls, and the girls themselves. The implementation of a democratic form of gover-
nance has brought about the formulation of a new constitution that is premised on the principle of 
universal human rights. This, in turn, has led to the formation of policies and organs of state that are 
aimed at ensuring the maintenance of such rights. As my research was not subject to the approval 
of any official and registered ethics committee in the Netherlands, trying to obtain the necessary 
permission to interview underaged girls was very difficult in South Africa.33 During my first field trip to 
South Africa, I was unable to find anyone in an official capacity connected with the general welfare of 
those in the Mpondo society who was prepared to consider my request for approval of my proposed 
research. Those whom I approached in this connection included the police, the social workers, the 
caretakers, the managers, and the directors of safe houses dedicated to thwala’ed girls. I even sent 
requests to interview some of the individuals concerned to provincial level, but to no avail. Not one of 
the individuals who could potentially have granted me permission to conduct interviews with those 
who were the most intimate subjects of ukuthwala reacted with surprise to my research topic. This 
was because the government’s related awareness campaign and the television documentaries of in-
vestigative journalists in this direction had served to sensitise them to the amount of (inter)national 
interest that ukuthwala draws. Some of the individuals concerned were even sympathetic toward my 
intended research, yet, without ethical clearance from a recognised body, I was officially barred from 
talking to certain individuals. 
 Fortunately, the situation changed during my second field trip, when I was able to obtain 
permission from the regional authorities at the Department of Social Development in Lusikisiki to 
interview the social workers who dealt with abduction cases in the area. The regional Brigadier of 
Police also granted me permission to interview any police staff members under his jurisdiction. In 
addition, the local magisterial court allowed me to talk to their staff who handle domestic violence 
cases. Finally, the manager of the Palmerton Child Care Multipurpose Centre (CCMC), which is a place 
of safety for vulnerable girls in Lusikisiki, granted me an interview with herself. She also gave her 
permission that I might interview her staff, who interacted with thwala’ed girls on a daily basis. The 
interviews that were obtained in this way provided me with a wealth of insightful data that will be 
presented in the ensuing chapters. Other than obtaining permission for my research at Qaukeni for a 
second time during my second field trip, and for my meeting with the same authoritative individuals 
for the second time, I can but ascribe the granting of this favour to ethnographic providence.
33  Though social science faculties in the Netherlands did have codes of conduct in place to ensure scientific 
integrity at the time of my fieldwork (see NISCO 2014), no ethics committee was available to screen and 
approve research proposals dealing with ethically sensitive topics. I could, therefore, not obtain any official 
statement or letter of introduction from such a committee that might have granted me access to the target 
groups concerned who fell under governmental protection in South Africa. I did, however, obtain a letter of 
introduction from my study supervisor. 
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 Finding the men who abducted girls proved to be even more difficult than it was to find the 
women who had been abducted. This was simply because the practice had, almost always, included 
some or other illegal element that those involved were usually keen to hide. Should the personal de-
tails of the men concerned have come to the knowledge of the law enforcement authorities, the men 
involved could have been subject to trial for statutory rape and sexual assault. Talking to me was, 
consequently, a risk that they were not willing to take. I also found evidence that some communities 
were not reporting such cases, even if they did not agree with such conduct. Issues of community se-
crecy and silence, accordingly, also made finding such men and girls difficult. In an attempt to solve 
the problem, I interviewed elderly ladies who were thwala’ed before the introduction and enforce-
ment of the principle of constitutional human rights, as well as young women who were abducted 
more recently, but who were older than 18 years, and, thus, were no longer legally minors. Though I 
managed to find a number of such women, I was able to speak with only one man who had thwala’ed 
a girl who, at the time of my research, was his wife. I supplemented the single first-hand male account 
with six interviews with men in general. Of the latter, three were the offspring of a thwala marriage, 
and another three had assisted a friend in some or other way when the latter had abducted a girl 
through ukuthwala. The male accounts provided an insightful male perspective on the practice, as 
well as on how the children of such marriages perceived the custom. I shall focus on the male per-
spective accounts in more detail in chapters Five and Six. 
Key Informants
vi) My key informant at Lusikisiki, Mrs Jikileza Nomthandazo Gongxeka, and I. Photo taken by the 
 author, February 2012. 
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 The six key informants with whom I chiefly worked during both of my fieldwork periods consi-
sted of two elderly and one young Pondo women, and three young Xhosa men. The informants were 
invaluable to the study, for which I owe them a depth of gratitude. McMichael (2002) wrote that she 
did not use an interpreter, but worked with an interpreter, [and] key informant 
[…] This approach enhanced the interview process, as [she and her interpreter] 
were able to work together and bring different skills and perspectives to the 
research project. (176, emphasis in the original)
My key informants not only acted as my primary informants, but they also served as interpreters, 
guides, and research partners, as well as inducting me into the Mpondo lifeworlds and culture. Being 
highly skilled individuals, they were able to navigate the sensitive subject matter of my research well 
within the codes of respect, hierarchy and propriety upheld in the Mpondo culture. 
 In Lusikisiki, when I rented a room in the empty parish rectory of a local church, their minister 
asked one of their church elders, who also lived on the premises of the parish, to help me with the in-
terviews that I needed to conduct. The church elder concerned, Mrs Jikileza Nomthandazo Gongxeka 
(see photo vi), became my closest companion and key informant during both my fieldwork periods. 
Nomthandazo, as everybody calls her, was 61 years old at the time of the study (in 2012), unmarried, 
and the spiritual worker of her church.34 In a personal capacity, she also orchestrated the distributi-
on of food to orphans through an American-based Christian NGO, called Oceans of Mercy. Being 61 
years old at the time of my first field trip, her age counted in my favour, as age is still a much-revered 
attribute in the communities that I researched. It was specifically because of her age that she came to 
organise almost all the focus group discussions that I conducted with the village elders with relative 
ease, as young persons often have to wait a long time before such potentates grant them an audien-
ce. She also introduced me to the village chief who, in turn, introduced me at the royal court of Qua-
keni, where I obtained approval from the traditional authority to conduct my research. Through her, 
I managed to interview those of an older generation, which enabled me to compare their views on 
ukuthwala with those of the younger informants. We spent many hours together, and had numerous 
insightful conversations about every aspect of my research.
 My second key informant and translator at Lusikisiki was Miss Nonkululeko Duntsula. She 
was 33 years old at the time (2012), unmarried, and with three children. She volunteered to do book-
keeping at a local NGO that was responsible for teaching life skills to primary school children through 
the medium of sports, receiving only a small stipend in return. At the time of the study, she was living 
in Nyuswa village, where she grew up, with the village in question being about 6km outside of Lusi-
kisiki. Kule, as everyone called her, was especially helpful, due to her being a local of the area, and, 
thus, very well connected and trusted. She introduced me to a number of the men who were in some 
or other way involved in ukuthwala proceedings, during which encounters she always acted as inter-
preter. Whereas Mrs Nomthandazo seemed to be holding on to rather historical and idealistic notions 
34  Her job entailed evangelism, and the providing of Christian counselling to the congregants.
61
Chapter Two Researching Ukuthwala in the South African Field: The Research Settings, People and Methods
of what Mpondo culture was supposed to be, Kule appeared to shun those traditions and customs 
that she perceived to be discriminatory. She was often vocal in the disapproval that she expressed 
while we were discussing the interviews that we conducted. This gave me an interesting perspective 
on the views that the younger generation tended to hold.
 My three key informants and interpreters in Bambisana were all young men, with Mnoza 
being 25 years old, Moses 27, and Bongani 28, during my first field trip that I undertook in 2012. All 
three were of Xhosa descent, and worked in partnership with the Oceans of Mercy in providing food 
for the orphans in the nearby areas, as well as life skills coaching for teenage boys. All three had 
studied at Joint Aid Ministries in Cape Town, which is a Christian Bible college, with all three having 
been friends since secondary school. I stayed with them in their house in Bambisana, where I had 
numerous insightful conversations with them. So doing, I gained valuable information about indi-
genous marriage practices, including the payment of  lobola, as both Moses and Bongani were in the 
process of raising funds to pay  lobola to the parents of their respective fiancés. That they were Xhosa 
(as opposed to Mpondo) did not seem to make any difference to my research, as the  lobola and 
marriage customs of the amaMpondo and the amaXhosa are very similar. Intermarriage between the 
groups concerned is, in fact, a normal part of everyday practice. Unlike with my two key informants 
in Lusikisiki, they arranged none of my interviews. Instead, I accompanied them to remote villages in 
the mountains around Bambisana, where we simply introduced ourselves and asked those people 
whom we met if they would grant us permission to interview them. It was on the trips concerned 
that I found, and interviewed, most of the women who had been thwala’ed. Since both the men and 
the women of the older and the younger generations disclosed very intimate information during the 
interviews, it did not seem as if my three interpreters’ young age or gender was an obstacle to the 
interviewees concerned, even in the case of the older women. 
 My last key informant, Mrs Nothembile Nohe, was 61 years old, married and retired. I stayed 
with her family at Mugwambu, 20km north of Lusikisiki. I met her through Mrs Nomthandazo, who 
was one of her closest friends. She supervised one of the orphan day care centres that the Oceans of 
Mercy sponsored, as well as taking care of many AIDS orphans in a personal capacity. My purpose at 
Mugwambu was, as I mentioned earlier, to gain experience and knowledge of daily rural village life, 
which is a valuable activity to do when investigating a local cultural practice that the local political, 
economic and cultural climate influences. Having informed Nothembile of the purpose of my rese-
arch, she acquainted me with Pondo culture and everyday life through our conversations, and she 
also let me accompany her as she went about her daily routines. Though I did not conduct any formal 
interviews during my stay with her, I did make numerous field notes at the time.
My Position as Researcher
The first, and perhaps the most obvious, challenge to my position as researcher was the emotive na-
ture of my study, which was far removed from my daily reality. As a researcher, I, secondly, found my 
environment, and the milieu in which I had to carry out my research, challenging. I shall here discuss 
the two challenges concerned, respectively.
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 When discussing the challenges of the ethnographic research design above, I alluded to the 
fact that using such a research design depends on a human researcher functioning as the main tool 
of investigation. I felt emotionally challenged when I functioned as a research tool in the field. A 
central objective of my fieldwork was to investigate the sexual abuse and rape of vulnerable children 
and women as a part of marriage proceedings. As an anthropologist, I, thus, had to deal with very 
sensitive issues that became even more sensitive in situations in which I had to investigate the view-
points of men who abduct very young girls, as well as those of consenting parents. Interviewing the 
individuals involved often unlocked strong emotions and prejudice in me. However, the harnessing 
and appropriation of emotions and sensory experiences, as I shall now explain, as effective research 
tools is possible, insofar as such tools are academically valid. 
 As early as 1966, Hortense Powdermaker famously remarked on the above point in her book, 
Stranger and Friend, in which she wrote that a
scientific attitude ignores no level of understanding […] If the dual nature of 
anthropology – as art and a science, a humanistic science – is accepted, there is 
no reason why each cannot be expanded. The inherent ambiguities of this ap-
proach are only a reflection of those which exist in life itself. (quoted by Robben 
and Sluka 2011, 306)
In agreeing with Powdermaker on this point, I wish to stress my belief that emotions and sensory 
experience can broaden our scientific and theoretical understanding of the other’s lived experiences.
 James Davies (2010) explains how the above is made possible through the adoption of a 
stance that he calls ‘radical empiricism’. He writes that radical empiricism is 
a position that refuses the epistemological cut between subject and object, that 
endows transitive and in-transitive experiences with equal status, and that in-
vestigates phenomena which the inductive methods of traditional empiricism 
were never designed to treat. (3) 
Radical empiricism, in broad terms, thus primarily collapses the separation between the ethnograp-
her and his/her phenomena of study, by means of placing equal emphasis on the tangible object of 
study (i.e. the in-transitive) and on the personal experience and emotions of the ethnographer (i.e. 
the transitive). By means of analytical use of the emotions, radical empiricism enables the critical 
investigation of the relationship between object and subject, by way of conflating the distance bet-
ween self and other. The adoption of such an approach allows for the relation and comparison of the 
emotions that a researcher experiences during periods that are void of self-containing strategies with 
the emotions that the researcher experiences during, or even before, fieldwork, leading to greater un-
derstanding of the issues at stake. Finally, emotions, and specifically sensory experiences, provide a 
way in which to exceed the boundaries of the social construction of actions and expressed emotions, 
thus broadening both the field of research and the depth of understanding involved. 
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 My adoption of a stance of radical empiricism in relation to the current study practically im-
plied the following for my research: the boundary between the phenomena that I studied, such as 
the thwala’ed girls, and myself was partially collapsed by means of the placing of an equal emphasis 
on the intransitive facts of the girls’ abductions, and on the emotions that I experienced while collec-
ting the relevant facts. My emotions, which sometimes bordered on horror, brought me closer to the 
girls, who had probably experienced a similar emotion during their abductions as well, though their 
feelings must have been much more intense and tangible at the time. Yet, such feelings also served 
as my warning signal, reminding me not to favour the girls’ side of the story and not to disfavour that 
of their abductors. Finally, my sensory experience (especially that pertaining to sight), of the conditi-
ons of extreme poverty with which some families have had to cope served as an access point to reach 
beyond people’s descriptions of the direness of their situation. Constant reminders were present of 
the broader implications of poverty, and how it could be alleviated through the use of such marriage 
customs as  lobola and ukuthwala. My sensory experience, thus, led me to investigate the impact of 
poverty on marriage practices in general, as opposed to me simply feeling sorry for those who suffer 
because of it. Put otherwise, the sensory experience of poverty was translated into an analysis of 
the conditions under which poor people have to live. The adoption of a stance of radical empiri-
cism is, thus, scientifically valid, as it is soundly premised on theory, revealing the processes and the 
pathways of research. It is also backed up by conclusive observations that the field note evidence 
substantiates.35
 Along similar lines, Altork writes that “a healthy blend of working from the mind and the heart 
is in order, and is the logical compromise here for the scholar negotiating the mind/heart dichotomy” 
(2011, 95). The heart, as the seat of the emotions, is impossible to ignore in the context of human 
suffering and injustice, with there being no way to circumvent the issue. During my fieldwork period, 
I, thus, attempted to harness my strong feelings and sensory experiences so as to serve my scientific 
pursuit to gain an understanding of ukuthwala’s violent re-emergence, and of how the individuals 
involved thought and talked about the issue at the time of the current study. Radical empiricism, 
therefore, aided me in using my heart as a tool, under mental guidance; empathy was the motivating 
force that encouraged me to apply my mind to understanding the phenomenon at stake. 
 My second challenge as a researcher was to position and orient myself within the environ-
ment and the milieu of my research setting. What struck me on the very first day that I arrived in 
Lusikisiki was that the town seemed to resemble Lilongwe, Malawi’s capital city, closely, as far as 
its physical surroundings were concerned. Growing up in Malawi as the son of white South African 
parents, I came to know Lilongwe very well, and, accordingly, I immediately felt at ease in Lusikisiki. I 
initially thought that I would feel out of place, not only because I was the only white person living in 
the town, but also because I was supposed to formally investigate those who were living there. I as-
sumed that my formal capacity would lead to the building of merely formal relationships. However, 
I soon realised that feeling comfortable and at home, in some sense, broke down most feelings of 
being other to the research setting and the people living there.
35  See Roger Sanjek’s 1990 essay On Ethnographic Validity.
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 Serving as a type of common ground, the belief and religious practices that I shared with 
the informants further broke down the boundaries between us. As a professing, practising Christian, 
and the son of missionary parents, I shared important common ground with my key informants. The 
research that an anthropologist does always depends, at least to a certain extent, on the amount 
of co-operation that exists between him/her and his/her key informants. Thus, partaking in my key 
informants’ religious activities was invaluable, as doing so created a bond of friendship and trust 
between us. Partnering with the key informants, who were themselves religious workers, often led to 
the informants assuming that I was a religious worker as well, which was both an advantage and a 
disadvantage. Since most of the local population still held religion (irrespective of the form or deno-
mination) in high regard, my association with religious workers afforded me the image of a trustwort-
hy and respectable individual, with whom the informants felt comfortable enough to share intimate 
experiences. Yet, the same image led some informants, especially the older men living in remote 
rural areas, to shy away from me for fear of moral condemnation, or for fear that I would report them 
to the police. As, during my entire time spent in the field, only two individuals refused to grant me 
the opportunity to interview them, I did not perceive my association with religious workers as being 
detrimental to my study.36
 In conclusion, I want to mention that I, at no time, requested to hold interviews or meetings 
with the Christian friends or co-congregants of my key informants whom I met at such activities. I did 
not want to give the impression that I only saw such activities and my informants as a means that I 
could exploit towards my academic ends, which might have spoilt the good rapport that I had with 
them. Having mentioned religion quite often, I now shortly want to indicate how religion provided 
me with a point of entry into the field, the importance of its prominence in the research field, and the 
interrelationship between religion and ukuthwala. 
A Note on Religion
Though my key informants were Christian, and I joined them in their religious activities, meeting 
up and working with them was purely a coincidence. Mrs Nomthandazo, the first person whom I 
met in Lusikisiki, happened to be a co-worker and a friend of a close family member of mine, who 
used to work in EmaMpondweni in her youth. This family member, thus, connected me with Mrs 
Nomthandazo, when hearing that I was going to Lusikisiki. Pleased to meet her friend’s grandson, 
Mrs Nomthandazo, in assuming the cultural role of being my makulu (grandmother) during my stay 
in EmaMpondweni, offered to help me. She then introduced me to my key informants at Bambisana 
and Mugwanbu, with whom she collaborated through Oceans of Mercy. It was, thus, through a family 
connection of which I was initially unaware that I gained access to the field. The sharing of religious 
worship, then, also provided the opportunity for me to build up good rapport with my key infor-
36  One individual who refused my request for an interview was a 19-year-old man who lived in Lusikisiki at the 
time, while the other was a young man in his twenties who thwala’ed his wife in 2012 close to Bambisana. 
Though the latter was willing to speak to my key informants about the circumstances surrounding his ab-
duction marriage, he refused to speak to me, since he believed that I would report his actions to the police. 
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mants. Religion and religious activity was, as my key informants showed, embedded in the lifeworlds 
of most people on the local level. 
 As I shall explain in the following chapter, the Cape Nguni practised forms of traditional religi-
on that centred on the activities of the ancestors, and on the interaction between the ancestors and 
living individuals. Colonisation and a steady increase of missionary activities during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, then, clearly altered both the religious and the cultural landscapes of the 
Cape Nguni. At the time of the study, traditional religion was still strongly present, as the number of 
initiation schools for traditional healers and diviners in EmaMpondweni showed,37 Christianity had 
also been firmly rooted in the local community. More recently, the influx of Muslim immigrants into 
the Eastern Cape has, furthermore, changed the religious landscape, making it difficult to pinpoint 
any dominant, or most prevalent, religion. The position of religious worship at Lusikisiki was a good 
example of this, with there being a few consultation booths, or stalls, where the locals could consult 
sangomas (traditional healers),38 and a broad spread of Christian congregations, ranging from Ro-
man Catholic and conservative Protestant (Methodist; Seventh Day Adventist, and Uniting Reforming 
Church in Southern Africa) to Evangelical and Pentecostal congregations. Christian sects like the Je-
hovah’s Witnesses, and the Christian syncretism of the Zionist Church of South Africa,39 were also 
present. More recently, however, Lusikisiki had also opened a mosque for immigrant worshippers 
from the Middle East and from East Africa, specifically from Pakistan and Somalia. 
 My key informants informed me that the churches that they attended, remarkably, had no 
formal policy with regard to indigenous marriage practices. However, the element of social control 
was strong, in the absence of formal policy. Both the leadership and the congregants, alike, dis-
couraged and frowned upon any activity that they associated with traditional worship, or that they 
deemed harmful.40 Yet, the lack of formal policy also created a space for the congregants to form their 
own views on traditional marriage practices, which were often in conflict with those that others held. 
The conflict was also evident among my key informants. Both Bongani and Moses were attempting 
to raise enough  lobola for their respective marriages, but only the latter saw the situation in a positive 
light, as a family-building strategy. Bongani, as well as Mrs Nomthandazo, perceived the practice as 
clashing with their belief in Christian liberty, as the requirement to pay  lobola often leads to indeb-
tedness for protracted periods of time, which, in turn, hampers and obstructs the freedom to live 
and do as seems fit. Then, whereas Mrs Nomthandazo considered ukuthwala positively, as far as the 
37  The term ‘initiation school’, which is somewhat misleading, is not to be confused with a school institution, 
as it is understood from a Western perspective. An initiation school is the colonial translation for the pro-
cess through which a traditional healer or diviner needs to go before being acknowledged as such. Since 
the term is in popular use in South African academia, the media and local communities, I shall use it as well.
38  I use the terms ‘consultation booth’ and ‘stall’ only for the lack of a better word to describe what, in fact, 
can range from a brick-and-mud room, through a shipping container that is converted into a room, to even 
a neat office in a modern office building.
39  A very prominent Christian church that incorporated traditional religion into their brand of Christianity.
40  In the sense of violating the Christian principle of brotherly and unconditional love.
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practice involved the seeking of parental consent and the consultation of all parties involved, Bonga-
ni, Moses and Kule thought that the practice in its entirety – irrespective of the form that it took – was 
in serious violation of Christian doctrine. All three individuals raised the issue of the one-directional 
violence towards, and the violation of, the bride as being opposed to the Christian values of mutual 
and multidirectional love, respect and goodwill. Mrs Nothembile was rather more dubious about the 
situation than were the above-mentioned individuals. Though it was against her Christian principles, 
she believed that every abduction case should be judged individually, depending on whether it had 
positive or negative outcomes for all parties involved.
 Thus, even though my key informants were all congregants of the same church (except for 
Kule, who attends a Pentecostal church), and even though they shared the same doctrinal beliefs, 
they held conflicting views on traditional marriage practices. I believe that the same can be said 
about religion in general with regard to indigenous practices in EmaMpondweni. As diverse as the 
forms of Christianity and traditional religion were that permeated the lifeworlds of so many of the in-
dividuals whom I interviewed, so diverse were the views of such individuals when it came to traditio-
nal practices like ukuthwala. The holding of such diverse views did not, however, mean that religious 
bodies and individuals did not engage in the ukuthwala debate. The Methodist Church of South Afri-
ca, for example, was very active in the ukuthwala controversy in EmaMpondweni. The Palmerton 
CCMC just outside of Lusikisiki, to which I have already referred as a place of refuge for thwala’ed and 
other vulnerable girls, was an initiative of the Methodist Church. At the time of the current study, one 
of the local Methodist Church elders, Mrs Nomapando Ngotane, was also the manager at Palmerton 
CCMC. As I, furthermore, mentioned in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, a missionary 
worker of the Methodist Church at Mount Frere (which is about 80km north-west of Lusikisiki) had 
finished a Master’s thesis in practical theology in 2011. In her thesis, she focuses on the counselling of 
girls who suffer from post-traumatic stress syndrome as a result of violent ukuthwala abuses. 
 Though a study on the role of religion (whether Christian or traditional) in relation to the 
ukuthwala controversy would certainly be an interesting topic for further research, such was not a 
focus of my investigation. There were a few reasons for this. Firstly, there is already a rich body of 
scholarly research on religion and its interaction with such contemporary issues as migration, HIV/
AIDS, and sexuality, among which the work of the following, among many others, is prominent: An-
derson (1993, 2005); Etherington (1996); Gathogo (2007); Prince, Denis, and Van Dijk (2009); Van Dijk 
and Dekker (2010); Dilger, Burchardt, and Van Dijk (2010). Yet, as I illustrated in the introductory chap-
ter, and as Rice (2014) has emphasised, any scholarly research into ukuthwala and its interaction with 
contemporary national issues was conspicuously absent until the current dissertation, leading to it 
becoming my chosen focus. Secondly, save for the Methodist Church, churches and religious bodies 
in the Eastern Cape, and throughout the broader South Africa, have chosen to channel their activities 
(as the above-mentioned literature shows) towards what they have perceived as being more pressing 
socio-religious issues. Such issues include: (non-violent) sexuality; male circumcision; the accepta-
bility of ancestral worship, and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Indeed, compared to the national issues of 
this nature, ukuthwala has apparently appeared to be too isolated and rarely practised a marriage 
custom to warrant the churches’ attention and effort so far. Thirdly, ukuthwala, similarly to  lobola, 
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has not, per se, yet become problematic from a religious point of view on the local level. Rather, cul-
tural justification of the practice has, until now, relied on it forming part of the repertoire of customs 
that relate to indigenous marriage, rather than on it relating to religion in any way. Individuals, rather 
than religious institutions, as I have indicated above, have tended to be those to raise objections as 
to its nature. Not even the two chaplains of police to whom I spoke problematised ukuthwala from 
a religious point of view. Instead, they argued, for example, that ukuthwala was simply a marriage 
custom that the generations had passed down, and with which the families involved should deal, as 
opposed to the police, or the church, intervening in such matters.
 Still, historically speaking, Christianity brought about changes in the indigenous religious 
systems and in the family-making processes and kinship structures (of which ukuthwala appears 
to be part and parcel) associated therewith. Religion is, thus, of historical and contextual relevance, 
as far as the family-making processes and kinship structures are concerned, rather than being an 
influencing force, or an actor, in terms of ukuthwala’s current violent re-emergence. The following 
chapter will allude to the historical-contextual relevance of religion, in terms of the Cape Nguni and 
their marriage and kinship practices.
Representing the Data
Anthropology is, basically, an investigation of the cultural lifeworlds of individuals and communities. 
Thus, anthropological research is scientific in both nature and method, with the subject matter itself 
being intimately human and real, and touching many lives in different ways. To find the data that I 
required as an anthropologist, and from which I could construct a theoretical framework within who-
se parameters I could come to the understanding of certain phenomena, I had to ask certain pointed 
questions. The questions that I asked frequently brought to light the concerns of my informants. Du-
ring the first week of my first fieldwork period, for example, I continuously met with objections from 
people to the concept of human rights, if I asked them how they felt about the issue of indigenous 
law. Their qualms about the existence of such a concept were often expressed during conversations, 
before I had even mentioned the concept of ukuthwala. My informants’ general dislike of the issue of 
human rights led me to investigate ukuthwala from a legal perspective, which eventually resulted in 
my writing of Chapter Four of the current dissertation. 
 That such concerns, stories and thoughts directed my research was rather the norm than 
it was the exception. It was, therefore, only the aspect of violence as part of ukuthwala that I had 
felt bound to investigate before I embarked on the fieldwork concerned. The intimate thoughts and 
stories of my informants were, thus, often the ‘signposts’ that indicated where I should focus my re-
search, as they served to reveal surprising new information. For instance, Chapter Five had its genesis 
in the story that Miss Sikunyana told me about her own abduction. She related how her uncles had 
arranged for her to be thwala’ed, so that they could profit from her  lobola. Her case inspired me to 
investigate the relationship between ukuthwala,  lobola and poverty. 
 I, thus, soon, and often, found myself digressing from the course that I had planned before 
embarking on my fieldwork. I quickly realised that I was no longer following my theoretical beliefs 
about ukuthwala, but that I was, rather, following the lead set by the data that I had gathered in the 
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field. Such revelations, accordingly, indicated for what data I should look, and what data I should 
gather. On my return from the field, I analysed the data obtained, revising my provisional theoretical 
framework of understanding ukuthwala’s re-emergence and its violence, so that I could account for 
the new data that I had found as well. I, thus, came to present the fieldwork data as the intimate 
thoughts, stories and actions of individuals that I explained within a theoretical framework. With the 
grounding of the data in the daily lifeworlds and in the lived experiences of the individuals concer-
ned, I used the underlying theory to illustrate how their experiences and lifeworlds intersected with 
national events and processes at the time. Each of the events and processes involved will be addres-
sed in a separate chapter, starting with the events and processes that historically influenced and 
altered the original marriage customs, family-making processes and kin structures of the Mpondo 
people, which will be described in the following chapter. 
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Rather sweepingly, White (2015) states that “[e]veryone agrees by now that the main thing to say 
about marriage in southern Africa is the fact of its decline” (1). Yet, a number of other scholars 
agree with the researcher concerned on this point. Niehaus (2015) writes that the last “two decades 
[1990−2010] saw a decline in marriage” (2), while Hosegood, McGrath, and Moultrie (2009) use statis-
tical data to illustrate that the institution of marriage is not only declining in South Africa, but that it 
is, arguably, in disfavour, to a certain degree. Hunter (2010, 2015) argues that, specifically, customary 
marriage is in decline, while various forms of cohabitation, like being “nearly married” (2015, 4), are 
becoming more popular. In turn, James (2014) explores the ways in which traditional marriage is 
becoming increasingly difficult to contract into, due to the rising financial strain that is being placed 
on young couples through the requirement for bridewealth ( lobola) payments. Finally, Rice’s (2014) 
research in EmaMpondweni revealed that the 
rates of marriage in the community are declining sharply, due in part to the high 
cost of bride wealth. While most young men aspire to marry […] many  
young men express frustration and anxiety over […] their poor employment 
prospects more generally. (387)
The above, in turn, makes raising enough bridewealth to be able to contract into customary marriage 
extremely difficult. 
 The decline of the institution of marriage in general, and of the traditional forms of marriage 
in particular, seems to contradict the starting point of the current dissertation that aims to investigate 
the apparent re-emergence of the ukuthwala marriage custom. Simultaneously, the broad shift in 
marriage practices in Southern Africa is exactly the context within which ukuthwala is re-emerging. 
This raises the question of how we are to make sense of the practice within its contrary context of 
national marital decline. 
 While engaged in archival and field research, I came to realise that various historical events 
and processes had, over time, shaped the settings in which, and the population among whom, I con-
ducted my research. Though such events and processes have profoundly influenced the prevailing 
marriage practices and kinship structure, as I indicated above, their impact on the recent changes 
that have been perceived in regards to ukuthwala are still conspicuously absent from the scholarly 
debate on this topic. The finding is particularly interesting in the light that such events and processes 
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have partially created the various contexts within which ukuthwala has now come to re-emerge in 
violent forms. An in-depth overview of the historical events and processes involved might, therefore, 
illuminate our understanding of how broader historical changes within marriage and kinship practi-
ces currently contextually influence the practice. Through asking the question ‘How do the historical 
events and processes that changed marriage and kinship practices contextually influence the current 
re-emergence of violent ukuthwala?’, this chapter not only analyses recent cases of violent ukuthwala 
within the context of the national changes occurring in marriage practices, but it also simultaneously 
provides the historical backdrop for the following chapters. 
 Against the backdrop of theories of modernity, as well as of Farmer’s (1996) analytical frame-
work for analysing structural violence that I discussed in Chapter One, I shall highlight the following 
aspects of the subject: the interplay between the global (in the form of colonisation) and the local 
(in the shape of local forms of governance); how foreign notions of marriage became (and are beco-
ming) part of various marriage practices on the local level; the continuities and changes that have oc-
curred within marriage practices and kinship structures over the last two centuries; and how people 
dialectically manage the changes by means of linking the past and future.41 To illustrate the influence 
of various forms of structural violence on marriage practices and kinship structures, the overview 
that I present in this chapter is both geographically broad (covering the whole of the Eastern Cape 
province) and historically deep (covering roughly two centuries). Simultaneously, I pay attention to 
the importance of gender and race in the evolution that has occurred. 
 As a point of reference, I shall commence with a historical overview of the research popula-
tion – the Cape Nguni – and their traditional marriage practices and kinship structures. This histo-
rical overview will also point out some key elements of marriage and kinship that are important to 
my investigation of marital decline in South Africa. After the short overview, I shall discuss the most 
important factors that facilitated the decline in the institution of marriage, as well as the changes 
that we now observe in the kinship structures and family-making processes. The (historical) factors 
involved are, respectively, colonialism, Christianity, the collapse of the indigenous economic and po-
litical systems, the apartheid policies, and urbanisation. The above-mentioned discussion precedes 
an exploration of how contemporary marriage and family-making practices are declining, changing 
and continuing in new forms. I shall then conclude my discussion by illustrating how the practice of 
ukuthwala is responding to the current situation of marital decline, changed kinship structures and 
family-making processes. 
 Note, however, that, due to the focus of the chapter being mainly historical, it will, thus, not 
elaborate in great detail on the contemporary events and processes that have a bearing on marriage 
and changing kinship structures. Such events and processes consist of post-apartheid legislation, 
with regard to human rights and gender/sexual equality; new economic policies and the neoliberal 
economy; gender relations and patriarchy, and, finally, the national HIV/AIDS pandemic. I shall, ho-
wever, indicate throughout the chapter where I shall address the events and processes concerned in 
the remainder of this dissertation. 
41  In other words, how social and cultural cohesion occurs through marriage practices in a changing society.
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The Nguni of the Eastern Cape Province
Kuper (2015) writes that the 
[d]istinctive features of what became the Nguni [historically a hoe-agricultural 
tradition] and Sotho-Tswana traditions appear in the archaeological record ear-
ly in the last millennium. The ancestral Nguni were concentrated in the fertile, 
lowlying south-east, in what became the Ciskei, Transkei, Kwazulu-Natal and 
Swaziland. (16) (see map iv) 
I conducted my fieldwork in an area within the Transkei that the locals know as ‘EmaMpondweni’. 
EmaMpondweni, which is roughly situated between the rivers Mbashe in the south and Mtamvuna 
in the north, falls within the provincial boundaries of the Eastern Cape province (see map iv below). 
The name ‘EmaMpondweni’ also resembles the name of the Nguni group – the ‘amaMpondo’, or the 
‘Mpondo people’ – who historically have chiefly lived in this area of the Transkei.42
42  The prefix ‘ama-’ denotes ‘people’ in the isiXhosa language.
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iv) The homelands of the various Cape Nguni groups, during the colonial era. Source: Beinart,
W. 1987. Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa: Politics & Popular Movements in the Transkei & 
Eastern Cape, 1890-1930. Berkeley CA: University of California Press. 
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 The amaMpondo are an isiXhosa-speaking group, whose language falls under the broader 
Bantu family of languages. Schapera (1929) writes that “the name ‘Bantu’ is primarily a linguistic de-
signation, applied to a particular family of languages spoken over almost the whole of Southern and 
Central Africa” (82−83), including over 250 separate languages that share similar linguistic features. 
Many of the Nguni groups living in South Africa speak a variant of South-Eastern Bantu, including SiS-
wati, Ndebele, isiZulu and isiXhosa. As Schapera explains (84), the Nguni groups who speak isiXhosa 
include the amaXhosa (consisting of the amaNgqika, the amaGcaleka, and the amaNdlambe); the 
amaTembu (consisting of the amaHala, the amaGcina, the amaTsatshu, and the amaNdunduane); 
the amaMpondomisi; the amaXesibe; the amaKwati; the amaTshezi; the amaBonvana, and, finally, 
the amaMpondo. 
 Other than language, the Nguni of the Eastern Cape also shared similar kinship structures 
and marriage customs, which were of great sociocultural importance. When exploring traditions of 
kinship and marriage among the Nguni of South Africa, Kuper (2015), for example, writes that the 
homestead was the residential base of a polygamous family. Its spatial ordering 
projected ideas about the relationships between the ancestors and the living, 
and between men and women. Centered on a cattle byre and surrounded by 
gardens and grains stores, it was an economic corporation. The homestead of a 
powerful man was also a political hub. (16) 
Kuper (2015) here points to the crucial aspects of Nguni life that were embedded in, negotiated 
through, and established by means of the institution of marriage, namely family and kinship, religion, 
gender relations, economics, and politics. The following overview of the historical marriage practices 
in the Eastern Cape – which will focus on the aspects that have been indicated by Kuper – serves as 
a historical reference point for understanding the current context of marriage decline in South Africa. 
Cape Nguni Kinship and Marriage – A Historical Point of Reference
As the title of this section indicates, my aim here is to reconstruct some of the key features of kinship 
and marriage practices among the Cape Nguni immediately prior, and during, the very early sta-
ges of Western contact. This reconstruction, thus, serves only as a reference point against which to 
measure, and to investigate, how kinship and marriage practices have changed since initial colonial 
contact. I do, thus, not present this reconstruction as the ‘correct’ and ‘unspoilt’ primordial cultural 
ideal, or model, since both kinship and marriage practices have always been subject to change. 
 Carver (2007) writes that the “homestead and its constellation of households is the center of 
Xhosa life”, and that a “household consisted of the dwellings of the head of the household, his wife 
or wives, and their children” (40). The household would then “more often than not [be] extended to 
include a variety of relatives, agnatic, cognatic, and/or affinal” (Hammond-Tooke 1963, 304). Carver 
(2007) asserts that the head of the homestead would be the wealthiest man of the household concer-
ned at any particular time. However, the prevailing situation could change, as another member of the 
homestead either became more wealthy, or gained influence over the other heads of households. 
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This could happen either by means of marriage, or by means of the forging of political alliances with 
powerful chiefs outside of the homestead. Through such alliances and/or marriages, the households 
of other homesteads could, thus, join with the homestead of an influential homestead head, further 
increasing his power and influence. Each household within a homestead, furthermore, formed part 
of a certain lineage within a broader, clan-based kinship structure (see Carver 2007; Hammond-Tooke 
1963; Hunter 1951). Hunter (1951) asserts that “tremendous emphasis is laid on clan exogamy and 
not marrying into the clan of one’s mother or of either grandmother” (311) was strictly observed. Hirst 
(2005) explains such strict observance by way of linking it with traditional social organisation in the 
following way:
Among the Cape Nguni, the two basic principles of social organization that find 
expression in the clan are the respect for genealogical seniority and the exoga-
my rules forbidding marriage or sexual intercourse between agnatic kin, with 
the latter prohibition being the diacritical feature distinguishing Nguni from all 
Southern Bantu. (2)
The men involved, thus, did not marry women who bore the same clan name as did any of their 
four grandparents, and a bride did not take the clan name of her husband after marriage.43 Clan 
names were, furthermore, also passed on through women to their children, so that the children did 
not inherit their father’s clan name. Other than the strict observance of such rules of exogamy, clan 
membership did not imply any special gathering, social network or clan rituals (Hirst 2005, 2). The 
membership was, however, of great strategic importance politically speaking, often playing itself out 
within the realm of marriage. Marriage, as a political strategy, is best understood within the context 
of the Cape Nguni political organisation, to which I shall now turn.
 The authority of independent chieftaincies of various isiXhosa-speaking groups presided 
over the broader Transkei area, with EmaMpondweni constituting the eastern border (see Beinart 
1987). Of the Mpondo, Hunter (1933) writes that “[a]dministration was organized on a territorial basis. 
There was a powerful paramount chief with distinct chiefs and sub-chiefs under him. Each sub-chief 
had a court, from which there was the right of appeal to his immediate superior and finally to the 
paramount” (259). Yet, headmen (or sub-chiefs, as Hunter calls them), chiefs and paramount chiefs 
ruled more by consensus than they did by force. Since agnatically related homesteads often fell un-
der the authority of a chief who did not bear the same clan name as did those in the homesteads 
(which often occurred, because of the rules of exogamy), and since allegiance was more clan-based 
than specific individual-based (Carver 2007), the allegiances of households and homesteads could 
easily change. Maintaining authority was, thus, always a highly politicised juggle among the different 
individuals concerned. Marriage practices, thus, were often the basis for negotiating and manipula-
ting political power, and the fluidity of political allegiances. 
43  Though I only peruse the matter of clan exogamy here, I shall return to the importance of genealogical 
seniority later on in the dissertation, when discussing the relationship between the institution of marriage 
and indigenous religious beliefs and practices. 
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 Though not directly concerned with marital politics as such, Carver’s (2007) description of the 
spatial arrangements of the households within the homestead (see also Hammond-Tooke 1963; Ku-
per 2015; Liebenberg 1997; McAllister 2004) serves as a good illustration of how marriage functioned 
as a possible political strategy. Carver writes that
[a] family was generally divided between the Great House and the Right-Hand 
House, with the Great House consisting of the principal wife and her children, 
and the Right-Hand house consisting of the lesser wife and her children [...] The 
Great Wife was responsible for producing a son and heir [to the chieftaincy.] 
The first born son of the Right-Hand Wife [...] was also a chief or a household 
head, but was responsible for establishing his own chiefdom by colonizing new 
territory. (42)
Though the eldest son of every household inherited the cattle belonging to that house (Schapera 
1928, 174), the Great Wife’s eldest son also inherited his father’s cattle. Even though the Great Son was, 
thus, heir to both his father’s chieftaincy and cattle, he always bore the clan name of his mother, and 
not that of his father. The influence of a clan could, thus, increase through the marriage of a daughter 
or sister to the chief of another clan, since a son born from such a union would bear his mother’s clan 
name. This meant that he would join the existing chieftaincy, incorporating a number of its cattle with 
those of the maternal kin, which came about along with him going to live with the other clan. 
 Kuper (2015), in turn, writes that 
marriage strategies of powerful families were […] of enormous political impor-
tance […] A chief who dispatched a wife to a rival was making a political inter-
vention, aspiring to control the succession to the chiefly house into which he 
introduced his sister or daughter. (20−21) 
Kuper (2015) continues that “[f]or lesser nobles and commoners, marriage links consolidated the 
patron-client relationships” (21) in terms of which a patron would provide a client with (bridewealth) 
cattle, expecting the client to offer him wives in return. The “exchange of cattle and wives [thus] lin-
ked the homesteads of commoners to local headman and lesser chiefs, and connected chiefs to 
particular royal homesteads” (ibid). Marriage was, thus, not only a family-building strategy, but it 
had a political function, with it being useful for the control of lineage, succession, inheritance, and 
economic gain. Similarly to it having various strategic usages, the marriage process could take on 
various forms. 
 Hunter (1969, 186) writes that, in such society, the girls usually married between the ages of 
16 and 18 years old, while the men tended to marry between the ages of 20 and 25 years old. The 
contracting and negotiation of marriages tended to fall within one of three general patterns (see 
also De Jager 1971 and Hunter 1969). The most common procedure was for a young man to ask 
his father to negotiate a marriage with the father (or the guardian) of the young woman whom he 
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 wished to  marry. In other instances, a father would arrange a marriage for his son with a woman from 
a household or homestead with which he was endeavouring to form an allegiance, so as to increase 
the extent of his own authority, or influence. In such cases, both the young man and the woman 
concerned had to accept their parents’ decisions as to whether the intended match could go ahead, 
as the hierarchal structure of authority provided the prospective couple with few alternatives. The 
third form of marriage, which was, and still is, the least common, was that of elopement or ukuthwala 
(Bennett 2010; Hunter 1969; Koyana and Bekker 2007). If the parents wanted their child to marry a 
person whom the latter did not choose, or if the children in question rejected their parents’ choice, 
then the couple concerned could elope together and have sexual intercourse as a sign either of their 
resolve to get married, or as a manifestation of the act of marriage itself. As I discussed in the intro-
ductory chapter, ukuthwala could take on various forms (Britten 1930; Soga 1931), ranging from the 
amicable form of elopement mentioned above, to a case where a girl refused to accept the advances 
of a prospective husband, whereupon (either with, or without her parent’s consent) she became an 
abductee, who had to have sexual intercourse with the man involved. Though parental consent is 
often the defining characteristic of a proper customary ukuthwala, it was, and has remained, up until 
the time of the current research, the cultural ideal, rather than the norm in practice. 
 At this point, a paradox emerged. Since the clan name passed on through the matrilineal line, 
the entry into marriage seemed to favour the kin of a wife in terms of it being a potentially prosperous 
political and economic strategy. Yet, the three patterns of marriage practised evidenced a patriarchal 
bias that favoured the potential groom and his father (and close male kin) in initialising, negotiating 
and contracting the practice. The paradox, furthermore, also showed in the conflicting relationship 
existing between the inheritance of the clan name through the matrilineal line, and the sociopolitical 
positions and property that passed on through the patrilineal line. The nature of the paradox will be-
come clear in the following discussion of the function of bridewealth as part of the marriage customs 
followed. 
 Irrespective of the pattern and form that the marriage took, the payment of  lobola was, and 
remained, at the time of the current study, the quintessential foundation of the institution of marria-
ge. According to Mills (1995),  lobola
was a fundamental element of Xhosa marriage. It involved the transfer of sub-
stantial amounts of wealth in cattle or an equivalent from the bridegroom (and 
his family) to the guardian (normally the father) of the bride [...] The number of 
cattle and the timing of the delivery were matters of long negotiation. (3) 
The payment of  lobola, thus, enabled the two families concerned to consolidate their new relati-
onship through the related marriage negotiations (see also Ansell 2001; Hunter 1933, and Van Dijk 
and Dekker 2010). Guy (1987) states that the  lobola cattle transfer would only take place on condition 
that 
(i) the wife fulfilled her productive obligations in her husband’s homestead and 
(ii) she fulfilled her reproductive role in that homestead. Thus if the wife failed 
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to labour productively in agriculture and domestic work for the homestead, or 
proved to be adulterous or infertile, the number of cattle pledged for the wo-
man could be reduced, or the cattle returned and the marriage dissolved […] 
the transfer of cattle between homesteads was in fact a transfer of labour power: 
the labour power of the wife herself in the homestead and the land attached to 
the homestead, and the labour power of the children which she produced as 
wife and mother. (21−22, emphasis in the original) 
The paradoxes of marriage once more become the focus of this discussion. Though a bride’s relati-
ons could make economic, social and political gains through her marriage, they forfeited her labour 
power, as well as the potential future labour power of her children, to that of her husband and his 
kin. The loss of labour power, furthermore, also implied the risk of future losses in the case of divorce, 
as the result of a wife’s productive and/or reproductive incapacity. Issues of inheritance, lineage and 
succession, thus, counterbalanced issues of labour power and risk. Though the patriarchal nature 
of Nguni culture might have favoured the groom as the initialising actor in marriage processes, the 
bride’s kin countered the bias concerned, by determining the amount of bridewealth that the groom 
should pay for her. 
 Yet, Carver (2007) also argues that  lobola “transfer was a form of insurance, for if the bride was 
mistreated, she would return to her family and the cattle [paid for her] would have to be returned to 
[the groom’s] family” (42). The above was a serious matter, as a wife’s children belonged to her clan 
until the  lobola was fully transferred. If a husband felt that a wife did not fulfil her role as wife and 
mother, he could bring his case before her kin, demanding the return of some of the  lobola cattle 
if they did not manage to persuade her to change her allegedly wayward behaviour. The payment 
of  lobola, thus, functioned as a type of marriage contract that bound both families and the married 
individuals concerned to the right to access certain privileges and obligations (see also Carver 2007, 
42; Hunter 1933 262, 265; Liebenberg 1997, 369, and Mills 1995). Wives could, thus, challenge their in-
laws by simply returning to their own homestead, where they retained the rights and privileges of a 
daughter, and from where their own families could negotiate the terms of their return to the in-laws. 
Marriage was, consequently, a careful balancing act, in terms of which the resultant economic and 
political gains and losses mattered, and the conditions of succession and inheritance were subject 
to negotiation.
 A final important aspect of traditional marriage among the Cape Nguni is that pertaining to 
religion. In his overview of Xhosa religious beliefs, Hirst (2005, 4) explains that the amaXhosa believed 
in a Supreme Being, uQamatha, prior to their colonial contact. uQamatha was regarded as having 
created the universe and then of having withdrawn from it, thus allowing the ancestors to act as in-
termediaries between the people and Himself (4). As such, the ancestors, as opposed to the Supreme 
Being, came to be at the centre of the Cape Nguni traditional religion. The ancestors were believed to 
be the spirits of one’s deceased forbears, who had the power to influence, for better or worse, the lives 
of their descendants. Though making their wills known chiefly through the medium of dreams, the 
Nguni people also believed in the use of the forces of calamity to the same effect. Hirst (2005) writes:
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The ancestors are known to change their form in dreams […] sometimes they 
first appear as wild beasts (izilo) and later as parents and/or grandparents de-
manding, by their presence and through their revelation and/or remonstrance, 
the performance of neglected traditional rituals. (2)
Both the ancestors and the most elderly kinsmen of the bride and groom concerned linked traditio-
nal religion to the institution of marriage in an intricate way. Earlier, I mentioned the importance of 
showing “respect for genealogical seniority”, as Hirst (2005, 2) puts it. The need to show such respect 
was based on the close association between the elders and the ancestors. As Kopytoff (1971) argues 
in his research on the Suku Bantu group in the south-western Congo, the ethneme that the group 
used for both their ‘ancestors’ and their ‘elders’ was the same. As such, “any elder […] represents to a 
junior the entire legal and mystical authority of the lineage. The very fact of eldership confers upon a 
person mystical powers over the junior” (Kopytoff 1971, 131), with the powers concerned being simi-
lar to those of the ancestors. The same principle applies to the authority system of the Cape Nguni. 
Kopytoff (1971, 135) points out how the common radicals (-kulu, -guga, -dala) used in forming the 
words ‘elder’, ‘ancestor’, and ‘old one’ placed both the elders and the ancestors in the same linguistic 
category as that of those who had mystical power and authority. Elderly kinsman, therefore, received 
the same degree of respect (and suspicion) as did the ancestors in terms of the negotiation and con-
traction of marriages. With such being the case, Hunter (1933, 1951), for example, stresses the degree 
of deference that the husband’s elders, specifically her mother-in-law, expected of a young bride. 
 Highlighting the importance of traditional religion in terms of marriage practices, furthermo-
re, Kuper (2015) writes that marriage was 
imbued with religious significance. People talked as though the ancestors 
themselves paid and received bridewealth. The ancestors were responsible for 
fertility and might withhold a woman’s fertility if the bridewealth was not paid in 
full […] Indeed, women were dangerous to cattle. The Nguni banned new wives 
from drinking milk from the ancestral herds. (21) 
The demands of traditional religion, thus, influenced marriage customs prior, during and long after 
the marriage arrangements and weddings took place. Cattle were both the property of a clan and of 
the clan’s ancestors. The latter’s claim to the beasts found expression in the ritualised cattle sacrifice 
that they demanded, and over which, consequently, the elders presided. The ancestors of a bride, 
accordingly, had vested interests in enlarging the herd through the bridewealth that the prospective 
husband paid for her. That a bride did not take her husband’s clan name, however, threatened the 
well-being of the ancestors of her husband’s clan, with her presence, simultaneously, representing 
that of her ancestors. McClendon (1995) explains the nature of the prevailing situation in writing 
that the journey of a bride was “both physical, in that the woman moved to her husband’s family’s 
homestead, and spiritual, in that she arrived as a member of a strange lineage [from a different clan 
with different ancestors to that of her husband,] but was progressively incorporated into her hus-
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band’s lineage” (542−543). Due to the initial precarious position in which a bride found herself, accor-
ding to Hunter (1933), “[in] some parts of Pondoland it was usual for a father to give his daughter on 
or after her marriage a heifer […] which she kept at her married home as a link with her own ancestral 
spirits” (162). Doing so not only provided a bride with milk, but it also offered her protection, as the 
presence of the heifer guaranteed the presence of her ancestors, who would look after her well-being 
in her new home. Hunter (1933) continues by saying that
[a] woman, some months or years after her marriage, is sacrificed for and given 
the milk of her husband’s cows. After that she ceases to drink the milk of her 
own clan’s cattle. From the time of her marriage she may be made sick by her 
husband’s ancestral spirits, but she never becomes a full member of his clan. 
(267)
Spiritually, a wife, thus, was always seen to occupy a liminal space. Though drinking the milk of her 
husband’s clan’s cattle might entice the ancestors to make her sick, it simultaneously integrated her 
into her husband’s clan and helped her to find her rightful place in relation to the relevant ancestors. 
Induction into the clan of a husband was, thus, a slow and contradictory process, but it did eventual-
ly occur through the making of a sacrifice that heralded at least her partial acceptance into her hus-
band’s clan. Even though a wife could join the ranks of her husband’s ancestors after her death, she 
never took his clan name, and, as such, she was always vulnerable to be “made sick by her husband’s 
ancestral spirits” (ibid), should they be displeased with her in any way. 
 The institution of marriage was, inherently, a spiritual and religious act, in terms of which the 
living both acknowledged and actively engaged with the ancestors by means of ritual. The same res-
pect was due the elders’ role in the marriage negotiation as was that of the ancestors. It was, further-
more, also the introduction of a foreign religion, namely Christianity, that was one of the first factors 
that led to changes in traditional marriage and kinship practices. Having started with a description of 
the influence of Christianity during the times of colonial expansion (during which period the political, 
economic and religious foundations of marriage were under severe attack), I shall now turn to the 
factors that led to changes in, and to the decline of, the marriage and family-making processes in 
South Africa.
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Foreign Invaders and a New Religion
Writing on the political history of the Transkei and the Eastern Cape, Beinart (1987) states:
During these years [1880s – 1930s] the area [i.e. the Transkei] was profoundly 
and irreversibly affected by political and economic pressures. Colonial rule was 
gradually imposed over the territory from the 1860s to 1894, and the Transkei 
was administered by agents of, successively, the Cape Colony and the South 
African state. The Transkei’s penetration by merchants, missionaries, magis-
trates and labour recruiters was an uneven, but inexorable process of critical 
importance in shaping the lives of its inhabitants. (2)
Over a period of time, the British colonisers, thus, systematically annexed the area that became known 
as the Transkei. During a brief five-year period, from 1877 to 1881, the Xhosa did attempt to resist coloni-
al encroachment through the waging of intermittent wars. However, since such acts of violent resistan-
ce led to the eventual defeat of all the Xhosa chiefdoms involved, other Nguni groups in the Eastern 
Cape did not resist colonial subjugation with similar shows of force (Beinhart 1987, 7). Consequently, 
the Pondo kingdom eventually fell under colonial rule and administration in 1894 (Beinart 1979, 473).
 Though not focusing on marriage as such, Beinhart does indicate three features of colonial 
rule that were “of critical importance in shaping the lives of its inhabitants” (Beinart 1987, 2), as far as 
marriage was concerned. The three features were the influence of missionary activities, the econo-
mic pressures that affected the locals, and their eventual administration by the South African state. 
I shall, here, focus on the influence of Christianity on the systems of marriage and kinship, and then 
move on to the changing economy and to the state’s influence on such systems. 
 Though the missionaries did, sporadically, undertake mission trips beyond the borders of 
the Cape Colony, the expansion of the Colony’s boundaries paved the way for their permanent set-
tlement in the Transkei. Etherington (1996) argues that the “century and a half of colonial expan-
sion which preceded the establishment of permanent missionary operations [already] shifted the 
boundaries of the spiritual universe […] through the subtle permeation of religious ideas” (205) that 
both the missionaries and the settlers involved held. Etherington continues to explain that, in “such 
colonial situations [where Christian ideas intermingled with those of indigenous religion], imported 
Christianity and ‘traditional culture’ do not so much constitute separate ‘worlds’ as poles on a conti-
nuum” (206) for the indigenous people. The Mpondo were, thus, often not opposed to the Christian 
religion as such, being willing to embrace certain aspects that they perceived as being compatible 
with their own religious practices. Blackbeard (2011), for example, argues that the Mpondo gradu-
ally accepted missionaries in their traditional homeland, both prior to, and after, their subjugation, 
due to their ability to perform “magic” through the use of western medicines (519−520). Since many 
Mpondo perceived such magic to be the work of the ancestors, as channelled through the white 
doctors, they often did not object to converting to the use of Western medicine. However, converting 
the locals to a brand of Christianity that implied and demanded the acceptance of European cultural 
practices proved to be an enduring challenge to the missionaries concerned.
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 Marriage and marriage practices are a case in point. Reflecting on the attitudes of settlers 
with regard to Xhosa marriage practices, Crais (1992) quotes from a publication (1840) by a certain 
Reverend Niven: “Beginning with the extended family, the author [Niven] argued that  lobola and po-
lygamy, long decried as immoral by Europeans, made the male sex ‘accomplished idlers, the perso-
nification of indolence’” (132). Carver (2007, 42) also states that the missionaries in the area often 
condemned the practice of  lobola on moral grounds. Explaining the situation still further, Mills (1995) 
writes that issues of  lobola and polygyny were
part of a larger missionary preoccupation in the nineteenth century – the ‘de-
graded’, ‘servile’ status and condition of women in African society […] Their 
greatest example of ‘degradation’ was polygyny, and  lobola, they felt,was the 
foundation of the ‘unnatural’ relationship” between husbands and wives. (5) 
The results of such rhetoric adversely affected the family structures and the marriage practices of 
many converts. Mills (1995) states: 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, a number of traditional Xhosa so-
cial customs [ lobola; initiation of boys and girls; cattle sacrifice; polygyny] were 
opposed by missionaries who tried to insist that their Xhosa converts abstain 
from all observance or participation on pain of discipline, even expulsion from 
the church. (1) 
In some cases, as Mills (1995, 7) and Russell (2004, 26) indicate, converted polygynous men had to di-
vorce all but their first wife, with the other converted wives having to leave their polygynous husbands. 
 The consequences of such actions were often disastrous for Cape Nguni households, but 
even more so for the offspring of Christian parents: if a man refused to transfer  lobola to his wife’s kin, 
her family did not acknowledge his claim to her children. The children concerned only became ab-
sorbed into a man’s clan after the transfer of the outstanding  lobola. The children of women who left 
their husbands, as certain churches demanded, in contrast, lost their possible paternal inheritance, 
and the opportunity for their absorption into their father’s clan. Changes in  lobola practices, further-
more, also affected the economy of households and homesteads that was largely based on the trans-
fer of cattle and on the labour power of women and their children. Refraining from certain marriage 
customs, as well as the existence of the divorce procedure, with the resultant breaking up of families, 
also had far-reaching consequences for broader traditional kinship structures. Such practices also 
impacted on how the Cape Nguni, in general, perceived the institutions of kinship and marriage, 
specifically because their marriage practices negotiated and established their sociopolitical organi-
sation and their traditional economic practices. Christian religion and ideology often had an adverse 
impact on the prevailing sociopolitical organisation, and on traditional economic practices The exi-
sting marriage and kinship structures, furthermore, deteriorated still more under the influence of the 
newly introduced colonial economic system’s provision of both challenges and opportunities. 
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v) The spread of lung sickness, and the cattle killings, during the mid-nineteenth century. Source: Peires, J.B. 
1986. “‘Soft’ Believers and ‘Hard’ Unbelievers in the Xhosa Cattle-Killing.” The Journal of African History.
Three historic events are essential to understanding the political and socio-economic changes that 
occurred among the Cape Nguni. After succinctly mentioning the events, I shall continue with my 
discussion of how such events affected the prevailing systems of marriage and kinship. Of the events, 
the first important one was the sporadic Xhosa anti-colonial wars that raged between 1850 and 1853. 
Peires (1986) argues that the 
scorched-earth policy of the Imperial troops, developed in response to the Xho-
sa style of guerrilla war, systematically devastated Xhosaland, burning all the 
crops and capturing all the cattle which could be found […] men and women 
[of newly subjugated lands] were forced into migrant labour on white settler 
farms.44 (444) 
44  It was specifically the harshness of the scorched earth policy of the Imperial troops that led to the Mpondos’ 
comparatively peaceful, yet reluctant, acceptance of colonial rule. 
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Before the end of the above-mentioned wars, the second event took place, namely the spread of 
cattle lungsickness in southern Africa (see map v). Tracing the history of the disease, Peires (1986) ex-
plains that lungsickness “arrived in southern Africa aboard a Dutch ship carrying Friesian bulls which 
reached Mossel Bay in September 1853. By March 1854, it had reached Uitenhage, whence a Mfengu, 
travelling with five cattle, brought it to Fort Beaufort on the borders of Xhosaland” (446), from where 
it spread rapidly throughout the broader Eastern Cape area. The epidemic was so severe that it killed 
up to 90 per cent of the cattle belonging to the isiXhosa-speaking Mfengu (Peires 1986, 448). The third 
event, which had, arguably, the most devastating consequences, was the Cattle Killings of 1856 to 
1857. The prophecy of a teenage girl named Nongqawuse (see Ashforth 1991; Peires 1986; Stapleton 
1991) (see map v) was the catalyst for such a cataclysm. Nongqawuse prophesied that the ancestors 
would purge the land of all white foreigners once the Xhosa had sacrificed all their cattle. The Xhosa 
king at the time, Sarhili, believed the prophecy and ordered the nationwide slaughter of all cattle, 
as well as the burning of grain stores and refraining from cultivation during the sowing seasons. The 
result was devastating, and Schapera (1928, 180) estimates that around 150 000 cattle died in 1857 
alone. The slaughtering of cattle that survived the scorched earth policy and the lungsickness formed 
the crux of a final desperate bid to regain independence and the favour of the ancestors. Needless 
to say, such events, which occurred in a very short time span of about ten years, not only decimated 
the local indigenous economy that was based on hoe-agriculture and on cattle herding, but they 
also irrevocably changed the sociopolitical dynamics of Cape Nguni life that were embedded in, and 
mediated through, marriage and  lobola negotiation. The starving, war-tired and politically weakened 
isiXhosa-speaking communities were, hence, no match for the colonial forces that were able to bring 
large parts of the Eastern Cape under colonial rule and economic policies relatively easily after such 
a disaster. 
 In the wake of such events, wage labour was the only viable alternative for most of the Cape 
Nguni during the second half of the nineteenth century. In the light of the growing presence of colo-
nial industry, Schapera (1928) writes that
[d]omestic service, farm labour, and industrial tasks all called for native em-
ployment, and the opening of the great mining industries greatly stimulated the 
demand […] It is a common practice for able-bodied men to leave their homes 
from time to time to enter the service of white employers, and for this purpose 
they often travel great distances. (182, see also McClendon 1995)
Though the absence of cattle as a source of livelihood and of  lobola currency served as a push factor 
for many men to join the migratory labour force, the ability to raise cash with which to purchase cat-
tle also served as a pull factor. This was because it granted young men a great deal of independence 
from their kin, on whom they had traditionally depended for the raising of the  lobola payments. With 
the ancestral herds greatly diminished, marriage, thus, became more difficult than it had previously 
been, while, rather paradoxically, paid labour provided an alternative route for making the required 
payments (Krige 1936). In pursuit of the above, men were absent from their homesteads for prolonged 
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periods, either because of their participation in labour migration, or because many opted to settle in 
the towns permanently. Even though they still saw the ancestral homestead as their true ‘home’, the 
men’s prolonged absence from their families weakened their kin relations (see Kingdon and Knight 
2004; Mayer 1962). With the weakening of their kin relations, and with the possibility of raising the 
 lobola for selfgranting a novel degree of independence, marriage negotiations increasingly became 
an individualised process, in which the circle of participating kin grew ever smaller (see Watkins 1948).
 Women eventually also joined the migrating labour force, often working and/or settling in 
the colonial towns, thus weakening their kin relations furthermore. Russell (2004, 29−30) mentions 
some of the ways in which the pattern of growing labour migration altered and destabilised marriage 
and family life in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Though married women often 
followed their husbands to towns in search of work, they often also did so to ensure their husband’s 
fidelity, as migration led to a sharp increase in the amount of infidelity existing among both married 
men and women. In addition, infidelity also led to extramarital pregnancies. The number of nonma-
rital pregnancies also drastically increased during the same period for young women, who either 
migrated to the towns, or who grew up in such towns. Children, whether born in, out of, or prior to 
wedlock were, more often than not, sent to live with their maternal grandparents, who their parents 
expected to raise them. Though kin relationships and ancestral homesteads were still important to 
the growing urbanised Cape Nguni population, they came to be more of a symbolic link to the ances-
tors than evidence of a lived relationship with family and kin. Though the institution of marriage was 
still based on the making of  lobola transfers, marital issues increasingly became a private affair, with 
the existence of extramarital relationships and children becoming more commonplace. 
 Marriage and kin relations suffered a further blow when the British Empire granted self-go-
vernance to the South African state in 1910. This soon resulted in the consolidation of the apartheid 
system in 1948, white minority rule, and a form of governance that was based on discriminatory 
conceptualisations of race and ethnicity.45 Hajdu (2006) provides a good explanation in this regard:
The population categorized as ‘black’ were furthermore divided according to 
ethnic groups, […] and were assigned certain territories, the so-called home-
lands. Many of these areas had been ‘Native Reserves’ during the colonial go-
vernment, but the Group Areas Act of 1951 induced forced relocalizations of 
people into the designated homelands. The homelands were then first given 
‘self-government’ and some were later given ‘independence’, however, they 
were hardly recognized by any countries outside of South Africa. The populati-
ons of the homelands lost their South African citizenship through this process, 
hence relieving the government of economic and political responsibility for 
them. Yet, the homelands remained easily accessible labour reserves, when la-
bour was needed in mines and at plantations. (69)
45  Officially the ‘Union of South Africa’, the country would remain part of the British commonwealth, until the 
‘Republic of South Africa’ was formed in 1961.
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Ironically, the apartheid state, despite wishing to remove the African population from the ‘white’ are-
as, still depended on Africans for its main workforce. Anderson et al. (1999) explain the results of the 
paradox for African families:
The combination of urbanization and Apartheid affected nearly every aspect of 
local [Xhosa] family life […] For example, Apartheid legislation stipulated that 
African men could come to cities such as Cape Town on 1-year contracts only, 
and they were prohibited from bringing their wives and children with them […] 
As a result, Xhosa men were often forced to live and seek employment apart 
from their wives and families […] these changes marked a general shift among 
Africans from patrilocal to matrilocal or neolocal residence patterns. (437)
With the strict legal restrictions on, and the regulation of, the mobility of the Mpondo people, the 
maintenance of kin and marriage relations became increasingly difficult for both the urbanised and 
for the migratory married couples and families. Yet, state laws also affected marriage-related practi-
ces. Dauda (1996), for example, writes that a 
series of droughts and erosion [1940s-1950s] had created a crisis which resul-
ted in the NAD’s [Native Administration Department] culling of cattle, fencing 
against grazing and promoting contour ploughing. Cattle were central to the 
African economy as they were the capital that paid for brides […] With a shorta-
ge of cattle, marriages had to be postponed or put off indefinitely. (4) 
Redding (1996) also explains the aftermath of the cattle culling that took place during the 1940s and 
1950s. He argues that cattle were either part of someone’s bridewealth, or they were due to become 
someone’s bridewealth. In cases where the postponing and the indefinite putting off of marriage 
took place, fathers of brides had to accept a much lower bridewealth than they expected. The pros-
pect of a much deflated, or of an indefinitely postponed,  lobola resulted in forms of cohabitation 
in both the rural and the urban areas. In such cases, partial  lobola transfers sometimes served as a 
pledge of a future marriage, while the act of cohabiting also often appeared as an irregular new form 
of marriage, albeit one that lacked the degree of security that the provision of a more substantial 
 lobola negotiation and transfer would have provided. 
 Summarising the above-mentioned changes in kinship and marriage in the specifically urba-
nised areas, Watkins (1948, 504) states that marriages were becoming increasingly secularised, in the 
sense that individualism and self-dependence were replacing the existence of strong family bonds, 
with marital bonds having became lax, and the amount of infidelity having increased. In addition, 
both women and children became less dependent on men, with, finally, marriage coming not to be 
necessary for the maintenance of individual welfare. The changes to which Watkins alludes, as well as 
the financial constraints that I discussed earlier, all contributed to the national decline of the institu-
tion of marriage during the second half of the twentieth century, on which I now focus my attention.
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The Decline and Change in, and the Continuity of, the System of Traditional 
Marriage
Seventy odd years after Watkins’s observation, and shortly after the end of the apartheid regime in 
South Africa, Anderson et al. (1999, 437) added to Watkins’ list of reasons for the decline of marriage 
and for the changing family structures. The researchers argued that the system of  lobola and traditi-
onal forms of marriage had become very rare among the urbanised population, whereas the number 
of divorces and nonmarital births had greatly increased. Hunter (2007) explains the situation further 
in suggesting that the
census data support the claim that there has been a quite dramatic decline over 
the last four decades [of marriage]. The factors behind this decline are complex; 
they include (until recently) women’s increased work prospects and thus their 
growing economic independence from men […] Among the poor, wedlock is 
being exposed as a decidedly inflexible institution through which to organize 
social alliances and the flow of resources. (695)
The decline in traditional forms of marriage can, thus, be ascribed to the increasing number of finan-
cial constraints resulting from the mentioned historical events, as well as from new post-democratic 
neoliberal economic policies, challenges and opportunities. Women often no longer had to depend 
on a husband as their source of economic income, as will become clear in Chapter Five. In contrast, 
poor women might have shied away from marriage, so as to safeguard their income from indiscri-
minate use by a husband. The rise in the divorce rates and in the number of nonmarital births (prior 
to marriage, after a divorce, or to a single mother), alternatively, might have been linked to women’s 
growing independence and sense of individualisation. Rice (2014), for example, writes that “virtually 
all young unmarried women with whom I spoke presented marriage as unpleasant and intolerably 
restrictive, owing to the excessive demands of husbands and in-laws, and most young women frankly 
stated that they do not want to marry” (387−388). I shall discuss the interplay between female indivi-
dualisation and marriage in Chapter Six. The ongoing urbanisation (which served to loosen kinship 
and family ties), as well as the post-democratic laws and policies, saw to the promoting of gender 
rights and sexual equality, which served to facilitate changes in gender perceptions. The perceptual 
shift enabled women to find the freedom to head their own households and to build their own fami-
lies after divorce, or in the absence of marriage. The increasing prevalence of divorce and nonmari-
tal childbirth, thus, rendered both divorce and nonmarital childbirth socially tolerable, even though 
marriage and a traditional family and kinship structure were still the cultural ideal.
 Noteworthily, however, the above-mentioned changes did not necessarily imply a complete 
rupture from the more historical forms of marriage, kinship and family-making processes, as I descri-
bed at the beginning of this chapter. As Watkins (1948) already indicated a few decades ago, there 
is a tendency to preserve the rules of clan exogamy, to retain emphasis on the 
value of children, whether born within or without wedlock, and to continue the 
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custom of  lobola (bridewealth), which, nevertheless, is losing its character as a 
pledge of social solidarity and instead is becoming a commercial transaction. 
(504)
The resilient nature of certain kinship and marriage-related practices still influence Cape Nguni life 
today. Russell (2004) confirms this in her research into urbanised African household structures in 
contemporary Southern Africa. She finds that the “agnatic system [of urbanised African families] is 
proving no less resilient at adapting to the demands of the international economy than the conju-
gal system” (64) of the West. The main reason for this resilience, according to Russell (2004), is that 
agnatic 
[h]ouseholds can reform in a number of ways at short notice in response to 
economic (or other) contingencies because of the kinship system. The formal 
multiplication of key statuses – fathers rather than father, mothers rather than 
mother. (65) 
With familial positions, responsibilities and functions possibly multiplying and being subject to 
transfer, the Cape Nguni agnatic kinship system became fluid to a certain extent. This enabled it to 
take on new forms that did not constitute a breakdown in familial relationships, or structures. Put 
differently, the principles and value of kinship prevail, though the form in which it appeared histori-
cally might have changed. 
 Russell’s (2004) observation also seems to hold true for the preserved aspects of kinship and 
marriage traditions, as Watkins (1948) points out. Though the various forms of precolonial kinship 
structures and traditional marriage might have undergone considerable change, their value is pre-
sent in new forms, to some extent. Put otherwise, while practices may change rather easily, the ideo-
logies in which the practices are steeped are much more conservative and persistent in the case of 
traditional marriages in South Africa. For example, though the amount of  lobola required might have 
changed, been temporarily postponed, or become an individualised affair, the value of its underlying 
principle still lies in its payment being an essential step in the marriage process. Similarly, children’s 
fathers might be absent, and children might not necessarily grow up in the patrilocal homestead, or 
be absorbed into their biological father’s clan, prior to the transfer of the required  lobola. Neverthe-
less, the recognition of the value of children as the carriers of the maternal clan name, and their sta-
tus as possible heirs to their father’s estate, and as a potential future economic asset, is still implicit 
within the kinship system, both agnatic and cognatic. As such, a maternal or paternal uncle, cousin 
or grandfather can act as a father, fulfilling the same role and functions as a biological father, at least 
to some extent. 
 The process of marriage decline and change is reminiscent of De Boeck’s (2000) notion of 
breccia. Breccia are “volcanic rocks in which hard fragments are caught within solidified lava flows. 
At moments, this lava brings back up to the surface elements [i.e. breccia] from the deepest magmas” 
(De Boeck 2000) that remain in a solid state, in an otherwise fluid substance. De Boeck uses the exi-
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stence of breccia as a metaphor for explaining the process in terms of which cultural practices conti-
nually change, while retaining certain hard fragments, or central elements. Van Dijk (2015) provides a 
good example of the above in his study on changes in marriage practices in Botswana. He illustrates 
how the responsibility for contracting marriage is shifting from the elders, who were traditionally 
responsible for such contracts, to the couple wishing to marry. The shift has brought about immense 
strain on the couple concerned, who have become responsible for the marriage negotiations, as well 
as for their planning and execution. Yet, irrespective of the above changes, Van Dijk (2015, 85) argues 
that marriage still “takes the form of a project that requires utter correctness in its management and 
careful planning”. In such a case, the formative steps towards marriage function as a kind of solid, un-
changing breccia, with marriage still commanding structural correctness and regulation. Irrespective 
of how  lobola, kin involvement and responsibility have changed, resulting in the partial decline of the 
institution of marriage, obligatory steps still form the pathway to marriage. The shifts and changes in, 
as well as the decline of the marital institution, has, thus, not occurred at the expense of the ideologies 
that are imbued in the hard fragments (or breccia) of the prevailing marriage and kinship systems. 
 Important elements and principles of traditional marriage and kinship practices have un-
dergone considerable change in the past, are currently fading, have come to be expressed in either 
changed, or new, forms, or are enduring as rigidly hard fragments. This serves to attract attention 
to the initial question that I posed at the outset of the chapter: how have the historical events and 
processes that have changed marriage and kinship practices contextually influenced the current 
re-emergence of violent ukuthwala? 
Ukuthwala and the Changed Landscape of Marriage and Kinship
In the preceding sections of this chapter, I recounted the main events that, over time, have resulted in 
considerable changes being made in Cape Nguni marriage and kinship practices. The changes con-
cerned have encompassed the advent of Christianisation; the collapse of the indigenous economy, 
and the introduction of the colonial economic system; the labour migration system, with the accom-
panying absence of men; urbanisation, and, finally, the formation, and the ultimate dismantling, of 
apartheid policies. I then indicated a few key features of current marriage and kinship practices: the 
existence of great variation in the amounts of  lobola paid, in the duration of its negotiation, and in the 
participants themselves (which may be referred to as the personalisation of  lobola); the growing in-
dependence and individualisation of the women themselves (economically, politically and sociocul-
turally); the general absence of kin engagement in marital affairs, and, finally, the growing tolerance 
for divorce, nonmarital births and, by implication, female-headed households. 
 Though an in-depth analysis of contemporary marriage patterns and practices, household 
composition and kinship structures (as the result of the above-mentioned historic and more recent 
events) is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is possible to extrapolate two common and defi-
ning elements of current marriage and kinship practices, namely irregularity and vulnerability. The 
irregularity and vulnerability of contemporary marriage patterns and practices, household compo-
sitions and kinship structures is, thus, the defining element of the context within which the practice 
of ukuthwala occurs, as well. Yet, the defining features (i.e. irregularity and vulnerability) resonate 
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with the experience of ukuthwala, which has, rather ironically, always borne the image of a wayward, 
informal and open marriage practice (whether its definition has been that of a form of agreed elope-
ment or of a form of forced abduction). 
 In the introductory chapter, I mentioned a few of the reasons for individuals to opt for ukuth-
wala, as opposed to opting for other forms of traditional marriage. The reasons included: to bypass 
conventional  lobola negotiations, if a conventional negotiation might have led to the charging of an 
excessively high  lobola amount, or in the case of an unplanned pregnancy; to indicate the serious 
intent of the groom; to bypass the possible objection of kin opposed to the marriage; and to force 
a girl into compliance and/or her parents into giving their consent to the marriage concerned. Such 
diverse applications of ukuthwala attest to its strategic usage to contract into a marriage that might 
either not be acceptable, or that might be very difficult to negotiate in the case of a traditional marri-
age. Ukuthwala’s informal character and openness, thus, have rendered it an acceptable disruption 
of the norm that is devoid of the breccia that characterises regular forms of indigenous marriage. 
Seen in terms of its historically wayward applications, ukuthwala can, hence, appear as a popular 
way of contracting a marriage, or of forcing one to come about, at a time when marriage is becoming 
increasingly difficult to contract into. The irregularity and the vulnerability of current marriage and 
kinship practices has opened them up for exploitation, through the fact that ukuthwala is an histori-
cally acceptable violation of traditional convention, as a few examples will make clear.
 Heeren et al.’s (2011) statistical study of marriage,  lobola and HIV/AIDS provides a good star-
ting point. In summary, the researchers concerned write that
[in] spite of widespread beliefs that traditions and customs are no longer 
strong, the results of the focus groups showed that  lobola is an important part 
of culture in South Africa. Most women and men believe that the payment of 
 lobola creates a greater value and strength in their marriage, and hence they 
insist that husbands should pay  lobola. It is when  lobola is not paid that many 
participants strongly believed that the marriage does not last, the husband or 
the wife will not respect the other, and the families will not accept the marriage. 
Husbands are having extramarital sexual partners, whether they paid or did not 
pay  lobola, and expose themselves to the risk of STD/HIV transmission. (79)
That  lobola negotiations and transfers still appear to be the foundation stone of a healthy marriage 
and of sound kin relations indicates the continuation of historical marriage practices and ideology. 
Yet, as Heeren et al. (2011) point out, the system of  lobola is rather a cultural ideal, as opposed to 
being a marital agreement that binds both parties to certain privileges and obligations. The vulnera-
bility that results from the existence of an idealised, yet nonbinding and unenforced form of  lobola, 
in such cases, runs counter to other cases that seem to honour the attendant negotiations, as well as 
the associated transfer of goods, and the consequent marital rights and obligations. 
 Hunter (2015), for example, argues that “[m]uch of the burgeoning sex-focused AIDS litera-
ture effectively ignores how most South Africans aspire to marry, and ilobolo retains unparalleled 
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importance in the moral economy of intimacy” (29).46 The researcher involved, accordingly, explores 
the different ways in which the poor strategically employ partial  lobola payments to reconfigure re-
lationships of cohabitation so that they resemble marital relationships. Consequently, he describes 
cases in which 
[m]en are able and willing to impart some ilobolo and constitute the relati-
onship as one of being nearly married but […] that these shouldn’t be seen as 
steps on a path to marriage. As a state, nearly married relationships have the 
potential to increase the status of men and women, rework gender in a way that 
evokes love, maintain links with multiple kin, manage relationships with amad-
lozi [ancestral spirits], and maintain healthy children. Conversely, they might be 
marked by conflict and even violence. (37)
Though Hunter’s (2015) cases confirm the fact that the payment of  lobola still elicits honour and 
adherence, they also show how its strategic uses are changing to fit current demands. Furthermore, 
partial  lobola negotiations and transfers tend to lead to conflict and violence in the relationships of 
cohabitation into which ‘nearly married’ couples enter, thus attesting to their vulnerable status. Hee-
ren et al. (2011) and Hunter’s contrasting findings demonstrate the irregularity of current  lobola prac-
tices, and the vulnerabilities to which they might lead in terms of marital and household relations. 
 Lobola as an ukuthwala-related practice is clearly subject to such increasing irregularity. Whereas 
Chapter Five will illustrate how the increasing irregularity of  lobola practices opens them up to new 
economic possibilities in relation to ukuthwala, Chapter Six will explore how very young thwala’ed 
brides become the victims of violent domestic abuse, even if the required  lobola transfers do take 
place. The practice of  lobola, consequently, has increasingly come to be the pattern for economic 
gain, it seems, by way of the use of an exploitative form of ukuthwala. 
 Niehaus (1994) gives a further example of the vulnerability and irregularity of current marria-
ge and kinship practices. In his research into marital conflict and sibling relations, Niehaus highlights 
the often overlooked vulnerability of female-headed households:
In the South African context this concept [of matrifocality] may be misleading 
as its suggestion of women’s authority obscures two issues. One is that even if 
a woman is the most senior person in a household she may lack influence over 
domestic decisions if the household also includes her mature wage-earning 
sons who support their mother financially […] The notion of matrifocality also 
obscures the fact that the weakest and the most vulnerable households are of-
ten those which are woman-headed. (135)
46  Ilobolo is the isiZulu spelling of the isiXhosa word ‘ lobola’.
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Whether because of divorce, separation, widowhood, or personal choice, women-headed house-
holds, despite them becoming more commonplace, still appear to comprise an irregular household 
structure. Bereft of the relative degree of safety that the participants can find in conforming to the 
sociocultural status quo, or to the establishment of ‘regular households’, such households become 
comparatively vulnerable to poverty and economic exploitation by kin. 
 As will soon become clear, there has been a similar rise in the number of elder- and minor-
/ sibling-headed households. The irregular households concerned are not only weak in structure, as 
Niehaus (1994) explains, but those who head them are also, often, themselves vulnerable. I shall ad-
dress the vulnerability of irregular households with regard to thwala marriage in chapters Five and 
Six. Whereas Chapter Five will elaborate on the case study of a girl who became an easy thwala target, 
as she was both an orphan and living in a ‘weak’ household, of which her widowed aunt was the head, 
Chapter Six will show how the violence that now characterises ukuthwala originated in the system of 
labour migration that often led to households being female-headed for prolonged periods of time.
 Marriage, as a partially religious act, serves as a final example of how marriage and kinship 
structure is obtaining definition in terms of its irregularity and vulnerability. A few decades ago, Seti-
loane (1978) observed that 
the rituals and the slaughtering of beasts […] during the [ lobola] negotiations 
and after, by either side (and this is still done by Christians too), the ancestors, 
who are part of the family, are invoked. Without their blessing and goodwill, the 
success of the marriage union would be in jeopardy. (32)
Irrespective of the initial Christian attack on Cape Nguni marriage and marital practices, the invol-
vement of the ancestors and the role of indigenous religious practices were still persisting in current 
marriage customs in some form or the other, even among Christians, at the time of the current study. 
More recently, Eriksson et al. (2010, 109) investigated how three different Christian denominations 
addressed the HIV/AIDS pandemic with regard to gender, sexuality and marriage. Though all three 
denominations – Roman Catholic, Lutheran (Protestant) and the Assemblies of God (Pentecostal/
charismatic) – condoned the practice of  lobola, great variation occurred in how much emphasis they 
placed on its importance, and on its function, in terms of marital and family relations. One Roman 
Catholic priest, for instance, argued that sexual intercourse within marriage should only take place 
after the payment of  lobola in traditional marriages. Yet, since  lobola sometimes took a lifetime to 
pay off, he condoned the sexual intercourse of couples after the church had officiated over their 
marriage, even though the full payment of the required amount of  lobola was still incomplete. The 
making of such an arrangement renders traditional marriage practices, as well as Roman Catholic 
marriages, irregular, since both become embedded in, and part of, the other, but without any clear 
principle, or rule, being in existence to regulate how the couples should navigate their way between 
the two intertwined systems. 
 In turn, Frahm-Arp (2006, see also Frahm-Arp 2011) investigated two Pentecostal/charisma-
tic churches with comparable doctrinal beliefs. Whereas she found that the system of  lobola was 
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 promoted in one congregation as a proper part of consolidating a healthy Christian family (specifi-
cally because  lobola involves the wider extended family), the other congregation rejected the system 
as a form of female subjugation. Similarly to Eriksson et al.’s (2010) study, Frahm-Arp’s (2006) investi-
gation illustrates how the Christian interpretations of traditional marriage practices have led to the 
latter becoming irregular. Conversely, the research in point also illustrates the ongoing vulnerability 
of traditional marriage practices within a growing Christian environment, albeit that the former has 
come increasingly to result from the choice of the congregants themselves, rather than from the coer-
cive force to which they are subject, as in the case of some of the early missionary churches. 
Conclusion
By means of an historical overview, the current chapter introduced and explained the destructive 
factors that caused, and that were still causing, at the time of the current study, a decline in the 
number of marriages entered into, as well as changes in the prevailing marriage customs and kinship 
practices. The factors described, namely colonialism, the changing economic structures and policies, 
the formation, and the ultimate dismantling, of the apartheid system, and labour migration, all had a 
part to play in giving rise to different forms of structural violence. The factors concerned also illustrate 
how various forms of structural violence on the national level tended to permeate, and adversely af-
fect, people’s lifeworlds on the local level. The way in which local customs responded to such adver-
se circumstances, furthermore, served to set the local context and the environment in which ukuth-
wala’s informal character and openness came to provide a strategy for coping with the changes, or an 
alternative route for contracting a marriage. Though ukuthwala might have served as an alternative 
course of action, it has not been immune to the broader changes that have occurred within the wider 
society. This is evidenced by the way in which the practice has become increasingly informal, leading 
to the heightened vulnerability of many individuals who are involved in the practice. The present 
chapter, accordingly, illustrated how the modern violent expressions of ukuthwala are partially the 
result of historical processes and events. It is, thus, crucial that the historical context that this chapter 
presented receive proper consideration throughout the remainder of this dissertation.
 The most prominent and salient change that has occurred in ukuthwala practices to date, as 
having resulted from the above-mentioned historical processes and events, is that of sexual violence, 
which has rendered the phenomenon an inherently legal issue. As I mentioned in the introductory 
chapter, the practice of ukuthwala, at the time of the current study, was legal under customary law, 
while the possible violent elements that its practice might have implied were illegal under constitu-
tional human rights. It is, therefore, important to reflect critically on the perception and definition of 
violence at the national legal, as well as at the local, level in order to be able to determine whether 
the surge of violence that was still ongoing at the time of the study was at all related to the practice 
of abduction marriage, as such. The following chapter will, therefore, address the question as to how 
conflicting discourses on human rights and custom were shaping ukuthwala’s violent re-emergence 
at the time that I undertook the research for the current dissertation.
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Steegstra (2004, 14) writes that “[w]here modernity emphasises change and rationally controlled 
development, tradition is its twin concept that denotes continuity with the past”. Along the same 
lines, I argued, in Chapter One, that tradition is not a relic of cultural history, but it is a contempo-
rary, fostered link with the past – it is a tradition within modernity, rather than having been prior 
to, and opposed to, such a zeitgeist. The assertion rings true for indigenous marriage practices in 
South Africa as well. As I showed in the previous chapter, though marriage and kinship practices have 
declined and/or changed considerably over the last two centuries, certain of the elements involved 
remain important breccia, or hard fragments, linking current modern forms to historical ones. The 
importance of the principle of agnatic descent, the principle of exogamy, and the practices of  lobola 
and ukuthwala served as examples of the above. Yet, fostered and fostering links with the past often 
conflicts with notions of change, and with what appears to be rationally controlled development in 
terms of modern-day society. The conflict involved finds concrete expression in the context of legal 
pluralism in South Africa, wherein modern notions of human rights coexist uneasily with the cultural 
relativist principles of customary law. 
 Perceptions of rape are a case in point. Sikweyiya and Jewkes (2009) write that “in December 
2007, South Africa adopted a new sexual offence law [with] a new gender-neutral definition of rape” 
(529). The 2007 Sexual Offences Act is based on the Constitution’s premises of universal human rights 
that focus on the rights of the universal individual, as distinct from his/her culture, ethnicity, race, ge-
nder, age, or religious persuasion. Yet, the circumstances surrounding the incidence of rape in South 
Africa are often steeped in local (historical) beliefs in, and expressions of, culture, custom, tradition, 
gender, and age. Whereas an instance of forced sex might be justified within certain forms of ab-
duction marriage, for example, the stipulations that the culturally blind, human rights-based Sexual 
Offences Act make condemn the same instance as consisting of marital, or partner, rape. Universal 
human rights, in terms of the Constitution, can, thus, often appear to be at odds with the local inter-
pretations of violence as a possible element of the cultural practices that receive protection under 
the local conceptions of customary law.
 The conflict between a human rights and a local perspective on violence as forming part of 
customary practice is the first context within which I aim to discover whether ukuthwala is re-emer-
ging in a more violent way, and whether the new, violent forms of the practice are, to any degree, 
marriage practices. The sub-question that this chapter specifically addresses is: How are conflicting 
discourses on human rights and custom shaping ukuthwala’s violent re-emergence? The answer to 
this question will also serve as the foundation for the following chapters, since the conflicts and the 
discourses that I identify here are crucial to understanding the violent re-emergence of ukuthwala in 
the other contexts within which I shall frame and investigate it. 
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 This chapter moves sequentially between several stages: 1) Through presenting a scenario 
that played out during my field research, as well as a recent case study of an ukuthwala-related court 
case, I shall introduce the various actors in, and discourses on, the ukuthwala debate. 2) I shall then 
provide an overview of the available literature and of the theory behind the clash between human 
rights and customary law, in order to frame my understanding of ukuthwala within the legal con-
text. 3) How the jurisprudent debate influences the legal discourse on the national level then comes 
into focus, as does 4), the emergence of an anti-human rights discourse on the local level. 5) I then 
investigate the internal conflict within the local anti-human rights discourse as an important cause 
of ukuthwala’s violent re-emergence, followed by 6) an investigation of how the violence concerned 
has also led to the emergence of a local discourse in support of human rights. In conclusion 7), I 
shall illustrate how the violent re-emergence of ukuthwala becomes understandable within the legal 
context, in terms of it consisting of an emerging discourse on violent actions, as much as it consists 
of the actual perpetration of violent actions. 
Ukuthwala – The Indefinable Marriage 
Setting off to conduct my fieldwork, I thought it wise to gain some knowledge of ukuthwala’s for-
mative steps. I assumed that identifying ukuthwala’s breccia would enable me to map out the local 
principles regulating this form of marriage, so that I could then compare it with its codified counter-
part. Being aware of the culturally acceptable informality of abduction marriage, I expected some dif-
ficulty in doing this. I was, however, not prepared to encounter the amount of confusion that I would 
experience in the field. I arranged to meet with the chief and elders of Mthimde village (see photo vii) 
for a focus group discussion. On their own initiative, they invited the whole village to participate in 
the discussion. Though people arrived and left during the course of our discussions, at least 40 peop-
le were present during the entire length of our meeting, with an even spread of both gender and age. 
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vii) The focus group at Mthimde village. Photo taken by the author, February 2012. 
 I commenced by enquiring about the process of ukuthwala, which elicited a heated debate. 
The deputy chief said: “If the girl don’t [i.e. doesn’t] agree, but the parents have agreement, she can 
go there, get thwala-ed [to the homestead of the abductor]”; another male elder interrupted with 
“It is not always the agreement of the parents. The girl don’t [i.e. doesn’t] know that she is going to 
be taken by thwala, and even the parents don’t know. She is taken by force [...] In that case, there’s 
no agreement”. After a lengthy argument had taken place on the role of agreement in the case of 
ukuthwala, I asked whether the villagers agreed with the media reports that ukuthwala was beco-
ming more commonplace, and in which ways it differed from its historical counterpart. A young man 
answered: “The conflict now [ensues] because the girl is taken now still so young […] the girl don’t 
[i.e. doesn’t] like it. It’s now the [human] right of that child, still young, now she is making [a] wife in 
not the right time”. There was a general murmur of consent that not only were girls becoming abduc-
tees at a younger age than before, but also that ukuthwala had become different, in the sense that 
it was illegal because of the existence of human rights. An elder lamented that they “do not like this 
thing of the rights because it destroys totally our customs […] the rights is killing the custom”. At this 
point, the discussion took a turn, when yet another male elder defended the practice of ukuthwala by 
arguing that it was not responsible for the rape of children, which is what had led to the perceived il-
legalisation of the practice: “Some who are doing this are criminals, they go and take that girl, and, on 
the way, they just rape her, and then release the girl to go home.” A middle-aged woman agreed that 
“it’s [ukuthwala] not back, because [now] there is no agreement of [i.e. on] thwala”, thus reigniting the 
earlier debate that had taken place on the role of agreement during the carrying out of ukuthwala. It 
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increasingly became clear to me that the practice of ukuthwala never contained any hard fragments, 
or breccia, and that such absence was possibly also the reason for its persistence.
 I soon realised that what I thought would be an ethnography based on ukuthwala was turn-
ing out to be an ethnography based on my own confusion in the field.47 Though the role of parental 
consent seemed to be important, there was no agreement on whether the abduction of young girls 
with the intention to marry them was ukuthwala in the absence of parental consent. Though there 
was consensus that girls were currently becoming abductees at a younger age than girls had become 
abductees a few decades previously (from around the age of 12, as opposed to from the historically 
acceptable age of 16 years upwards), there was no agreement on whether the present abductions 
were true cases of ukuthwala, or not. Those who thought of the cases as ukuthwala argued that 
the cases concerned differed from previous forms of the practice, in the sense that they were illegal 
under the constitutional insistence on the upholding of the principle of human rights. Those who 
claimed that such cases were not ukuthwala, but, rather, a novel form of rape, cited the absence of 
marriage negotiations and parental consent in defence of their argument. The key to determining 
what constituted an ukuthwala, thus, lay in unravelling the internal diversity, and the conflicting per-
ceptions, of violence during ukuthwala, and how the practice currently appears in the light of the 
above-mentioned legal stipulation. 
 In an attempt to accomplish such unravelling, I then turned to a documented ukuthwala-re-
lated court case. The informal practice of ukuthwala had led to conflicting perceptions of the practi-
ce, and to an openness that I encountered in the field. A ‘landmark’ (www.dispatchlive.co.za) case of 
2014 served to exemplify the legal complexity of the practice, as well as to identify the various actors 
and voices that were involved in the national polemic (South African Law Reform Commission 2014). 
The details of the case concerned are given below. In January 2010, in the Eastern Cape, 32-year-
old Mvumeleni Jezile forcibly married a 14-year-old girl through what he claimed to be customary 
ukuthwala (see photo viii). Jezile’s family arranged the abduction together with the girl’s uncle and 
grandmother, who kept it a secret from the girl’s mother. Though the girl refused to marry Jezile, 
her uncle and grandmother received R8000 (+/- €580) as bridewealth ( lobola) for her. He then took 
her to live with him in Cape Town in the Western Cape province, where he locked her up daily. After 
months of sexual abuse, she finally managed to escape and reported the matter to the police, who 
47  The notion of an ‘ethnography of confusion’ emerged from my discussions with Rijk van Dijk concerning an 
article I wrote that I based on this chapter. Conducting research into increasingly expensive marriage prac-
tices in Botswana, Van Dijk (2012, 192) illustrates that the emergence of “costly, lavishly-styled weddings is 
a highly complex ‘cocktail’ of arrangements, appetites, styles, formal requirements and ritual procedures 
that are difficult to disentangle. This complexity makes it analytically challenging to distinguish and classify 
elements of local culture according to ‘tradition’, ‘innovation’ or ‘adaptation’. Where does one category 
begin and the other end?” Inspired by this study, Van Dijk’s notion of weddings as being a social cocktail of 
blurred categories, elements and ritual procedures, thus, prompted the idea of understanding ukuthwala 
as an indefinable marriage of confusion for outsiders and informality for insiders.
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arrested Jezile. In November 2013, Jezile received the conviction of three counts of rape, two counts 
of assault, and one count of human trafficking for sexual purposes. The postponement of his case 
until 7 February 2014 resulted in the presentation of the sentencing arguments on the later date. One 
week later, on 14 February 2014, Jezile received a sentence of 22 years imprisonment, which was the 
toughest sentence that South Africa’s National Prosecuting Authority has ever secured (see Ntabaza-
lia 2014). The case was, furthermore, also the first ukuthwala-related case to appear before a Western 
Cape court, after referral from a magisterial court to the High Court of Cape Town. 
viii) The sensationalised media presentation of Mvumeleni Jezile’s case, during court proceedings. 
Source: Sapa (2014), http://m.timeslive.co.za/politics/?articleId=11007447
 
 Jezile “persisted throughout the trial that the girl was a willing partner who gave her full con-
sent. He blamed religion, tradition and the young girl but never himself. At one time during the trial, 
he described her as cheeky, disobedient and a fake” (Ntabazalia 2014, 8). Yet, Karimakwenda (2014) 
reports that “the National House of Traditional Leaders, one of the groups admitted as a friend of 
the court in the Jezile matter, maintains that Jezile’s actions of ‘kidnapping, rape and trafficking’ do 
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not fall within the traditionally approved bounds of the custom of ukuthwala”. Jezile’s perspective 
on customary ukuthwala appeared to stand in stark contrast to that of the traditional authorities, 
as well as to that of the other stakeholders involved. Minister of Justice Jeff Radebe’s sentiments lay 
with those of the House of Traditional Leaders. He released a statement (SAPA 2014a), saying that the 
 
Constitution states that a child’s best interests are of paramount importance in 
every matter concerning the child […] We believe that the sentencing will send 
a strong message to those who are still practicing ukuthwala, against traditio-
nal practices and the law. 
Sonke Gender Justice (Sonke Gender Justice 2014), probably South Africa’s biggest and most influen-
tial NGO that is tasked with the monitoring of gender equality issues in the country, also released a 
press statement saying: “‘This is a groundbreaking moment,’ says Bafana Khumalo, Sonke’s Senior 
Programme Specialist in response to this first conviction of ‘ukuthwala’ – the practice of kidnapping 
or selling children for marriage – in the Western Cape”. While the various actors concerned responded 
to the specific case in question, I shall now turn to the other actors who engaged with, and who, at 
the time of the current study, were still engaging with, the controversy on the national level.
 The South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) published an extensive discussion paper 
that was made open to public scrutiny, comments and suggestions in May 2014 (SALRC 2014). The 
document was the foundation for further discussion and research, with the aim of compiling a future 
document that would serve as a recommendation for the drafting of new bills related to children’s 
law, and to sexual offences. A few months later, the South African Press Association (SAPA 2014a) 
reported:
In November [2014], KwaZulu-Natal traditional affairs MEC Nomusa Dube-Ncu-
be signed a pledge denouncing the practice of ukuthwala. It was also signed by 
Commission for Gender Equality chair Mfanozelwe Shozi, provincial House of 
Traditional Leaders chair Inkosi Chiliza, and KwaZulu-Natal Council of Churches 
chair Bishop Mike Vorster. They agreed that the practice should take place only 
if both parties to it consented, and the woman was of marrying age - 18 under 
South African law.
The Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic 
Communities (CRLRC) also released a report on ukuthwala a few months later, in December 2014. 
Their focus, however, was on how the practice of ukuthwala should receive protection if it were to be 
practised in accordance with the Constitution’s take on human rights. SAPA (2014b), again, reported 
on the matter: “‘We unashamedly promote ukuthwala,’ chairperson Thoko Mkhwanazi-Xaluva said 
in Johannesburg during a briefing on the commission’s latest report on ukuthwala. ‘We will protect 
ukuthwala […] We don’t want to abolish anything but we want the criminals arrested,’ she said.” The 
above-mentioned statement implies that, not only would the CRLRC resist the abolishment of the 
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custom as a whole, but that it would also support the prosecution of individuals who committed 
crimes in their practising of ukuthwala. 
 A few important aspects of the broader controversy came to the fore during the trial, of which 
the first and most pertinent aspect was that of legal pluralism, which found expression in the con-
flicting legal discourses at the time. Whereas Justice Minister Radebe, for example, argued for the 
supremacy of the individual’s constitutional human rights, even if it was at the expense of customary 
practices, the House of Traditional Leaders based their take on the court case on the grounds of cus-
tomary law, which was prepared to sanction an ukuthwala marriage, albeit within the “traditionally 
approved bounds” (Karimakwenda 2014) of customary law. The issue of definition, of which the con-
flicting discourses on the definition and practice of customs are evidence, is a further important as-
pect of the debate regarding ukuthwala. As shown, the House of Traditional Leaders held a definition 
of the concept that was in line with that of the CRLRC, but which was completely contrary to that of 
Jezile. Whereas forced sexual intercourse was culturally justifiable, according to Jezile’s interpretati-
on of the concept, the House of Traditional Leaders, being the body responsible for representing the 
cultural, customary and traditional interests of indigenous peoples, held a definition of ukuthwala 
that did not transgress the human rights of any individual concerned. The insider−outsider dichoto-
my, furthermore, complicated the question of definition at the time of the trial, Jezile, as well as the 
uncle and the grandmother of the abducted girl, had an insider’s perspective on the situation, for 
example, that conflicted with the outsider perspective of Sonke Gender Justice, which viewed the en-
tire custom – whether violent or not – as a form of unconstitutional gender discrimination. The third 
aspect of interest in the present instance is that of gender. Though the practice of ukuthwala certainly 
holds potential for discriminatory and asymmetrical gender relationships, simply labelling it a form 
of patriarchal, or gender, discrimination does not hold. This appears clear in the stance that the girl’s 
grandmother took in the Jezile case, with the former not only being complicit in, but also supportive 
of, her granddaughter’s violent abduction. She, apparently, held a position of power from which she 
had the authority to negotiate on her granddaughter’s behalf, while expediently circumventing the 
wishes of the girl’s mother. The internalisation of the violent ramifications of a patriarchal system can 
manifest itself in such support of related practices. Furthermore, while the male chairperson of the 
Commission for Gender Equality, Mfanozelwe Shozi, signed the pledge to abolish ukuthwala in its 
entirety, whether or not the practice was legal, the female chairperson of the CRLRC, Thoko Mkhwa-
nazi-Xaluva, pledged to protect the custom at all costs.
 The diverse and conflicting perceptions of ukuthwala make it difficult to determine what 
would constitute a legal customary ukuthwala. Ukuthwala has always been an informal marriage 
practice that, typically, has had great internal diversity. However, I believe that recent changes in 
the law, and in the perceptions regarding human rights, have added a layer of confusion to the exi-
sting informality around the custom, as is evident in the above-mentioned conflicting perceptions. 
Though the three important discourses on ukuthwala and human rights that I identify are by no 
means exhaustive on the issue, they show, firstly, the shaping of perceptions of ukuthwala’s violent 
re-emergence, and, secondly, they appear to have contributed to the amount of confusion that I 
encountered in the field, and in relation to the court case. The first, as the amount of contention 
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that the case study raised shows, is the national legal discourse on codified customary law. Minis-
ter Radebe’s and the House of Traditional Leaders’ conflicting interpretations thereof are a case in 
point. The second is the local discourse (including, most notably in the present instance, that relating 
to Jezile’s case), which opposes the national discourse on human rights, as Sonko Gender Justice 
propagates, for example. The anti-human rights discourse, as I shall call it, was, furthermore, inter-
nally disharmonious, as various individuals on the local level seemed to hold contradictory views on 
ukuthwala. The rather obvious example of the internal contradiction was apparent in the views of 
the girl whom Jezile thwala’ed and of her mother, on the one hand, as opposed to those of the girl’s 
grandmother and of her uncle, on the other. The third discourse that has come to shape ukuthwala’s 
violent re-emergence is the local discourse that uses the language of human rights to demonise the 
practice of ukuthwala, similarly to the way in which Sonko Gender Justice and the media have come 
to demonise it. I shall now turn to the three discourses, respectively.48
The National Legal Discourse 
The national legal discourse on ukuthwala is the result of two important aspects of South Africa’s 
legal context. The first aspect is of an historical nature, consisting of the legal codification of customs 
during colonial times. The second aspect is the current precarious relationship that exists between 
the dictates of the Constitution and those of customary law, to which I have already alluded. I shall 
elucidate on each aspect, respectively, so as to illustrate how they affect the national legal discourse. 
 South Africa has a plural legal system, encompassing civil, common, and customary law. 
Whereas civil and common law are mainly the inheritance of the historical colonial presence in the 
country, customary law has its genesis within the various indigenous cultures of South Africa. Bekker 
(1989) defines customary law as 
an established system of immemorial rules [...] evolved from the way of life 
and natural wants of the people, the general context of which was a matter of 
common knowledge, coupled with precedents applying to special cases, which 
were retained in the memories of the chief and his councilors, their sons and 
their sons’ sons until forgotten, or until they became part of the immemorial 
rules. (11)
Customary law, in short, is, therefore, the traditional, or the customary, way of organising society, as 
previous generations have passed down, yet, as it is tailored to serve present needs, it is, therefore, 
always changeable. The structuring of customs first became ‘law’ (as defined in the form of a written 
48  Gender and gender discourses, though obviously a crucial aspect of the above-mentioned court case, are 
also a key component of ukuthwala in general. In the light of this importance, I decided to devote an entire 
chapter to the discussion of issues of gender, as opposed to confining my discussion to a single section in 
this chapter. Chapter Six will, thus, exclusively focus on issues of gender from the historical and sociocultu-
ral perspectives.
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code from a Western perspective), when the colonial administrators codified them, and recorded 
them in writing. Yet, Costa (1998) and Chanock (2001) argue that the codification of customary law 
was more a colonial attempt to ease the settling of administrative and legal matters with regard to 
the indigenous people than it was an attempt to reflect the ever-changing nature of the legal systems 
regulating customary practice.
 To complicate matters further, it was, more often than not, the male chiefs and elders, who 
became appointees to avoid the need for the colonial authorities to govern by direct rule, who provi-
ded their personal versions of customs for codification into written law. The current forms of codified 
customary law, which originated as the result of the often biased and one-dimensional versions of 
traditional customs, often bear the label of “invented tradition” in South Africa (Zimmerman 2001, 
199−200). On the one hand, the invention involved refers to the dubious process of the colonial au-
thorities’ ham-fisted handling of historical legal codification. Such authorities were often prone to 
primitivist and imperial ideologies, and transcribed the legal codes from an etic perspective. On the 
other hand, there is reference to the inventiveness of the situation, in terms of the fact that customary 
law, as a living practice, is always changing, whereas its codified counterpart often remains ossified 
for a prolonged period, being, thus, outdated by default, in a sense. Put otherwise, an ever-changing 
local custom often does not reflect the codified form under whose governing it falls. Though custo-
mary law, just as was the case with civil and common law, went through a rigorous process of revisi-
on following South Africa’s transition to a constitutional democracy in 1994, since then its invention 
has often still led to the existence of judicial challenges.
 The above-mentioned challenges, which are evident in the conflicting interpretations of the 
Jezile case, have their source in the historical informality of the practice of ukuthwala. Scholars dis-
agree on the extent to which ukuthwala was, and is, a violent practice, thus making it difficult to 
determine whether the current violence is a new phenomenon, or the continuance of older forms 
thereof. Bekker (1994), Britten (1930), Koyana and Bekker (2007) and Ntlokwana (2011), all sketch the 
picture of marriage by abduction in benign terms. De Jager (1971), however, writes that ukuthwala 
“is forced and brutal according to Xhosa values” (160), but without any reference to sexual violence 
as such. The discrepancies in the published literature become clear if the researcher views De Jager’s 
(1971) opinion against that of Koyana and Bekker (2007, 143), who go so far as to say that ukuthwala 
“is not ipso facto an offence […] for an open-minded observer thwala is indeed a charming, roman-
tic practice”.49 In contrast, authors like Mwambene and Sloth-Nielsen (2011) and Monyane (2013), as 
well as the Commission of Gender Equality (2009), the Parliamentary Monitoring Group (2009), and 
the HIV/AIDS NGO, the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) (2009), all focus on the violence that men 
commit under the guise of ukuthwala. More recently, Karimakwenda (2013) argues that varying de-
grees of force have historically always been an imbued characteristic of ukuthwala, whether through 
the willing role-play of both the bride and groom, or through the coercive abduction of an unwilling 
49  Bekker and Koyana based their article on four different case studies in which both the parents and the 
abducted girls were complicit in arranging the abductions. Though I agree that there was no harm done in 
the cases studied, I object to the authors’ one-sided representation of the practice.
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young woman (Britten 1930; Soga 1931). It is, specifically, the violent manifestation of force that cau-
ses the practice of ukuthwala to be of legal concern with regard to the issue of human rights. 
 The legal solution for dealing with both the custom’s relative informality, and with the dis-
crepancies that exist between living and codified customary law, is to render illegal any element of 
a custom that does not conform to the Constitution’s statutes of human rights. For example (though 
in the form of a somewhat simplified one), an arranged customary Pondo marriage is legal (being a 
cultural relativist provision that the Constitution allows), only insofar as it does not, in any possible 
way, infringe on the individual human rights of the intended groom and bride involved. As the House 
of Traditional Leaders states, constitutional human rights take precedence over the local interpreta-
tions of customary law. Legal codification, therefore, seems to be an attempt of the government and 
of governmental institutions to regulate ukuthwala’s historical informality by means of prescribing 
and describing its terms and conditions. 
 It is at this point that the conflict ensues. In the preceding case study, what might have ap-
peared to be a wayward, forceful method of marriage, when the girl’s grandmother was young, was, 
at the time of the deed under discussion, criminally prosecutable. On the local level, however, the 
legal differentiation between the use of force as a form of coercive violence, as opposed to its use in 
a form of consensual role-play, did not seem to be viable. Jezile’s insistence that the girl was a willing 
partner in her own abduction proves this. In the light of the redressing terms of the Constitution, 
the girl’s own views of her situation did indeed matter, and Jezile should have heard and listened 
to them. Her views were clearly opposed to Jezile’s contrary interpretation of the living custom in 
this regard. The neat legal packaging of the practice of ukuthwala in the courts, which differentiates 
between the use of force as being a matter of coercion, or as being an issue of consensual role-play, 
did not ring true, in the above context, for living custom on the local level.
 Whereas codification might be a way of regulating indigenous marriage customs, it seems 
to be incapable of regulating the continuing discrepancies and confusion that exist within the juris-
prudent debate with regard to ukuthwala. As I found during my fieldwork investigation, the codifica-
tion of the practice might, very well, have had the opposite effect to what the legislations originally 
intended. Codification and human rights force the local communities to redefine how they perceive 
and practise ukuthwala, in terms of a process that leads to further deregulation, in the form of for-
ced cultural change, with considerable impact on the cultural identity that is present in this form 
of marriage. Conflicting perceptions of ukuthwala on the national level, combined with the forced 
redefinition of ukuthwala on the local level, have led to a greater sense of openness regarding the 
informal practice than there might otherwise have been. The question then arises: how do the lo-
cal communities react towards the way in which the legal definitions that are supposed to regulate 
them affect their customary and cultural identities , and do they respond in the same way in terms of 
ukuthwala-related violence?
An Emerging Local Anti-Human Rights Discourse
With the exception of four individuals, all of my informants in the different locations where I con-
ducted my interviews complained that the government was forcing them to change “our ways”, as 
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they put it, through the enforcement of the human rights of the local populace. Activities that used 
to form part of their everyday life suddenly became demonised in the media, as well as becoming 
legally prohibited, within a very short period of time. When I consulted both men and women on the 
customs that they felt the stipulations regarding human rights negatively impacted on, both genders 
especially raised issues of the corporal punishment of children; the legalisation of abortion; virginity 
testing; ukuthwala, and certain forms of ritual cattle slaughter. Though there had previously been 
internal criticism of such issues, the way in which both the media and the government had treated 
the situation had placed the adherents to such customs on the offensive as regards defending their 
practices and beliefs against those who seemed to them to be intrusive outsiders. Jezile’s continuo-
us claim that he had thwala’ed the young girl in accordance with customary ways is a case in point. 
Consequently, the government and the human rights discourses appeared as evidence of outside 
interference, which was geared towards disrupting the previously relatively smooth-operating local 
customary practices. 
 During an interview, an elderly lady tellingly said: 
The reason for making thwala bad is the rights, it’s because of the law […] you 
can be caught now, so that’s why it’s so bad. But in previous times it was not bad; 
no one would caught you for thwala […] because it was like our culture to thwala.
Note that the above-mentioned informant accused human rights and the law of making ukuthwala 
look “bad”, rather than being critical of the custom’s potential for gender discrimination and sexual 
violence. She, furthermore, also argued that the lawful arrest was “bad”, and not the practising of 
ukuthwala. Along similar lines, an elderly man observed: 
[L]ong ago it was happening, it was right that time, nothing was bad previously 
[…] Yes, we were born in that thing of thwala but these days if we thwala we are 
called rapists, even if we [the respective families to a thwala] agree with each 
other [that a girl will be abducted] this government is saying it is rape.
As can be seen from the aforesaid man’s argument, prior to 1996 the communities that practised 
ukuthwala did not think of the act as being criminal and destructive, even if it did involve having 
sexual intercourse with a girl who had not given her consent to such an interaction. In the rural areas 
around Lusikisiki, three of my informants50 saw ukuthwala as a way of ‘making families’. However, 
after the promulgation of the current Constitution in 1996, some of the historical elements of ukuth-
wala came to seem forms of statutory rape and sexual assault. Those who were most intimately 
involved with the practice either came to bear the appellation ‘rapist’ (the abductor) or ‘rape victim’ 
(the abductee). This was in the eyes of both the broader public and of some members of the local 
communities who were opposed to the custom. 
50  Of which one was the son of a thwala marriage, and another a woman who married by means of ukuthwala.
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 Such legal changes have had, and continue to have, very serious implications for the indivi-
duals involved: the men and women who married through ukuthwala prior to, and after, 1996 now, 
respectively, appear to outsiders as rapists and rape victims, even if they may currently share a suc-
cessful and happily married life. One young male informant complained, during one rather heated 
focus group discussion, of the resultant predicament in which the changing situation had placed his 
immediate family. Though his father had thwala’ed his mother, they were still happily married, with 
both of his parents (who were present at the focus group as well) agreeing that ukuthwala was a con-
structive way of making a family. What the outside labels rape, might, accordingly, appear differently 
from the insiders’ perspective. This young man’s aversion to what he (wrongfully) perceived to be 
the wholesale illegalisation of ukuthwala illustrates how the new legislation, and the misinterpreta-
tion thereof, can give rise to the experience of the legal system ‘wrongfully’ accusing those who still 
practise the custom of becoming embroiled in a form of structural violence. The above might very 
well explain why Jezile showed no sense of remorse during his trial. That the girl’s relatives were in 
cahoots with him might indicate that they truly believed that they were acting within their cultural 
and customary rights. If this is so, it is not too far-fetched to argue that Jezile thought that he was the 
subject of a wrongful accusation by an alien legal system that meddled with his customary rights. 
Irrespective of how individuals might feel about the effect of the constitutional human rights stipu-
lations on their customs, it has become clear that the advent of the principle of human rights has 
resulted in an atmosphere of uncertainty and of increasing openness with regard to the process that 
the law demands from those attempting to contract a legal ukuthwala in contemporary South Africa.
 Government neglect and the promotion of human rights have caused further experiences of 
structural violence, thereby exacerbating the extent of local antagonism. Apart from the suffering of 
certain individuals in terms of the adverse effects of the practice of ukuthwala, all except four of my 
informants felt as though the government had shown that it was disinterested in them as individuals, 
and as a cultural group. A male village elder said, during a focus group discussion, for instance, that 
there were “things that disturb us, because those people of human rights did not come to us with the 
referendum so that we could explain to them where our culture is coming from and where it is going”. 
He then went on to explain that “[w]hen the rights came to our country it disturbs us, because you are 
just coming to us to say ‘the rights say’, without consulting us”. The individuals concerned were upset 
because, according to them, human rights made ukuthwala and other practices illegal in the absen-
ce of the necessary consultation on the ground level. About 20 male elders and their village chief told 
me, during another focus group discussion, that they were very upset that those who had managed 
the referendum in 1996 had left out whole regions, in regard to determining whether people still 
preferred to be governed by the traditional authorities and by customary law. They, accordingly, felt 
that they did not have the opportunity to engage the government in conversation with regard to 
the new legal proposals before they became into law. As a result, they felt that they had lacked the 
opportunity to discuss the fate of such practices as ukuthwala under the new legal dispensation. 
The one-sidedness of the related government actions appeared to have violated the indigenous cul-
tural modes of decision-making processes in respect to matters that were of central importance to 
the communities concerned. Their neglect, even if it had been through the means of a referendum, 
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seemed to show a blatant disregard and disrespect for the community, and for the Mpondo nation 
as a whole. That laws and legal systems, at times, clash with customary beliefs and practices is not 
surprising, and perhaps it had not been the real issue at stake in the current context. Lacking gover-
nmental permission to take part in the negotiations, however, seems to have been the more critical 
issue involved, and, furthermore, it appears to have exacerbated the government-directed antago-
nism that the community at large felt. 
 The above-mentioned rapid legal-cultural changes, thus, appeared to have threatened many 
of the concerned individuals’ feelings of cultural security and habitual rules. This was especially so 
if the changes involved seemed to have resulted in the enforcement of a foreign legal system, at the 
expense of the locals’ interpretation of customary practices. The attendant feelings of frustration 
and anger gave rise to a local anti-human rights discourse. The sentiments of the police chaplain of 
the Lusikisiki region served as a good example of the extent to which the local discourse opposed 
outside interference. He argued that the police should not interfere with thwala cases, even if the 
practice was abusive, since there were customary procedures that those involved could follow to 
address customary violations: “[If] the custom is abused the father to that lady […] has the right to go 
and demand his daughter [back from the abductor]. And something [usually a damage fee] is going 
to come as a compensation for what they have done to the daughter.” In such a case, the possible 
violation of a girl appeared to be less of an offence than was the violation of customary procedures 
through police interference. 
 Since there were customary ways of dealing with customary violations, the chaplain percei-
ved the customary system to be self-regulating. As such, police interference appeared unnecessary, 
with the issue of human rights also seeming to be redundant in the prevailing situation. The chaplain 
in question, therefore, did not differentiate between ukuthwala as a particular custom and the entire 
customary system, with the part representing the whole, and vice versa. When the police, therefore, 
investigated a crime that occurred in the practising of a specific custom, the locals experienced the 
investigation as an unwarranted investigation into the general living culture of which the practice for-
med a part. This was even though the individuals concerned might have been aware of the criminali-
ty of their actions in their trying to follow the specific custom. When possible illegal action, as part of 
ukuthwala, undergoes investigation in the interest of human rights (as embodied by the institutional 
force of the police), the community might experience the investigation as an attack on their ancestral 
customary system, which then leads them to defend their custom as a whole, and not to consider 
the severity of the crime that they might have committed. Consequently, the local anti-human rights 
discourse acted, in a certain sense, as a shield that barred outsiders from intervening in cases of the 
violent perpetration of ukuthwala. Though the violence involved might, itself, have been subject to 
condemnation, it seemed to be a matter that required internal handling.
 Though the views of the chaplain represented only one extreme end of the local discourse, it 
did illustrate the general aversion that the locals had to the enforcement of human rights, which they 
often expressed in terms of a perception of police interference. Yet, within the general local anti-hu-
man rights discourse that pitted insiders against outsiders, there was considerable internal diversity 
and confusion that muddied any attempt to attain clarity on how to define force and violence, as part 
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of ukuthwala. Though the presence of such conflicting emotions made it very difficult to determine 
how prevalent the violent variants of ukuthwala were, right up until the time of the current study, the 
feelings concerned did provide important keys to understanding how the locals observed the violence. 
Conflicting Local Perspectives on Violence
ix) From left to right: Mnoza, one of my key informants at Bambisana, I myself, and Mrs Mangxamile, 
with some of her great-great-grandchildren. Photo taken by the author, March 2012.
One of my elderly informants, Mrs Mangxamile, who was married through ukuthwala more than a 
half-century before the current study, had a very good relationship with her husband (see photo ix).51 
Yet, her deceased husband was not her first suitor. Before him, three other men had attempted to th-
wala her, but she had escaped each time, just as the men had tried to have forced sexual intercourse 
with her. As she used the term ‘sex’, and not ‘rape’, I asked her what she meant by ‘sex’. In response, 
she said that she had been incarcerated in the men’s huts during each ukuthwala attempt, when a 
forceful attempt had been made to have sexual intercourse with her. Remarkably, Mrs Mangxamile 
said that she still believed that the practice of ukuthwala was good, irrespective of the trauma and 
the anguish that it had caused her at the time.52
51  See Appendix B for the transcripts of my interview with Mrs Mangxamile. 
52  The informant concerned was such an ardent supporter of ukuthwala that she even told me that she would 
be honoured if a man would thwala one of her granddaughters. If both men and women support, or are 
averse to, the practice, it seems that perspectives on violence are not gender-specific, even though both ge-
nder groups were capable of, and did, experience and understand the perpetration of violence in different 
ways.
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 Mrs Mangxamile’s account of her four experiences of ukuthwala, as well as the accounts of 
eight other thwala’ed women whom I interviewed, stand in stark contrast to the opinions of those 
authors who assert a belief that sexual violence is not part of the custom. Rather, force, in the form 
of sexual violence, was possibly, at the time of the current study, becoming the defining characteris-
tic of its current form (Monyane 2013; Nkosi and Wassermann 2014)and “ukuthwala ngenkani” (134. 
Bekker, who, in the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, together with Koyana and 
Bekker (2007), published an extremely positive article on the practice of ukuthwala, has, since then, 
revised his initial positive stance towards the practice. During an interview with Bekker in Pretoria, he 
elaborated on the violent changes that the custom was undergoing at the time:
This custom has now really degenerated [and] acquired bizarre proportions […] 
some of those marriages are nothing less than the rape and abduction of child-
ren still under their parents’ supervision. And it doesn’t seem as if the govern-
ment is able to control it. […] The idyllic situation in which a guy and a girl are 
in love with each other is the one Koyana and I have discussed. In those years it 
happened every now and then that the parents accused someone of abducting 
a girl against her will, but that was almost never the case. Fifty years ago Koyana 
and my argument would indeed have held water. What would have been ille-
gal was a case in which the girl, according to tradition, Koyana and my version, 
wouldn’t play along. Nowadays the people conjure up an argument that this is 
a legal custom, and then the onus is on the police to prove that the abduction 
didn’t follow traditional custom; that it was in fact violent.
A few important aspects come to the fore in connection with the above, the first of which is the es-
calation of coercion and violence. Secondly, the absence of parental awareness of, and involvement 
in, the abduction arrangements is noteworthy. Finally, Bekker mentions that the perpetrators claim 
to be practising a legal custom, irrespective of the human rights violations that they commit in the 
process. While reading through my transcripts of this interview with Bekker, I remembered the heated 
debate about parental involvement and violence that transpired during my focus group discussi-
ons at Mthimde village. Though all three of the aspects Bekker mentions corroborate the beliefs of 
some of the focus group participants, they contradict Manxgamile’s experiences during the time that 
Bekker and Koyana’s argument was supposed to ‘hold water’, as he puts it. At this point, I realised 
that the whole issue of violence revolves around the historical informality and openness that always 
surrounded ukuthwala, but which has become increasingly difficult to grasp, due to people’s current 
misinterpretation of the issue of national human rights, as it is understood on the local level. Using 
the issue of parental consent as a starting point is a good way of illustrating the above.
 Nkosi and Wassermann (2014)and “ukuthwala ngenkani” (134 describe the difference bet-
ween the historical practice of “ukuthwala intombi” (134), which is consensual, and without violence 
and sexual coercion, and “ukuthwala ngenkani” (134),53 which is forced, abusive and non-consensu-
53  Literally, ukuthwala intombi means ‘to carry a girl’, and implies the giving of some sort of consent. Ukuthwa-
la ngekani translates into ‘to carry forcefully’, and implies the lack of any form of consent.
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al. Soga (1931, 271) also indicates similar general patterns. Nkosi and Wassermann (2014, 134) argue 
that there is a growing ‘grey area’ in which the different forms of ukuthwala currently overlap and 
conflate, giving rise to the current abduction abuse. Based on my fieldwork and on the Jezile case, I 
tend to believe that the grey zone has always been the norm according to which violence has been a 
matter of definition and perspective. Accordingly, Nkosi and Wassermann’s two essentialised forms 
of ukuthwala should be seen as two fluid variants of abduction marriage, rather than as two set cus-
tomary forms. 
 According to a village elder, “[i]f the girl doesn’t agree, but the parents have agreement, she 
can go there”, with the “there” in the present context referring to the homestead of the man, where 
she will become his wife through the act of sexual intercourse. Confirming the above, a village chief 
told me that “[p]reviously it was pure because the parents talk […]. Now, it’s not pure, because they 
just go and steal a child […], but that thing they are calling rape.” During a focus group discussion at 
Mervan village, a middle-aged woman made a similar remark: 
It was not done according to the opinion of the girl; it was done according to the 
agreement of the parents by force […] They don’t mind about the desire of the 
girl, if she likes [it] not. My mother, she was taken at Flagstaff. She never saw that 
man, she never talked to him. It was just the parents who talked.
The Mpondo people do not, thus, consider having sexual relations with parental consent to be a 
crime, but a sign of the confirmation of an agreement. If the prospective husband does not seek pa-
rental consent, however, they see the act of sexual intercourse concerned as rape, and they see the 
practice as consisting of the theft of a child, under the guise of ukuthwala. 
 During a focus group discussion that I held with four female chiefs, one chief emphatically said:
[i]t was totally unacceptable to touch the girl sexually […] people long ago res-
pected the girl a lot, they didn’t even touch her without the  lobola [bridewealth] 
negotiations. Nowadays, […] even if he is not given consent, what he does is, he 
just takes control of the girl and rapes her. 
Although the chief concerned asserted that the sexual contact involved was unacceptable, the res-
pect for girls that made such contact unacceptable was directed towards the bridewealth negotiati-
ons and the parental consent, and the chief did not express it in reference to the girl. A young male 
teacher agreed: “[l]ong ago it was ukuthwala, but now it is rape. It is new, we were very surprised 
when we heard of it”. Concluding a focus group discussion, a male elder stated that current forms of 
ukuthwala appeared to be instances of “rape, because there is no agreement of the adults [concer-
ned]”. The above-mentioned informants all considered abduction and sexual intercourse without 
parental consent to violate customary practice, and thus to be a form of rape. If the parents gave their 
consent, forced sexual intercourse with their daughter did not appear to be rape, even if she objected 
to the intercourse. What seemed to be right and acceptable in regard to any form of ukuthwala was, 
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thus, not necessarily that to which the girl accedes, but, rather, that for which the parents gave their 
permission. 
 The above accounts differ from the historical, clear-cut variants to which Nkosi and Wasser-
mann (2014) allude. Though I am aware that a young man and woman could jointly decide to elope, 
in the process of performing an alternative variant of ukuthwala (see Britten 1930 and Soga 1931), 
such a variant was the exception, rather than the rule. The indication of this was that only one of my 
informants mentioned it. According to all my other informants, ukuthwala was, thus, consensual, 
insofar as the parents consented to it. As parental consent sanctions it, the coercion and the forced 
sexual intercourse entailed were neither a form of violence nor one of rape, with them being in ac-
cordance with the customary practice and with the authoritarian relationship between the parents 
and their children. My analysis is, therefore, more in line with Karimakwenda’s (2013) argument that 
ukuthwala has always been a violent practice, but it is also more representative of what my infor-
mants interpret as constituting ukuthwala. 
 It, then, follows that what Nkosi and Wassermann (2014) call ukuthwala ngenkani was under-
taken in a similar fashion to ukuthwala intombi, but without parental consent. This made the act of 
abduction out of the ordinary, and, thus, possibly seeming to be violent. A middle-aged male high-
school teacher elaborated on the practice of ukuthwala ngenkani, by saying:
A long time ago […] you simply see the girl, and yet you have no affair with 
that lady [through parental mediation], you simply tell her “Hey, I want you to 
be my wife”, [...] the lady says “No, I don’t want”. Then you take her, you force 
her – take her straight to your house. Even there in the house, we force her to 
sleep with him.
Mrs Tshiqani from Mcobothi village related to me the details of her friend’s abduction, which seemed 
to support the teacher’s beliefs:
So the men took her in the presence of her mother. She was crying but they just 
lifted her up on their shoulders and took her. And the mother was left crying. 
These men did not discuss it with the parents. It was that time, a thing of that 
time [a few decades ago]. If he want to talk to her parents he talks, if he doesn’t, 
he doesn’t. When the parents find out that you were taken, they just go to the 
family and get cows. And if you run back home, you’ll be beaten and told to go 
back. Even if the cows have not been collected, he can have sex with you.54
What the teacher describes as being normal ukuthwala from “a long time ago”, and what Mrs Tshiqani 
refers to as “a thing of that time”, Nkosi and Wassermann (2014) describe as ukuthwala ngenkani. Yet, 
54  I shall discuss the importance of  lobola and its connections to the violence related to ukuthwala in the 
following chapter. 
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as I have mentioned, Nkosi and Wassermann’s two historical forms appear to be two fluid variants 
on the same spectrum. Two of the women whom I interviewed, whose parents had not been aware 
that their daughters were about to be abducted, initially protested to the action by demanding their 
daughters back, as well as by claiming compensation for the damage done. Yet, later on they acqui-
esced to the ukuthwala, because of the comparatively high amount of bridewealth that the men’s 
families offered. What initially appeared to be theft and the rape of a daughter – ukuthwala ngenkani 
– could, accordingly, become a case of ukuthwala intombi. 
 The diverse and numerous possibilities that have become available in terms of the informal 
character of ukuthwala bring me back to the Jezile case. As illustrated, ukuthwala is an intricate grey 
zone. in which the perception of violent action depends on the perspectives of the actors involved: 
Justice Radebe perceived Jezile’s actions as having constituted a form of rape that was unrelated to 
any customary practice, whereas the House of Traditional Leaders perceived them to have constitu-
ted the perpetration of unacceptable ukuthwala ngenkani. Assuming the role of a parent, the girl’s 
grandmother had, possibly, perceived his actions as consisting of ukuthwala intombi, since she had 
consented to them. Finally, it seems almost inevitable that Jezile insisted that he had acted within 
his customary rights, if due consideration is given to the fluid internal differentiations between ukuth-
wala intombi and ukuthwala ngenkani, and the general informality and openness with regard to the 
formative steps of ukuthwala.
 At this point, the violent re-emergence of ukuthwala comes into play. Three aspects of the 
way in which all the informants spoke about ukuthwala are important. Firstly, all made reference 
to the historical involvement of the parents during ukuthwala procedures; secondly, everyone ex-
pressed their aversion to the current forms of sexual abuse that occur during the perpetration of 
the present forms of ukuthwala, and thirdly, most expressed their difficulty in making sense of the 
contemporaneous abuses that typify the practice of ukuthwala (as indicated by the use of such phra-
ses as “we were very surprised”; “[t]he rape is new”; “it was ukuthwala, but now it is rape”, and “[it] is 
going to be a new thing”). Taking the above-mentioned aspects into account, it seemed as though 
the variants of ukuthwala that did not involve parental consent were becoming more commonplace 
at the time of the current study than they had been a few decades previously. This, in turn, created 
the perception of heightened levels of violence55 that confounded the local communities. The abuse 
and rape of girls was, thus, not a new phenomenon, but those on the local level merely perceived it 
as being new, because of the increasing absence of parental consent, and the salience of the human 
rights discourse that labelled it as being such. Furthermore, where, previously, parents could have 
prevented abductions by not granting their consent to them, the prospective husbands’ circumven-
tion of asking for parental consent (which formed part and parcel of ukuthwala’s historical informa-
lity) arguably led to more cases of ukuthwala, thus contributing to the perception that the violence 
involved was becoming more intense. A shift in how ukuthwala is practised, in conjunction with the 
changing local discourse on the perception of violence, thus has come to make violence a more 
salient aspect of current ukuthwala practices. How local perceptions on violence have changed, and 
55  Which I deductively define as stemming from the lack of parental consent.
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how they are still changing, is intricately linked to the third discourse that I identified, and to which I 
shall now turn. 
An Emerging Local Discourse on Violence
A social worker at Lusikisiki referred to KwaNcele (a rural location about 60km north-east of Lusikisi-
ki) when talking about ukuthwala cases that she had had to handle. Over half of my informants called 
the area concerned an ukuthwala hotspot. The aforementioned social worker said, in this regard:
I don’t even think they know the human rights […] People they just want to be-
lieve in the olden days, as their great-grandmothers [… did ...]. They believe that 
they are the only people [culturally exclusive]. They speak their own language, 
even their language is different.56 So I think they want to be those people who 
are different, who are still holding to their tradition. 
According to the above-mentioned social worker, the persistence of a violent form of ukuthwala at 
KwaNcele was the result of people’s unawareness of the issue of human rights, and of their alleged 
desire for cultural uniqueness, with them finding their identity in “their tradition”. Within the context 
of human rights, they saw the violent actions of others as the result of their desire for cultural uni-
queness. I found that such blanket blaming of the perpetration of violence on the perceptions of the 
adherents of the prevailing culture greatly influenced the local discourses on ukuthwala. 
 The blaming of ukuthwala-related violence on culture again became relevant during a focus 
group discussion that I held with five police officers at Mtontsasa Police Station in the KwaNcele 
district.57 When I asked the officers why the practice of ukuthwala was still prevalent in their area, one 
replied: “It is their custom, isiko lethu, [which means] ‘our custom’”. The officers greeted his response 
with much laughter, as all present jokingly agreed that isiko lethu was always the reason and the 
‘excuse’ that the perpetrators of criminalised ukuthwala elements used for justifying their actions. 
The local community uses the idiomatic language of isiko lethu to explain customary practices and 
procedures, the officers informed me. Yet “their belief is wrong, because here in South Africa no one’s 
belief is bigger than the Constitution”, another officer stated. In their capacity as representatives of a 
state department, the police officers, like the previously mentioned social worker, pitted the ‘bigger’ 
issue of the Constitution and of human rights against the ‘smaller’ issue of the values of isiko lethu 
that the local community held. 
 The aforementioned individuals, furthermore, did not seem to differentiate between the 
legal codified ukuthwala and the constitutionally condemned historical elements of ukuthwala, in 
terms of the upholding of the principle of human rights. Just as is the case with the local anti-human 
56  Though the KwaNcele area is still geographically part of the Mpondo kingdom, it borders on the Zulu king-
dom. The local dialect of IsiXhosa, therefore, contains numerous Zulu loanwords. 
57  The station commander and the officers in attendance were all involved in a campaign to raise awareness 
of human rights issues in regard to ukuthwala.
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rights discourse, the part represents the whole, and vice versa. Ukuthwala is, thus, equated with its 
illegal elements, appearing to be representative of the practices of the culture as a whole. The adop-
tion of the national human rights discourse on the local level has, thus, facilitated the emergence of 
a local discourse of a similar nature that totally others both the local cultural practices and their prac-
titioners. This othering is evident in the phrases that the social worker used: “they believe that they 
are the only people”; “their own language”, and “they want to be those people who are different”. The 
police officers used similar terms – “their custom” and “their beliefs” – that not only served to other, 
but which also offered them a way of distancing themselves from the others. Along similar lines, a 
33-year-old female social worker at Lusikisiki spoke somewhat contemptuously of the violent form 
of ukuthwala:58
There is one specific area, Cele, that specialises in this. People are saying that 
it’s their culture […] their grandmothers were doing it, and they don’t see any-
thing wrong with it, because they believe [it to be part of] their culture. 
She perceived that those who were living in “one specific area” as a homogenous community “speci-
alise[d]” in the violent abduction and rape of underage girl children, since they failed to “see anything 
wrong with it, because they believe [it to be part of] their culture”. Rather than having a human rights 
take on violence, her account seems to be an instance of demonising “their culture” in a similar way 
as to what the national media was doing at the time. Headlines in the latter pertaining to the practice 
of ukuthwala included: “Culture no justification for young girls’ forced marriage” (Petrus 2009); “Rape 
has become a culture” (Gonyela 2009) and “Ukuthwala! A nation under siege” (Fayo 2010).
 The local individuals had also adopted the local discourse on human rights in their personal 
capacity. Mr Maqepula, a TAC community mobiliser said: 
It has something to do with cultural beliefs […] the leaders in our communi-
ties, such as the chief, they believe in culture. So it is difficult for them to take 
them [their people] away from culture […] they will tell you that this thing is not 
new, it happened years ago, even our forefathers [did it]. So that is why it hap-
pens. You might find that, beneath, there are people who are seeing this thing 
as a bad habit, but you find that, now, it becomes a debate like at KwaNcele. 
Another group said: “We don’t want this, because it is against the Constitution, 
and we are feeling that the rights of our children are violated, and this is a way 
of vandalising, of killing their future”. Then there is this [other] group who say: 
“This thing is not way of killing people, because even our forefathers, they did 
this thing and there was nothing harmful”, and that is why it is still happening. 
58  The social worker concerned had recently handled three ukuthwala cases, in which the girls had been 16, 
17 and 18 years old, in turn. Two of the cases that happened at KwaNcele went, under referral, to the De-
partment of Social Development in Lusikisiki.
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The traditional leaders (who were the chiefs in the present instance) were purveyors of the local an-
ti-human rights discourse. Yet, not all members of the community shared their interpretation of isiko 
lethu, which was used to idiomatically justify the way in which their forefathers had conducted ukuth-
wala. Adopting a human rights discourse, some individuals viewed the practice as running counter 
to the Constitution, thus amounting to a violation of children’s rights. A similar sentiment, then, took 
the form of a vocabulary of violence and violation within a local human rights discourse that accused 
those who supported the practice of ukuthwala of “vandalising” and “killing their [children’s] future”. 
 While the salience of violence during ukuthwala practices was increasing at the time of the 
current study, I realised that the degree of discourse on violent customary practices was, simulta-
neously, intensifying. Though I do not doubt that there has always been some internal critique of, 
and opposition to, the ukuthwala custom (as I showed in the previous section), the introduction of 
constitutionalism seems to have given the local communities a new vocabulary with which to voice 
their critique of, and their opposition to, the institution. The awareness and enforcement of human 
rights,59 had, by the time of the current study, influenced the local opinions that were held on cus-
tomary practices in general, and on violence, as part of ukuthwala, specifically. The result of such a 
process has been the emergence of a local human rights discourse that opposes all forms of ukuth-
wala through the blanket othering of entire communities, or through internal criticism and opposi-
tion. While ukuthwala had been re-emerging in more violent forms than those to which people had 
become accustomed, the local human rights discourse on ukuthwala’s re-emergence had also been 
intensifying. Such intensification, in turn, had drawn both national and local attention to the violence 
often accompanying the current practice. Drawing attention through the demonising of ukuthwala 
and through the casting of the communities as being permeated with violent sexual crime, the local 
human rights discourse had contributed just as much to the perception of ukuthwala as re-emer-
ging in a more violent form as had the actual violence perpetrated. In short, the specific discourse in 
question had drawn from national human rights discourses to foster a perception of ukuthwala as 
re-emerging violently, through the othering of customary practices and their practitioners. The per-
ception that ukuthwala was re-emerging as more violent than before was, thus, just as much a case 
of the intensified discussion of violence as it was a case of actual violence. 
Conclusion – Ukuthwala as a Form of Violent Action and Discourse
Answering the question “how are conflicting discourses on human rights and custom shaping ukuth-
wala’s violent re-emergence?” proved to be more complicated than I had expected, due to two im-
portant reasons. The first reason had to do with the historical informality and openness of the practi-
ce of ukuthwala. As I discovered during the very early stages of my fieldwork, I was unable to pinpoint 
any breccia within all the informality and internal cultural diversity that constituted ukuthwala, pre-
cisely because the custom did not build up around hard fragments. Any investigation of ukuthwa-
59  Whether obtained by means of awareness campaigns, or by means of the intervention of the police and/or 
the social services.
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la-related violence would have to take the fluidity and openness of the practice into account. The 
second reason had to do with the conflicting definitions and perspectives of the custom in both the 
national legal discourses and in the local perceptions thereof. While the concept of marriage as a 
form of consented abduction, as well as in terms of the locally coined concept of ukuthwala, were 
legal under customary law at the time of the current study, the living practice of ukuthwala rarely re-
sembled its codified, sanitised legal counterpart. The reality of the situation was that ukuthwala often 
occurred contrary to the constitutionally defined statutes of human rights. The uneasy relationship 
between the different legal systems, the conflicting ways in which ukuthwala appeared through the 
lens of customary law, as opposed to how its local interpretation, and the historical informality that 
was now becoming even more open, because of the legal complexities involved, had led to various 
clashing discourses on the re-emergence of the custom. I identified three of the conflicting discour-
ses as they emerged from the court case that I reviewed, and from my fieldwork data, namely the 
national legal discourse, the local anti-human rights discourse, and, finally, the local human rights 
discourse.
 Following Karimakwenda (2013), Nkosi and Wassermann (2014), and in line with the field-
work evidence, I argue that the practice of ukuthwala has always taken a variety of forms, of which 
many have included various types of violence. My analysis, firstly, revealed that ukuthwala was, at the 
time of my study, not necessarily re-emerging in new violent forms (as opposed to the forms that it 
had taken in its relatively non-violent past), but, rather, that its historical violent variant, ukuthwala 
ngenkani, was becoming more commonplace. The cases of ukuthwala, in terms of which children 
no longer asked for parental consent, were clear evidence of this. The result is that the historical 
potential for violence was now coming to fruition, and that it had become increasingly pervasive. My 
analysis, secondly, revealed that the fear of cultural change, and of what appeared to be a foreign le-
gal system that was alien to customary practices, had given rise to a local discourse that rejected the 
principle of human rights. Though the current forms of violent ukuthwala stood condemned, they 
seemed to be a matter requiring internal handling, according to custom. Consequently, the local an-
ti-human rights discourse acted as a shield that barred outsiders – like the police – from intervening 
in cases of the committance of a violent form of ukuthwala.
 I, thirdly, discovered that violence, as part of ukuthwala’s re-emergence, was becoming a 
more salient issue, due to how the perceptions of violence and abuse were changing. Though legal 
scholars, like Monyane (2013, 64), believe that “ukuthwala […] evolved considerably”, my fieldwork 
suggested another possibility, namely that the abuse and rape of girls was not a new phenomenon, 
but that it merely appeared to be new, because of the absence of parental consent from the proce-
dure. The perception of violence in the committance of a sexual act as involving a new element, and 
the labelling of such an act as rape, had caused the local communities to experience the currently 
experienced forms of violence as having intensified, and as being worse than before, though they still 
often supported the practice. Simultaneously, the local communities and individuals who opposed 
all forms of ukuthwala drew from the national human rights discourses to foster a perception of 
ukuthwala as re-emerging violently through the othering of customary practices and their practitio-
ners. While there was reason enough to believe that violence was becoming a more prominent fea-
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ture of ukuthwala, the experience of the former as being new, coupled with the emerging discourse 
that had served to demonise the practice, seemed to have contributed just as much to the public 
perception of ukuthwala as had the violent aberration of customary marriage. 
 Irrespective of how the concept of violence is interpreted within a certain discourse, it beco-
mes clear that ukuthwala has always been violent, if only in the sense that a girl’s consent has never 
been a serious consideration within the process. Yet, neither the scholars, nor my informants, raised 
the question of the proposed bride’s consent and agency, even though the issue appeared to be 
central to the principle of human rights that the Constitution upholds. Even though the incident for 
which Jezile was arraigned, was, according to him, merely an instance of the practice of customary 
ukuthwala, no form of violent abduction marriage is legitimate marriage practice, from either a con-
stitutional, or a customary, legal point of view. Yet, as I have shown above, the local communities 
had come to consider violent forms of ukuthwala as being innate to certain marriage practices, no 
matter whether or not the children involved had obtained parental consent either before, or after, the 
abduction.
 For all the reasons discussed above, I wish to conclude that the violent forms of ukuthwala 
still deserve regard, at least in part, as marriage practices. This is not to say, however, that all forms 
of violence that bear the label of ukuthwala are, necessarily, related to the end goal of marriage. 
The emerging discourse that was based on the perception that ukuthwala-related violence was 
new at the time of the current study, was, as I found, only one of numerous discourses influencing 
the present debate on ukuthwala. Moving on from how national legal legislation has affected the 
re-emergence of a violent form of ukuthwala, I want to focus on how national economic policies have 
affected the re-emergence of violent ukuthwala in the following chapter, Chapter Five. Other than the 
media allegations of the willy-nilly exchange of girls for cattle, in the form of ukuthwala, the quotes 
of thwala’ed women who claimed that their parents had opposed the abduction, until the intended 
groom had presented the latter with the appropriate number of cattle (as I mentioned above), made 
the next step in my investigation necessary. As I shall show, how the economic context influenced 
the re-emergence of ukuthwala was still much more connected to violent marriage practices than 
it was to the discourses on violence that were unrelated to marriage. Consequently, Chapter Six will 
emphasise the ways in which the re-emergence of ukuthwala have, increasingly, become a matter of 
discourse on a form of violence that is unrelated to marriage, as opposed to marriage-related violen-
ce, per se.

Chapter Five
The Economic Context: Ukuthwala and the 
Violence of Bridewealth Practices
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Often labelling ukuthwala forced marriage, The Telegraph sensationally reported on the practice in 
2009, in the form of a report entitled “Poverty in South Africa: Three Cows and a Forced Marriage” 
(Khumalo 2009). Three years later, similar allegations were still being made, with the South African 
Press Agency (2012), for example, voicing the idea of “Forced Marriages – Girls Sold for Cows”. Not 
only do the two above-mentioned examples reflect the nature of the human rights-based discourse 
that demonises ukuthwala and marriage-related customs, but they also indicate the ways in which 
the news media have speculated about the financial aspects of ukuthwala, through linking it with 
the concept of bridewealth, called  lobola, that is payable during indigenous marriage proceedings. 
Rereading the above articles after I discovered the layers of discourse and perspectives in which the 
ukuthwala controversy was mired, as I discussed in the previous chapter, I became increasingly intri-
gued by the influence of the economy on the violent re-emergence of the practice. Were girls really 
being thwala’ed for the  lobola that their parents could gain, or was the news of such a transaction 
merely a form of sensationalised discourse? Was  lobola becoming a new sort of leverage that the 
advocates of human rights employed in their fight against ukuthwala, or were the speculations con-
cerned based on some empirical truth?
 As Chapter Three indicated, considerable changes have occurred in both the indigenous ca-
ttle-based economy and in the bridewealth rate that depended on it (see Krige 1936;Walker 1992; 
McClendon 1995, and Hosegood et al. 2009). The restructuring of the economy60 resulted in the esca-
lation of bridewealth rates that made it increasingly difficult for individuals to marry. Issues of marri-
age and bridewealth are inextricably linked to, and affected by, South Africa’s national economy. Yet, 
at first sight, the above-mentioned speculations seem to have been far-fetched, since the payment 
of bridewealth was, and continues to be, linked to all forms of traditional marriage, and not only 
to ukuthwala. Yet, Britten (1930), not too long after the start of the last century, already revealed 
the economic potential of ukuthwala as a strategy for 1) circumventing the often long-lasting  lobola 
negotiations, and 2) obtaining a rather immediate form of income, as the amount of  lobola that suc-
cessfully settled a thwala marriage was often less than that which settled other forms of traditional 
marriage. Britten’s observation, though already being valid almost a century ago, was still a valid 
reflection of ukuthwala’s current strategic applications, as I found in my fieldwork. One elderly lady 
interviewee admitted that her father had agreed to her thwala, because he urgently needed cattle 
with which to perform a ritual sacrifice commemorating the ancestors. She informed me that she 
60  Whether through the initial introduction of capitalism, monetisation, or the more recent liberalisation of 
the economy.
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would probably not have become a thwala’ed bride if the sacrifice had not been necessary, but that 
she probably would have received a higher  lobola if she had had a traditional marriage that did not 
involve abduction. 
 The question that the current chapter will endeavour to answer is, accordingly: How does the 
restructuring of the economy and economic policy influence current ukuthwala practices? Asking the 
question allowed me to situate ukuthwala’s re-emergence within its economic context, in terms of 
which I was able to investigate whether, at the time of the study, the girls involved were really exploi-
tees, through the strategic use of ukuthwala, for the  lobola that their marriage could raise. If the girls 
were, indeed, becoming the subjects of thwala for purpose of obtaining  lobola, it might help us to un-
derstand another form of ukuthwala-related violence. If this was not the case, then it might be possible 
that the discourse on violence that I discussed in the previous chapter has not only adopted the lan-
guage of human rights, but also that of the economy, in its efforts to understand and explain the various 
forms of sexual and gender-based violence that have occurred during some ukuthwala practices. 
 By means of an introduction, I shall, firstly, provide a succinct overview of the role that  lobola 
plays, its importance for marriage in general, and its economic implications for ukuthwala, specifi-
cally. This will lead to a discussion of the historical processes and events that shaped the marriage 
market in such a way that the practice of  lobola was, at the time of my study, often the means of 
exploitation for economic gain. I shall then present a case study that illustrates how ukuthwala’s 
re-emergence and violence linked to the economic exploitation of  lobola. I conclude by illustrating 
that the link concerned was rooted in empirical fact as much as it was in the historical informality and 
openness of ukuthwala, and in the imaginations of the individuals concerned. 
 Lobola, a Precursor to Marriage
One of my informants, who was a middle-aged lady who lived at quite a distance from Lusikisiki, in 
the direction of the coast, provided the initial clue that gave rise to this chapter. She said:
When you give birth to a girl, and she is thwala’ed, you know that you will get 
cows with  lobola. They used to praise the family for giving birth to a girl, becau-
se they knew they would have more wealth, more cows. Because, back then, a 
family depended on the stock they had.
Though my conversation with her was not the first that I had had concerning marriage, she was the 
first to direct my attention to the link between the importance of marriage, ukuthwala and the pos-
sibility of wealth that one might be able to gain through the  lobola payable for one’s daughter. Co-
hen (2004) writes that “[m]ost societies and cultures view marriage as a normal and expected rite of 
passage – an inherent good associated with safety for all involved” (1). Though the concepts of good 
and safety seem to be a far cry from what a girl might experience when she is thwala’ed for  lobola, I 
did find that most of my informants regard marriage, as Cohen (2004) writes, as an expected rite of 
passage for both women and men. Marriage, as such, implies, and is almost synonymous with,  lobola 
negotiations. I, therefore, realised that if I wished to discover whether  lobola was culpable for the vio-
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lent abduction of young girls, I first had to understand the concept of  lobola, and how it contributed 
to marriage, more comprehensively than I did at that stage.
 “You never stop paying  lobola” is a well-known South African idiom that I came across du-
ring my interviews. The idiom means that, although a price is settled upon, the final price regular-
ly takes the form of ongoing (sometimes lifelong) negotiations, and periodic instalments. Kunene 
(1995) agrees with such a conceptualisation of the practice in his explanation that “[l]obola was not 
even paid in full, since it was a method of maintaining a relationship between the families” (36). The 
payment of bride price is not unique to the Mpondo people, as many other indigenous groups in 
South Africa also practise  lobola, as I discussed in Chapter Three. The payment of  lobola is very fluid, 
varying according to family, community, clan, and region. Though I do not believe that Chambers 
(2000) is correct in stating that  lobola is a once-off transaction, he does provide a working, succinct 
and general description when he writes that the
cornerstone of the customary marriage system is the lobolo transaction. Lobolo 
retains positive and complex meaning to most black Africans, including most 
urban black Africans. It stands variously as a symbol that the wife is valued, as a 
mark of the bond between families, as compensation to the bride’s parents for 
the cost and effort to raise her, and, today, as a symbol of continuity with African 
traditions. (104)
When I questioned all my informants on the workings of  lobola, Bongani and Moses, who were two 
of my key male informants, both of whom were aged in their twenties, were especially helpful. Both 
were, at the time, raising money to pay  lobola to their respective fiancée’s families (see photo x). Alt-
hough the negotiation for the  lobola currency is often still in terms of cattle, South African Rand are 
also viable currency in this context. The family of the proposed bride determines the worth of one 
metaphorical head of cattle, which varies between €200 and €600 (except in the very rural areas of 
South Africa, where the locals sometimes still use actual cattle). The final price upon which the par-
ties to the transaction settle might vary considerably, depending on a number of factors, including: 
whether or not the bride is a virgin; the bride’s level of education; her social and economic status; the 
wealth of the proposed groom’s family; the level of friendship, or social connections, between the 
two families concerned, and whether the bride’s family likes, or dislikes, the groom and his family. 
On consideration of all the factors, the parties to the agreement finally settled on the price, which 
might be any amount between €1500 and €6000. The family of the bride must then, in turn, provide 
all the household goods that the married pair will need – furniture, linen, kitchenware, electronic ap-
pliances, and, if possible, even a house. Usually, the payment of a certain amount occurs prior to the 
marriage, with the remainder of the amount taking the form of instalments, in terms of the premarital 
agreement, as well as at the sporadic request of the bride’s family. The  lobola for girls who are virgins 
is higher than it is for girls who are not. The payment of the full amount must, ideally, take place prior 
to the wedding ceremony.61
61  However, there is no guarantee that the family of the bride will not ask for more  lobola later on.
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 x) Discussing the issue of  lobola during a focus group discussion at Bambisana. Photo taken by the 
author, March 2012.
In the case of ukuthwala,  lobola is handled differently. Bopa (which is a the payment of a damage fee, 
ideally, the equivalent of a single head of cattle) must be instant, irrespective of whether the thwala 
was agreed upon, or not. The bopa is a form of compensation for taking away a girl’s virginity (in 
the case of sexual intercourse). Consequently, it accounts for the paying of the higher  lobola in such 
cases than would otherwise have been necessary. In practise, however, this is rarely the case. If the 
parents agree to the marriage, whether or not the prospective husband asked for their consent , they 
have to pay the  lobola, even though the combined amount of bopa and  lobola will be lower than 
it would have been for a regular customary marriage. There is, nonetheless, no guarantee that the 
bride’s family will not keep on making  lobola demands. The requirement of a lower  lobola in such 
cases runs counter to the historical strategic uses of ukuthwala: to circumvent the prolonged  lobola 
process, as well as the high  lobola rates; to pay the immediate bopa fee; to force an advantageous 
family connection; to hide an unplanned pregnancy; or to marry the person of the individual’s own 
choosing. 
 An important note is necessary at this point. I found that the general  lobola principles that 
applied to ukuthwala, as well as to the ukuthwala’s strategic applications, were always subject to the 
informal, and open, way of handling the custom. I encountered a case in the mountainous regions 
north-east of Bambisana in which the bride and groom were just as happy about their arranged 
ukuthwala as were their parents. In this case, consensual sexual intercourse had been part of the th-
wala process, and proof of their marriage, as both the families and the bride and groom had agreed 
thereto. Nevertheless, the day after the thwala had occurred, the 21-year-old man took his 19-year-
old wife back to her parents, informing them that he did not want to be married to her any more. 
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Instead of the customary head of cattle, he presented a goat to her parents as bopa and refused 
– together with his own parents – to pay any further  lobola. When my fieldwork period came to an 
end, the case was still in progress at the traditional royal court of Qaukeni. The  lobola process in the 
case in question was contrary to what my informants had told me and, as I shall discuss later on in 
this chapter, such informality tends to be the norm, and the root of many of the discrepancies that 
were, at the time of the study, spawning many different misconceptions with regard to the violent 
re-emergence of ukuthwala.
 In all my discussions with regard to marriage, only Mrs Nomthandazo, my elderly key infor-
mant at Lusikisiki, was opposed to the payment of  lobola as a custom, citing her Christian faith as 
the reason for her opposition. All other participants in the study were either positive or neutral about 
it, with their objections being to the exploitation and the manipulation that it might have entailed, 
and not to the practice itself. Both Walker (1992) and Huffman (1998) found the same approach to 
be true, indicating that both women and men supported  lobola as an institution, but critiqued the 
extortion that it sometimes involved. The reason for both men and women to support the practice 
was often because they considered their parent’s agreement to the  lobola as being crucial to them 
having a safe marriage, as, if there was agreement to the payment of  lobola, and the required amount 
underwent transfer, they could count on their respective families’ backing in the case of possible 
future marital trouble, as I discussed in Chapter Three. It is interesting to note the parallel that exists 
between ukuthwala and  lobola. In both cases, the people concerned did not necessarily take issue 
with the practice itself, but rather with the way in which it took shape in an exploitative, or discrimi-
natory, way.
 Two elderly men, and one young woman, informed me that  lobola functioned as a type of 
marriage contract, binding the involved parties to their privileges and obligations, as I discussed in 
Chapter Three (see also Carver 2007, 42; Hunter 1933, 262, 265; Liebenberg 1997, 369, and Mills 1995). 
A middle-aged man informed me that, if a man paid  lobola for a daughter, and the daughter misbe-
haved, he had the right to go to the family of the daughter, and to confront them, because they had 
his cattle. The inverse was also true that, if a family were the recipient of cattle for a daughter, they 
had the right to intervene if the other family did not look after their daughter properly, since they 
tended the cattle of the in-laws properly. Cattle, for the Mpondo, appeared as the metaphorical pre-
sence of the in-laws, as it were, guarding over the married couple (see Hunter 1933; Kuper 2015). 
 Such a marriage contract originally had repercussions beyond the scope of the families in-
volved. As appeared evident through the interviews, such a contract also involved the community 
indirectly, yet purposefully. Elderly Mrs Tshiqani, from Mcobothi, said that “[b]ack then, when you 
would get married as a girl, everyone in the community would see that so-and-so have paid so much 
for that girl.62 Because now it is only a family thing, not a community thing, because it is only the 
family that knows how much have [i.e. had] been paid for their daughter”. Mrs Mamthembo, a young 
mother in her 30s, also from Mcobhoti, agreed when she said that “[n]owadays people are no longer 
paying  lobola with something everyone could see, it [is] just a private matter of cash that is not seen 
open[ly]”. Cattle transfers between households, thus, served as announcements of engagements and 
62  See Appendix B for transcripts of my interview with Mrs Tshiqani. 
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marriages, and of the making of new family and clan pacts/alliances, thus fulfilling a social function. 
Yet, the payment of  lobola also signalled the status of families through the paying of a prescribed 
number of cattle, which, by implication, indicated the symbolic worth and the status of the girl invol-
ved, thus also fulfilling a socio-economic function.
 Such a communal sense of social cohesion came into being through a multiplicity of familial 
and communal relationships that the economic  lobola negotiations and transfers facilitated, at least 
to some extent. Nonetheless, according to the two ladies concerned, it seems as though the familial 
and communal relationships changed through “emerging opportunities for individually acquiring 
and owning cattle made possible by ‘a “money-form” of commodity exchange’”, as Hutchinson (1997, 
207) argues. The ability to acquire cattle without the help of the family, as well as the ability to replace 
cattle with money, had serious ramifications for the sense of both the social and the familial cohe-
sion that the payment of  lobola brought about. My discussions with my key informants, who were 
saving for their own  lobola, as well as with Mrs Tshiqani and Mrs Mamthembo, made me realise that 
understanding how historical processes and events have shaped current  lobola practices might be 
key to perceiving how such payments related to current ukuthwala practices. In other words, if the 
introduction of money into the marriage market shifted the focus of marriage from family-building to 
that of material gain through  lobola, could it be that ukuthwala was becoming the vehicle of choice for 
achieving such a shift? An historical overview of  lobola that was more specific than the general over-
view of the changing marriage economies that I presented in Chapter Three, thus, became necessary.
Monetising the Marriage Market
Delving into capitalism’s history not only in the Eastern Cape, but also in the broader South Africa, 
might serve to illuminate our understanding of how, and why,  lobola acquired a more economically 
exploitative bent through the introduction of the money economy than it had previously had. The 
introduction of capitalism and the elements of the monetary system consisting of wage labour and 
the drive for profit brought on major changes among the indigenous communities in South Africa. 
McClendon (1995) states that the “colonial presence, resulting in the creation of wage labour and a 
money economy, caused a significant inflation in  lobola in the mid-nineteenth century” (543). How 
inflation came about requires due attention. The capitalist system is based on a vision of the use of 
individual freedom to acquire wealth, with such a vision being partly made possible through wage 
labour, as practised in the former colonies, like South Africa. The use of an ability to earn money 
through own labour systematically replaced subsistence farming and herding as a way of earning a 
livelihood. Raising capital through labour empowered poor families and individuals, who, otherwise, 
would have had too few cattle to be able to pay  lobola, to be in the position to be able to earn suffi-
cient money with which to pay for the required brides. This new possibility, however, escalated the 
 lobola price, as the locals came to seek after money as a currency and commodity more than they 
did cattle (see Krige, 1936, 14). 
 In addition, a few more crucial events shaped the genealogical development of capitalism 
in South Africa. Firstly, there was a steady flow of men (and later women) from the homelands to the 
bigger cities, when the mines started opening up at the end of the nineteenth century. Accordingly, 
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wage labour on the mines and in the cities became more important as a livelihood strategy. It also 
served to alter family structures, as breadwinners, who were often fathers and older brothers, beca-
me part of the migrating labour force (Mayer 1962; Kingdon and Knight 2004). Yet, the Groups Area 
Act of 1950 still regulated, and inhibited, migrant labour and trade (Narsiah 2002). Fifty odd years on, 
though, the end of the formal system of apartheid in 1994 heralded a new era, not only of political 
freedom, but also of extended economic freedom and opportunities. The system of migrant labour 
was no longer under control, and the homelands became integrated into the broader South Africa, 
with its new economic policies. Political changes, coupled with the new Constitution of 1996, led to 
the establishment of a neoliberal capitalist economy within a moderate welfare state, with dubious 
effect (Van Driel 2009; 2014). 
 While South Africa was still, primarily, an agricultural and labour-intensive economy, having 
additional members of households meant that it was possible to produce more food for the house-
hold economy than it might otherwise have been possible to obtain, Ineke Kessel of the African Stu-
dies Centre of Leiden University informed me (personal correspondence, 28 May 2014). By the time 
of my study, however, agriculture had become part of the marginal economy through the adopti-
on of new economic policies, and South Africa was developing as a capital-intensive economy. The 
situation implied that the adding of human resources to a household increased its consumption, 
rather than its production, so that it added to the burden of, rather than being advantageous to, the 
household concerned. Yet, social grants and other welfare instruments had become an important 
livelihood element in terms of the household economy. As the South African Institute of Race Rela-
tions (SAIRR 2013, 20) indicates, the adoption of effective poverty alleviation strategies has resulted 
in a steep decline of the actual number of people going hungry, mainly due to the provision of social 
grants (notably, pensions and child support grants) and food parcels. The poorest are also subsidi-
sed, or they receive free provision of basic health care and education, as well as water, electricity and 
housing. Though the above certainly denotes an improvement in the well-being of those who benefit 
thereby, such social advancements do not herald the end of poverty. 
 The transition to a capital-intensive economy from a labour-intensive one resulted in a sub-
stantial decline, over the last few decades, of the system of labour migration, as well as in a massive 
surplus of labour, unlike in the 1950s. The surplus has caused unemployment, to the detriment of 
those who do not qualify for social grants. With national unemployment figures standing at 25 per 
cent (Statistics South Africa 2011), and with 50 per cent of the South African population surviving on 
just more than €2 daily (Woolard 2002), it is hard to imagine how men can scrape together enough 
money to pay  lobola. Chambers (2000) concurs when he writes that 
[i]n the past, the lobolo was nearly always paid in cattle. Today the parties near-
ly always agree on a sum of money, though the amount is still commonly deter-
mined by the current cost of a certain number of cows. The equivalent of several 
hundred American dollars would be a common figure. That is a very large sum 
for most black South African men in their twenties. (103)
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From numerous conversations that I held with the local inhabitants, I came to believe that paying 
 lobola was becoming increasingly difficult. According to my informants, the actual  lobola price was 
not becoming more expensive per se, but the circumstances of people had so changed that it made 
it more difficult for them to pay the amounts required. Decades ago, people still had cattle to use 
as a currency, but the keeping of such livestock was declining quite rapidly. There were a number 
of reasons for this, including the fact that children had, legally, to attend school, meaning that they 
could no longer watch over the cattle, and people did not have enough money to pay cattle herders. 
In addition, large segments of the population had come to live in cities and towns, where there is no 
space to keep cattle. The biggest factor seems to be that of crime and a shortage of job opportunities. 
Cattle theft, which is partly the result of poverty, has become rampant in the Eastern Cape, leading 
to many people simply abandoning the tradition of cattle keeping. Although cattle are acceptable 
as  lobola, both their absence and that of jobs make it difficult to make such payments. Even though 
many informants claimed that the  lobola price was not, per se, increasing, Shope (2006) found that 
the “amount of lobolo paid had increased tremendously over time” (86), attributing this to the capi-
talisation of the rural economy.
 The persistence of poverty, thus, highlighted the need that some families had for the  lobola 
money that a daughter could provide. Mr Mdze, the Cluster Chairperson, who represented the locals 
to the police in the Lusikisiki area, seemed to be sure of the existence of such a factor. He said that if 
“a man thwala a girl and sleeps with her by force, the parents do not see it as rape because they need 
cows. If you do not pay  lobola they call it rape” in which case they will receive the bopa. Mr Mdze then 
plainly stated: “The fact of the matter is cows”. But is it so simple? Can it be that the need to make 
 lobola payments is becoming sufficient motivation for poor families to allow their daughters to be 
subject to thwala for purposes of financial gain?63 I set out to find empirical proof of what Mr Mdze 
told me, and, indeed, managed to find evidence that pointed towards the validity of his claims. As the 
following case study makes clear, it is specifically vulnerable, impoverished girls and women who are 
the exploitees of the  lobola system that is connected to the ukuthwala practice. 
Money for Brides: A Case Study
Miss Kuthala Sikunyana was the first person whom I met who underwent an attempted thwala for the 
sake of profit, and she was also the person who introduced me to the importance of family honour 
in relation to marriage. Miss Sikunyana was an orphan, and, in 1998, when she was 14 years old, an 
18-year-old boy and his friends tried to abduct her, so that he could marry her. Because the boy’s 
parents offered to pay a substantial  lobola for Miss Sikunyana, her maternal uncles forced her aunt to 
consent to the abduction, indicating patriarchal control and gender discrimination. Miss Sikunyana 
managed to escape from the attempted abduction, after which she had had to fend off her uncles’ 
63  I am not proposing that ukuthwala is the default course of action that poor men and families take when 
they want to enter into marriage. As Hosegood et al. (2009) and White (2015) argue, cohabitation and other 
forms of partnerships that exclude, or precede, the payment of  lobola (if only partially), are other alternati-
ves that many choose. 
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subsequent attempts to force her into the marriage. Her refusal to marry not only deprived her family 
of the potential  lobola, but it also shamed them. Her family, consequently, ostracised her, and, at the 
time of the study, she was living with one of her widowed aunts. Miss Sikunyana said that she was 
relieved that she had managed to escape, because the payment of  lobola only occurred after there 
was sexual intercourse that sealed the marriage deal. If she had not managed to escape, there was 
a good chance that the boy concerned would have raped her, especially since her family had agreed 
to the marriage. 
 Other than illustrating the importance of financial and familial considerations during  lobola 
and marriage discussions, Miss Sikunyana’s story illustrates the internal cultural diversity that existed 
with regard to the perception of violence and sexual intercourse, in a way that is reminiscent of the 
Jezile case in Chapter Four. Miss Sikunyana used the English word ‘rape’, revealing her aversion to 
both the practice and to the people who arranged it. Yet, her aunt used the neutral term ‘ukuthwala’, 
because she eventually agreed to the proposed marriage. Accordingly to Miss Sikunyana’s aunt and 
uncles, there could not have been consideration of a case of rape, since thwala-related intercourse 
with the consent of the elders appears either as part of the engagement process, or as an act of 
marriage. The age of Miss Sikunyana’s aunt might, furthermore, also have had an influence on her 
opinion of ukuthwala and the situation. Being of an older generation, who grew up at a time when 
the practice was more commonplace, she might not have harboured the same human rights-based 
views as did Miss Sikunyana on issues of gender and sexual discrimination. That she had initially 
refused to give her consent to the ukuthwala might indicate her objection to the marriage, but not 
necessarily to patriarchal and/or elder control in terms of traditional family affairs. Miss Sikunyana’s 
case, furthermore, also served as a good example of Farmer’s (2004) conviction that it was specifically 
the poor, those of female gender, and those of subjugated ethnicities who were prone to being the 
victims of forms of structural violence. 
 Miss Sikunyana sarcastically employed two idioms that isiXhosa-speaking communities tend 
to use to explain the importance of marriage: “A girl must build her own house (which can also be 
translated as ‘household’)”, and “the house of a girl is in marriage”. Mnoza and Moses, two of my key 
young male informants laughed when she cited the familiar idioms, agreeing that marriage was, 
indeed, a very important institution. It seemed, at the time of the study, to be a girl’s duty to her fa-
mily and community to “build her own house” through marriage. In Miss Sikunyana’s case, however, 
her uncles seemed to have wanted to provide her with a house “in marriage”, which is why they had 
organised her thwala.
 Both my male and female, as well as my young and old, informants regarded marriage and 
childbearing to be the cultural ideal, though they were not the norm in practice. Not complying with 
the ideals of marriage could hold dire consequences for some young women, as Miss Sikunyana’s ex-
perience evidences. It was not necessarily Miss Sikunyana’s refusal that caused the conflict that arose 
in her situation, but rather her wish for self-determination regarding the time of marriage and who 
the partner would be. The desire for agency caused the conflict concerned, as it deprived her (mainly 
elderly male) family of the offered  lobola, and it opposed their notions of the ideal construction of 
families. Miss Sikunyana’s case, thus, illustrates the importance of making family, the financial impli-
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cations of marriage, and how ukuthwala becomes a vehicle for obtaining the required goals speedily, 
within the current context of economic hardship. 
 Though Miss Sikunyana’s case presented me with evidence that ukuthwala might be an eco-
nomic strategy for gain (specifically benefitting her male kin), one case was insufficient to prove that 
the current re-emergence of ukuthwala was based on the economically beneficial possibilities of the 
situation. Further research was, accordingly, necessary, and, as I discovered, the economic exploitati-
on of  lobola through ukuthwala was just as much an historical aspect of ukuthwala’s informality and 
openness as it was a contemporary phenomenon. 
 
 Lobola’s Shifting Emphasis and the Re-Emergence of Ukuthwala
In keeping with Mr Mdze statements mentioned above, elderly Mrs Gxagxiso also held the belief that 
the sudden rise in ukuthwala cases was the result of the poverty of parents who wanted to acquire 
some form of income thereby. When I asked her why ukuthwala was such a persistent practice, she 
said that it was because
the parents are poor, so [they] agree just because they are going to get some-
thing […] Sometimes it is because of the poverty. Even if the chief’s daughter 
was thwala’ed, he would agree, because of the cows. 
A 59-year-old woman living in Bambisana gave a similar account to the above when she told me 
about her attempted abduction that had transpired more than four decades previously. The “reason 
why my father said this [i.e. had agreed to the abduction] is because they have promised cows, and 
my father wanted cows”. During a focus group discussion at Mervan village, a middle-aged woman, 
concurred with the above: 
Their aim is for cattle, seeing that that home has a lot of cattle. They don’t mind 
about the desire of the girl, if she likes [it] or not [i.e. whether or not she agreed 
to her abduction]. My mother, she was taken at Flagstaff [for the  lobola that was 
offered to her parents]. 
My key informant, Mrs Nothembile, also agreed with the woman, saying, “they [parents] would allow 
you to be thwala’ed because they are poor, and then they would want  lobola”. 
 After closer investigation of the above-mentioned data in the field, the accounts examined 
revealed that early marriage through thwala was not only a contemporary strategy to which the bri-
de’s family acceded, so as to ease an economic burden, while gaining something in return. It also 
seemed as though there was an existing (possibly an historical) cultural rationale that intertwined 
with the capitalistic drive for profit. Though the intertwining was not the sole purpose for  lobola’s re-
latively recently acquired rampantly exploitative nature, it has seemed to stimulate its development. 
During my conversation with a young man, Mr Mdze, he mentioned a common Mpondo idiom – ndid-
lile. Literally, ndidlile means, “I have eaten”; if a person uses the expression idiomatically, however, 
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it means “I have gained wealth through my daughter.” Mr Ndze explained that a person has eaten 
well ‘through one’s daughter’ if the person concerned has gained many cattle through the marriage 
concerned. A participant mentioned the same idiom during a focus group discussion that I held with 
police officers a few weeks later. The focus group concerned took place at the Mtontsasa Police Sta-
tion, about 60km north-east of Lusikisiki. The area surrounding Mtontsasa village was, as numerous 
informants told me, and as mentioned in the previous chapter, the area where ukuthwala was most 
prevalent. When asking the participants what ndidlile meant, I received one of two different respon-
ses, with the first being, “you put food on the table in exchange for a daughter”, and the second being, 
“I have gained something through my daughter; it is like that for families who are poor”. The beliefs 
of my informants, combined with the historical expression ndidlile, convinced me that the focus of 
some individuals and communities during  lobola negotiations was increasingly on material/financi-
al gain, in terms of the building of families, in comparison to where the focus might have lain in the 
past. The above seems to have been particularly true for the bride’s family.64
 Mrs Ngotane presented me with further evidence of the shift from a focus on family-building 
in connection with a thwala marriage to one of the economic advantages involved for the bride’s 
family.65 Mrs Ngotane was, herself, a social worker, who had provided care and safety for numerous 
thwala’ed girls in the past. There were six underage girls living at the Centre whom the Department 
of Social Development had rescued from having to participate in illegal thwala marriages at the time 
of our interview. Mrs Ngotane told me that it was often the girls who came from homes where only 
their mothers had been present who were vulnerable to thwala marriages. Male relatives, usually 
maternal uncles, tended to arrange such abductions without either the mother’s consent, or her 
knowledge. Being a woman, and therefore frequently subject to the authority of the men in the wider 
family, she was often powerless to intervene on her daughter’s behalf. Referring to the cases she had 
handled herself, Mrs Ngotane also said that it “is cheaper because only the first [ lobola] instalment 
is paid, and the uncles do not follow up on the next instalment. They don’t give a beat about the 
girl, because it is minus one plate.” Middle-aged Mrs Nothemba, who lived at some distance to the 
south-east of Lusikisiki, and who had witnessed a few thwala’s made similar remarks about the ad-
vantages of  lobola’s fluidity in relation to ukuthwala:66
64  It is interesting to note that the increasing focus on the economic aspects of marriage might also incre-
asingly have come to overshadow the historical importance of the political aspects of marriage arrange-
ments, as I discussed in Chapter Three. The placing of a greater emphasis on the economic aspects of 
family making, as opposed to on marriage as a political strategy, implies the disempowerment of the local 
leaders and of the traditionally politically powerful families. Though investigating the shift in question falls 
beyond the scope of the current dissertation, it highlights the extent to which both the historical and the 
contemporary national processes and events were influencing and changing marriage and family-making 
practices on the local level.
65  It is interesting to note that Mtontsasa village in the KwaCele area is the only area where she and her team 
did not conduct their ukuthwala awareness campaign, as it was too dangerous for them to do so. The 
Mtontsasa police were, thus, responsible for the undertaking in the area.
66  As the informant concerned wanted to remain anonymous, ‘Nothemba’ is a pseudonym.
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If you are a virgin and a guy wants to marry you they will have to pay  lobola first 
and finish it while you are still at home. But then with ukuthwala, he thwala you, 
he rapes you then he will start paying  lobola but he will not pay the full  lobola – 
he will end up not paying the full amount.
Initially, I believed that such cases could not be purely economic, as the full  lobola was never ob-
tained, but taking a closer look convinced me otherwise. Firstly, the mother was often not involved 
in the  lobola negotiations, indicating the bypassing of a possible obstacle to making a profit through 
ukuthwala. Secondly, the girl’s marriage was implicitly “minus one plate”, meaning that there was 
one less mouth to feed, which also resulted in less expense. Use of the expression “minus one plate” 
provides an interesting twist to the idiomatic language of ndidlile: while the thwala of a girl provided 
“food” in the past, it was apparently perceived as being the exact opposite in the current economic 
context, in which it implied that there was one less person to feed. Finally, that the full  lobola was 
never requested seemed to be rather a good marketing strategy. If a person does not ask much for 
a much sought-after product, there is more assurance of finding a buyer for it; if an unwritten agree-
ment exists that payment of the full (yet relatively inexpensive) price will not be expected, a cash sale 
is almost guaranteed without those concerned having to undergo a lengthy customary bargaining 
process. Alternatively, as the two elderly ladies at Mcobothi had brought to my attention (see abo-
ve), if the process of  lobola is becoming increasingly individualised, it is possible to argue that the 
amount payable should be lower, since the groom’s family had only to consult with, and to transfer 
the  lobola to, one, or perhaps two, (male) kin of the potential bride, as opposed to her extended 
family, who would otherwise have been involved. 
 Though the above argument might seem to be crude, I believe that it is justified, seeing how 
the emphasis of  lobola has shifted to the obtaining of profit, to the detriment of certain vulnerable 
family members. Five of the nine thwala’ed women whom I interviewed said that their parents had 
allowed their thwala (whether or not it had been arranged) only because they had wanted the  lobola 
concerned. All five of the individuals to whom I spoke and who had been directly involved in the 
ukuthwala of a close family member said that their main motivation had either been for them to 
receive  lobola, or to connive at the payment of a low  lobola. 
 The currently more exploitative form of  lobola was, therefore, the continuation of an older 
pattern of behaviour, with a shift in emphasis, rather than a new, ukuthwala-specific phenomenon. 
 Lobola’s age-old element of material and political gain, as I discussed in Chapter Three, started to 
resonate with capitalism’s emphasis on profit and monetary calculative thinking, as people faced 
increasingly difficult economic challenges. Such resonance, over time, created a cultural precedent, 
in terms of which social cohesion developed between families through the transfer of an agreed 
amount of money, rather than through the actual union of the bride and groom. Thus,  lobola’s po-
tential for making profit, coupled with capitalism’s sole drive for profit, over time, led to the current 
situation, where  lobola sometimes resembles a financial transaction that is based on the profit that 
is derived from the conclusion of the marriage involved. 
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 The changing economy, hence, has led to the impoverishment of rural communities, with 
poor families and individuals, through the  lobola practice, now having come to use ukuthwala stra-
tegically in various ways to cope with economic challenges and poverty. I argue that, since money, 
though not a new aspect of the situation, has come to be an increasingly important consideration 
and a defining aspect of  lobola and ukuthwala, it has led to the growing exploitation of such vulne-
rable individuals as single mothers and their daughters. This was clear in the Jezile case, in terms of 
which the family concerned had arranged for the abduction of the daughter of a single mother (see 
previous chapter). The prioritisation of money as a major motivating force does not, however, imply 
the escalation of physical violence. Rather, the changing economy has led to the exacerbation of 
the amount of structural violence that is endured, in the sense of local people, and especially rural 
dwellers, being subjected to unemployment, the inflation of  lobola rates, and poverty. Consequently, 
they have to cope with the prevailing challenges to contracting a marriage. The structural violence of 
poverty, then, exacerbates the amount of cultural violence that women have to endure in the form of 
patriarchal control67 over them, and symbolic violence.68
 Though the above argument sounds reasonable from the perspective of the bride’s family, 
who might accept the necessity for ukuthwala, because of the  lobola/bopa that they would receive, 
the question why a man (and his family) would conduct ukuthwala, knowing the requirement for 
 lobola and bopa, still remains unanswered. The question is an important one in the light of the con-
tents of Chapter Three, in which I pointed out that marriages were becoming all the more fluid, and 
that cohabitation was becoming all the more popular, over time. Not being able to interview the men 
who had actually practised ukuthwala made answering the question very difficult. Yet, based on the 
literature on changing marriage practices, and on the accounts that I gathered in the field, I do be-
lieve that it is possible to gauge what some of the reasons for the men’s actions might have been. As 
with the reasons that applied in the case of the bride’s family, the men’s reasons for opting for abduc-
tion marriage were, most probably, tied to financial considerations. As opposed to the  lobola rates 
of regular indigenous marriage that have escalated over the last few decades, the amount of  lobola 
that forms the payment for a thwala marriage, as I have shown, has remained comparatively low.69 
The lower  lobola (even including the bopa) linked to ukuthwala has always been one of the historical 
strategic usages of the custom, as I discussed in both the Introduction and in Chapter Three. The ge-
neral escalation of  lobola rates might, thus, have led to the creation of a situation in which the lower 
 lobola of a thwala marriage became a possibility that men would consider more readily than they 
would the financial commitments that more conventional marriages would have required of them. 
 The second reason is, like the first, an aspect of the historical openness of the ukuthwala pro-
cess. As I explained in Chapter Three, the formative steps of marriage have remained rather constant, 
irrespective of the changes that have occurred in how marriage occurs. As Hunter (2015) explains (see 
Chapter Three), the poor have strategically employed the use of partial  lobola payments to reconfi-
67  Such as that which Miss Sikunyana’s uncles held, for example.
68  Such as Miss Sikunyana’s aunt’s acceptance of the need for her abduction, for example.
69  I shall illustrate this point more clearly in the following section.
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gure relationships of cohabitation to resemble marital relationships. Though entering into such re-
lationships that practically function as marriages, the  lobola negotiations and payments concerned 
remain an ongoing process that is grounded in the unchanging, formative steps of marriage. Usually, 
the parent(s) of the couple, as well as the wider community, do not consider cohabitation to be a 
‘proper’ marriage. Similarly to the way in which ukuthwala is a strategy for contracting a marriage 
with a lower  lobola than is usual, so is it also a strategy for completely circumventing the dragged out 
negotiation process (see Britten 1930 and Ntlokwana 2011) of regular indigenous marriage. Hence, 
embarking on cohabitation serves as a step towards marriage. As opposed to a cohabiting relati-
onship that resembles marriage, the practice of ukuthwala, accordingly, allows a man to contract 
a quick marriage with a lower  lobola than might otherwise have been appropriate in the case of a 
proper marriage (at least from his perspective). Thus, this gives him the right to produce legitimate 
offspring. Though the structural violence of poverty might serve to stimulate the increasing econo-
mic exploitation of young girls and women through the practice of ukuthwala, structural, cultural and 
symbolic forms of violence do not necessarily translate into forms of physical violence. I, therefore, 
still needed to investigate whether both the bride’s family’s and the groom’s economic exploitation of 
ukuthwala were, indeed, becoming the current physical violence that now often characterises ukuth-
wala. My investigation of ukuthwala within the legal context provided me with the keys to answering 
the question, as it forced me to take the historical reality of the custom’s openness into account, as 
well as the current discourses in which it was embedded. As I found during my field research, local 
communities and individuals, as well as the media, often misinterpret economic exploitation, becau-
se of the current amount of confusion to which ukuthwala’s historical informality and openness has 
given rise. 
Historical Informality and Openness
On my way home after a day of fieldwork, a middle-aged man stopped me in the road, greeted me, 
and asked me what I was doing in the area. I told him about my research, and about my interest in 
the re-emergence of ukuthwala within the context of economic challenges. Since he, incidentally, 
had also studied anthropology as a subject at university, he found my research interesting, though 
he was sceptical of my hypothesis. In contrast, he argued that poverty had no bearing on ukuth-
wala-related  lobola, since the paramount chief decided on a reasonable set  lobola amount for all 
forms of marriage. Since he was of Pondo descent, lived in Lusikisiki, and was knowledgeable about 
anthropology, I initially believed him. Five other individuals, who had been directly involved in inci-
dents of ukuthwala, supported his conviction of a set rate of ten head of cattle. Further investigation, 
however, revealed the fluidity of both  lobola rates, as well as of the  lobola process, when it came to 
matters of ukuthwala. 
 An elderly woman living in Nyathi Mkumbeni village was the first whom I came across whose 
 lobola had been ten head of cattle.70 After meeting Mrs Mlomo (see photo xi), who had also been the 
subject of thwala for ten cows, I encountered 83-year-old Mr Dlamini, of Nyuswa village. He narrated 
70  See Appendix B for transcripts of my interview with this elderly woman living in Nyathi Mkumbeni village.
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to me the tale of the abduction of his teenage stepmother, when he had been a teenager.71 Though 
the agreed  lobola had been ten cows, he said that his father had ended up paying only seven cows, 
and a horse, for his thwala’ed wife. Though elderly Mrs Phuthuso of Gamgatha village agreed that 
the  lobola of a thwala marriage was, ideally, ten head of cattle, her parents had received ten cows, 
ten sheep, and a horse for her abduction, with the whole  lobola having been paid in one instalment, 
prior to her abduction. The informants concerned all agreed that transference of the  lobola should 
occur prior to the abduction. The realisation of the ideal ten head of cattle was, as Mrs Phutshuso’s 
case showed, a very fluid concept. The parents of elderly Mrs Olphino of Bambisana had received 
four cows, R800, ten sheep, and one horse, whereas an elderly women living in Jokazi village was 
abducted for the price of seven cows, two horses, and ten sheep.72 Such rather steep  lobola rates 
stood in stark contrast to the current rates. A 31-year-old councillor working with vulnerable girls at 
the Palmerton CCMC shared the details of six abducted teenage girls with whom she was currently 
occupied: “Of course poverty comes [counts] because this  lobola thing paid is not much, two cows, 
one cow. Not more than three. Most of them, it was two cows after they were taken.” The low  lobola 
amount in question not only illustrates the fluidity of ukuthwala-related  lobola, but also the strategic 
use of ukuthwala to obtain a bride in a relatively cost-effective way from the perspective of the groom 
and his family, as I discussed above, as well as in reference to Miss Sikunyana’s case.
 
xi) Mr and Mrs Mlomo, who were married by means of ukuthwala. Photo taken by the author, May 2013.
71  See Appendix B for transcripts of my interview with Mr Dlamini.
72  See Appendix B for transcripts of my interview with Mrs Olphino, as well as with the female respondent 
living in Jokazi village.
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 Other than the fluidity that occurs with regard to the  lobola rate, when the  lobola should be 
negotiated and transferred was, historically speaking, just as open. Talking about her friend’s abduc-
tion, Mrs Tshiqani of Mcobothi village said:
When the parents find out that you were taken, they just go to the family and get 
cows. And if you run back home, you’ll be beaten and told to go back. Even if the 
cows have not been collected, he can have sex with you. 
In her friend’s case, the abduction was not arranged, so the negotiation and transfer of the  lobola 
occurred after the thwala, which, in the case mentioned, implied having forced sexual intercourse. 
Mrs Manxgamile, who was thwala’ed four times, said that if 
you didn’t go to bed with the man, and then the man, the family, is not going to 
pay the  lobola [...] First, you must go to bed, you must sleep with the girl, and 
then the family can come back and say, “Ja, she is a wife”, then they can start 
paying  lobola. 
Contrary to what my initial informants said and had experienced, Mrs Manxgamile’s experiences il-
lustrate that, even though the amount of  lobola to be paid might have been subject to negotiation 
prior to the abduction, it was often only after the forced sexual intercourse had taken place that the 
transfer of the  lobola took place. Her experiences of more than fifty years ago were more in line with 
the recent experiences of Miss Sikunyana and the six girls at Palmerton CCMC. It was on the condition 
that the men managed to abduct and have sex with the women that the payment of the outstanding 
 lobola occurred.
 As I discovered during my research into the legal context of ukuthwala, there were no defina-
ble or discernible breccia in the sense of formative steps, forms or processes involved. The same rang 
true for all of the aspects of ukuthwala-related  lobola, as well as for the motivations that inspired 
people to opt for such a marriage. In the previous chapter, I illustrated how many individuals and 
communities (including thwala’ed women and their children) saw abduction marriage in a positive 
light, as an effective family-making practice. An assessment of the motivations for ukuthwala within 
the economic context revealed quite the opposite, though. Discussing (in the third person) how his 
neighbour had abducted a girl, Mr Dlamini of Nyuswa village said:
She [has] a boyfriend somewhere, and the old man wants to marry her, and on 
[i.e. at] that boyfriend’s home, there are no cows. The old man is rich, and some-
one well-known in the community, with more cows. So, also, the girl’s parents 
would want to have cows, so they stop the relationship by allowing her to be 
thwala’ed. That is entirely why they would allow thwala – they wanted riches. 
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Mrs Mhlanti, a 62-year-old also living in Nyuswa at the time of the current study, gave me the details of 
a thwala case in which her uncle had been the abductor: “It wasn’t a matter of choice [for the girl], the 
parents were actually looking for the rich families where they know they would get cows”. Since her 
uncle was rich, they had agreed to the abduction. A 59-year-old woman living in Bambisana agreed 
with this state of affairs. Talking to me about her own thwala, she said the very old man who wanted 
to marry her 
was so rich. So even [my] parents said, “Why [do] you not want to get married 
there? You see the number of cows and goats he has?” Then [I] said, “I am not 
going to marry there, because he’s got a lot of cows and goats. I am young and 
this man is old.”
The above-mentioned accounts, in conjunction with those that I discussed in the previous chapter, 
illustrate the informality and the openness of the way in which family making was perceived and 
practised in terms of ukuthwala. Whereas the previous chapter’s many positive accounts expressed 
their motivation, and their construction, in relational terms, the negative accounts in the current 
chapter expressed their motivation, and their construction in, economic terms. Save for the obvious 
informality with which the incidents occurred, the accounts provide clues as to which features of 
the situation currently cause so many discrepancies and so much sensation within the discourses 
on ukuthwala. The most contentious points are, firstly, as I already discussed above, the fact that 
the practice of ukuthwala has always held the possibility of economic exploitation for both families 
involved. Secondly, the fact exists of the advanced years of the abductors, and, finally, is the fact of 
the abductors’ financial means. The three historical elements of ukuthwala’s openness were, at the 
time of the current study, becoming, as I discovered, the substance of yet another demonising and 
othering discourse on both the local and national levels. 
Confusion and the Emerging Discourse on Ukuthwala’s Profitability 
During my interview with Mr Mduduzi, the administrative officer at Lusikisiki’s police station, he suc-
cinctly summarised what he perceived to be the reason for  lobola and ukuthwala becoming enterpri-
ses by means of which to profit: “now they [abductors] are paying something in the market. Earlier, in 
the 1980s, it was just making a family. We were making a family in the 80s, but now parents are selling 
their daughters” through thwala marriages, in order to gain  lobola. Mr Mduduzi’s words seem to echo 
the sensationalised discourse of the popular media, with parents selling their children for money. I 
found it particularly interesting that, whereas the social workers and the police officers to whom I 
spoke, blamed the current forms of sexual violence on the demonisation of communities who held 
on to historical, illegal elements of ukuthwala, as I discussed in the previous chapter, Mr Mduduzi bla-
med them on the parents and on other involved individuals. He asserted that the individuals menti-
oned wanted to make money, or wanted to rid themselves of a possible economic burden. Following 
the new lead, I discovered that recently developed perceptions of human rights, in conjunction with 
the discrepancies to which the historical informality of ukuthwala had given rise, had come to foster 
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a local discourse in terms of which individuals tried to make sense of the interaction between  lobola 
and ukuthwala within the context of economic hardship. I term the above-mentioned form of dis-
course the local discourse on ukuthwala’s profitability. 
 I interviewed Mrs Ntombifikile, a social worker in Lusikisiki, who had recently handled two 
thwala cases. In the first case, the girl was 15 years old and the man 48. In the second case, the girl 
was 16 and the man 46. Mrs Ntombifikile told me that
[t]hey can thwala the children. I know they do it, because of the cases that are 
reported to us by the schoolteachers. The parents, they didn’t report it, becau-
se they like that abduction. They have a belief, if they don’t go for a marriage, 
she [a daughter] is going to get pregnant while she is not married. So they [the 
parents] believe they should go and get her a man. It is better to thwala than 
not get married. They don’t want their girls to bear children without marriage. 
The first important aspect of what Mrs Ntombifikile communicated to me was the age of the abduc-
ted girls. As I pointed out in the previous section, age discrepancies were not uncommon historically 
speaking, but the current national and local awareness of human rights issues provide a new lens 
through which the age discrepancies appear similarly to the way in which the perceptions of vio-
lence are changing (as I discussed in the previous chapter). The uncertainty of whether or not girls 
have always been abductees at a fairly young age, the  lobola that is inextricably tied to the practice 
of ukuthwala (as in the case of any other indigenous form of Nguni marriage), combined with new 
perceptions of the issue of human rights, have resulted in the media’s sensational portrayal of age 
discrepancies and of the selling of girls as being a new phenomenon. Consequently, rights-orienta-
ted captions have become common: “Teenager Snatched, Forced to Marry’” (George 2005); “Teen 
Mothers Find Refuge after Forced Marriages to Older Men” (Ngcukana 2009); “Schoolgirls Being For-
ced into Early Marriage in T’kei” (Ndabeni 2009); “Ukuthwala Turns to Statutory Rape” (Third Degree 
2010), and “Bride Kidnapper Convicted in SA’s first ‘ukuthwala’ Trafficking Case” (Dano 2014). Though 
I am not demeaning the nature of the human rights abuses of which the girls, who were, at the time of 
the study, in Mrs Ntombifikile’s care, had been victims, her explanation that parents did not report ca-
ses of ukuthwala “because they like that abduction” appears to reflect the propagandistic approach 
that the media has tended to take. This is mixed with her own attempt at explaining the persistence 
of the practice of abducting underage girls through thwala, and the reality of such abuses with which 
she had to deal. Yet, I still needed to explain the second aspect of interest in the interview, namely 
the alleged belief that it was better to be subject to thwala than not to marry, and to conceive a child 
at the parental home. 
 The answer to my above-mentioned quandary soon came during an interview with Mrs Zwe-
lifile, who was a councillor who worked with domestic violence victims at the magistrates’ court in 
Lusikisiki. Talking about her own experiences in dealing with thwala’ed girls, she informed me that
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[t]his guy goes to the parent’s place, and talk[s] to the parents […] The parents 
will not say this child is young, she is not ready for marriage. He (the girl’s father) 
will say, “Go for it, as long as we get cows. It is better for you to take her to your 
place as a man [husband] than [for her] to stay here, because, at the end of the 
day, the child will get pregnant here […], so it is better to take her, because we 
are going to get cows. So, she can get pregnant in your place […] So, some of 
the parents say it is OK that their children are abducted, because [if] they fell 
pregnant […] at their [parental] homes, no-one will support them. It is better if 
someone can go and marry that guy, even if he is older than her, because he will 
be able to support her. Better to go and get married at an early age than to get 
pregnant here at home.
Explaining the belief to which Mrs Ntombifikile referred within the economic context, Mrs Zwelifile 
argued that parents would rather accept ukuthwala, so that their daughter could conceive within a 
thwala marriage with a financially supportive husband. This was preferable to them having to sup-
port their underage daughter and her child in the eventuality that she fell pregnant outside of wed-
lock. Mrs Zwelifile appeared to link the historical notion of ndidlile (in terms of which parents received 
 lobola) with the current concept of being ‘minus one plate’ (i.e. without a possible economic burden) 
from the perspective of the bride’s family. Consequently, she believed that her parents had ensured 
their own economic security, through allowing an ukuthwala to take place for strategic reasons. Ho-
wever, as I had discovered earlier on in my investigation, there was more to childbirth in marriage 
than merely preventing a possible economic burden.
 As I illustrated in the discussion of Miss Sikunyana’s attempted abduction, there was eviden-
ce to support Mrs Zwelifile’s claims, with the possibility of bringing shame on own family being a very 
legitimate fear and threat for vulnerable girls like Miss Sikunyana. Yet, the fear of a girl child falling 
pregnant outside of wedlock was also tied to the stigmatisation of such girls and their families, and it 
was, therefore, suggestive of an alternative interpretation. Other than numerous conversations that 
referred to the increase in the number of premarital childbirths (as I also discussed in Chapter Three), 
five individuals labelled the girls who had children out of wedlock as ‘cheap’, and they blamed them 
for having been responsible for their own rape.73 As Miss Sikunyana, and a number of village elders, 
explained the situation to me, ‘a girl must build her own household’ through marriage, which was a 
difficult ideal to achieve for girls who fell pregnant prior to marriage, and who, accordingly, bore the 
stigma of being thought cheap and unmarriageable.
 The informality and the openness of ukuthwala, accordingly, make it very difficult for indi-
viduals to discern historical cultural ideals from current stigmas, and fact from fiction. Even though 
ukuthwala, historically, always held the potential for economic exploitation and child marriage, 
Mmes Ntombifilile and Zwelifile tried to make sense of the current violence that underaged thwala’ed 
73  I shall discuss the relationship between the violent form of ukuthwala, the ‘cheapness’ of girls and the pre-
vailing discourses on sexuality and gender in much more detail in the following chapter. 
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girls suffer by means of blaming and othering a range of causes. Such causes included poverty, gree-
dy parents, older men who used their financial means as leverage to marry children, and excessive 
social control and pressure, in the form of the stigmatisation and shame of premarital childbirth. 
Though I argue that the considerable changes that have occurred in  lobola practices over the last 
two centuries, as well as the emphasis in marriage that has shifted from family making to issues of 
 lobola, have currently resulted in cases of economically exploitative ukuthwala, the role that the local 
discourse plays in terms of the profitability of the practice should also be subject to consideration. 
While economically exploitative forms of ukuthwala can, and do, result in the abduction and rape 
of children, as the women whom I interviewed made vividly clear, the discourses that grapple with 
such cases create the image of ukuthwala as consisting simply of the selling and buying of children 
for profit, and their subsequent rape by the men who ‘buy’ them. Within the local discourse on the 
profitability of ukuthwala, the rape of underage girls, in short, receives much attention, on the basis 
of the despicability of a practice that apparently lets them be sold for profit to older, rich men. Con-
sequently, the physical violence of ukuthwala appears as the worsening manifestation of structural 
forms of violence (mainly poverty) that now plague marital economics.
 After making the above-mentioned discovery, I again reflected on the conversation that I had 
held with Mr Mduduzi, (the administrative officer at Lusikisiki’s police station), and I found out another 
aspect of the local discourse on ukuthwala’s profitability. After telling me that parents were ‘selling’ 
their daughters, I asked him whether he was referring to specifically poor parents. He answered that
those who are well-educated, or who is [i.e. are] literate, it [ukuthwala] is not 
happening to them, it is only happening to the very poor in our society […], 
because they are afraid of challenging the situation, and these thwala syndi-
cates are done by those who have power in terms of money […] they know 
the poor cannot even price the girl. Then they pay the money on the spot. And 
those poor families, they also like to be attached to those who are in power. Our 
parents are selling those girls to the ones in power, because now we are going 
to have that attachment with a family that is in power. Because, in our society, 
there are also elite groups, so these poor ones like having a connection with 
those elites I am talking about. 
Very similar to the way in which the local human rights discourse that I discussed in the previous 
chapter has adopted the language of constitutional human rights, Mduduzi demonised the practiti-
oners of ukuthwala by means of using the language of commerce and of the black market. Such ex-
pressions as “thwala syndicates”, “power in terms of money”, “price the girl”, and “selling those girls” 
illustrate how the violence of ukuthwala appeared in the local discourse on ukuthwala’s profitability 
at the time of the current study. 
 Then, comparable to Mmes Ntombifikile and Zwelifile’s focus on ndidlile and on the stigma-
tisation of the process of premarital childbirth, Mduduzi attempted to make sense of the confusion 
surrounding ukuthwala’s re-emergence, by blaming it on yet another historical aspect of indigenous 
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marriage, namely its political significance. As I discussed in Chapter Three, and as I discussed above, 
marriage used not only to be a family-building strategy, but it also used to have a political function 
that could be used to control issues of lineage, succession, and inheritance. Kuper (2015, 20−21) ex-
plains the above in writing that 
marriage strategies of powerful families were […] of enormous political impor-
tance […]. A chief who dispatched a wife to a rival was making a political inter-
vention, aspiring to control the succession to the chiefly house into which he 
introduced his sister or daughter. 
Misconstruing the historical and political importance of marriage strategies as being a matter that 
was mostly confined to “powerful families” (see Kuper 2015, 20), Mduduzi almost randomly explained 
why poor families would allow rich families to exploit their daughters through ukuthwala. He did so 
by alleging that they “like[d] to be attached to those who are in power”, seeing the situation in terms 
of the families concerned aiming “to have that attachment with a family that is in power”. Quite sim-
ply, according to Mduduzi, “poor ones like having a connection with those elites”. Though the expla-
nation seemed to be far-fetched, there was an unexpected logic to it. Since the practice of ukuthwala 
at no stage seemed to have revolved around any hard fragment, or form of breccia, there was no 
definable, or nameable, cause or culprit that was culpable for the violence and the abuse that the 
thwala’ed girls suffered. Individuals who witnessed the violence were, consequently, at a loss when 
trying to understand and explain the phenomenon. This had led to the situation at the time of the 
current study, in which people had come to blame, seemingly at random, any possible potentially 
violent aspect and/or element that might have constituted a possible ukuthwala. 
 The emerging discourse on ukuthwala’s profitability is, thus, the attempt of outsiders to ex-
plain the physical violence of current ukuthwala cases in terms of the economic advantages that 
abduction marriage holds for all involved parties. In the process of such discourse, poverty, greedy 
parents, older rich men, the stigmatisation of premarital childbirth, as well as the prestige of being 
linked to a powerful family through marriage, are subject to blame. Though the discourse concerned 
is partially grounded in actual individual cases in which girls have, indeed, become abductees, and 
often rape victims, to the economic advantage of the involved perpetrators, the cases are too isola-
ted for presentation as conclusive empirical evidence that proves the substantiveness of the discour-
se. Such cases, as well as the discourse on which they are based, do, however, lead to the popular, 
yet incorrect, perception (both locally, and in the national media) that current economic factors and 
othered individuals are solely culpable for the violent re-emergence of ukuthwala.
 The above-mentioned discourse (which is similar to the local discourse on human rights that 
I discussed in the previous chapter), ultimately, hides from view an important aspect of ukuthwala’s 
violent re-emergence, namely the continuation of historical forms of violence. Corroborating my fin-
dings that I presented in the previous chapter, investigating ukuthwala, within its economic context, 
revealed that violence was not, per se, new, and, thus, it was not only intimately connected with the 
growing economic hardships and  lobola. Rather, girls have always become abductees in forceful and 
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abusive ways, and they have always been given in marriage for the strategic goal of gaining  lobola 
that is associated with the informal nature of ukuthwala. Though the commercialisation of  lobola, 
and the local discourse on ukuthwala’s profitability, do, therefore, at least partly explain the re-emer-
gence of ukuthwala as an abusive economic strategy, it fails to take into account, and to criticise, the 
continuation of the historical forms of violence and abuse to which young women were still subject 
at the time at which I conducted the current study. 
Conclusion – Naming and Blaming
Through asking the question, ‘How does the restructuring of the economy and economic policy 
influence current ukuthwala practices?’, this chapter has illustrated how South Africa’s changing 
economy has adversely affected  lobola practices. This, in turn, has affected the ways in which con-
temporary ukuthwala occurs and appears as well. I have illustrated how the capitalist system and 
its attributes of monetary calculative thinking and profiteering (McClendon 1995), over time, have 
impacted on the local economies, as well as having made the paying of  lobola increasingly diffi-
cult (Walker 1992). I then showed how the capitalisation of rural economies, coupled with  lobola’s 
potential use for material gain, shifted the focus of marriage from family cohesion, by means of the 
joining of two families, to the transference of money between families. The idea of family-building is, 
in general, thus, still important as a cultural ideal (as I showed in chapters Three and Four), but the 
means of such building, as well as the reasons for its importance, have changed. In all the cases that 
I discussed in the current chapter, the purpose and function of the committance of ukuthwala was 
still marriage and childbirth, irrespective of whether the practice was becoming more violent and 
prevalent as an advantageous and economical marriage strategy.
 Though many researchers74 have documented the above-mentioned national processes of 
change, and their influence on the indigenous forms of marriage, poverty and  lobola well, their in-
fluence on ukuthwala, specifically, remained uninvestigated and unknown. Shedding light on the 
above situation, I illustrated (through Miss Sikunyana’s, and other, cases) how poor individuals and 
families currently utilised  lobola’s emphasis on money as a means of profiting from the conducting 
of ukuthwala marriages, while simultaneously easing a possible economic burden. Ukuthwala’s his-
torical strategic use of the flouting of conventional  lobola practices (Britten 1930), combined with 
 lobola’s historical potential for economic gain (conveyed through the concept of ndidlile) makes the 
above hypothesis all the more plausible. In this sense, contemporary ukuthwala appears as an emer-
ging economic survival strategy, with the practice re-emerging and becoming a more popular form 
of marriage than the conventional. This is because it presents both families and individuals with a 
cheap way of contracting a marriage.
 The above-mentioned simplistic interpretation runs counter to, and counts against, my dis-
covery that ukuthwala’s informality has consistently, throughout its history, held the possibility of 
economic exploitation, as the detailed background of the elderly thwala’ed women whom I inter-
74  Including, most notably, Krige (1936); Hutchinson (1997); Chambers (2000); Shope (2006), and Hosegood et 
al. (2009).
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viewed shows. Economic exploitation, as both the popular media and numerous individuals on the 
local level allege, is, therefore, not a recent phenomenon, even though the practice of  lobola, and 
ukuthwala by implication, increasingly have come to resemble economic ventures. That the violence 
of the re-emerging ukuthwala has become more intense and prevalent than it was before, within the 
context of a changing economy, is consequently inconclusive, since the few cases that I documented, 
and the circumstances surrounding the cases, only go to prove that  lobola practices have changed 
over time, due to historical and current economic policies. Ultimately, the changes that have come 
about in the practice have served to stimulate the continuation of older forms of ukuthwala-related 
violence. The violence of economic exploitation that marks the re-emergence of ukuthwala should, 
hence, still receive consideration as an element of historical abduction marriage, albeit that it is now 
coming to the fore in the current challenging economic climate on the local level.
 Yet, I also found that human rights discourses and the media were sensitising people to the 
problematic nature of the issue, as well as to the experience of the structural violence of poverty, 
to the possible cultural violence of exploitative marriage practices, like  lobola, and to the physical 
violence that underage girls who are subject to ukuthwala suffer. This awareness and sensitivity is 
currently feeding into the discourse on ukuthwala’s profitability, as individuals try to make sense of 
the violence that, similarly to ukuthwala’s informal character, has no tangible, knowable culprit. As 
a result, it seems as if the individuals and the local communities concerned blamed the current vio-
lence that underage thwala’ed girls had been subject to on the existence of: poverty; greedy parents; 
older men who used their financial means as leverage to marry children; social control and pressure, 
in the form of the stigmatisation and shame of premarital childbirth, and the desire to be linked to a 
prestigious family. 
 Though this attempt at making sense of the violence of ukuthwala may seem to be arbitrary 
from an outsider’s perspective, it does point out an important aspect of the local discourse on ukuth-
wala’s profitability, as well as of discourses on the violent re-emergence of ukuthwala in general, 
whether local or national: the inability to understand, and explain, both ukuthwala and the violence 
that characterises it. Put crudely, it seems as though unsupportive individuals randomly pick and 
choose any aspect of the marriage custom, which they then link, either to the abuse of human rights, 
or to any form of economic exploitation, continuing to present such linkage as capable of explaining 
the current forms of ukuthwala-related violence. Rather than trying to achieve understanding by me-
ans of adopting a holistic approach, that heeds the openness of the custom, to the current forms of 
violence , and the consequent discrepancies that it causes, the numerous contemporary discourses 
and debates seem to lead only to more confusion about the re-emergence of the practice of ukuth-
wala, and about the violence that characterises it. This occurs almost to the extent of the wholesale 
suppressing of the real abuse and violence that thwala’ed girls and young women suffer by those 
who oppose it, but do not comprehend it.
 My analysis in chapters Four and Five, thus, revealed that the practice of ukuthwala was not 
necessarily, at the time of my study, re-emerging in new violent forms (as opposed to its relatively 
non-violent past), but that, rather, historical violent variants were becoming more commonplace. 
The everydayness of the practice, in its most violent form, was, accordingly, also making more  salient 
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the issues pertaining to how perceptions of violence and abuse were changing. While there was re-
ason enough to believe that violence was becoming a more prominent feature of ukuthwala, the 
experience of violence as new, coupled with the emerging discourses within the legal and economic 
contexts that demonised ukuthwala, seemed to be contributing just as much to the public percepti-
on of ukuthwala as a violent aberration of customary marriage as was the actual violence itself. What 
still remains absent from the synthesis of the two chapters is an analysis of actual acts of physical 
violence on the local level that sparked the emergence of the various discourses involved. As was 
shown in both chapters Four and Five, the families seemed, by far, in the majority of cases, to have 
overruled the wishes of the girls and young women concerned, with the former often appearing to be 
indifferent to the violence that the latter had suffered. The above, in conjunction with the possibility 
that more men might opt for a relatively cheap ukuthwala marriage, which, by implication, would 
lead to an increase of violence against thwala’ed girls, stresses the importance of critiquing actual 
acts of violence. 
 At this point of my study, I realised that, up until then, my research had chiefly focused on 
the legal75 definitions of violence, as the result, or the byproduct, of macrostructural disruptions and 
changes within the broader political and economic sphere, or as the contemporary continuation of 
historical ukuthwala elements. As such, I had focused on forms of structural and cultural violence on 
the national level more than I had on the local forms of symbolic and direct violence. Still missing 
from my investigation was, therefore, an analysis of how forms of structural and cultural violence 
influenced the actual, interpersonal and direct acts of physical violence, on the local level. Seeing 
that the perpetrators of direct physical forms of violence were overwhelmingly male, and that the 
victims were overwhelmingly female, the analysis of the direct and symbolic violence involved in the 
prevailing situation inevitably implied the need to undertake an investigation of gender. In the follo-
wing chapter, I shall, accordingly, present such an analysis of the direct local forms of gender-based 
violence. 
75  Whether codified, or living customary.
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During an interview with Mrs Zwelifile, a councillor of domestic violence victims at the Magistrates’ 
Court in Lusikisiki, I asked her whether she thought that the forms of ukuthwala that men were prac-
tising in the local communities were becoming more violent than before. She promptly insisted that 
sometimes they just do it for fun. I [a man] want to sleep with this one [a girl]. I 
[the man] want to have sex with her, then after that [sexual intercourse] he will 
take her back [to her parents]. They call it thwala, because she will be thwala’ed 
[abducted] and they lock her in. 
The explanation that she gave challenged how I thought of ukuthwala in more than one way. My dis-
covery of the role that the various discourses played in the controversy made me question whether 
physical gender-based violence was really becoming more frequent and intense, or whether such 
was only the perception within discourses on ukuthwala. In other words, was ukuthwala really 
re-emerging as a new form of rape unrelated to marriage, as Mrs Zwelifile believed, or was it her 
attempt to explain sexual and gender violence by means of blaming it on suspicious male others 
who practised ukuthwala? If the direct physical violence was, indeed, becoming more intense than 
before, did it serve a purpose other than forcing a young girl into marriage? Alternatively, if the men 
involved were, indeed, doing “it for fun”, could we still consider what they labelled ukuthwala to be a 
marriage practice, as such? Furthermore, if the ukuthwala controversy were a matter of real physical 
and sexual abuse, as opposed to only discourse, where were the voices of the thwala’ed women and 
girls? What was their perspective on the violent re-emergence of ukuthwala? 
 Irrespective of whether Mrs Zwelifile’s allegations were based in empirical fact, or in dis-
course, the local forms of gender and sexual violence, as well as the blaming of such violence on 
suspicious male others appeared to be distressing for social reasons, and important for theoretical 
reasons. Firstly, it added a sense of urgency to the pressing social issue of gender-based violence 
in South Africa, and to the reasons for its existence. Whereas Jewkes et al. (2002, 2005) and Moffett 
(2006), for example, discuss how the perceptions of respect, authority and gender hierarchy often 
serve as the rationale for sexual violence, I was interested to learn whether such motivations led to 
acts of gender violence that related to ukuthwala, how the victims experienced the forms of violen-
ce, and how the perceptions of sexual violence mingled with discourses on ukuthwala. Secondly, it 
drew attention to the theoretical debate on the mechanisms of violence, and on the ways it served 
to structure both culture and society. As I discussed in Chapter One, Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 
(2004) stress the fact that violence is often culturally legitimised and, as such, it becomes an invisible 
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part of the everyday; they urge that we should take such mechanisms of legitimisation into account 
when researching violence. This raises the theoretical question of how the mechanisms of legitimi-
sation operate in terms of the current forms of violent ukuthwala. The question involved pertains to 
what extent the cultural legitimating of ukuthwala-related violence was making direct gender violen-
ce invisible and enabling its continuation, as opposed to the extent to which new perceptions and 
discourses on human rights and ukuthwala were making direct gender violence visible, resulting in 
new gender discourses within the ukuthwala controversy on the local level. As a means of addres-
sing the various questions that Mrs Zwelifile’s comments raised, as well as their important social and 
theoretical implications, the current chapter tackles my final research sub-question: ‘How do various 
forms of violence converge in ukuthwala practices, thus causing the continuation of gender-based 
violence?’
 This chapter takes the reader through a few stages to assist in imparting an understanding 
both of the context of the chapter question, and of the subsequent discussion/analysis thereof. 
Firstly, I shall provide an overview of the relevant literature on gender, sexual discrimination and 
rape in South Africa. The overview will illustrate the context of sexual violence within which violent 
ukuthwala is emerging, as well as how to analyse it. I shall then provide an overview of the historical 
events and processes that have created national forms of structural violence that currently lead to, 
and exacerbate, symbolic and direct forms of violence on the local level. The events and processes 
include the already existing indigenous patriarchy; the labour migration of men; the introduction of 
violent urban-styled gang culture in the rural communities, and the militarisation of South African 
society during the anti-apartheid struggle in general.76 I shall then illustrate how the processes and 
events also resulted in an increasing awareness of historical violent patriarchy, and of the concomi-
tant silencing of women during ukuthwala practices. I shall then conclude my investigation with an 
explication of how the awareness of human rights leads to the voicing of women’s concerns, giving 
rise to two further emerging discourses, in which violent gender and sexual crime, which are comple-
tely unrelated to marriage, have come to bear the label of ukuthwala. 
Ukuthwala Within the Contemporary Context of Sexual Violence
During my focus group discussion at Mthimde village – where I became aware of the extent of the 
custom’s informality and the historical lack of breccia, as I discussed in Chapter Four – a male village 
elder made an interesting comment on how the locals currently perceived and explained incidents 
of direct sexual violence: “Now, because they have no jobs, they are starting this thing of thwala, 
and [the] rape [of] children, because they have nothing to do.” Conflating of the term ‘thwala’ with 
the word ‘rape’ suggests not only that the elder believed that ukuthwala was simply becoming a 
76  It is important to note that the order in which I present these historical causes for violence roughly re-
sembles the same order of events that led to gender-based violence. In other words, though the system of 
apartheid was already an institution before its forced imposition of the racial segregation of South Africans, 
which led to mass labour migration, I shall first discuss the migration, as it chronologically led to the further 
engendering of violence prior to the start of the liberation struggle. 
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new form of rape, but it also illustrates how the custom of ukuthwala seems to have become the 
scapegoat that the locals blame for the sexual violence that they observe generally. Responding to 
the remark, another elder agreed, stating that “[s]ome who are doing this are criminals, they go and 
take that girl and on the way, they just rape her and then release the girl to go home”. I was, initially, 
hesitant to believe that individuals would so readily, and seemingly uncritically, blame the perpetra-
tion of rape on a custom that many still supported in principle. However, my discovery of the local 
human rights discourse and of discourse on ukuthwala’s profitability convinced me to take the com-
ments seriously. They indicated why ukuthwala might be becoming more violent, as well as being 
evidence of a possible local discourse on gender violence that linked to ukuthwala in some or other 
way. Though issues of rape and gender violence, as elements of ukuthwala, are the primary concern 
of this chapter, they are intricately interwoven with the broader context of rape, sexual and gender vi-
olence in South Africa. As the elders argued, the context of sexual violence seems to have influenced 
and affected the violence that is linked to ukuthwala, whether in terms of reality or perception. It was, 
therefore, necessary for me first to understand the contemporary context of gender violence within 
which the practice of ukuthwala is currently re-emerging.
 As mentioned earlier, towards the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Me-
dical Research Council of South Africa (see Jewkes et al 2009) conducted a study that indicated that 
one out of every four South African men admitted to raping a woman or girl. That men admitted 
so openly to having perpetrated the crime of rape is alarming, and alludes to the normality of such 
actions as being performances of everyday masculinity. Although there were reports of 65 000 rapes 
in that year, the South African Police Service suspect that the number was 25 per cent or higher. This 
indicates that about 81 250 women are rape victims in South Africa annually, with, daily, approxi-
mately 222 women and girls being subject to rape. Reporting on cases of domestic violence (which 
most often appear to be forms of assault), Africa Check (Africa Check 2015), an NGO that promotes 
the accuracy of statistics in the media (and which the Journalism Department of the University of the 
Witwatersrand in South Africa set up and hosted) reported that
• The Civilian Secretariat for Police found that between October 2013 and 
March 2014, only 1.4% of police stations inspected (two out of 145) were 
fully compliant with the Domestic Violence Act [that require police by law 
to record all instances of domestic abuse]. 
• 77% were partially compliant and 21% were rated as non-complaint.
• This means that the police are not adhering to their own policies in relation 
to recording domestic violence and therefore do not have an accurate pic-
ture of the extent of the problem facing the country.
The under-reporting of rape is often due to the fact that it happens within marriage and kin circles. 
As such, young female victims tend to remain silent for fear of the perpetrator, but also because they 
lack the backing of other family members, since reporting the crime would put the values of family 
solidarity and honour at risk. Further reasons for the under-reporting of rape and domestic abuse are 
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simply that the police neither record, nor investigate such incidents, or because they happen as part 
of such tolerated cultural practices as ukuthwala.
 In short, the statistics concerned are alarming, and they give reason for great concern. Rape 
and domestic (sexual) violence, however, is only one violent symptom of a much broader issue of 
gender discrimination and sexual violence in South Africa. When investigating ukuthwala as a discri-
minatory and/or violent practice, it is vital to remember that the form that violence takes might be 
just as varied as are the reasons for its cause. Sen (2001) is helpful in this regard, as he investigates 
the issue of gender inequality (internationally) by means of critically reflecting on disparate forms 
of gender discrimination, and on the inequalities that are present in mortality, natality, and house-
holds. He cautions that there is no singular form of gender discrimination, but advises, rather, that 
the different forms thereof manifest for various reasons, and that different women experience them 
differently. The available literature has already yielded a number of helpful texts that allude to the 
diverse reasons behind the perpetration of rape in South Africa, and how people perceive such rape.
 Larsen, Chapman and Armstrong (1998), Bowley and Pitcher (2002), Jewkes et al. (2002), Mei-
er (2002), and Posel (2005) focus specifically on the prevalence of the rape of babies and children in 
South Africa. These authors all attribute such a form of rape to extreme forms of family dysfunction, 
poverty and gender inequality. Dunkle et al. (2004) suggest that the inability to handle interpersonal 
conflict is often the cause for rape. Men who lack the ability to resolve conflicts peacefully through 
compromise use violence, and even rape, to solve conflict. Perceptions of disrespect, loss of autho-
rity and gender hierarchy are further reasons for rape. Kim and Motsei (2002), Jewkes et al. (2005), 
Wood (2005), Wood et al. (2007), Moffett (2006) argue that sexual assault and rape are often forms 
of social control, and they are frequently ways of enforcing local communal norms and values. Such 
norms might, for example, entail that a woman should not wear clothes that accentuate her body, 
as doing so is subject to cultural condemnation for being too sexually provocative. Should a woman 
then wear such clothing, men would enforce the law prohibiting such actions by raping her, as a form 
of punishment. As the above-mentioned authors found, both men and women often supported the 
infliction of punishment through rape and sexual assault as being a just form of social and cultural 
policing.
 Save for Wood (2005), who only alludes to the issue, the aforementioned authors do not in-
clude traditional customs in their analyses of incidents of rape and sexual violence. This does not, 
however, imply a complete lack of scholarly research on how indigenous customs lead to gender 
violence. As I discussed in Chapter Four, authors like Mwambene and Sloth-Nielsen (2011), Monyane 
(2013), Karimakwenda (2013), Monyane (2013) and Nkosi and Wassermann (2014) all focus on the his-
torical and contemporary forms of gender discrimination and violence that characterise indigenous 
marriage in general, and ukuthwala specifically. What seems to be missing is an analysis of the inter-
play and dialectics between the historical forms of gender violence with the contemporary forms the-
reof. The way in which the elders of Mthimde village equated the terms ‘ukuthwala’ and rape suggests 
that the violence of the re-emerging ukuthwala (whether as an act or discourse) is the result of the 
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(perceived) convergence of historical and contemporary reasons for, and forms of, gender violence. 
My discovery of the way in which any possible historical violent element of ukuthwala is currently 
subject to blame for the rape of girls, as I discussed in the previous chapter, seems to support such a 
possibility. 
 In order to determine whether the elders’ assumptions that ukuthwala was simply a new 
form of rape was due, or whether they were symptomatic of yet another emerging discourse on the 
violence that people perceive and attempt to comprehend by means of blaming it on ukuthwala, I set 
out to investigate how the various reasons for gender violence mentioned above came into being. I 
also wished to determine whether the discourse concerned currently exacerbated historical gender 
inequalities, and whether this has had any bearing on the supposed violent re-emergence of the 
practice of ukuthwala. 
Gender and Sexual Violence in South Africa from an Historical Perspective
Both historical and contemporary dimensions exist to the endemic gender and sexual violence that 
is prevalent in South Africa. Andrews (1999) point to three historic reasons for violence against wo-
men in South Africa, which I shall discuss respectively:
[T]hese three factors, a [1] white militaristic and racist state, [2] widespread de-
fiance in the form of armed struggle, and [3] patriarchal indigenous systems of 
law, combined to spawn a particular kind of South African masculinity, which 
left women in a particularly vulnerable position. (439)
The apartheid government, a structurally violent form of governance on the national level (as I dis-
cussed in chapters One and Three), carefully controlled the labour migration that occurred between 
the industrial areas and the homelands, in terms of which black South Africans had to live as the 
Groups Area Act of 1950 stipulated. Simplistically put, able-bodied men obtained permission to leave 
the homelands to live and work temporarily in white-controlled areas, but they had to leave their 
families behind in the rural areas. 
 Investigating the perpetration of violence against women in South Africa, Gelb (2003) also 
alludes to this labour system, when he writes about “the disastrous legacy of South Africa’s migrant 
labor system – with men going to work in cities and mines, leaving women and children in the rural 
areas” (10). Andrews (1999) point to the results of this system, when she writes that the
migrant labor system denied the majority of African people the right to a decent 
family life […] African children grew up with absent fathers – mandated by law 
– and were denied the opportunities to flourish and grow in a family environ-
ment. (432)
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Traditionally, fathers had been responsible for imposing discipline on the family, and for keeping 
unruly youths and young men in check. Such discipline was specifically necessary in traditional boys’ 
and young men’s societies. The absence of fathers and uncles not only left a power vacuum, but it 
also led to the slow decay of family and social cohesion in the homelands. The situation then wor-
sened when the older boys also left to work in the metropolis. McAllister and Deliwe (1996) write that 
from “about 1974 far reaching industrial changes resulted in older boys staying in industrial areas 
for much longer periods than in the past, resulting in the diminishing of the youth organisations” 
(16) in the rural communities. The older boys, then, also become entangled in the city gang culture, 
as they lost their connection with the youth organisations in the homelands. The development had 
dire consequences for the local communities, marking an important moment in the rise of violence 
in AmaMpondo culture. 
 According to McAllister and Deliwe (1994) and Mager (1998), when the boys and young men 
returned home, they introduced a violent city gang culture to the rural communities in the home-
lands. The gang culture, which evidenced a violent form of masculinity, then systematically replaced 
both traditional men’s and boys’ organisations between the 1920s and the 1980s. McAllister and De-
liwe (1994) state that “in the intlombe [traditional young men’s societies] great emphasis was placed 
on restraint and on the rule of law” (6). Though violence was present in domestic settings, people 
frowned upon it, and avoided it in public spaces, like at the intlombe gatherings. Such condemnation 
was partly because the locals praised oratory skills as a method of dealing with conflict, and partly 
because the male elders often monitored such organisations. However, the norms and values of the 
gang world were violent, specifically when it came to sexuality, as well as being defiant of the traditi-
onal authority of the elders. McAllister and Deliwe (1994) continue to write that
[s]exuality in the ibhavu [the new gang-styled intlombe] was secretive and not 
controlled, and the loss of group chaperonage led to a rise in premarital preg-
nancies. Drunkenness and fighting were common, and the elders tried to dis-
courage its meetings […] ibhavu was not linked to the community structures 
and not respectful of community norms. (9)
Mager (1998) agrees with the above when she explains how similar violent changes occurred in boys’ 
societies. She writes that “[a]lternative forms of rural boys’ organisation with greater affinity to ur-
ban gangs structured themselves along militia lines” (659). She then mentions documented cases of 
where a policeman had to “thrash girls should they fail to satisfy the boys” (659) at the young men’s 
intlombe meetings. Such violent and disruptive changes adversely affected rural village life, and it 
became even more so as the amount of drugs and substance abuse increased, which was another 
import of the urban gang culture.
 With the men working in the cities, the maintaining of discipline at home became incre-
asingly difficult. The management of conflict through conversation and restraint became the settling 
of disputes through violence. Whereas the now waning intlombe meetings were sites for the practi-
sing of oratory skills, fighting skills, and the possession of a violent character soon became the signs 
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of manhood that men displayed at the more popular ibhavu meetings. The absence of fathers and 
older men also left the daughters and wives more vulnerable to the whims of young men who were 
seeking to assert their masculine identity through the subjection of vulnerable individuals, like women 
and children. Such subjugation was often obtained through sexual abuse. The structurally violent eco-
nomic and governmental policies of apartheid, thus, disrupted the local cultural life, leading, in a roun-
dabout way, to the abuse of vulnerable individuals, especially young women and girls on the local level.
 A side note is necessary at this point. The absence of fathers/husbands loosened the pa-
triarchal grip on women, specifically since the male migration led to a rise in the number of fema-
le-headed households, which caused numerous women to take up what previously had been the 
responsibilities of their husbands/fathers. Though such a transformation certainly occurred, it was, 
however, not the norm. Firstly, there was never a complete absence of men from the homelands. 
Male relatives – grandfathers, elderly uncles, and younger brothers – often stood proxy for those who 
had left, taking charge of their households in the latter’s absence. Secondly, the exodus to the cities 
of able-bodied men was also not a once-off mass migration that left all households bereft of fathers, 
older brothers and uncles, but it was, rather, a slow to-and-fro movement of men that left different 
households fatherless at different times. The general absence of husbands and fathers, thus, did not 
imply that women were not under male guardianship, generally speaking. 
 I am arguing neither that paternal discipline existed without violence, nor that there was no 
violence when the fathers were still present in the homelands. Rather, I am arguing that the chan-
ges that occurred exacerbated existing forms of patriarchal cultural violence. A young female social 
worker at Lusikisiki tellingly said: “Yes, it’s more now [violent sexual crime]. The world is changing. In 
the older days, men were respecting women more than now. Men are no longer respecting women. 
There is violence, fighting, men abusing women”. Though acknowledging that violence was present 
in the rural communities a few decades ago, there was more respect at the time for women, which 
served to shield them, to some extent, from the perpetration of male violence. The respect that was 
shown women seems now to have dissipated, leaving women and children more vulnerable than 
they were in the past. All of my informants indicated their concern regarding the prevalence of (sexu-
al) violence in the Lusikisiki region, attributing it to a form of violent masculinity that resembled the 
gang-style culture that McAllister and Deliwe (1994) and Mager (1998) discuss. The councillor for do-
mestic violence at the magistrates’ court in Lusikisiki, Mrs Zwelifile, said, for example:
 
It increases because now, on the last 50 years, it was only the husbands who 
beat, abused the wives. But now it increases, because of drugs. Our children are 
using drugs; they even abuse us as mothers, they beat us, they threaten to kill 
us, they assault us. 
A 34-year-old teacher, Mr Samkelo, stated that “[t]his violence […] is caused by drugs. Our guys are 
using drugs and alcohol to rape.” My key informant at Lusikisiki, Mrs Nomthandazo, similarly argued 
that the young men who commit rape “are the rebels – [because] they have not been disciplined” 
by their parents.
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 Though all my key informants cautioned me that I should not venture out of my house at 
night, the prevalence of violent crime, especially of violent sexual and domestic abuse, only became 
a reality to me after a few events had transpired during my second field trip, as I shall detail below. I 
met someone at the hospital whom armed men had shot through his foot when attempting to hijack 
his car at 10:00 a.m. just outside Lusikisiki; the discovery of a young lady’s body hacked to pieces next 
to the gravel road about 2km outside Lusikisiki came to light; armed men robbed a grocery store in 
the main street at midday; a young man shot and killed an elderly couple in their hut when stealing 
their cell phones;77 and the local police station recorded three cases of rape at about this time. A 
gradual shift in the notions of masculinity, which the structurally violent policies of apartheid on 
the national level set off, led to an increase in the amount of gender violence on the local level. The 
historic militarisation of men (and often of women as well) further worsened the gender violence of 
those who fought against apartheid, which was a fight the waging of which justified and legitimised 
violence. 
 Hamber (2000) writes that in “South Africa, the legacy of the past and how it destructively 
plays itself out in the present needs to be fully understood if current levels of violence are to be ade-
quately addressed” (13). The influence of apartheid, and of the struggle for democracy, is one such 
important reference point in attempting to make sense of violent crime, and in violent sexual abuse, 
by extension. Hamber goes on to describe how violence was “legitimized by all political groupings in 
the decades prior to the 1990s” (6). The apartheid government legitimised the use of violence against 
those who attempted to topple it, and those who sought to oppose the apartheid system legitimised 
violence as a means of opposition. The negotiation process for democratic reforms in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s also opened up spaces for an increase of legitimised violence, due to the liminal 
authority and power vacuums that it caused in the political interim. 
 Ironically, negotiating democracy, thus, ushered in more normalised levels of violence in the 
rural communities, where violent gang-styled masculinity had already become normal to some ex-
tent. As Hamber (2000) states: 
By the 1990s the term ‘culture of violence’ was frequently used to describe the 
conflict that enveloped South African society. The pervasive nature of this vio-
lence seeped into all parts of public life, undermining the moral interpersonal 
and social fabric of society. (6)
Legitimised forms of political violence eventually spilled over into other aspects of cultural life, con-
gealing, over time to form violent cultural forms. Hamber (2000) argues that the “nature of violence in 
the early 1990s also changed, from vertical […] to horizontal […] By the 1990s intra-community and 
intra-organisational conflict in the townships and rural areas […] accounted for the greatest number 
of fatalities” (7). One result of the formation of the culture of violence has been that “the experien-
77  The couple’s toddler grandchild was found unharmed lying between the two corpses on the bed the next 
morning.
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ce of being violently victimized in South Africa has almost become a statistically normal feature of 
everyday life in the many urban and rural settings” (Hamber, 2000, 8). That violence in general beca-
me a normal feature of everyday life, furthermore, served to normalise the already present forms of 
gang-styled, female-directed violence, which was, by this time, already culturally justified, and which 
women also often accepted in the form of symbolic violence. 
 This culture of everyday violence that developed during the 1980s and the 1990s worsened, 
indirectly and unintentionally, due to South Africa’s political transition to democracy. The new con-
stitution safeguarded the transition, with its implementation specifically aiming at the rectification 
of all forms of inequality and discrimination among all groupings of South Africa’s population. Wood 
(2005) argues that
the re-definition of gender and the liberalization of sexuality entailed by the de-
mocratic transition have posed serious challenges to orthodox, mainly autho-
ritarian notions of masculinity, leaving many men with a disempowering sense 
of irrelevance in the domestic sphere. (304)
The new political dispensation for which many men (and women) fought, thus, served to protect and 
promote the rights of women and children, criminalising long-standing patriarchal practices in the 
process. Wood (c.f.) calls the process “the re-definition of gender and the liberalization of sexuality”. 
Wood’s (2005) notion of a “crisis of masculinity” (304), as reflecting a sense of disempowerment, is in 
line with the writings of Mager (1998) and Morrell (2001), who illustrate how the occurrence of a num-
ber of sociocultural and eco-political changes in South Africa led to a crisis of masculinity. The crisis, 
over time, changed a culture founded on respect into a culture that was characteristically (sexually) 
violent. Men blamed their “disempowering sense of irrelevance” (Wood 2005, 304) on women whom 
they perceived as threatening their historical patriarchal authority. With violence being part of the 
everyday, men translated their frustrations into, and vented them through, acts of sexual violence 
that they perpetrated against women.
 It is at this point that I want to return to my discussion of the custom of ukuthwala on the 
local level. As I already revealed in Chapter Four, and which I again illustrated in Chapter Five, the 
practice of ukuthwala has always reflected a potential for violence. This is so even if only in terms of 
the bypassing of the bride’s agreement, or in terms of the role-play that forms part of agreed-upon 
elopement. The question, at this point in my investigation, was, thus, whether the processes concer-
ned that had led to the current national spate of endemic gender and sexual violence were transla-
ting ukuthwala’s historical potential for violence into forms of direct gender and sexual violence that 
were manifesting themselves in ukuthwala’s re-emergence. Other than the information that I gained 
during the Mthimde focus group discussions, I discovered the clues to answering the question in the 
two initial interviews that I had conducted during my first field trip. The first had taken the form of 
an interview with a Miss Hintsa, who worked in a printing shop in Lusikisiki, while the second had 
consisted of my first interview with a thwala’ed woman – an elderly woman living in Nyathi village 
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(see photo xii), who had wanted to remain anonymous.78 I shall first elaborate on the elderly woman’s 
experience, and then reflect on Miss Hintsa’s convictions.
xii) Moses, one of my key informants at Bambisana, and two thwala’ed elderly Nyathi villagers. Photo 
taken by the author, May 2013. 
 The elderly woman told me that a man whom she had never before either seen, or met had 
arranged her ukuthwala together with her parents. A group of his friends then abducted her, and 
brought her to his compound. She was about 17, and he was already in his 40s. Once she had rea-
ched his compound, he sent people to inform her parents that she had arrived at his compound. She 
stayed there for a few months, during which period she refused to have sex with him. Since the act of 
sexual intercourse signified the consolidation of their marriage, the man did not pay  lobola. The man 
already had a wife who was growing old, so he had only wanted to marry her so that she could take 
care of them both in their old age. Eventually, she managed to escape, at which point her parents 
accepted her back home begrudgingly. Three months later, she married the man she actually loved. 
As I illustrated in the previous chapter, the abduction of young teenage girls by men much older than 
them, as well as their running away from such marriages, are not new phenomena, but the media 
only portray them as such. Much older men (of whom two were already married) had abducted four 
of the nine thwala’ed women whom I interviewed, and six of the nine women had run away after the 
abduction, whereas three had not. Though eight of the aforesaid women noted that they had not, 
initially, been at all happy with their own ukuthwala, four acknowledged to me that they still suppor-
ted the practice. There were two important aspects of the cases, of which the first was the parents’ 
78  See Appendix B for the transcripts of my interview with this female inhabitant of Nyathi village. 
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complicity. Irrespective of their motivation, the fact that they had allowed, or accepted, the thwala of 
their daughters, indicated that the already present forms of cultural violence had made the violence 
of ukuthwala invisible to them, yet their daughters had still intensely felt such violence, both emotio-
nally and physically. Secondly, that most of the girls had run away from the marriages indicated their 
initial recognition of its gender and sexual abusive nature. Yet, that some of them eventually began 
to accept and support the practice illustrated how, through the imposition of symbolic violence to 
which they had been subject, they themselves, over time, had become used, and eventually blind, to 
the abuses that they had suffered in its name. 
 Then, when I asked Miss Hintsa whether she thought that the practice of ukuthwala was be-
coming more violent than it had previously been, she replied that “alcohol and drugs plays a big role 
in this abduction thing [for the purpose of rape], but if a man wants to rape a girl, he would do it, 
without alcohol. I wouldn’t say that it plays a role in the abduction [related to ukuthwala], but it does 
play a role in the violence” in general. As opposed to the elders who partook in the Mthimde focus 
group discussions, Miss Hintsa did not express a belief that substance abuse was the cause of the 
increasing forms of gender violence that occurred during ukuthwala. As opposed to the accusations 
that men were simply raping girls and calling it ukuthwala, not one of the thwala’ed women whom I 
interviewed,79 had come across any alleged cases of ukuthwala-labelled rape that were unrelated to 
marriage. At least in all the recently reported cases that I discussed with the individuals involved, the-
re had been an intention on the part of the man concerned to marry the girl whom he had abducted, 
even if such abduction did involve the violation of an underage girl. 
 I then recognised that a heightened current awareness of human rights,80 mingled with ex-
periences of violent gang-styled masculinity and with peoples’ knowledge of the historical gender 
violence that older men who abducted teenage girls committed, seemed to have led to two distinct 
discourses on violent masculinity. Both the discourses on violent masculinity resembled the local 
discourse on ukuthwala’s profitability (as I discussed in the previous chapter), insofar as they were an 
attempt to explain, and to render comprehensible, the current forms of gender violence, rather than 
being a reflection of the actual events that had occurred. However, they, ironically, also seemed to 
silence the voices of young thwala’ed women. While the one discourse demonised older men who, 
allegedly out of a sense of loss of their historical patriarchal authority, thwala’ed girls simply to be 
able to bend them to their will in marriage, the second discourse demonised mostly younger men 
who were associated with gang-styled violence. Since the two discourses seemed to have had their 
genesis in historical forms of cultural and symbolic violence that appeared, at the time of the current 
study, differently, due to the impact of human rights discourses, I decided to direct my attention to 
historical forms of cultural and symbolic violence, before refocusing on the two discourses on violent 
masculinity. 
79  Nor of the social workers, the police officers, or the staff of Palmerton CCMC who handled actual cases.
80  The national and local discourses on human rights, which I discussed in chapters Four and Five, contribu-
ted to the raising of such awareness.
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Ukuthwala and the Complicit Silence and Silencing of Women
I interviewed a 59-year-old woman about her attempted abduction that had happened more than 
four decades ago.81 At the time of my research, she was living in Bambisana, about 40km from Lusiki-
siki. She told me that she had escaped from her abductor, and she had run back home, even though 
both he and his family had pursued her. When I asked her how her parents (her father and stepmo-
ther) had reacted when the abductor and his family arrived at her home, she said: 
My father […] told them, “You must hunt her; you must take her by force.” And 
the reason why my father said this is because they have promised cows, and 
my father wanted cows. So my father said, “Get her by any means possible”. So I 
heard that, and ran away to another village [where she found refuge in her older 
sister’s house]. So I have never spoken to them [her parents], and they have 
never spoken to me ever again. 
Other than my shock at the woman’s father’s apparent ease at instructing the man to “hunt” his 
daughter, simply because he wanted cattle, I was puzzled by her stepmother’s conspicuous silence 
in the matter. In response to me asking her how her stepmother had responded to what her father 
had said, the interviewee said that after she had implored her stepmother, “[My] stepmother said 
they paid one cow, so they can go and take [me] by force. But [my] sister said they must forget about 
it, it will never happen.” Though her stepmother’s initial silence might have indicated her support of 
her husband’s reply, I conjectured that it, rather, revealed how she had been the subject of a similar 
patriarchal authority and abuse as that to which her stepdaughter had been subject. 
 After some time, I discussed the practice of ukuthwala with the middle-aged Mrs Ngotane, 
the manager of Palmerton CCMC. During our conversation, she told me that older male relatives 
often forced single, as well as widowed, mothers to accept the ukuthwala of their daughters. Such 
was specifically the case when male relatives arranged abductions with prospective grooms without 
including their mothers (and their prospective brides) in the negotiation processes. This illustrated 
how the cultural violence of patriarchy, according to Farmer’s (2004) analytical model, leads to the 
victimisation of the most vulnerable in society, namely single black mothers and orphaned black girl 
children, in the present instance. Mrs Ngotane’s words certainly rang true for the Jezile case that I 
discussed in Chapter Four, as well as for Miss Sikunyana’s attempted abduction, which I discussed in 
Chapter Five. While Jezile’s family bypassed the girl’s single mother by means of arranging the abduc-
tion with her uncle and grandmother, the orphaned Miss Sikunyana’s uncles arranged her abduction 
through bypassing both her and her guardian aunt. The situation again brought the question of pa-
triarchal power during ukuthwala practices to the fore. I asked Mrs Ngotane why she thought women 
were treated in this way, and why they did not offer more resistance than they did. She replied: 
81  See Appendix B for the transcripts of my interview with the woman living in Bambisana. 
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Traditionally, a woman does not have a right, being a mother, being a [girl] 
child, a woman does not have a right. Your father, even if he is abusing you 
emotionally, physically, financially, or whatever, it’s right. Anything they see in 
front of their eyes is right. 
According to Mrs Ngotane, men, thus, held the position of authority in the local communities, specifi-
cally in terms of the women and girl children in their families. Such patriarchal dominance is not new, 
but it is historically embedded in the local cultural discourses, as the elderly woman’s account sug-
gests. Violence in general, and forms of gender and sexual violence during ukuthwala proceedings 
specifically, are, therefore, intricately linked to the historical context of hegemonic patriarchy, and to 
how such patriarchy silences any form of female protest.
 A note of caution is necessary before I continue. I am not arguing that men are a homogen-
ous group, of which all the members commit violent acts. Rather, I am proposing that the dominant 
cultural discourse was, and still is, patriarchal, and, thus, it is biased towards men, placing women 
and children in a vulnerable position with regard to those of the male gender who tend to choose to 
commit some or other form of violence. As I discussed in Chapter Three, labour migration, urbanisa-
tion and the transition to democracy led to the formation of numerous female-headed households. 
It also led to the individualisation of women, who increasingly challenged the patriarchal system by 
claiming agency over themselves and those under their care. The result of this process is dubious at 
best, as will soon become clear. 
 Andrews (1999) provides some insight into the dominant patriarchal discourse, when she de-
scribes the discriminatory aspects of male-centred indigenous law that historically governed indigen-
ous communities in general. They write that, prior to the approval of South Africa’s 1996 Constitution,
women were under the perpetual tutelage of a male, whether their father, hus-
band, or even a son. These patriarchal legal structures were buttressed and en-
forced by a culture that did not question the fundamental logic of such gender 
inequality. For African women, these laws operated to deprive them of rights to 
rent or buy their own homes, to custody of their children, to an education, or a 
living wage. (430−431)
The aforementioned indigenous legal systems form part of what Galtung (1990, 291) would call the 
“symbolic sphere” of culture, and, thus, can provide a means of justifying the “fundamental […] 
gender inequality” (Andrews 1999, 430−431) that they sustain. Such patriarchal norms and values 
not only pertain to legal systems, but they also permeated through to the domestic sphere. George 
(2008), a medical anthropologist working in South Africa, who investigated the controversial custom 
of virginity testing,82 furthermore explains that not even official attempts to combat gender discrimi-
82  During the cultural practice of virginity testing, female elders of the community routinely check young girls 
to make sure that they are still virgins. 
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nation have succeeded in the private sphere, where historic patriarchal control still often holds sway. 
She states that “while laws governing the public sphere have often been altered through colonial 
contact and reformed by post-independence constitutionalism, the norms and practices regulating 
the private sphere may serve to sustain gender inequality” (1467). Through cultural justification, cer-
tain communities, thus, have come to promote norms and values that favour the use of patriarchal 
violence in the private sphere. The translation of the resultant gender abuse into forms of symbolic 
violence, accordingly, is also subject to misrecognition. The above might explain, as Mrs Ngotane 
mentioned, why some women and girl children interpret the patriarchal abuse that “they see in front 
of their eyes [as being] right”, thus resulting in their subjection and silencing. Others, as I illustrated 
above, initially protest by running away from attempts at ukuthwala. During a focus group discussion 
that was held in Mervan village, the middle-aged daughter of a thwala’ed mother made an observa-
tion that was similar to that which Mrs Ngotane made: “But now she obeyed the parents, my mother; 
previously the girls were obeying their parents because they had nothing to say”, indicating a daugh-
ter’s filial acceptance of her father’s will. 
 To make the above discussion more concrete, I found that many thwala’ed women were not 
opposed to the practice of ukuthwala – in fact, they even seemed to encourage and support it. Two 
women who partook in two separate focus group discussions used the positive phrase of “making 
family” to describe their experience of ukuthwala, and two of the thwala’ed women whom I intervie-
wed actively supported the practice. Two others said that they would see it as bestowing an honour 
on their household, if their own daughters were to be abducted, even though both told me that they 
had experienced their own abduction as a form of traumatic rape. Calling her first three attempted 
abductions “really […] bad experience[s]”, elderly Mrs Mangxamile, who had ultimately married the 
fourth man to thwala her (as I discussed in Chapter Four), professed that
you get overwhelmed. If you get overwhelmed with the love [that] you cannot 
escape, that’s what make [me] to stay for the fourth time; [I] just fell in love with 
the guy, so that’s now when [I] decided, “OK, I’m not going to run away”.
 In turn, elderly Mrs Phuthuso, of Gamgatha village, recounted how she, at first
hated the man. Even though [I] married him, [I] hated him. But there is nothing 
like going back. So when the man is outside, and I am inside, I hate him, but 
when he comes inside, I just love him, we are lovebirds. It is like a charm; [I] 
loved [my] husband. I would even walk with him all the way to the taxi when he 
went to work. 
After I started to compare the experiences of the older women who had remained with the men who 
thwala’ed them with those of the women (older and younger) who had managed to escape attemp-
ted abductions, I noticed a significant dynamic. While the narratives of the women who escaped 
were only negative, the narratives of the older women who had remained with their husbands started 
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out negative, but ended up positive. I, therefore, concluded that the victims of invisible symbolic 
violence, as in the case of forced sexual intercourse during ukuthwala, as well as their communities, 
were not, initially, blind to such forms of violence. However, they gradually became resigned to it the 
longer that they were exposed to it. In short, the women who remained with their husbands initially 
recognised their abuse as such (which their negative narratives, in terms of ukuthwala, indicated), 
but eventually (out of the need to cope with what had happened, perhaps) began to misrecognise 
the abuse (which the positive endings of their ukuthwala narratives indicated). However, the women 
who had escaped from attempted ukuthwala, in contrast, remained critical of the custom, since they 
had not been victims of it for a prolonged period of time. 
 A 33-year-old female social worker living in Lusikisiki, who wanted to remain anonymous, 
provided me with further clues regarding the above-mentioned dynamic. She had dealt with three 
cases of ukuthwala in which the abducted girls had been, respectively, 16, 17 and 18 years old, of 
whom all three had managed to run away from their prospective husbands after their abductions. 
Precisely because the respective mothers had sent their daughters back to their abductor-husbands 
when the girls arrived at their parental homes, the girls had sought the help and protection of repre-
sentatives of the Department of Social Development. When I asked the social worker in question why 
the Mpondo parents, in general, allowed ukuthwala to take place, she said that 
their grandmothers were doing it, and they don’t see anything wrong with it 
because they believe their culture. The mothers of the children think thwala 
is fine, but not the children. Because [I] find out that these children who were 
abducted, when they go back home, the mothers send them back […] They say 
that they are already married and should stay there [at the compound of the 
abductor]. They [the mothers] say, even them, they were abducted, and they 
can be happy in their families.
Though what the above-mentioned social worker said is somewhat reminiscent of the local human 
rights discourse (which I discussed in Chapter Four), in terms of which communities and customs 
seem culpable of sexual abuse, the fact that specifically mothers tend to send their daughters back 
to their husbands seems to confirm the dynamic that I discovered. The mothers, who were themsel-
ves thwala’ed, seemed to misrecognise the cultural and symbolic violence of their own complicity, 
arguing that, since “they [mothers] can be happy in their families”, their daughters can, and should, 
be as well, irrespective of the sexual abuse to which they might have been subject during the abduc-
tion. Supporting the potential forced sexual intercourse that is implicit in ukuthwala entails granting 
support to an extreme example of symbolic violence, with it illustrating how women can be complicit 
in the structure of cultural violence, if they misrecognise the violence that they suffer as a result of 
it. The misrecognition, and the consequent support of ukuthwala, might, by default, aid and help to 
ensure the continuation of the practice into the next generation. The violence that mothers currently 
suffer can become so internalised that they – who were once the victims of cultural and symbolic vio-
lence – end up becoming the perpetrators in the upcoming generation. The result is the enforcement 
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and the sustaining of the vicious cycle of violent sexual abuse and oppressive silencing.
 Based on the above discussions and examples, I concluded that the militarisation of men 
and women, the struggle against apartheid, and the consequent redefinition of gender, as well as 
the introduction of human rights in post-apartheid South Africa on the national level led to a sharp 
increase in the extent of gender and sexual violence in general. It also, by extension, led to the exacer-
bation of the degree of violence associated with ukuthwala’s current re-emergence. As I illustrated in 
Chapter Three, the growing irregularity of marriages, household compositions and family structures 
has implicitly resulted in the growing vulnerability of women and children. If ukuthwala is becoming 
a more popular marriage alternative, it is plausible that young women and girl children are becoming 
easily exploitable in terms of abusive forms of ukuthwala, specifically because of their vulnerability 
that the national changes in marriage and kinship structures have caused. The national processes 
and events, which were, and which still are, structurally violent, thus are serving to exacerbate the 
cultural and symbolic violence on the local level. This has resulted in the increasing vulnerability of 
young women and girls, as well as in an increasing potential for them to become victims through 
ukuthwala, which is growing ever more violent, due to the same processes and events. 
 Yet, the above has also given rise to changing legal perspectives and policies, as well as to a 
general awareness of gender violence and discrimination. As the cases I presented in this and the pre-
vious chapters illustrate, there was grudging tolerance of running away from ukuthwala, or else it led 
to a complete break in parent−child relationships in the past. Though a similar pattern might still be 
happening, the redefinition of gender in post-apartheid South Africa, the increasing awareness of ge-
nder equality, and, on the other side of the coin, gender discrimination, as well as the local human 
rights discourse on ukuthwala, are changing the appearance of the practice and its involved actors. As 
I illustrated in Chapter Four’s discussion on the local anti-human rights discourse, people have now 
come to perceive running away from ukuthwala as escaping, and a thwala’ed girl as a rape victim/
survivor. In addition, people perceive the abductor as a rapist and human trafficker, which two labels 
Jezile shall evermore bear. The increasing awareness of gender equality and human rights has made 
visible the historical invisibility of forms of symbolic and cultural violence, with such visibility appearing 
simultaneously as a threat to the cultural identity of those who still support culturally condoned vio-
lence. Though human rights discourses are giving voice to previously silenced women, they challenge, 
and are in conflict with, the ongoing silencing of women through entrenched forms of cultural and sym-
bolic violence. As I discovered while conducting my fieldwork, the aim of local human rights discourse 
to make visible and recognisable the potential for violence that is implicitly present in the practice of 
ukuthwala not only demonises the custom, but it also leads to two ways of perceiving and explaining 
violent masculinity, in terms of the committance of rape. Ironically, explaining the concept of ukuthwala 
in terms of violent masculinity, in contexts where rape is often still culturally justified, seems to shift the 
focus away from the actual violence that young women and girl children suffer, to the level of discourse. 
Two Emerging Discourses on Violent Masculinity 
During a focus group discussion with five police officers at Mtontsasa Police Station in the Cele re-
gion, the female station commander said: “People were silent about this thing when it was taking 
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place, but it was brought to our attention during that period that it was exposed [2009]. Then we 
devised other means for it to stop, and I think we achieved our goal”. She was referring to the national 
government’s tasking of the regional police department with the addressing of the issue of ukuthwa-
la, through the latter’s hosting of numerous awareness campaigns. Through raising the necessary 
awareness of the gender and sexual violence that was taking place in their communities, the cam-
paigns made visible and recognisable both of the aforesaid forms of violence, which had previously 
been invisible to some communities and individuals. In a similar way to how the evolution of local 
and national discourses on human rights took place, the aforementioned growing awareness led 
to the perception that ukuthwala-related gender and sexual violence were new phenomena, which 
came, often, to be expressed in such phrases as: “we were very surprised”; “the rape is new”; “it was 
ukuthwala, but now it is rape”; “it is going to be a new thing”, and “it’s only now abuse, previously it 
was not abuse”. In the previous chapter I illustrated how, through the local discourse on ukuthwala’s 
profitability, the financial exploitation of ukuthwala through  lobola had come to make the following, 
seemingly random aspects of the situation appear blameworthy: greedy parents; rich old men; the 
poverty of certain families, and poverty in general. In a similar way, the now heightened awareness 
of gender and sexual violence, coupled with the perception that such forms of violence are new to 
ukuthwala, has prompted both individuals and communities to try to explain and understand the 
concept by means of blaming men who, apparently, practise forms of violent masculinity. 
 During our discussion about the way in which gender equality policies were affecting the lo-
cal communities, Mr Nyembezi, a 26-year-old social worker in Lusikisiki who had handled one ukuth-
wala case, made an interesting observation. He said that “[b]ecause of the change in our world, 
young men, they do not carry [thwala] girls. It is almost always the old men […] The young ones are 
more aware” of human and gender rights.83 The mother of the middle-aged abductor in the case that 
Mr Nyembezi handled apparently told her son: “I was carried by your father. So even you, if you want 
a woman, you can always take any women”. Elderly Mrs Tshiqani, who related to me the details of 
two girls whom she knew who had been abductees a few years previously, made a similar remark. 
When I asked her about the abductors’ age, she said that the “old men thwala, not the young”. A 
middle-aged legal professional, Mr Ndima, also insisted that it was specifically older men who still 
thwala’ed women. Yet, a police officer at Lusikisiki Police Station told me that it was rather young 
men who, nowadays, often thwala’ed young women. A teacher and the two elders whom I mentio-
ned at the start of the current chapter shared the officer’s sentiments, arguing that substance abuse 
was the main reason for young men to thwala girls. Other than reminding me of the extent of the 
discrepancies existing on the local level with regard to ukuthwala and the demonised individuals 
83  In general, my informants thought of older men as men who were older than 40 years old, and of younger 
men as being between 20 and 40 years old. It is also important to note that the colloquial use of the word 
‘girl’ is rather broad. My informants often spoke of girls when referring to women in their mid-20s, to girlf-
riends in general, as well as to teenage girls. The term ‘girl’ in the remainder of this chapter, thus, denotes 
young women from their teenage years till their mid-twenties, so more or less those who were between 13 
and 25 years old.
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who practised it, the holding of such contradictory opinions initially puzzled me. This was especially 
so since I found no evidence that indicated a higher prevalence of ukuthwala among either older or 
younger men. Yet, as my fieldwork progressed, I realised why age was, indeed, an important aspect 
to take into account in the local discourses on violent masculinity, since older men were usually as-
sociated with abduction for the sake of marriage, whereas younger men were usually associated with 
abduction for the sake of rape. I shall discuss the two emerging discourses on violent masculinity, 
respectively. 
The Discourse on Violent Historical Patriarchy 
Two councillors for domestic violence at Lusikisiki’s magistrates’ court explained to me why they be-
lieved that older men were increasingly thwala’ing girls violently, and raping them in the process. The 
reasons echo what Wood calls men’s “disempowering sense of irrelevance in the domestic sphere” 
(2005, 304). Mrs Dlova said an older man would thwala a girl
because he wants a girl who doesn’t know anything [about human rights]. Who 
will hear everything from him [obey him]; a girl that he is able to control, and [to 
make] do whatever he wants her to do. 
Mrs Dana agreed when she related that men 
don’t want a girl of the same age. They want to rule, they want to do whatever 
they want to do, because she’s younger than him. Because if he can get married 
to me, or [to someone of] the same age as him, he know[s] that I can talk for 
myself. 
Mr Nyembezi, the social worker who initially differentiated between older and younger men, gave a 
telling example of why he believed older men specifically targeted girls much younger than them-
selves:
They [older men] know a lot compared to the young ones [women], so they 
want to teach them at [a] young age what it is that a woman has to do [sexually]. 
Secondly, in the Xhosa tribe there is a name called umfazi [wife]. So that word 
says you will die knowing one thing, that you are a woman to the man, so you 
wouldn’t do anything other than being a wife to that man [complete subservi-
ence]. So that is why they want to groom them young – knowing I am a wife to 
my husband.
According to the above accounts, older men tended to desire a subservient wife who was unspoilt, 
as it were, by the “change in [their] world”. The individuals concerned argued that older men sought 
to re-establish their privileged patriarchal positions, but within a changed environment that charac-
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teristically protected the principle of gender equality, being an environment in which a woman “can 
talk for [her]self”. Forcing a young girl into marriage through ukuthwala seemed to be a way, the 
individuals involved believed, in which to force a young girl into knowing that she was a “wife to that 
man” before she was old enough to know otherwise.
 Initially, I had thought that blaming ukuthwala rape on older men who sought to have a sub-
servient wife was only the perception of a few individuals, yet I found that such was a common theme 
in the discourse. I was invited to discuss my research with the elders of Gunyeni village during their 
weekly imbizo meeting.84 Since the presiding chief, Mr Mzanyelwa Sicau, was a close family member 
of the current queen, his village was the seat of the highest traditional authority, second only to the 
royal court at Qaukeni. As such, only chiefs, including a few female ones, attended the imbizo. When 
I asked the chiefs whether they thought that the practice of ukuthwala was becoming more violent, 
two female chiefs insisted that 
[i]t’s only now abuse, previously it was not abuse. It’s just, these days, the girls, 
they do not want to marry. They [referring specifically to older men] just bring 
bad children [girls] home. Those children [girls] who do not marry. 
Though these women did not excuse the “abuse” that the older men committed, they tended to bla-
me the custom of ukuthwala on “bad” girls who did not want to marry. Put differently, the women ar-
gued that the older men were currently forcing their patriarchal and cultural ideals of marriage onto 
young girls through ukuthwala, specifically because the latter resisted being subject to such ideals. 
The participants in the discourse regarding violent masculinity blamed the violence of ukuthwala on 
the older men who raped girls in order to make them “umfazi”. The men were able to ‘groom’ the girls 
in such a way that their marital relationship conformed to the ideals of the patriarchal culture of, and 
associated with, older men, which had apparently been lost.
 The blaming of the older men who practised ukuthwala for the current forms of sexual and 
gender abuse was, perhaps, relatively unsurprising. As seen from the literature that I discussed in 
Chapter Three, it was particularly within marriage, family structures and the home that the principles 
of patriarchal culture were, in the past, enshrined. With the growing awareness and recognition of 
the potential discrimination that was an inherent part of patriarchal culture, it seems almost ine-
vitable that people on the local level would blame the current forms of sexual and gender violence 
on the older men and ukuthwala for two reasons. The reasons, firstly, were since the older men had 
historically abducted young girls through ukuthwala (as I showed in both this and the previous chap-
ter), and, secondly, because ukuthwala, as a marriage practice, was, by default, associated with the 
historical aspects of culture, in which patriarchy was enshrined. Such aspects included family ma-
84  As I discussed in Chapter Two, the imbizo meetings were the weekly meetings of the chief and the village 
elders. During such meetings, those present addressed village concerns, and resolved the legal disputes 
among villagers, through the holding of a traditional tribunal, according to customary law. I often requested 
to address the elders during their imbizo meetings, or they invited me to do so. 
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king, marriage, the domestic space, and male-headed households. Rather than reflecting whether 
the re-emergence of ukuthwala was actually becoming more violent than it had previously been, 
the emerging discourse on violent historical patriarchy seemed to be an attempt of the local com-
munities to understand, and to explain, the current forms of child marriage, child rape and marital 
violence, in general. 
 However, the linking of the discourse on violent historical patriarchy to the understanding of 
ukuthwala as a marriage practice had possibly come about because the older generation, and the 
older men, by implication, were generally associated with a perceived lost cultural past, I illustrated 
this possibility in my discussion of the local anti-human rights discourse in Chapter Four. Yet, as Mrs 
Zwelifile had already hinted at, young men tended to rape girls for fun and then to call it ukuthwala. 
The emerging discourse on the form of violent masculinity tended, in part, to blame others, mostly 
younger men, for the gender and sexual abuse that young women suffered.
The Discourse on Violent, Gang-Styled Masculinity
Only during the second half of my second field trip did I became aware of yet another distressing 
form of forced sexual intercourse during ukuthwala, being that of collective rape. Mr Dlamini of Nyus-
wa village had witnessed the ukuthwala and group rape of his stepmother, as well as that of a girl 
who had been the abductee of his neighbour. Relating the details of his stepmother’s thwala to me, 
Dlamini said:
So when she was going there [to the river to fetch water], some of the guys 
would be waiting halfway to where she was going [to abduct her]. He [Dlamini’s 
father] didn’t have power; the lady was powerful when they abducted her […] 
When they have abducted her to his house, the guys assisted [his father] to hold 
the girl down, so the guy would sleep with her right in front of them. 
Though I responded with shock to the details of the above account, it was not the last account that 
I heard of ukuthwala that included group rape. Mrs Olphino, who was living in Bambisana at the 
time of the current study, and who had been married through ukuthwala, gave me the details of her 
friend’s ukuthwala that had occurred a few decades previously. The mother of a mentally handicap-
ped man had wanted a wife for her son, so she had proceeded to organise her friend’s abduction 
with the girl’s parents. Though parentally agreed upon, when it came to the sexual intercourse that 
was supposed to have consolidated the marriage, the mentally handicapped man did not know how 
to have sex with the girl. The men who had abducted Mrs Olphino’s friend for the handicapped man 
consequently proceeded to rape the girl, to show the man how it was done. Though Mrs Olphino’s 
friend “was angry and crying […] men from the village came and hold her so that this man can sleep 
with her”, so that he would learn how to have sex with her. Though the two above-mentioned ac-
counts were the only ones of which I heard that had included group rape during the ukuthwala, they 
directed my attention to the fact that a group of men had abducted most of the thwala’ed women 
to whom I spoke, or of whom I heard. The young man who wished to marry Miss Sikunyana had, to-
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gether with his friends, abducted her, whereas three men had abducted the elderly woman living in 
Nyathi. In addition, groups of men had abducted Mrs Mangwanya’s two friends, the aforementioned 
elderly woman living in Jokazi village, and another older woman living in Bambisana. 
 That neither scholars, nor the media, mentioned the group rape of girls through ukuthwala 
was most probably because such rape only happened very rarely, and in isolated cases. That first-
hand witnesses informed me of three such cases does, however, indicate that such actions were 
possible in terms of the informality and openness of historical ukuthwala. The latter served to add 
a further layer of ambiguity to the nature of the perception and practice of sexual coercion and in-
tercourse during ukuthwala. Similarly to the way in which the historical patriarchal violence of men 
was subject to blame for the violence that was unrelated to the practice of ukuthwala, current acts of 
collective male coercion and gang-styled violence were also understandable in terms of ukuthwala, 
even though such forms of direct sexual violence were, in fact, completely unrelated to the concept 
of marriage.
 Providing a possible rationale for how current forms of sexual violence were connected to 
historical cultural forms of sexual violence, Wood (2005) argues that current forms of collective sexual 
violence form “part of a context in which male collective coercion has long been deemed historically 
acceptable” (313). In her investigation of group rape in South African townships, Wood (2005) writes 
that “[c]ontemporary actions occurring in one context, such as group rape, are linked contextually to 
other domains of cultural practice. In this particular South African context, the practice of ukuthwala 
[…] is worth exploring” (313), since friends of the abductor usually assist him with the abduction, to 
the point of holding a girl down for penetration, if she resists. Wood then identifies four situations in 
which young men might commit gang-styled group rape: 1) where opportunistic young men become 
intoxicated with liquor, which frequently happens; 2) if girls have been drinking with young men, and 
become so drunk that they are not able to resist them; 3) if a girl resists the sexual advances of a man 
and he wishes to punish her for her resistance by gang raping her; and 4) where gang rape becomes 
a means of ending a relationship, because the girl involved was unfaithful, or because of the public 
humiliation of the man concerned. The above-mentioned four situations and the sexual violence to 
which they might lead are fitting examples of the everydayness and normality of sexual violence in 
South Africa.
 Though I agree with Wood’s assertion that historically acceptable violent sexual practices 
contextually link with contemporary ones, I want to take the argument further by proposing that the 
perception of contemporary action is subject to scrutiny in terms of the historical action to which 
it is contextually related. In other words, at the local level, there is a direct linkage of young men’s 
contemporary violent actions to “other domains of cultural practice”, like ukuthwala, thus giving rise 
to the contemporary discourse on violent masculinity. In this process, the concept of ukuthwala has 
become disconnected (on the level of discourse) from its historical significance as a marriage prac-
tice, by becoming a new term for rape that is used in the emerging discourse on the issue of vio-
lent, gang-styled masculinity. While older men are still associated with the committance of historical 
forms of patriarchal violence and with ukuthwala as a marriage practice, young men are associated 
with gang-styled sexual violence that can be alcohol-induced, opportunistic, or a form of corrective 
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discipline, or punishment. This is explainable in linguistic terms as a type of ukuthwala that is un-
related to marriage. The source of such discourse, as is the case with the local anti-human rights 
discourse, with the local discourse on ukuthwala’s profitability, and with the local discourse on vio-
lent historical patriarchy, lies in the local communities’ inability to comprehend, and to explain, the 
intensity of everyday sexual violence that marks everyday life, as well as the violence of re-emerging 
ukuthwala.
 Realising the above, I again recalled, and reflected on, Mrs Zwelifile’s and Mr Samkelo’s 
thoughts on the origins of the sexual violence that is associated with ukuthwala. MrsZwelifile said 
that sexual violence
increases because of drugs. Our children are using drugs. They even abuse us 
as mothers, they beat us, they threaten to kill us, they assault us, our children 
[…] because of drugs, because of dagga [i.e. marijuana], because of disrespect 
in our children; they are disrespectful. 
Along the same lines, Samkelo said that the “violence […] is caused by drugs. Our guys are using 
drugs and alcohol to rape.” A 54-year-old male warrant officer at Lusikisiki Police Station directly 
linked substance and sexual abuse with ukuthwala, in mentioning that “when people get drunk they 
just think about committing sexual crime. Yes […], it [substance abuse] creates more thwala cases.” 
Note that the officer equated the use of ukuthwala in such cases with the committance of “sexual cri-
me”, specifically since there was no intention to marry involved. Being unable to comprehend current 
forms of gang-styled substance abuse and sexual violence, the individuals concerned attempted to 
explain the practice by blaming it on young men who thwala’ed girls solely for the purpose of raping 
them. However, further fieldwork revealed that the blaming of young women for the sexual abuse 
that they suffered at the hands of young men was common as well. Such blame not only linked to 
their perceived transgression of historical notions of female propriety (as I discussed in the previous 
section), but it also illustrates how the perceptions of gender and violence were an attempt to make 
sense of the local gang-styled violence.
 Middle-aged Mrs Matshawe, who taught the girls in her community traditional dances and 
beadwork, informed me that the relatively conservative notions of womanhood of the past were 
changing among the younger generation. She expressed a belief that “another thing causing that 
thing [ukuthwala] is the drugs they [girls and young women] are using […] they are drinking beers, 
while previously they were just drinking umqoboti”.85 Matshawe’s conviction echoes Wood’s (2005) 
depiction of the modern-day situation, in which girls who get drunk can become subject to group 
rape. Struggling to come to terms with the local forms of sexual violence, Mrs Matshawe perceived 
rape to be a form of corrective discipline, since the action of becoming drunk was deemed to be in-
appropriate female behaviour. I was surprised by Mrs Matshawe’s explanation of sexual violence, as 
85  A traditional beer that the locals make with fermented maize, having a much lower alcohol content than 
that which the industrially manufactured brews have.
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I thought that an awareness of human rights would also dispel the belief that women were to blame 
for the abuse that they suffered at the hands of men. Yet, numerous other individuals made similar 
remarks. During the focus group discussion at Mthimde village, a young woman also linked ukuth-
wala directly to what the locals perceived as being unfeminine behaviour. Calling girls who drink 
“cheap”, she told me that “girls are just walking about [living promiscuously], staying on the streets 
[a public, male-dominated space]; now for that girls it is easy to be thwala’ed”. Similarly to what Mrs 
Matshawe had had to say on the matter, this young woman labelled the rape of girls as being a form 
of ukuthwala that was unrelated to marriage. Likewise, she blamed the perpetration of such violence 
on the girls themselves, for them having entered historically male spaces, and for them engaging in 
such activities as drinking and promiscuity, which were associated with currently acceptable behavi-
our only for men. 
 During the Mthimde focus group discussion, when I asked what it meant to be ‘cheap’, ano-
ther participant, who was also a young woman, responded that being cheap meant that a girl initia-
ted a sexual encounter through calling a man whom she did not know well on her cell phone, as well 
as flirting with men through Facebook. She concluded: “She [any girl, in general] is going to the boy 
nowadays, by that she is cheap, because it is not the boy calling her.” Other than laying the blame for 
rape on the girls involved engaging in historically male spaces and in male activities, the locals also 
blamed girls who allegedly approached men to start off a relationship, as opposed to the cultural 
ideal of the men approaching the women to whom they were attracted. Mr Samkelo, a 34-year-old 
teacher, made similar remarks. When I asked him whether he thought that the practice of ukuthwala 
was becoming more violent, he said that 
girls are so cheap, they ask for love. They do not wait many days; they are so 
easy to love [i.e. have sex with]. Girls are cheaper, so they agree with the boy, 
because now sometimes the girls have no respect, they are just cheap to go to 
the young man. They are supposed to say “No” to the young man, but they just 
agree with everything.
Samkelo’s belief that girls were being raped because they initiated, and consented to, sexual en-
counters that were associated with current male behaviour, was very similar to what the women of 
Mthimde told me.
 Initially, I was puzzled by the way that the locals blamed young women if they were raped, to 
the same extent to which they blamed violent young men for having committed the rape. Though the 
locals blamed supportive mothers and grandmothers in the other discourses that I had encountered, 
they had not blamed the raped and/or thwala’ed girls. I then realised that ukuthwala’s historical 
informality, in conjunction with the discrepancies surrounding it, made it susceptible to becoming 
merged with the local beliefs that the women involved were responsible for being raped (see Jew-
kes et al. 2005; Kim and Motsei 2002; Moffett 2006; Wood 2005, and Wood et al. 2007). The historical 
acceptability of sanctioned forced sexual intercourse, and the cultural justification of collective male 
coercion, if a girl resisted ukuthwala, seemed to resonate with the current concerns regarding the 
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justified rape of a woman for acting contrary to the local notions of womanhood. Similarly to the dis-
course on ukuthwala’s profitability and on the violent masculinity of older men, such discourse drew 
from one possible violent aspect of ukuthwala – in this case, possibly the historical acceptability of 
collective male coercion if a girl resists the advances of a man – to explain current forms of gang-sty-
led substance and sexual abuse that were associated with younger men and with transgressive, way-
ward young women acting as though they were “cheap”. 
 It seems contradictory that the increasing awareness of human rights and gender discrimina-
tion has made the abuse that men commit visible, while discriminatory communal cultural percep-
tions of womanhood and of proper female conduct have appeared to remain invisible to the same 
communities that have tended to blame the men involved. Even though I am still puzzling over this 
contradiction, I believe that it is linked to what I frequently heard with regard to the perception that 
mothers and grandmothers were the custodians, or the vessels, of cultural heritage.86 I often heard 
phrases like: “People are saying that it’s their culture […] their grandmothers were doing it, and they 
don’t see anything wrong with it, because they believe their culture”; “People, they just want to be-
lieve in the olden days, as [did] their great-grandmothers”; “In rural areas, the girls are doing jobs, the 
chores of the wife. Their mothers teach them to do things. So they were chosen, thwala’ed, because 
[they] were doing those wife chores at home [so well]”. If women acted contrary to the idealised 
norms and values of culture, the local communities perceived such wayward behaviour as threate-
ning to their cultural identity and heritage that the locals associated with women. Men’s direct acts of 
sexual abuse and of patriarchal control were becoming visible and condemned, since they were not, 
at the level of discourse, related to idealised culture, generally speaking. Though the local discourse 
on violent gang-styled masculinity neither supported nor condoned the act of rape, the locals, fre-
quently, couched their explanations of the phenomenon in terms of the blaming of women for acting 
contrary to the local perceptions of proper womanhood. Such behaviour appeared to jeopardise the 
idealised purity of the culture that they were expected to protect. Put differently, the fear of perceived 
cultural loss (as I illustrated in Chapter Four’s discussion on the local anti-human rights discourse) 
seems to reflect the concerns in the local communities with regard to the redefinition of gender and 
to changing gender relations. Such concerns, coupled with people’s inability to comprehend the es-
calation of sexual violence in general, have served to facilitate the emerging discourse on violent, 
gang-styled masculinity, in terms of which the historical acceptance of forced sexual intercourse du-
ring ukuthwala has started to become a term that now denotes the gang-styled sexual violence and 
rape of women who transgress the gender roles that their culture expects of them. 
86  That human rights discourses have a bias towards individual agency, as opposed to considering the ena-
bling, or disabling, of communal relationships, could also explain why the broader community remains 
blind to its own discriminatory perceptions of womanhood. In other words, human rights serve to highlight 
the abuse committed and suffered by the individual, as opposed to how the communal culture and beliefs 
contribute to abuse from within.
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 Though the aforementioned discourses might be the result of the necessary growing awa-
reness of ukuthwala’s increasing violence, and an attempt at voicing resistance to the everydayness 
of sexual violence in general, it, ironically, seems to silence thwala’ed women anew in two different 
ways. Firstly, the discourses are occupied with people’s own explanations for ukuthwala’s violent 
re-emergence, rather than allowing the thwala’ed individuals to speak from their personal experien-
ces. Secondly, blaming women for the abuse that they suffer at the hands of men through the culture 
of ukuthwala serves to create an image of women and young girls as being the actual culprits in the 
cases of abduction marriage, once again silencing their plight. The discourses concerned are, thus, 
very informative concerning how gender, human rights and sexual violence are concerned, but not 
as far as the actual abuse that young thwala’ed women and girls suffer is concerned.
Conclusion – Ukuthwala, a Term for Rape
In this chapter, I have shown that national structurally violent events and processes have significant-
ly affected the gender discourses and the forms of cultural and symbolic violence that have been 
present at the local level during the last few decades. The events and processes include the labour 
migration of men; the introduction of the violent, urban-styled gang culture in rural communities; 
the militarisation that the local population underwent during the anti-apartheid struggle, and the 
introduction of human rights and its influence on the redefinition of concepts of masculinity and 
femininity in post-apartheid South Africa. Though such events and processes led to democratic re-
forms, the equalisation of human rights for all genders, and an awareness of the need to do away 
with gender discrimination, they, paradoxically, also led to the formation of gang-styled violent mas-
culinity in the local communities, and to the exacerbation of already violent indigenous patriarchal 
practices. While local gang-styled violence has the characteristics of sexual violence resulting from 
dysfunctional families, forms of masculine control (Jewkes et al. 2002; 2005), the punishment (Wood 
2005) and correction of perceived unruly women, or the settling of disputes (Dunkle et al. 2004), local 
forms of patriarchal dominance have worsened due to men’s “disempowering sense of irrelevance” 
(Wood 2005, 304). Such feelings on the part of men have resulted from the perception that they are 
losing the patriarchal agency and power that they had in the past. Additional causes are the gover-
nment’s drive for gender equality, and women’s current engagement in public activities and spaces 
from which they were historically barred.
 In my search for an answer to the question that is asked at the outset of this chapter, ‘How do 
various forms of violence converge in ukuthwala practices, causing the continuation of gender-based 
violence?’, I discovered that the re-emergence of violent ukuthwala is enmeshed with, and it is affec-
ted by, the paradoxical context just mentioned. The context has polar opposites: endemic sexual and 
gender violence on the one hand, and an increasing awareness of human and gender rights on the 
other. Within this paradoxical context, ukuthwala is re-emerging as both a form of violent practice, as 
well as a discourse on violence, respectively. 
 As I have illustrated in this chapter, as well as in the previous three chapters, historical forms 
of structural violence – colonialism, capitalism and apartheid – sparked off a process in which struc-
tural violence became endemic on the local level. Resistance to these forms of structural violence – in 
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the form of the militarisation of men and women, the struggle against apartheid, the consequent 
redefinition of gender, and the introduction of human rights in post- apartheid South Africa – led to 
a sense of ambiguous freedom that people obtained by way of the aforesaid structures. Though the 
implementation of the forms resulted in the consolidation of a democratic, constitutional form of 
governance, the historical influence of such violent structures on the local culture, as well as their 
ongoing dismantling, continuously exacerbated the cultural and symbolic violence of patriarchy and 
gang culture on the local level. The exacerbation of diverse forms of violence on the level mentioned 
facilitated the re-emergence of violent forms of ukuthwala, as well as the increasing vulnerability of 
young women and girls to the depredations of a violent ukuthwala. Irrespective of the gains that 
the human rights discourses have made, young, poor black women and girl children seem to have 
remained in the most vulnerable positions in society. This does not, however, imply that their plight 
remains invisible. The discourses on ukuthwala and sexual violence that I discovered during my field-
work, though often being based on misdirected beliefs and on the perception of ukuthwala, were 
attempts at explaining and tackling the issue of violence on the local level. Accordingly, I identified 
and described two of the discourses.
 While an increasing awareness of human rights and of patriarchal violence has led some indi-
viduals and communities to explain sexual and gender violence by blaming it on older men who th-
wala young girls for historically patriarchal reasons, others have come to blame it on violent younger 
men and women who engage in gang-styled local culture. Both of the discourses attempt to explain, 
and to comprehend, current forms of violent rape and abduction in terms of ukuthwala, even though 
there is no empirical evidence to indicate that such forms of violence, in any way relate to marria-
ge, or to the intention to marry. Contemporary discourses on gender are, thus, not generating new 
forms of sexual violence within ukuthwala practices, but, rather, contemporary discourses on gender 
are adopting the concept and the language of ukuthwala to explain, to come to terms with, and to 
express current concerns with regard to a form of sexual and gender violence that is unrelated to 
marriage. 
 I then realised that the two discourses on violent masculinity illustrate how the concept of 
ukuthwala provides a language for the local communities and individuals to reconcile historical and 
contemporary discourses on gender, as well as the historical and contemporary forms of sexual vi-
olence and gender discrimination. Through sensationally portraying current ukuthwala as a type of 
rape and sexual abuse, the national polemic and media sensationalism revolving around the prac-
tice serve to reflect the concerns of the local communities with regard to the perpetration of local 
violent sexual crimes that are unrelated to marriage. The vocal disapproval of the media, and the 
legal language that is part of the national discourse on ukuthwala, are, accordingly, on the local le-
vel, becoming the language that the local communities use to talk about violent sexual crimes in 
general. Ukuthwala’s historical connotation with what the locals regard as being acceptable and jus-
tified collective male sexual coercion (Wood 2005) is, consequently, also becoming an integral part of 
the local language on sexual crime, since it reflects the current local concerns with regard to violent 
gang-styled masculinity. It also reflects the local tolerance of such violence, in terms of it concerning 
the belief that wayward women are responsible for their own rape.
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 The misappropriation of the media’s human rights-based language, the radical adaptation of 
the meaning of historical terms, and the mixing of historical ukuthwala elements with current myths 
and beliefs within the two discourses provide the local communities with a form of language in which 
to talk about violent sexual crime, and in which to reconcile clashing contemporary and historical 
gender discourses. However, they also, disconcertingly, serve to fuel the perception that ukuthwala is 
re-emerging as a violent cultural aberration. This is alarming, since scientifically uncritical observers, 
whether they be the local social service providers and the police, or the national policymakers and 
the media, might potentially engage in the controversy. Entering upon the controversy while being 
unaware of the difference between the perceptions and the myths of ukuthwala as a form of discour-
se on violent sexual crime that is completely unrelated to marriage, as opposed to the custom of 
ukuthwala that is intimately bound up with the understanding of the purpose of marriage, in innately 
dangerous. 
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Abduction marriage came to wider public view for the first time in 2009, sparking public outrage, 
as news of the phenomenon appeared splashed over the cover pages of national newspapers. In 
addition, it made news headlines on bulletins of the South African Broadcasting Corporation for the 
first time in the history of the South African media (Ndabeni 2009; Sizani 2009; Ngcukana 2009; Fuzile 
2009 and Hans 2009). Yet, the reason for the media outrage was not the abnormality of the practice 
as such, but rather concern about the forms of fierce violence that it took, as well as the apparent 
social condonation of the communities within which it took place. Superintendent Susan Pienaar, 
head of the Crime Prevention Unit of the SAPS at the time, agreed with the media reports, saying that 
“the practice of ukuthwala had resulted in 353 cases in 2006, and 338 in 2007”. She stated that the 
incidents, almost without exception, had involved the use of force, violence and rape, with no con-
sent to sexual intercourse having been provided by the girl herself (PMG 2009). Captain Adonis of the 
SAPS (OR Tambo District Municipality) called the intensity of the violence a “new phenomenon”, whi-
le emeritus professor Mtuze lamented the “unorthodox revival of ukuthwala”, when the news media 
interviewed them about the matter (Khumalo 2009). Starting with the media sensationalism, the dis-
cussion on ukuthwala quickly spread to various segments of society – journalism, law enforcement, 
academia, politics, and social services. Yet, irrespective of the public debates involved, the media 
speculation, and the jurisprudent inquiries, two aspects of the controversy still remained unclear. 
The first pertained to ukuthwala’s alleged re-emergence in violent forms, in regard to whether the 
current forms of violence were indeed novel, and what the factors were that facilitated such severe 
manifestations of sexual abuse and gender discrimination. The second aspect, which was a corol-
lary of the first, concerned the relationship between marriage practices and violence, pertaining to 
how the locals perceived marital violence, and whether gender-based violence, in general, affected 
abduction marriages. In addition, whether current forms of violence associated with ukuthwala were 
viewable as part of traditional abduction marriage was debatable. I addressed the two aspects of the 
controversy through asking the questions: ‘Is ukuthwala re-emerging in a more violent way, and can 
these new violent forms still be considered marriage practices?’ As I discovered, the answers to the 
questions depended both on the context within which ukuthwala was practised, and on the perspec-
tives on ukuthwala that the involved parties held. While violence was becoming more prevalent in 
the re-emerging forms of ukuthwala, not all forms of violence that people blamed on the re-emerging 
ukuthwala were forming part of the marriage custom.
 Since the published reports in the media were very sensationalised, the growing corpus of le-
gal scholarly publications limited itself to the jurisprudent aspects of abduction marriage. Save for a 
few publications within the social sciences, the reports only provided brief descriptions of ukuthwala 
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(Britten 1930; Soga 1931; Hunter 1969; De Jager 1971). In addition, only one paper on ukuthwala had 
appeared specifically within the field of anthropology (Rice 2014). The general lack of social science 
and anthropological research on the topic inspired me to follow a holistic and historical approach 
towards situating my investigation of ukuthwala’s re-emergence within various historical and con-
temporary contexts, paying particular attention to how the events and processes concerned had 
contextually influenced the re-emergence of ukuthwala. The historical events and processes were 
colonisation, urbanisation, labour migration, apartheid, and post-apartheid liberalisation. The cur-
rent contexts that the historical events and processes have influenced – and which, in turn, have in-
fluenced the marriage practices involved – were, firstly, the historical context of indigenous marriage 
in South Africa; secondly, the legal/jurisprudent context; thirdly, the economic context, and, finally, 
the contemporary sociocultural context of violence in general. I then analysed ukuthwala’s re-emer-
gence within the set contexts, using theories of modernity and violence. I used theories of moder-
nity (Comaroff and Comaroff 1993; Eisenstadt 2000; Macamo 2006; Piot 1999) to reveal how such 
customs as indigenous marriage are understandable as consisting of the continuation and change 
of historical tradition within contemporary society, while my explication of theories of violence provi-
ded an analytical framework for comprehending various forms of violence, including structural (Far-
mer 1996), cultural (Galtung 1990), symbolic (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2004), and collective violence 
(Wood 2005). 
Ukuthwala’s Historical Informality and Violence within Currently Changing 
Contexts
Answering the questions ‘Is ukuthwala re-emerging in a more violent way, and can these new violent 
forms still be considered marriage practices?’ proved to be more complicated than I expected, due to 
three important aspects of customary ukuthwala that were causing a considerable amount of ambi-
guity in the national ukuthwala polemic. The first had to do with the diverse and changing contexts, 
or the social realities, within which ukuthwala occurred, while the second concerned the historical 
informality of ukuthwala. The third aspect, which was a corollary of the second, had to do with the 
conflicting perspectives on ukuthwala in the national legal discourses and in the local perceptions 
thereof. 
 In Chapter One, I illustrated how four aspects of modernity in South Africa shaped the various, 
and diverse, local social realities or contexts (on the national level) that have now come to facilitate 
the violent re-emergence of ukuthwala (on the local level). The four characteristics of South African 
modernity are liberalism (legal pluralism), capitalism (neoliberal economic policies), historicism, and 
emancipatory ideology.87 I argued that the processes, events and policies on the national level not 
only influenced the changes that were observable in the local practice of ukuthwala, but also how 
outsiders perceived the practice, thus obfuscating the true meaning of ukuthwala, and what people 
believed it to be. Capitalism, as an aspect of modernity in South Africa, for example, found expression 
in the monetisation of rural economies during colonial times, and in certain neoliberal economic 
87  Of apartheid, of the anti-apartheid struggle, and of the redefinition of gender.
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policies, currently. The forces of capitalism created the current economic context that led to an es-
calation of the  lobola rates, which has now resulted in ukuthwala becoming practised as a relatively 
cheap way of contracting a marriage. While individuals on the local level might interpret the situation 
as the continuation of an age-old practice, the media might interpret it as the selling of girl children. 
Seen through an economic lens, the perceptions of ukuthwala range from it being an economically 
advantageous marriage practice, to it amounting to trade in human life. It was, accordingly, impor-
tant to take into account how the forces of modernity have shaped the various social realities and 
the contexts within which the customs operate, since they have caused discrepancies as to how the 
various actors perceive such practices. The above, furthermore, stresses how necessary it was to ap-
proach the practice of ukuthwala holistically, as opposed to investigating it only on the local level. 
 Other than the national contextual influences on ukuthwala, the historical irregularity of the 
custom on the local level also complicated my research. In order to ascertain whether the violence 
concerned was novel, or just part of the historical ukuthwala process, I set out to map the various 
formative steps, or breccia, through which an abduction marriage had to go. Yet, after consulting 
the literature, and after conducting numerous interviews, I realised that there were hardly any custo-
mary procedures or elements on which the local communities agreed. Historically speaking, a strict 
formative process of marriage never regulated the practice of ukuthwala, since it was specifically the 
strictly formative processes of more regular forms of indigenous marriage that ukuthwala was (and 
is) meant to circumvent. Depending on the individual, the community, and the context, ukuthwala’s 
historically informal forms of violence could simultaneously be interpreted as consensual elope-
ment, family making, economic marriage strategy, forced marriage, parentally agreed-upon forced 
sexual intercourse, the theft of a girl for marriage, or simply rape, masked with the label of ukuthwala. 
The concept of ukuthwala was always open and ambiguous, and, since the issue of violence was 
always present, but never regulated, it left the custom vulnerable to all sorts of interpretations and 
explanations with regard to the place of violence and sexual coercion in its contemporary context of 
human rights and media sensationalism.
 The third reason had to do with the conflicting definitions of, and the perspectives on, the 
custom in both the national legal discourses and the local perceptions thereof. As my fieldwork 
shows, and as Bennett (2010) and Karimakwenda (2013) indicate, violence, per se, is not a new phe-
nomenon. The introduction of the concept of human rights to the South African jurisprudent en-
vironment, however, led to new codified definitions of violence, as well as to the outlawing of certain 
elements of ukuthwala that appeared to breach human rights. While the concept of marriage by 
means of consented to abduction, as the local term ukuthwala designates, is legal under customary 
law, the living practice of ukuthwala rarely resembles its codified, sanitised legal counterpart, and it 
often occurs contrary to constitutionally defined human rights. The construction of the new distinc-
tions did not occur on the local level, with the result being that the local communities, as well as the 
actors on the national level, have mistakenly tended to equate the codified legal ukuthwala with its 
violent elements. 
 Authors have already pointed out that ukuthwala could be present in a number of ways (Brit-
ten 1930; Nkosi and Wassermann 2014; Soga 1931), and that it, historically, held the potential for 
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coercive violence (Bennett 2010; De Jager et al. 1971; Karimakwenda 2013). However, scholars, re-
searchers, politicians and the media seem to fail to take into account how the historical informality 
and violence affected their own engagement with the controversy, and their given explanations of 
why ukuthwala was, allegedly, becoming more violent. The failure to critically reflect on the historical 
informality of ukuthwala and on its unregulated forms of violence, in conjunction with the conflicting 
ways in which ukuthwala was observable through the human rights lens of customary law, as oppo-
sed to living custom, and through the sensationalised media reporting, led to feelings of uncertainty 
and ambiguity on all levels of society. Such uncertainty and ambiguity were felt with regard to the 
true nature of ukuthwala and how it was, and should be, present, thereby shrouding the concept in 
suspicion and myth. 
 Taking historical informality and violence into account as the starting point of my investiga-
tion, my analysis revealed, contrary to current beliefs and accusations, that ukuthwala has not been 
re-emerging in novel violent forms (as opposed to the manner in which it occurred during a non-vio-
lent past). Rather, its historical violent potential has currently come to be realised and emphasised in 
certain contexts, specifically in the legal-cultural, economic and gender contexts. I, furthermore, also 
found that current ukuthwala-related violence has caused an intensification of conflicting discourses 
on ukuthwala, while, simultaneously, giving rise to new discourses thereon. Put differently, though 
the continuation of historical forms of violence has characterised ukuthwala’s re-emergence, how 
the violence has appeared and in what form it has become the subject of discussion is also changing, 
and becoming more salient. Within the legal context, for example, the conception of violence is of 
a violation of human rights within one discourse, but it is of a cultural marker in terms of another 
discourse. In answering the central research question, I, thus, had to investigate the phenomenon of 
ukuthwala both as a violent action, and as a form of discourse on violent actions. 
The Continuation of Historical Ukuthwala-related Violence
Based on my fieldwork, and on the actual cases of ukuthwala that I documented, there is no doubt 
that ukuthwala is, indeed, still a practice that is, more often than not, violent and abusive. It is, spe-
cifically, due to the current national enforcement of human rights in the local communities, to the 
hardships resulting from the changing economic policies, and to the context of harsh gender-based 
violence in South Africa, that the practice of ukuthwala has remained a resilient marriage custom 
that might even be changing into forms of non-marriage-related sexual violence.
 I illustrated how customary law became subject to South Africa’s new Constitution in 1996, 
which is based on human rights. In having to comply with the demand for such rights, some of ukuth-
wala’s century-old elements that were discriminatory became illegal. Yet, for many individuals, such 
legal terms as ‘rape’, ‘abduction’ and ‘discrimination’ do not apply if parental agreement sanctions 
the thwala marriage concerned, or if the parents interpret the committance of forcible sex during 
thwala as accepted cultural practice. The implications of enforced human rights for the local cultu-
ral lifeworlds cause anxiety and fear regarding cultural change, and regarding what appears to be 
a foreign legal system that does not resemble customary practices. This has given rise to a local 
discourse that rejects human rights. Even though many tend to condemn the current forms of violent 
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ukuthwala, the incidents involved are seen as a matter that requires internal handling, according to 
living custom. Consequently, the local anti-human rights discourse acts as a shield that bars outsi-
ders – like the police – from intervening, thus allowing the continuation of violent forms of ukuthwa-
la. This might, perhaps, explain why violent historical variants of ukuthwala, like ukuthwala ngenkani, 
which is characteristically devoid of parental consent and consultation, are ongoing. 
 While the national context of enforced human rights causes local communities to protect 
ukuthwala, the national economic context of changing economic policies possibly causes an in-
crease in ukuthwala cases. My analysis revealed that the capitalisation of rural economies, coupled 
with changing economic policies, has made it increasingly difficult to pay bridewealth. It has, simul-
taneously, served to stimulate the use of bridewealth practices for profit. In response to the new 
challenges involved, the more regular forms of indigenous marriage are undergoing considerable 
change, with them becoming more irregular, though they still retain the ridged formative steps and 
the processes that are associated with formal marriage. It is within such a context that there seems 
to be renewed interest in the historical informality of ukuthwala and in the  lobola practices linked to 
it. The informality and openness of ukuthwala and of ukuthwala-related  lobola have come to render 
the customs more easily exploitable than are the more conventional forms of formative indigenous 
marriage. This is, firstly, because ukuthwala has always held a potential for violence, and, secondly, 
because the practice has often taken the form of strategically conniving at achieving an advanta-
geous  lobola. 
 Even if the current legal and economic contexts are, currently, creating an environment that 
stimulates the continuation of violent forms of ukuthwala, my analysis revealed, through comparing 
recent with older cases, that current ukuthwala-related violence is neither more intense than it was a 
few decades ago, nor is it more commonplace, or much changed. What the media and legal scholars 
have claimed to be new phenomena – the rape and sexual coercion committed during ukuthwala; 
the abduction of underage girls; the considerable age discrepancy between the abductor and the 
abducted girl; the economic exploitation of girls through the system of ukuthwala-related  lobola, 
and the specific targeting of female-headed households and orphans – are all aspects of ukuthwala’s 
historical informality, as the older cases that I documented evidence. 
 That ukuthwala was, at the time of the current study, re-emerging in new, violent forms was, 
in actuality, a perception that the emerging discourses on violence created and fostered. Although 
the discourses concerned were mutually constructive and intermeshed, I split my examples of them 
roughly into two categories, based on their relevance to the two parts of my central research questi-
on. Through analysing the national legal discourse and the local human rights discourse, I came to 
be able to answer the first part of the central research question, namely ‘Is ukuthwala re-emerging in 
a more violent way than before’? The answer to the second part of the central research question, ‘Can 
these new violent forms still be considered marriage practices?’ was, accordingly, provided through 
an analysis of the local discourse on ukuthwala’s profitability, and of the two local discourses on 
violent masculinity. 
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Whether Ukuthwala is Re-emerging in a More Violent Way
Though such legal scholars as Monyane (2013, 64), for example, posit that the present forms of vio-
lent sexual abuse are ascribable to the practising of a form of ukuthwala that has “evolved considera-
bly”, my research points in the opposite direction. I found that the abuse and rape of girls is not, in 
fact, new, but that it merely appears to be new, based on the two types of discourse that currently 
hold sway. In 1996, long-standing customary law became subject to South Africa’s new Constitution, 
which is based on the principle of human rights. In having to comply with the demand that such 
rights be upheld, some of ukuthwala’s century-old elements, being deemed to be discriminatory, 
became illegalised and labelled ‘rape’. From 1996 onwards, national human rights discourses and 
the media have been sensitising people to an awareness and perception of the cultural violence 
of such exploitative marriage practices as ukuthwala and  lobola. The physical direct violence that 
underage girls who forcibly enter into ukuthwala suffer, and the structural violence of poverty that 
presents challenges to the local marriage economy have also become subject to scrutiny. The aware-
ness of human rights, in conjunction with the illegalisation of certain violent elements of ukuthwala, 
has, thus, led to the perception of violence as being new, intensified and worse than before. At the 
same time, the local communities and the individuals who oppose all forms of ukuthwala draw from 
the national human rights discourses to foster the perception of an ukuthwala that is re-emerging 
violently through the demonising of customary practices and their practitioners. The experiencing 
of violence as new, due to the legal redefinition of customary elements, coupled with the emerging 
discourse that demonises ukuthwala, have contributed in equal measure to the public perception of 
a re-emerging ukuthwala that is a violent aberration of customary marriage. 
Whether the New Violent Forms Can Still be Considered Marriage Practices
The consistent association of force and varying degrees of violence with ukuthwala practices has 
led to consideration of the current forms of ukuthwala-related violence as a novel attribute of ab-
duction marriage. The question as to whether all current forms of violence that are associated with 
ukuthwala do, indeed, form part of ukuthwala is, however, a more complicated question to answer. 
The reason for such difficulty is directly linked to ukuthwala’s historical informality, and to the cur-
rent perceptions of ukuthwala-related violence as being new. Those individuals and communities 
who are unaware of ukuthwala’s openness and internal diversity often respond in consternation to 
the diverse forms of violence resulting from such characteristics. The resultant incomprehension, in 
conjunction with the perception that the ukuthwala-related violence is new, has given rise to much 
perplexity and ambiguity. The lines between the type of violence that is specifically related to ukuth-
wala, and the general marital, gender and sexual violence that is unrelated to ukuthwala, have, con-
sequently, become blurred. Let me elaborate on each type in turn.
 Since, historically, the potential violence of ukuthwala was never subject to regulation, it 
could take a range of forms, making it, to some extent, indefinable and arbitrary. In an attempt to 
make sense of, and to explain, the violence that people have associated with contemporary ukuth-
wala, the local communities and individuals have resorted to blaming any possible violent element 
historically linked to ukuthwala’s informal nature. Put crudely, it seems as though the individuals 
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concerned randomly pick any aspect of the marriage custom, view it through the lens of human 
rights as a crime, or articulate it in terms of any form of economic exploitation, and then present 
the perception, or articulation, as being the reason for the current forms of ukuthwala-related vio-
lence. As a result, the current abuses that underage thwala’ed girls suffer are blamed on demonised 
customs, on suspicious male others, on poverty, on greedy parents, on older men who use their 
financial means as leverage to marry children, on the fear of the imposition of social control and 
pressure, in the form of the stigmatisation, and the shame, of premarital childbirth and, finally, on 
the desire to be linked to a prestigious family. Though such an attempt to make sense of the vio-
lence of ukuthwala might seem to be as arbitrary as is the violence that it endeavours to explain, it 
does point out how an inability to understand, and to explain, both ukuthwala and the violence that 
characterises it, has led to a discourse, in which the historical aspects of abduction marriage have 
become subject to blame for the contemporary violence that is related to abduction marriage. Even 
though the violence concerned is not new per se (though it might be perceived as such), both the 
actual violence, and the discourses that reflect on the violence (albeit through the lens of the human 
rights principle), are still confined to the realm of abduction marriage and to the realm of its historical 
and contemporary elements. In this sense, both actual violence and discourses on violence can, and 
should, be considered as part of marriage practices.
 Yet, as I indicated above, uncertainty and perplexity with regard to how the violence that is 
involved should be subject to interpretation and definition, on both the national and the local level, 
has caused the lines between the type of violence that is specifically related to ukuthwala as marri-
age practice, and the general marital, gender and sexual violence that is unrelated to ukuthwala, to 
become blurred. Such blurring of distinctions between the various types of violence has led to the 
production of the current ambiguity, which has resulted in the conflation of terms, concepts and dis-
courses, with the term ukuthwala having now come to denote not only the custom, and the various 
forms of violence related to the custom, but also violence in general. Within the current national 
context of the increasing awareness of human rights and the endemic gang-styled sexual and gender 
violence, seemingly any expression of direct sexual or gender violence, such as that which bears the 
label of rape, now either bears the label of ukuthwala, or else it becomes explainable as being the 
result of ukuthwala. I highlighted two emerging discourses on violent masculinity that evidence the 
new meanings now attributed to ukuthwala – while some individuals and communities label the 
sexual violation of young women ukuthwala, and blame it on older men, others label any form of 
rape or sexual violation ukuthwala, when they discuss the violent local culture. Both the above-men-
tioned types of discourse are an attempt to explain, and to gain an understanding of, current forms 
of violent rape and abduction that informs some people’s apprehension of ukuthwala, even though 
there is no empirical evidence to indicate that the forms of violence concerned are, in any way, rela-
ted to marriage, or to the intention to marry. Seen this way, neither the violence, nor the discourses 
reflecting on the violence connect to marriage as such, yet they use the language of ukuthwala to 
explain gender and sexual violence in general, or, else, as a new term for rape, together with the ex-
planatory discourses involved. 
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Ukuthwala as Diagnostic Event 
In the introductory chapter of the current dissertation, I argued that present forms of ukuthwala are 
most understandable as having resulted from the interaction between local and national processes, 
and between discourses and events. To understand the practice of ukuthwala holistically and in all 
its complexity, I situated my investigation of the practice at the crossroads of the local and national 
contexts, by means of investigating different themes88 within the debate at the macro and micro 
levels of South African society. I adopted such an holistic approach because I believed that ukuth-
wala concerns broad current affairs in modern-day South Africa, particularly in terms of the interplay 
and the conflicts that exist between customary practices, the human rights issue, and the media. As 
such, it is not ukuthwala an sich that is interesting, but it is how it is open to use as a diagnostic event 
through which to consider how the broader processes and conflicts are playing out in contemporary 
South Africa. Investigating the practice of ukuthwala is, thus, important, not only since it concerns 
continuous forms of discrimination and abuse, but also because it can serve as a diagnostic case for 
understanding the processes with which it is engaged.
 I now posit that the ukuthwala controversy will remain a salient legal-political polemic. Not 
only will it continue to provide fodder for sensationalistic accounts in the media, but it will also re-
main high on the agenda of lobbyists in regard to social, cultural and gender rights. This is specifically 
because the unique situatedness of the related controversy stands at the crossroads of local and 
national processes, with discourses and events opening up, and creating, a new discursive space. 
Within the space, the social concerns of marriage, gender and sexual violence and discrimination are 
available for discussion and negotiation, in terms of their historical context, as well as in terms of the 
contemporary culture, legal system and economy. 
 Herein lies the key to understanding why the ukuthwala controversy serves as a diagnos-
tic event through which it is possible to attain an understanding of broader current affairs in mo-
dern-day South Africa. Though the current dissertation focused only on ukuthwala, the practice is a 
good example of how other controversial and litigious customs – virginity testing, male and female 
circumcision, initiation rites, arranged marriages, and polygyny, to mention but a few – are similarly 
situated at the crossroads of the local and national processes, discourses and events. The result has 
been a conflicting interplay between customary practices, the issue of human rights, and the media. 
The ukuthwala practice and controversy is, thus, diagnostic of how all the above-mentioned con-
troversial practices that jointly create the new discursive space within which the social concerns of 
marriage, gender, sexual violence and discrimination are open for discussion and negotiation within 
their historical, as well as within their contemporary cultural, legal and economic, contexts.
88  Namely, changes in marriage practices, human rights discourses, gender, economic policy, and violence.
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Towards an Understanding of Ukuthwala as a New Emerging Language on 
Violence and Violation
Within the above-mentioned new discursive space, the concept of ukuthwala (rather than the actual 
custom itself) appears as a metaphor for voicing out, and for talking about, the pressing sociocultural 
concerns of contemporary marriage practices, and of violent sexual crime, in general. Ukuthwala’s 
historical informality and openness enabled the custom to occur in diverse ways and contexts, as 
well as allowing for the strategic application of various degrees of force, so as to obtain certain goals. 
This historical informality, in conjunction with ukuthwala’s association with the imposition of force, 
served to open up the concept of ukuthwala to diverse interpretations in terms of the contempo-
rary setting of human rights and endemic violence. This provided versatility to the type of language 
appearing in the numerous discourses engaged in the new space. The meaning of the metaphor of 
ukuthwala, is, therefore, as diverse as are the discourses engaged in the controversy: Ukuthwala, in 
short, amounts to: (1) the demonisation of customs within the rhetoric pertaining to the promotion 
of human rights; (2) the idealisation of cultural heritage in discourses promoting indigenous cultural 
rights; (3) the violent actions in discourses on customary violence; and (4) the phenomenon of rape. 
 I, in no way, wish to ignore the continuing violent sexual crimes that occur in the name 
of what the local inhabitants perceive to be an acceptable form of ukuthwala, according to living 
custom. Neither do I wish to diminish the relevance of the abuse that violated girls and young women 
suffer who are the victims of illegal actions, according to codified customary law. I do, however, belie-
ve that the meaningfulness and the success of further engagement, activism and research will largely 
depend on how the difference between ukuthwala as potentially violent custom, as discourse on 
marriage-related violence, and as emerging language on violence, in general, comes to be accounted 
for, treated and negotiated.
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Appendix A:
Overview of Informants and Interviews
Types of Interviews
1. Six interviews and numerous informal conversations with six key informants (I list the key infor-
mants separately from the general interviews below; the interviews that I recorded with each 
key informant bring the total number of recorded interviews up from 39 to 45).
2. Five life histories of thwala’ed women. 
3. Nine interviews with thwala’ed women.
4. One interview with a man who had thwala’ed his wife.
5. Five interviews with individuals of whom a close family member was either abducted, or with 
the abductor himself. 
6. 38 recorded general interviews (including formal interviews, and informal conversations).
7. Ten focus group discussions. 
General Notes on Interviews 
1. The names of the informants were used with their permission. No names were given of those 
informants who wished to remain anonymous. Pseudonyms used in the dissertation are indi-
cated as such. 
2. The older generations, especially the women, were often illiterate. In such cases, they were not 
certain either of their birth year, or of how old they were. Such cases are indicated as being ‘age 
uncertain’. In some instances, the informants did not want their ages revealed, but they did not 
mind if I made a general note indicating that they were ‘elderly’, ‘middle-aged’ or ‘young’. In 
cases where some of the informants requested complete anonymity, no mention was made of 
their age. 
3. Certain overlapping of village names and informants appears in the interview subdivisions gi-
ven below. The overlapping is due to the informants concerned having partaken both in focus 
group discussion, and in individual interviews, or because an informant was first interviewed 
and then, at a later date, provided their life history.
4. Interviews and conversations with my key informants are not listed below, as they were nume-
rous, though the six key informants are mentioned. Other than the holding of at least one formal 
interview with all my main informants, I noted down information that was garnered throughout 
our informal conversations in my field diary. What I do want to, once again, draw attention to 
here is that two of my male informants were in the process of raising  lobola, or of negotiating 
bridewealth with their potential in-laws. This led to a wealth of information on the internally 
diverse practice of  lobola, family-building and marriage. For a more comprehensive discussion 
on my key informants, see Chapter Two (in the section entitled ‘The Various Fieldwork Sites’). 
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1. Six Main Informants
Name Age Town/Village Marital Status/Family Remark
1.1 Mrs. Jikileza Nomthan-
dazo Gongxeka 
(Makulu)
61 Lusikisiki Unmarried She is the spiritual 
worker for the Uniting 
Reforming Church in 
Southern Africa.
1.2 Miss Nonkululeko 
Duntsula (Kule)
34 Nyuswa village about 
6 km outside of Lusi-
kisiki.
Unmarried with three 
young children.
She volunteers by 
doing book keeping 
for a local NGO. 
1.3 Mr. Mnoneleli Mnoza 
Simanga (Mnoza)
25 Bambisana, 42km sou-
th west of Lusikisiki.
Unmarried Works for an Ame-
rican-based NGO, 
Oceans of Mercy.
1.4 Mr. Bongani Xhanti 28 Bambisana, 42km sou-
th west of Lusikisiki.
Engaged at the time 
of my fieldwork. Now 
married with twins.
Works for an Ame-
rican-based NGO, 
Oceans of Mercy.
1.5 Mr. Moses Mente 27 Bambisana, 42km sou-
th west of Lusikisiki.
Engaged Works for an Ame-
rican-based NGO, 
Oceans of Mercy.
1.6 Mrs. Nothembile Nohe 
(Nothembile)
61 Mugwambu, 20km 
north east of Lusikisiki.
Married and has five 
children and eight 
grand children. She is 
retired. 
Works in partnership 
with American-based 
NGO, Oceans of Mercy.
2. Life Histories of Thwala’ed Women
 
Name Age Town/Village Date Remark
2.1 Mrs. Mangxamile Age 
 uncertain
Goqwana 17 April 2012 She was abducted 
four times, her case is 
discussed in Chapter 
Five and Six.
2.2 Elderly lady Age 
 uncertain
Nyathi 17 April 2012
2.3 Elderly lady Age 
 uncertain
Nyathi 17 April 2012
2.4 Miss Kuthala Sikunyana 26 Jambeni 18 April 2012 Her case is discussed in 
Chapter Five.
2.5 Elderly lady 59 Bambisana 21 May 2013 Her case is discussed in 
Chapter Six.
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3. Interviews with Thwala’ed Women
Name Age Town/Village Date Remark
3.1 Mrs. Mangxamile Age 
uncertain
Goqwana 17 April 2012 She was abducted 
four times, her case is 
discussed in Chapter 
Four and Five.
3.2 Miss Kuthala Sikunyana 26 Jambeni 18 April 2012 Her case is discussed in 
Chapter Five.
3.3 Mrs. Mlomo Nyathi 7 May 2013
3.4 Elderly lady Age 
uncertain
Nyathi Mkumbeni 8 May 2013
3.5 Elderly lady Age 
uncertain
Nyathi Mkumbeni 8 May 2013  
3.6 Mrs. Ndabeni Olphino Age 
uncertain
Bambisana 12 May 2013
3.7 Elderly lady Age 
uncertain
Jokazi 14 May 2013
3.8 Mrs. Phuthuso Age 
uncertain
Gamgatha 21 May 2013  
4. Interview with Man who Thwala’ed His Wife 
Name Age Town/Village Date Remark
4.1 Mr. Mlomo Age 
uncertain
Nyathi 7 May 2013 Mr. Mlomo gave me 
the details of a current 
ukuthwala case his 
neighbors were invol-
ved in as well. 
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5. Interviews with Family or Friends of Thwala’ed Women
Name Age Town/Village Date Remark
5.1 Mrs. Mangwanya 
Tshiqani
Age 
uncertain
Mcobothi 29 April 2013 She related to me 
the details of two of 
her friends who were 
abducted.
5.2 Mrs. Mhlanti 62 Nyuswa 1 May 2013 Her uncle abducted 
a girl.
5.3 Mr. Gedlabantu Dlamini 83 Nyuswa 1 May 2013 His stepmother was 
thwala’ed by his father. 
He witnessed the ab-
duction and group rape 
of a girl his neighbor 
thwala’ed.
5.4 Mr. Tabalza Age 
uncertain
Jokazi 14 May 2013 A friend of his arranged 
the thwala of his 
daughter. 
5.5 Elderly Lady Age 
uncertain
Jokazi 14 May 2013 Her sister was th-
wala’ed.
6. General Interviews
Name Age Town/Village Date Remark
6.1 Two men Elderly Lusikisiki 11 February 
2012
One of the men studied 
anthropology as a 
minor at university. 
6.2 Mrs. Nomthandazo 
Gongxeka
61 Lusikisiki 11 February 
2012
6.3 Mr. Madolo Samkelo 34 Canaan 15 February 
2012
6.4 Mrs. Nomangezi 
Matshawe
Middle aged Kwadick 20 February 
2012
Mrs. Matshawe is a 
virginity testing advo-
cate and teaches girls 
traditional dances and 
beadwork. 
6.5 Mrs. Fikile Gxagxiso Middle aged Lusikisiki 23 February 
2012
6.6 Female friend of Mrs. 
Gxagxiso
Middle aged Lusikisiki 23 February 
2012
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Name Age Town/Village Date Remark
6.7 Miss Thandekile Hintsa 23 Lusikisiki 25 Februrary 
2012
6.8 Female Middle aged Lkunzimbini 27 February 
2012
6.9 Male teacher Middle aged Lusikisiki 4 March 
2012
He was involved in an 
ukuthwala awareness 
campaign at the school 
where he work. 
6.10 Mrs. Mandlamni Age 
uncertain
Goqwana 5 March 
2012
6.11 Miss Thembi Thimbo 30 Lusikisiki 17 March 
2013
6.12 Miss Nomavoti Zwe-
lifile
Lusikisiki 19 March 
2013
Miss Zwelifile works as 
a domestic violence 
councilor at the magis-
trate court in Lusikisiki.
6.13 Mrs. Gcobisa Dana Young Lusikisiki 13 April 2013 Mrs. Dana works as a 
councilor for domestic 
violence at the magis-
trate court in Lusikisiki.
6.14 Mrs. Nontembiso 
Dlova
Young Lusikisiki 13 April 2013 Mrs. Dlova works as a 
councilor for domestic 
violence at the magis-
trate court in Lusikisiki.
6.15 Mr. V.A. Mdze Middle aged Lusikisiki 15 April 2013 Mr. Mdze is the Cluster 
Chairperson of five 
police stations, as 
well as the civil liaison 
officer for police. He 
was the first person to 
mention the idiomatic 
expression ‘Ndidlile’.
6.16 Mr. Wellington Zizi 
Ndima 
Middle aged Lusikisiki 24 April (Not to be confused 
with Mr. Ndima who is a 
legal scholar at UNISA)
6.17 Mrs. Nomapando 
Nokele Ngotane
Middle aged Palmerton 24 April 2013 Mrs. Ngotane is the 
manager at Palmerton 
CMCC.
6.18 Mrs. Nokuzola 
Ntoyirnyembezi
43 Palmerton 25 April 2013 Mrs Ntoyirnyembezi is a 
care giver at Palmerton 
CMCC.
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Name Age Town/Village Date Remark
6.19 Female Lusikisiki 29 April 2013 Works as a social wor-
ker at Lusikisiki.
6.20 Mrs. Nomfundo 
Silanda
27 Lusikisiki 29 April 2013 Mrs. Silanda is a social 
worker at Lusikisiki and 
handled one ukuthwala 
case. The girl was 13 
years old and the man 
37.
6.21 Mrs. Tshafele Ntom-
bifikile
38 Lusikisiki 29 April 2013 Mrs. Ntombifikile is 
a social worker at 
Lusikisiki and handled 
two cases of ukuth-
wala. The girls were 
respectively 15 and 16 
years old, and the men 
48 and 46.
6.22 Mr. Qaqambile Nyem-
bezi
26 Lusikisiki 29 April 2013 Mr. Nyembezi is a social 
worker at Lusikisiki and 
handled one ukuthwala 
case.
6.23 Mrs. Mamthembo Age 
uncertain
Mcobhoti 29 April 2013
6.24 Mrs. Nontuthuzelo 
Tshiqani
38 Mcobhoti 29 April 2013
6.25 Mr. Lungisile Zingququ Middle aged Mcobhoti 29 April 2013
6.26 Male Warrant Officer 54 Lusikisiki Police Station 30 April 2013
6.27 Mr. Mtyukata Mduduzi 30 Lusikisiki Police Station 30 April 2013 Mr. Mduduzi is the 
administrative officer 
at Lusikisiki Police Sta-
tion who pointed out 
the way in which rich 
individuals and families 
exploit poor families 
through ukuthwala.
6.28 Mrs. Marhadebe 64 Kwadick 4 May 2013 This is the same 
informant I interviewed 
on 20 February 2012. 
This was a follow-up 
interview.
6.29 Mrs. Limaphi 49 Kwadick 4 May 2013
6.30 Miss Koliswa Sondzaba 27 Lusikisiki 6 May 2013
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Name Age Town/Village Date Remark
6.31 Mr. Bekisisa Maqepula 28 Lusikisiki 6 May 2013 Mr. Maqepula is a com-
munity mobilizer and 
volunteers for Treat-
ment Action Campaign 
(and HIV/Aids NGO), 
and partook in an 
ukuthwala awareness 
campaign at Palmerton 
CMCC.
6.32 Mrs. Noxolile Noge-
mane
50 Malangeni 15 May 2013
6.33 Female Councilor at 
Palmerton CMCC.
31 Palmerton 20 May 2013 She is currently counse-
ling six girls who were 
thwala’ed.
6.34 Professor van der Bijl University of South 
Africa, Pretoria
5 June 2013 Van der Bijl specializes 
in sexual violence and 
human rights.
6.35 Mr. Ndima (Not to 
be confused with 
Mr. Ndima the police 
chaplain.)
University of South 
Africa, Pretoria
5 June 2013 Mr. Ndima specializes 
in customary law.
6.36 Director of Kids Haven 
Place of Safety
Benoni, Johannesburg 7 June 2013 The director often deals 
with girls who journey 
to Johannesburg in 
order to escape abduc-
tion marriages. 
6.37 Mr. Sam Mokgopha Benoni, Johannesburg 7 June 2013 Mr. is the manager at 
Kids Haven and has 
handled many cases of 
ukuthwala.
6.38 Professor Bekker Pretoria 10 June 
2013
Professor Bekker speci-
alizes in legal pluralism 
and customary law.
6.39 Doctor du Plessis University of Johannes-
burg, Johannesburg.
11 June 
2013
Doctor du Plessis 
specializes in private, 
customary and proper-
ty law.
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7. Focus Groups
Focus Group Participants Town/ Village Date Remark
7.1 Qaukeni Tribal Council Five women Qaukeni 4 February 
2012
7.2 Treatment Action 
Campaign 
One young lady,
Two middle aged 
ladies
Lusikisiki 16 February 
2012
7.3 Imbizo meeting with 
chief and elders89
18 male elders, the 
chief was female.
Canaan 15 February 
2012
7.4 Imbizo meeting with 
chief and elders.
More than 40 people 
attended.
Mtinde 28 February 
2012
Women were invited 
with the rest of the 
village community.
7.5 Imbizo meeting with 
chief and elders.
Seven males Gunyeni 7 March 2012 This was the imbizo of 
the Traditional Authori-
ty; a meeting presided 
over by chief Mzanyel-
wa Sicau, a member of 
the royal family. Only 
village chiefs were in 
attendance.
7.6 Imbizo meeting with 
chief and elders.
Five men
Four women
Mervan 12 March 2012 Other than the female 
chief, other women 
were also invited.
7.7 Mtontsasa Police 
Station
Mtontsasa (KwaCele 
region)
One women 
(Station com-
mander)
 Five 
men
23 April 2013 The female station 
commander of Mtont-
sasa Police Station was 
tasked with raising 
awareness and curbing 
ukuthwala in the 
KwaCele region, which 
is specifically notorious 
for violent forms of 
ukuthwala.
89  Imbizo refers to a weekly customary tribunal presided over by the village chief and male el-
ders. The chief elders have the legal (customary) authority to settle disputes and misdeme-
anors within their village jurisdiction.
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Focus Group Participants Town/ Village Date Remark
7.8 Three women Elderly Mcobothi 29 April 2013 These ladies recounted 
a number of thwala’s 
that were not arranged 
or agreed upon prior 
to the abduction. The 
men forced the girls to 
have sexual intercourse 
and only then informed 
the parents. These 
cases happened more 
than three decades 
ago.
7.9 Three individuals One man
Two women
Mevana 1 May 2013
7.10 Five women Two middle aged
Three elderly
Jokazi 14 May 2013 One was thwala’ed 
and one’s sister in was 
thwala’ed.
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Appendix B: 
A Selection of Thwala Narratives
I here present sections of interview transcripts of a few ukuthwala narratives; all the original inter-
views were recorded and transcribed however. Women and men involved in ukuthwala cases nar-
rated these stories, while my key informants translated. The purpose of this selection is to give an 
overview of the internal diversity and variation of ukuthwala. These cases all happened within a ra-
dius of 50km around Lusikisiki. Note that there are often shifts from first to third person narration. 
This is due to the different ways in which my key informants translated what the interviewees said. 
Some of my translators were rather consistent in translating directly and literally what the informants 
said, always using the 1st person pronoun ‘I’ when the informant said ‘I’. Yet, some of my translators 
mentioned the ‘facts’ of an informant’s narration through a rather indirect and ‘loose’ translation. In 
such cases, there is considerable alternation between the use of 1st and 3rd person pronouns. In the 
excerpts below both ‘I’ and ‘she’ thus refers to the narrating informant. I chose not to sanitize these 
grammatical errors as this will alter the transcribed material – which is already a translation of the 
original – too much in some cases. 
 My questions are italicized.
Name Age Town/Village Date Remark
1 Mrs. Mangxamile Age uncertain Goqwana 17 April 2012 She was abducted four 
times; her case is discus-
sed in Chapter Four.
Did your parents arrange the thwala’s?
She said that everything started with the parents before it [ukuthwala] happens, so the parents they 
agree [contrarily her parents were not informed of her impending abductions]. She [girls in general] 
will be thwala’ed because when you are thwala’ed people sees something in you, they see that you 
are bright and they see the way you carry yourself. Every time she [Mangxamile] was thwala’ed, when 
they take her to the house [of the abductor], she ran away, she escaped. If you get overwhelmed with 
the love you cannot escape, that’s what make her to stay for the fourth time, she just fell in love with 
the guy, so that’s now when she decided “OK, I’m not going to run away”. 
 When she was thwala’ed, she went to wash the cloths and the young guys came to take her 
to the house of the man; the man was not there, he was in Johannesburg. When the guys were for-
cing her to go to the house she was crying because she didn’t want to go. But when she gets to the 
house the man was not there. So when she gets there, the sisters, the young people of the house was 
making sure that everything she does, they make sure they were with her so that she can not escape; 
they were kind of like guiding her. She was staying in that house, working and doing everything for 
like three days before the husband came. When the man came after this three days he started to like 
pursue a relationship with her so that she can be his wife. 
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Why were you thwala’ed four times instead of a customary marriage? 
They [the men] did come and approach [to request a her hand in marriage], but she didn’t want to 
go to get married to those bachelor guys, the other three guys. The family did approach her family; 
that she will go without being thwala’ed, but she didn’t wanted to. So that is why they ended up 
thwala’ing her – because she refused. 
Why will thwala not stop even though it is illegal?
There is that law that is making it illegal, but it will go on because it is between the families, the two 
families, that if they agree the girl will be thwala’ed. Even in old days it was happening. If they take 
you to the man’s house, the man would force you, you know, to sleep with you. It depends on how 
strong you are for you to fight. She says that it even happen to her three times, and then she fought 
three times. When the man takes her to his house, he tries to rape her. And she fought and she ran 
away. She says it can be like that in olden days; it’s not something new. If you didn’t go to bed with 
the man, and then the man, the family, is not going to pay the  lobola you know. First you must go to 
bed, you must sleep with the girl, and then the family can come back and say, “Ya, she is a wife” then 
they can start paying  lobola.
So why do you think the men chose you?
The thing she enjoyed most as a girl before she was married was to fetch wood every morning. She 
had many boyfriends, and that is where they would meet, in the bushes where she was supposed to 
fetch wood. This is the reason she thinks she was thwala’ed; her parents knew she was having many 
boyfriends so they realized that she was old enough to be married. 
 The man she married already had three wives – she was the fourth. The other wives also had 
young children, and as the children were still young, it was her duty, as the youngest wife, to bring 
them up and teach them their domestic choirs. However, this was not the only reason why she had 
to bring up the children. Her husband chased away two of his wives just before he married her, so he 
needed someone to take care of his young children. 
 Still, she preferred to marry the old man because she did not love the younger men. She 
loved the older man because he protected her. She already knew him as he had often met with her 
sisters to discuss her since he was already interested in as a possible wife. So when she managed to 
escape the first three thwala attempts, she ran to him and he protected her against the family who 
thwala’ed her. She is very happy that she managed to escape from the first three attempts; this was 
only possible as the men who wanted to marry her were in Johannesburg at the time of the thwala – 
if they were present, she doubts whether escape would have been possible. 
 Soon after she married her husband [who was the fourth abductor]. His third wife ran away, 
so she was left to take care of all five children on her own. Even now she is taking care of great grand 
children of those wives, making her their great-great grandmother! All her children have passed away 
now, but she has all her grand children and great-great grand children around her. 
 She never spoke to her parents about the first three ukuthwala cases because she knew that 
they would give her a beating for running away and just send her back. When she ran away she thus 
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went to live with her maternal grandmother with whom she consequently lived from then on. She did 
again meet her parents at a later stage, but by then they were friendly with her again. 
 The reason why men thwala’ed her so many times was because they saw that she was a very 
hard worker and had a lot of respect for elders and men. This is also why her relationship with her 
husband was very good. He did have a lot of mistresses, but he respected her as well, and made sure 
that she never saw him with these ladies. 
Name Age Town/Village Date Remark
2 Elderly lady Age uncertain Nyathi 17 April 2012 She was thwala’ed.
Her parents organized the abduction because they wanted the  lobola cattle. So they told her to go 
and fetch wood where they knew the men would be waiting for her. When she got to the place she 
was suppose to get the wood, three men abducted her even though she cried and screamed. 
 At the man’s compound she saw him for the first time in her life. She was about 17 and saw 
that he was already in his forties. Once she reached his compound, he sent people to inform her 
parents that she arrived there. She stayed there for a few months but as she refused to have sex with 
him the  lobola was never paid. He already had a wife who was becoming old, so he only wanted her 
so that she could take care of them in their old age. 
 She was very miserable and wanted to commit suicide, but this was not possible as she was 
guarded the whole time. However, she eventually managed to run away back to her parents who 
received her because they were also afraid that she would commit suicide. Luckily, she married the 
man she actually loved three months later. 
 Ukuthwala does not happen any more, and for this she is very glad. It was like Satanism to 
force a girl to marry a man she did not love and never met. She does not know how or when precisely 
it stopped as no-one decided to stop it; it was not a communal or governmental decision, it just 
faded away. 
Name Age Town/Village Date Remark
3 Mrs. Mangwanya 
Tshiqani
Age uncertain Mcobothi 29 April 2013 She related to me the de-
tails of two of her friends 
who were abducted. I 
here relate one of the 
incidences. 
When she was 15 years old she took the basket to fetch maize in the maize field. When she was in 
the field she heard her grandmother say that there are men in the field to thwala another lady [her 
friend]. She was crying out for help and she was surrounded by a group of men. So the men took her 
in the presence of her mother. She was crying but they just lifted her up on their shoulders and took 
her. And the mother was left crying. These men did not discuss it with the parents. It was that time, a 
thing of that time. If he want to talk to her parents he talks, if he doesn’t he doesn’t. When the parents 
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find out that you were taken, they just go to the family and get cows. And if you run back home you’ll 
be beaten and told to go back. Even if the cows have not been collected he can have sex with you. It 
was the thing of that time, there were not explanation to what they were doing. The parents didn’t 
even have a problem then.  Lobola then was more than now, even if you thwala a girl. 
Name Age Town/Village Date Remark
4 Mr. Gedlabantu 
Dlamini
83 Nyuswa 1 May 2013 His stepmother was 
 thwala’ed by his father. 
He witnessed the abducti-
on and group rape of a girl 
his neighbor thwala’ed. I 
here relate the narrative 
of his stepmother.
His stepmother was thwala’ed. She was 13, 14 years old. His father was left alone with kids after his 
wife passed, and there was this girl in the community his uncle went to. So his uncle spoke to the 
brother of the lady he [his father] was interested in marrying. And they arranged some sort of meet-
ing and the brother asked the lady to go to a certain place and the lady was sent to the other family. 
So when she was going there some of the guys would be waiting halfway to where she was going. 
He [the groom] didn’t have power, the lady was powerful when they abducted her. When they have 
abducted her to his house the guys assisted the uncle to hold the girl down, so the guy [his father] 
would sleep with her right in front of them. They only spoke to her brother; she didn’t have parents. 
The  lobola was paid after she was at that other place. Seven cows and one horse on top. During that 
encounter she also get pregnant and she was comfortable after that incident. So she stayed there 
and bore kids and passed away there still married to him.
 
Why would parents consent to ukuthwala?
She would have a boyfriend somewhere, and the old man wants to marry her, and on that boyfriends 
home there are no cows. The old man is rich and someone well known in the community with more 
cows. So also the girl’s parents would want to have cows, so they stop the relationship by allowing 
her to be thwala’ed. That is entirely why they would allow thwala, they wanted riches. 
Name Age Town/Village Date Remark
5 Elderly lady Age uncertain Nyathi Mkum-
beni
8 May 2013 She was thwala’ed.
She never loved the man and never met him before. But he came to talk with her and insisted on a 
marriage but she refused. After one week he came back and abducted her around 18:00. She did not 
tell her parents about it because they also did not know the man so there was no need to worry. But 
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her parents suspected that someone took her because if a girl did not come it was unusual. The next 
morning her parents were informed about the abduction. Her parents sent elder to go to the man’s 
family to collect the  lobola. There was no need for negotiation because in a case of ukuthwala people 
know that ten cows should be paid immediately. The ten cows were promptly paid, specifically be-
cause she was a virgin. When she arrived at the house of the groom, she was immediately asked if she 
was still a virgin since his parents needed a guarantee of her virginity. She answered in the affirmative 
because she went for the testing. In those days the women who conducted the virginity testing would 
be called in to test a girl whether it was a normal traditional wedding or a thwala. 
Name Age Town/Village Date Remark
6 Mrs. Ndabeni 
Olphino
Age uncertain Bambisana 12 May 2013 She was thwala’ed.
The parents of the man who thwala’ed her saw her. His parents spoke to her parents and agreed be-
fore he met her. So her parents meet and agreed before she can even see this man. He new, they (his 
parents) told him there is a girl. When the parents of the husband came, her father said, “We agree, 
but you must bring your son so that our daughter can see [him]. And then they brought him and I saw 
him. Then when he came I said to them “No, I don’t want him!” I never knew him, they never even 
spoke, because I never knew him before and never spoke to him. And then the parents say “look, see, 
take her, even if she refuses, take her”. And while I was going I cried on the way. Even though I get into 
the house I was crying. 
 I was angry after everybody has left. And then I started fighting, I started beating him. I bite 
him on the cheek, pinching him, scratching him. There was marks on him even, scratches on him. 
Then I decided to run away. I took my small things together. Even though we were suppose to sleep, 
I did not yet sleep with him and I run away to my mother’s home. And when they [the groom’s family] 
fetch me there [her mother’s compound] they brought me back here [the groom’s compound]. My 
mother’s brother and also the parents of the husband they went to fetch me. They brought me back 
here. And then I stayed. 
 When I got there I told them that they thwala’ed me and I don’t want to marry that man. But 
what my parents did, they went behind my back and went to tell them that I am in their house. Then 
when they fetch [took] me there [the grooms compound] then men came to me. If a man sleeps with 
you, you remain there. The next day his parents asked him “Did you manage [to have sex with her]?”, 
and then he said “Yes”. I didn’t fight now. 
 And then they went back to her home to speak, and to tell the parents that he slept with her 
and they are satisfied and now  lobola have to be paid. They paid four cows, R800 and ten sheep, plus 
one horse. And then they gave me cloths to show that I am a married woman. I had no idea what 
happened because I was a virgin. Now, they have to pay extra money to loose off the lace of her being 
a virgin. If you marry a virgin and you sleep with her while she is still a virgin you have to pay a money; 
they call that money like a ‘lace’ for being a virgin. 
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Name Age Town/Village Date Remark
7 Elderly Lady Age uncertain Jokazi 14 May 2013 She was thwala’ed.
She was sent to fetch beans at a certain house. When she arrived at this home there was a group of 
young men. So the one that was going to thwala her asked her to go into a room on this very same 
yard to pick up the beans. So she was with her granny and the granny knew but she did not. She en-
tered the room with the granny and the young men that were there also entered the room and closed 
the door and let the granny to go out. And they told her that you are getting married now. There was 
an old man involved and this was the man who was going to marry her. So the granny asked who 
was the man that was going to be the husband of her grandchild. It was the assistant to the chief who 
was the one who was abducting her. So the granny asked ‘is it you who is going to thwala my girl, 
knowing the laws of ukuthwala?’ so she didn’t cry when this was happening, so she was crying later. 
She didn’t even what to eat what was prepared for her in that place. And the reason why she didn’t 
want to go back home is because she has seen some of her friends, the cows that was paid for her 
friends so she wanted her parents to have the cows, so she was comfortable with what was happe-
ning. He was old, very old because he even had grandchildren. The group of men who abducted her, 
together with this guy, and the guy proposed in the midst of everybody and she agreed. The granny 
and the father knew. 
Name Age Town/Village Date Remark
8 Elderly lady 59 Bambisana 21 May 2013 Her case is discussed in 
Chapter Five.
She was coming from a friend who did her hair, so along the way she met a group of guys. So 
she recognizes one man, the gentleman who always asks her to be his girlfriend, but she always 
refuses. So this guy was among those guys, and there were dogs. So they took her by force and 
they were chasing her with dogs. So if she will make noise [the men informed her] they will chase 
her and the dogs will bite her. So that if she try and make noise the dog will be there because on 
their way they were going to pass the house where she did her hair she will cry. [The men were 
afraid that she will cry for help when they passed her friend’s house, so they threatened her with 
the dogs.] So they knew what they were doing was illegal, so people will beat them if they do that 
[thwala her]. 
 They promise her that they will chase her with dogs if she makes noise, and beat her becau-
se they were carrying rope to tie her hands. So when she got there [the compound of the potential 
groom], there was a group of girls [who took care of her in their custody]. The man didn’t actually 
sleep with her there. Then the guy came the next day and told her that he went to her home and told 
the people that she was here now. The guy she thought was doing it [abducting her] was not actually 
the guy [groom]; he [the abductor] was doing it for somebody else. 
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 The actual guy had a wife already. She was going to become the second wife. Everybody 
knew that they were going to bring her, so these girls were told that when she was there you [the 
group of girls] must keep her company. And the next morning when she wakes up they show her this 
is the guy we are thwala’ing you for. This is when things started to be hard for her. Then I fought with 
this guy, and the people disappeared because we were fighting and fighting. This man was a bit older 
than me [elderly] so I manage my why out, so I manage to conquer him. It was physical fighting. So 
when people saw that I was strangling him they come to talk and other men came to sleep in the 
house. He wanted to sleep with me because if he sleeps with me I am defeated, so I go nowhere. So 
he couldn’t sleep with me so other people came to sleep here so that I cannot run away. So he was 
afraid that I will run. So he called other men to sleep here. 
 And then meanwhile they were talking in the house, the men, asking him why are you being 
embarrassed, letting this young girl strangle you. So they were inside and I was outside, and while 
they were talking there I had an opportunity so I ran. So I ran to my sister. And at about 10:00 am they 
came back with dogs, and the man’s son was here with dogs to get me, to get me back again [to his 
father’s compound]. When they came there to her sister’s house, her sister said “You will never take 
her by force in my house and in my presence. I will not allow you”. Then they said “Yes we will”. So her 
[the abducted girl’s] stepmother said they [the groom’s family] paid one cow, so they can go and take 
her by force. But her sister said they must forget about it, it will never happen. 
 Now my father new that [his wife already accepted one head of cattle], so he told them “You 
must hunt her, you must take her by force”. The reason why her father said this is because they have 
promised cows, and her father wanted cows. So her father said get her by any means possible. So she 
heard that and ran away to another village. So that is where she lives now. So they never got her again 
because she ran away to another village. She has never actually spoken to her parents [after this 
incident]. So the person who was fighting for me was my sister, she was even fighting for me because 
they wanted to sell me out for cows. So I have never spoken to them [her father and step mother] and 
they have never spoken to me ever again. I never married, I am not married, I went to work.
Why would people try to stop, or beat the men if they saw them abducting you?
Even that time [1970s] the thwala was old. During that time people knew that if you thwala you will 
be beaten. So that was the time when the community beats you when you thwala. But your parents 
will take you back by force. But if somebody hears you crying, say, if your brother is thwala’ing me, he 
is going to get beaten by people. But the reason why they were afraid was because the road they were 
going to pass was going through her relatives’ [village]. So they went by the bushes. It happened in 1974. 
How much was the  lobola offered to your parents?
She doesn’t know, but what she knows is that those who came to steel her brought a big female cow 
to her parents. In those days, if you had a lot of cows and sheep and goats, then you are rich. And that 
old man was so rich. So even her parents said, “Why you not want to get married there? You see the 
number of cows and goats he has?” Then she said, “I am not going to marry there because he’s got a 
lot of cows and goats. I am young and this man is old. Even some of his daughters are older than me, 
they are married, they’ve got children”. 
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Appendix C: 
The Story behind the Cover Page
During the final months of writing this dissertation I came across a striking photograph of a young 
thwala’ed mother and her child – the photo that is now on the cover page of this dissertation. I found 
out that the photograph was part of a larger collection of beautiful photographs that were presen-
ted as an exhibition in 2014 (see Doucakis 2014). A short narrative of ukuthwala accompanies each 
photographed individual, bringing further depth to the exhibition. As a sign of appreciation to the 
photographer, as well as to supplement my own thwala narratives, I present the story behind the 
cover photo here below. This is followed by a description of the exhibition. Both the narrative and the 
exhibition description was written by Doucakis and presented here with her permission. 
Thembeka’s Story
“My in-laws went to my family to ask for my hand in marriage.” It was two months before her sixteenth 
birthday, in 2001, when Thembeka (not her real name) was sent on an errand with her cousin to buy 
milk for a baby in the family. On the way back home three young men approached them from behind 
and took hold of her. 
 She recalls it was about three in the afternoon. Their words to her were “We are taking you to 
make you a wife.” She relayed her story.
 “My cousin started crying but I didn’t because I was sure my family was going to fetch me and 
take me home, which is also why I didn’t because I was sure my family was going to fetch me and take 
me home. That’s also why I didn’t bother trying to fight them. One of them walked on either side of 
me, each holding an arm, and the third one walked behind me.” 
 “We came across my cousin coming in the opposite direction and he asked where they were 
talking me. They asked him where did it look like they were taking me. I grabbed tightly on to him 
and he also held on to me, but they hit him with a stick on his waist and he cried and let go of me. We 
didn’t walk for too long and I still was not too worried because I was certain of my family coming to 
fetch me.”
 “When we got to that house I was dressed by one of the elder sisters of the family in makoti 
clothes. I was made to sit behind the door. I refused to eat dinner. When it was time to sleep the whole 
family slept in one room – the sister who dressed me, the mother, the grandfather, and another fema-
le cousin. I sat up the whole night, not able to sleep a wink.” 
 “In the morning I was given water to bath. I later heard that my family had come and gone, 
but I did not see them. That’s when I started to cry, because I knew that that meant I was not going to 
go home. The grandmother and grandfather of this house told me that everything had been pre-ar-
ranged with my family, that the  lobola negotiations had been done, and that was why my family had 
not seen me.”
 “I still did not know who my husband was, but he arrived a week later, from Johannesburg. 
Nobody told me he was coming. A strange man just came into the house and I was told that he was 
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my husband. We were told to go to his hut. He asked me my name, I told him. I asked his name, he 
told me. I lay on my grass mat, covered myself with a blanket and slept. He slept on his bed. For a 
month he kept asking me to join him in the bed but I kept refusing, and he would leave it. After refu-
sing this one night he grabbed me and forced me into his bed. I tried to fight him but he overpowered 
me. That was the first time we slept together. From then onwards I went directly to bed instead of to 
my grass mat.”
 “I thought of escaping but I was unfamiliar with this village and had no idea which direction 
to take if I was to escape, so I stayed. Had I known the way I would have run away and gone home.” 
 “My brothers came to collect the  lobola cattle a month after the thwala. They told me they 
want me to grow up and become a wife. I didn’t answer. By then I had stopped crying, I had resigned 
myself to my fate.” 
 “It was beginning of the year when it happened and I was about to go into Grade Seven when 
I was thwala’ed. I hadn’t even thought of marriage at the time. I had plans to finish matric and then 
find a job. When I first got married I really wanted to go back to school but I gave up on that a long 
time ago. My husband never went to school. He is a builder so we live off his wages and off another 
family member who is the bread winner. We also live off the children’s grants. The only skill I have is 
sewing, so I think I would manage to look after my daughter and myself if the men in the family were 
no longer able to provide for us.” 
 “From the beginning I was treated very well by the whole family, my husband included. It took 
me two months to make peace with the whole situation and tell myself that I was not going anywhe-
re. That was just about the time I realised I loved my husband.” 
 “When I asked my husband why he thwala’ed me he said it was because he saw me at my 
house and liked the fact that I was at home and not roaming the streets, and felt that I was a good 
young woman and would make a good wife. I had a boyfriend at the time of the thwala but that was 
the end of our relationship.” 
 “My mom ran away from me when I first visited my home after being thwala’ed, she said she 
was scared of me. I eventually asked her to come and see me and assured her that I was fine. My 
brothers say they asked my mom why she allowed it to happen, but my mom said it wasn’t her, it was 
my uncle who decided because he is the head of the family after my father passed away.”
 “I don’t think women should be thwala’ed, I think they should be allowed to marry for love. 
Although I love my husband, I still think women should be allowed to choose their own husbands 
and not be forced to separate from men they love to marry complete strangers.” 
 “I would never allow my daughter to be thwala’ed. If the men of the family tried to force it, I 
would give her money and help her escape.”
 “I knew thwala happened but I never thought it would happen to me. It never even crossed 
my mind.”
 “My friends and I have never discussed thwala. I was the second of my peers to be thwala’ed. I 
was very shocked when my friend was thwala’ed because I never though she’d be married at her age. 
I think she was 14 when she was thwala’ed in 1999. Even then I never thought it would happen to me.”
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About Silence Beyond the River 
The Silence Beyond the River: Encounters with the lives of ukuthwala is the work of photographer Me-
lanie Doucakis, as part of her research project with Media Monitoring Africa on ukuthwala, supported 
by Kindermissonswerk “Die Sternsingers”. The exhibition photographs and stories were collected 
over a period of four months in the Eastern Cape in 2013, while conducting interviews with individu-
als from different spheres of communities.
Silence Beyond the River: 
‘The River’ – frequently associated with ukuthwala as the place where girls were ‘taken’. 
‘Silence’ - what followed after the ‘taking’, cultural acceptance of a perceived unchangeable reality.
The practice known as ukuthwala can be described as taking a girl, at times by force, in order to ini-
tiate marriage. Historically it is intricately woven into other parts of social custom and it possessed 
much nuance in its manifestation. Having evolved organically within society as all cultural traditions 
and practices do, as a response to an experienced reality, problem or challenge, that makes sense to 
the originating community and supports social cohesion and continuity.
 History and experts tell that ukuthwala was intended to initiate marriage negotiations, that 
it was not in itself a marriage. Though a girl may not have wanted to get married, if her parents con-
sented, she would be required to concede to their wishes according to the cultural norms of family. 
Importantly, nuanced rules of cultural etiquette and taboo, if known to a girl, would present her with 
escape clauses should she be absolutely opposed. However over time cultural relevance and nuance 
has been lost and cultural knowledge blurred.
 The purpose of the project was to come to a greater understanding of the practice of ukuth-
wala. Media Monitoring Africa observed stories increasingly appearing in South African media that 
told of the cultural practice. Some raised the view that the practice should be criminalised as a relic 
of a patriarchal past, while others highlighted traditionally oriented communities claiming cultural 
rights and accusing outsiders of ignorant interference. The aim of the project was to gain greater in-
sight into the practice by obtaining the views and voices of those in communities where the practice 
occurs, including children. Including gaining insight into some of the complexities of the practice 
within its contemporary context. 
 The project saw how ukuthwala, as a perceived part of culture, was frequently understood in 
contradicting ways, so communicated by the people interviewed. In addition numerous statements 
made particularly by some of the young women who had been married through this practice, starkly 
highlighted ‘bigger picture’ challenges of life in these rural areas where ukuthwala manifests and 
which play a role in perpetuating the practice. Ukuthwala was often communicated as a perceived 
solution to some of these very real challenges, where lived realities of people provide little alternative 
solutions.
 It became noticeably evident how people hold to their identity as a reflection of their soci-
ety, embedded in the notion of the permanence of reality – ‘this is just how things are’. These pho-
tographs reveal real South African’s living in this rural reality. We hope they would shape a greater 
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understanding of the diversity of South Africa’s collective citizenry and how juxtaposed these realities 
can sometimes be. With this understanding questions can then be asked openly and genuine solu-
tions for all aspects of a challenging reality for all can be sought. Additionally by highlighting these 
complexities it must be seen, as with trafficking, that the many underlying contributing factors and 
complexities involved need solutions to be found, without which the abuse of those who are vulne-
rable will continue. 
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Nederlandse Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift behandelt ukuthwala, een huwelijksvorm door schaking onder de Cape Nguni bevol-
kingsgroep, woonachtig in de provincie Oost-Kaap in Zuid-Afrika. Sinds de eeuwwisseling is ukuth-
wala opnieuw in opkomst, gepaard gaand met ernstige vormen van seksueel- en gendergebonden 
geweld. Dit proefschrift onderzoekt Ukuthwala als uitgangspunt voor de analyse van de interactie en 
conflicten tussen gebruiken, mensenrechten en de media. Hierdoor komt de volgende vraag naar 
voren: ‘Is een meer gewelddadige vorm van ukuthwala in heropkomst in de moderne tijd en kan deze 
nieuwe, gewelddadige vorm nog beschouwd worden als een huwelijkspraktijk?’ 
 Het officiële einde van de apartheid in Zuid-Afrika in 1994 luidde een nieuw gemeenschappe-
lijk politiek en wettelijk systeem in. Het introduceerde tevens een liberaal economisch beleid en een 
bescheiden welvaartsstaat. Deze ontwikkelingen brachten drastische veranderingen teweeg in het 
dagelijks leven van vele Zuid-Afrikanen in de afgelopen twee decennia. Sommige zwarte individuen 
en gemeenschappen die de bedoelde begunstigden van deze veranderingen hadden moeten zijn, 
ervaren deze nog steeds niet als positief noch bevrijdend. Ongeacht overheids- en NGO initiatieven, 
ter bevordering van gelijkheid, en de invoering van een welvaartssysteem, houden genderdiscrimi-
natie en seksueel geweld onverminderd stand. 
 Het ukuthwala huwelijksgebruik is hier een voorbeeld van. Ukuthwala omhelst de schaking 
van een jonge vrouw of een meisje als voorbode van een huwelijk. Alhoewel deze praktijk be-
schermd is binnen het gewoonterecht, gaat het dikwijls gepaard met vormen van genderdiscrimi-
natie en seksueel geweld, zoals veroordeeld in de basis van mensenrechten waarop de grondwet 
gestoeld is. Meldingen van gewelddadige vormen van ukuthwala namen toe in de eerste maanden 
van 2009, hetgeen leidde tot nationale verontwaardiging. De reden voor deze nationale oproer 
was niet het gebruik an sich, maar het buitensporige geweld waarmee het gepaard ging. Zo ook de 
sociale goedkeuring van de gemeenschappen waarbinnen het plaatsvond. Beginnende met een 
media hype, verspreidde de discussie over ukuthwala zich naar meerdere sectoren van de samen-
leving – de journalistiek, de politie, de academische wereld, de politiek en de maatschappelijke 
dienstverlening.
 Van groot belang, volgens de media, is dat dit huwelijksgebruik in vergetelheid geraakt zou 
zijn geweest, maar in het afgelopen decennium opnieuw de kop op heeft gestoken, zij het in een an-
dere vorm. Bovendien vindt deze opleving plaats in een tijd waarin het formele huwelijk, in Zuid-Afri-
ka, een sterke teruggang kent. Hoewel minder mensen geneigd lijken een formeel huwelijk aan te 
gaan, lijkt ukuthwala zowel in gewelddadigheid als frequentie toe te nemen. Deze nieuwe en geweld-
dadige ommekeer zou strafbare vormen aannemen en ertoe leiden dat uitvoerders op gespannen 
voet met de wet komen te staan. Bovendien dient het ter illustratie van de wijze waarop huwelijksge-
bruiken transformeren in reactie op de sociale, culturele, politieke en economische uitdagingen van 
post-apartheid Zuid-Afrika. Zowel binnen de jurisprudentie en de publieke debatten, is er aandacht 
besteed aan de sociale last van endemisch seksueel geweld en het wetenschappelijke vraagstuk, 
omtrent de veelal ambigue relatie tussen de grondwet en het gewoonterecht. Deze discussies be-
treffen echter het abstracte niveau van de wetgeving. Het blijft echter nog de vraag of ukuthwala 
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daadwerkelijk opnieuw in opkomst is, en waarom het gewelddadigere vormen lijkt aan te nemen. 
Daarnaast rijst de vraag wat deze ontwikkeling zegt over de wisselwerking tussen lokale gewoontes, 
wetgeving en de sensatiezucht van de media. 
 Om de centrale vraag te beantwoorden ‘Maakt ukuthwala een gewelddadige heropkomst 
door onder moderne omstandigheden, en kunnen deze nieuwe gewelddadige vormen nog steeds 
beschouwd worden als huwelijkspraktijken?’ is een etnografisch onderzoeksontwerp opgesteld. 
Verder heeft er ook een uitgebreid literatuur- en archiefonderzoek plaatsgevonden. Dit is aangevuld 
met etnografisch onderzoek op meerdere locaties in de Oost-Kaap Provincie, gebruikmakend van 
kwalitatieve onderzoeksmethoden, waaronder participerende observatie, diepteinterviews, case 
studies en levensverhalen. Naast vele korte gesprekken, zijn er in totaal 64 interviews en tien focus-
groepgesprekken gehouden: 45 interviews met vrouwen, 19 interviews met mannen; waarvan vijf 
met academici en NGO medewerkers; vijf met mensen van wie een familielid ofwel geschaakt of een 
schaker was; negen interviews waren met geschaakte vrouwen (bij vijf van deze negen vrouwen is 
tevens een levensverhaal afgenomen); één keer vond er een interview plaats met een man die zijn 
bruid geschaakt had. Van de tien focusgroepgesprekken waren drie met uitsluitend vrouwen, één 
met uitsluitend mannen en zes met zowel mannen als vrouwen.  
 Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat de huidige vormen van ukuthwala begrepen dienen te worden 
als gevolg van de interactie tussen lokale en nationale discoursen en gebeurtenissen. Er worden vier 
aspecten benadrukt binnen de nationale context, die invloed uitoefenen op lokaal niveau. Namelijk: 
de historische context van kolonialisme en apartheid, de spanning tussen mensenrechten en ge-
woonterecht, de herstructurering en verandering in het nationaal economisch beleid, en ten slotte, 
de sterke toename van gender- en seksueel geweld op nationaal niveau.
 De verscheidene vormen waarop individuen en gemeenschappen omgaan met nationale 
discoursen, processen en gebeurtenissen beïnvloeden, zowel bedoeld als onbedoeld, de vormen die 
lokale ukuthwala praktijken aannemen en de discoursen waarop ze gebaseerd zijn. Dit onderzoek 
laat zien dat, hoewel ukuthwala inderdaad meer gewelddadige vormen heeft aangenomen in de af-
gelopen jaren, de term tevens dienst doet als metafoor voor diverse vormen van seksueel geweld en 
misbruik in zowel lokale als nationale discoursen. Dientengevolge worden verscheidene vormen van 
seksueel geweld geduid als ukuthwala, zelfs zonder dat ze gerelateerd zijn aan schakingshuwelijken. 
 Dit proefschrift is opgebouwd uit een inleiding, zes hoofdstukken en een conclusie. Het in-
leidend hoofdstuk schetst het onderzoeksprobleem, verscheidene definities van ukuthwala, alsme-
de een uiteenzetting van de onderzoeksvragen en de wijze waarop deze behandeld zullen worden. 
Hoofdstuk één introduceert het overkoepelend kader en de antropologische benadering die gevolgd 
wordt in de vorm van twee algemene theoretische discussies, die relevant zijn voor de analyse van 
ukuthwala. Het eerste thema betreft de invloed van moderniteit in Zuid-Afrika, met een specifieke 
verwijzing naar de wijze waarop het invloed uitoefent op de nationale politiek, jurisprudentie, econo-
mische ideologieën en lokale culturele praktijken. Het tweede thema betreft geweld. Het hoofdstuk 
presenteert verschillende theorieën over de mechanismen van geweld en hoe het geconceptuali-
seerd kan worden als analytisch model in het onderzoek naar het geweld dat ukuthwala tegenwoor-
dig kenmerkt. 
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 Hoofdstuk twee introduceert de context van het onderzoek, de populatie en de methodolo-
gische benadering. Het begint met een omschrijving van de verscheidene veldwerklocaties, alsmede 
de belangrijke aspecten van de lokale contexten, voor zover relevant, voor ukuthwala. Vervolgens 
worden de onderzoeksmethoden besproken door een reflectie op de positie van de onderzoeker in 
het veld. Het hoofdstuk eindigt met een verklaring van de wijze waarop de data gepresenteerd worden. 
 Hoofdstuk drie geeft een diepgaande lezing van de onderzoekspopulatie en hun huwelijks- 
en verwantschapspraktijken en familiebanden op regionaal en nationaal niveau vanuit een histo-
risch perspectief. Het beschouwt chronologisch de belangrijkste gebeurtenissen en processen die 
de traditionele huwelijks- en verwantschapspraktijken beïnvloed hebben. De conclusie laat de wijze 
zien waarop hedendaagse huwelijks- en verwantschapspraktijken als achtergrond begrepen kunnen 
worden waartegen de heropkomst van ukuthwala zich afspeelt. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat ukuthwa-
la altijd een informeel, open en ambigu huwelijksgebruik is geweest, dat een alternatieve mogelijk-
heid biedt voor het sluiten van een huwelijk in de huidige context, waarbinnen het regulier huwelijk 
in toenemende mate bemoeilijkt wordt. 
 Hoofdstuk vier legt de nadruk op het veranderend politieke klimaat en de invoering van een 
pluriform wetssysteem in Zuid-Afrika, die traditionele schakingshuwelijken wijzigen en leiden tot 
conflicterende discoursen en verwarring over de definitie en uitvoering van ukuthwala op lokaal en 
nationaal niveau. Het onderzoekt hoe deze conflicten hun uitdrukking vinden op het lokale niveau 
waar patriarchale ideeën van gebruiken en gendernormen, op basis van historische idealen – aan 
onderhandeling onderworpen worden door middel van praktijken en discoursen omtrent ukuthwa-
la. Hoewel er reden genoeg is om aan te nemen dat geweld in toenemende mate een factor is bij 
ukuthwala, laat dit hoofdstuk zien dat de ervaring van geweld, samen met opkomende discoursen 
die ukuthwala demoniseren, in even grote mate bijdragen aan de perceptie dat ukuthwala een ge-
welddadig gebruik is als daadwerkelijke gewelddadige incidenten. 
 Hoofdstuk vijf laat zien hoe een veranderend economisch klimaat in Zuid-Afrika invloed uit-
oefent op ukuthwala en andere huwelijksgerelateerde praktijken. Deze economische veranderingen 
leiden tot een sterke toename in bruidsschatten, die een belasting vormen bij gezinsvorming en hu-
welijksonderhandelingen. Dit hoofdstuk verkent hoe ukuthwala, door de uitbuiting van vrouwen een 
potentiële economische overlevingsstrategie kan vormen. Het laat zien dat economische uitbuiting 
geen nieuwe eigenschap is van ukuthwala, ook al wordt het als dusdanig gepresenteerd in vele loka-
le en nationale discoursen. Dit hoofdstuk illustreert dat mensenrechtendebatten en de media men-
sen bewust maken van het structurele geweld van armoede en het fysieke geweld dat minderjarige 
meisjes wordt aangedaan, door gedwongen ukuthwala met het oog op potentiële bruidsschatten. 
Ten gevolge daarvan leggen individuen en gemeenschappen de schuld voor het huidige geweld bij 
armoede, verdachte mannen en gierige familieleden. Kort gezegd, het lijkt alsof individuen, die de 
praktijk veroordelen, willekeurige onderdelen van ukuthwala aanwijzen, de verbinding leggen met 
mensenrechtenschendingen of economische uitbuiting, en deze verbinding vervolgens presenteren 
als de reden voor huidige vormen van schakingsgeweld. 
 Hoofdstuk zes zet uiteen hoe huidige vormen van de gewelddadige manifestatie van ukuth-
wala in verband gebracht kunnen worden met de grotere context van seksueel geweld. Door middel 
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van een historisch overzicht van gebeurtenissen en processen die de opkomst van een geweldda-
dige vorm van mannelijkheid in de hand werkten, alsmede huidige discoursen met betrekking tot 
mannelijkheid, laat dit hoofdstuk zien dat twee algemene, overlappende discoursen van geweld-
dadige mannelijkheid een rol spelen in schakingsprocessen. De toename van het bewustzijn van 
mensenrechten en patriarchaal geweld leidt ertoe dat sommige individuen en gemeenschappen 
seksueel en gender geweld wijten aan oudere mannen die jonge meisjes schaken vanwege histori-
sche en patriarchale redenen. Anderen wijten het aan jongere mannen en vrouwen die er een lokale 
gang-gerelateerde cultuur op na houden. Beide discoursen doen een poging om de huidige vormen 
van gewelddadige verkrachting en ontvoering in termen van ukuthwala te verklaren en te begrijpen. 
Dit, zelfs wanneer er geen empirisch bewijs is dat geweld verbindt aan het huwelijk of een intentie 
om een huwelijk aan te gaan. Dit toont aan dat huidige genderdiscoursen geen nieuwe vormen van 
seksueel geweld genereren binnen ukuthwala. Echter, huidige discoursen over gender eigenen zich 
het concept en het taalgebruik omtrent ukuthwala toe om te verklaren, te begrijpen en uitdrukking te 
geven aan contemporaine zorgen met betrekking tot seksueel en gender geweld dat ongerelateerd is 
aan het huwelijk. 
 Op basis van de besproken data en de analyses in de voorgaande hoofdstukken, behandelt 
de conclusie de hoofdvraag. De conclusie is dat ukuthwala enerzijds een voortdurend misbruik van 
meisjes en jonge vrouwen in de hand werkt, terwijl het anderzijds een discours vormt voor seksueel 
en gendergerelateerd geweld in het algemeen. Dit hoofdstuk belicht tevens de sociale en academi-
sche bijdrage, van dit proefschrift, aan de controverse rondom ukuthwala en huwelijkspraktijken in 
Zuid-Afrika. Het licht toe hoe het schakingshuwelijk fungeert als een diagnostische gebeurtenis die 
bijdraagt aan een beter begrip van contextuele veranderingsprocessen op politiek, economisch, cul-
tureel en sociaal vlak.
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